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ABSTRACT
WHAT ARE THOUGHTS?
FEBRUARY 1991
MARK ARONSZAJN
,
B.A., UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS
Ph
. D
. ,
UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Directed by: Professor Barbara Hall Partee
In this dissertation, I investigate a conception of
thoughts figuring in ordinary discourse, and argue that this
conception is an improvement over a certain standard
conception employed in current philosophical and linguistic
endeavors
.
In Chapter 2, I discuss the leading principles of the
standard conception, a conception according to which
thoughts in general are to be identified with propositions.
I also briefly preview some of the main features that
distinguish the conception developed in the course of this
study from the standard conception.
Chapter 4 is the heart of the thesis. I isolate a
reading of (forms of) the verb 'think’ that I contend is
both familiar from and central to our ordinary discourse
about thoughts and thi nki ng--the "generic reading", I call
it. An investigation of the relation expressed by the verb,
'think’, on this generic reading, and of the correlative
conception of thoughts, occupies the remainder of the study.
If this ordinary conception of thoughts is to serve the
principal functions to which thoughts have standardly been
vi i
assigned, in philosophical and linguistic endeavors, then
there should be a discernible sense in which it is correct
to say that thoughts, so conceived, are things that
sentences express
. In Chapter 5, I discuss the relevant
notion of sentential expression. Accounts of this notion
have commonly faced a stumbling block in the case of non-
declarative sentences. What sort of thoughts, for example,
can imperatives or i nterrogati ves be said to express? In
Chapter 6, I explain how, on the present conception, there
is a clear sense in which sentences of a variety of
grammatical moods-- i mperati ves and i nterrogati ves as well as
declaratives—may be said, with equal propriety, to express
thoughts
.
In Chapter 7, I discuss a fundamental thesis of the
standard conception, and argue, in Chapter 8, that any
account of the nature of thoughts accommodating this thesis
is incompatible with the conception of thoughts arrived at
in Chapter 4. Then, in order to retain this familiar
conception and its benefits, a new account of the nature of
thoughts must be provided. Such an account is described in
Chapter 9.
vi i i
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
I accept an old, though still widely favored
philosophical idea according to which, simply put, there are
such things as thoughts. By 'thoughts’ what is meant,
roughly, are things that can properly be said to be what a
person is thinking, what has occurred to a person— the
"something” we speak of when we say, more colloquially, that
something has crossed a person’s mind, or that something has
dawned on the person. This idea has served and continues to
serve as a cornerstone of much work in analytic philosophy;
it figured prominently in the work of Frege, Russell and
Moore, and continues to figure prominently in the work of
most who have followed in the footsteps of those three.
Support for the idea is sometimes drawn from
consideration of things said in everyday discourse. It is
pointed out, for example, that when we say such things as
"I’m thinking what he was thinking",
"That never crossed her mind", or
"The same thing just occurred to both of them",
it’s not as if we’re always saying something false. The
fact is, it would be claimed, many times when we say such
things, we are saying something true. A natural way to
account for the truth of what we say on these occasions is
to allow that there are things we refer to when we speak,
1
for example, of what a person is thinking, or of that which
never crossed some person’s mind, or of the thing occurring
to two persons at some point in time.
I assume that the informal characteri zation of thoughts
given here is familiar. Many philosophers willing to hold
that there are such things as thoughts, conceive of them in
accordance with this familiar gloss, so far as it goes.
Many such philosophers would also allow, as I do, that the
considerations of ordinary usage cited above provide at
least some prima-facie motivation for countenancing
thoughts, so conceived. But agreement on this much does not
determine any very detailed conception of the nature of the
entities to be countenanced.
What are thoughts? It is easy enough to cite
categories that everyone agrees don’t include thoughts:
rocks, lampposts (inanimate physical objects generally),
people, cats (animate creatures generally). Most everyone
agrees that thoughts are not numbers, that they are not any
sort of properties of inanimate, physical objects. But the
question as to precisely what sort of thing thoughts are is
still subject to dispute and inquiry.
The main project of this thesis is to set forth a
particular conception of thoughts that, as far as I know,
has had no other contemporary adherents— a conception the
main outlines of which have only rarely been considered in
contemporary philosophical literature. Of course, I
2
believe there is more to be said for this conception than
merely that it has not recently been much considered. The
thesis that thoughts are lampposts of a certain sort would
do as well on that count. In the next chapter, I shall
offer a rough sketch of this new conception in order to
contrast it in a provisional way with what I take to be the
current, standard view. Presently, however, there are
certain matters of terminology and conceptual background
that I would like to address.
1 • 1 Relational Readings
Let us say that a reading of a verb (or verb phrase)
is relational just in case, on that reading, i) it has a
single complement position, and ii) introduction of
referring terms in, and objectual quantification over either
subject or complement position is admissible. Standard
examples of the syntactic category of transitive verb—verbs
such as 'kick’, 'hit’, 'thank’, ' accept ’ --are clear cases of
verbs that, in the present sense, admit relational
readings
.
I assume that if a verb phrase has a relational
reading, then it is properly symbolized, on that reading, by
a two-place predicate constant. Moreover, for any such verb
phrase, I assume it acceptable to employ that verb phrase
itself as a predicate, with its relational reading(s) (that
is, the reading(s) it has as an expression of natural
3
language) affording its intended interpretation(s) (as an
expression of the formal calculus). Then, we can treat
x is kicking y,
x thanked y,
for example, as bona-f i de open formulas, and sensibly speak
of pairs satisfying them, on their intended i nterpretati ons
.
I assume it acceptable, too, to form complex terms with such
open formulas, or to affix quantifiers to them, obtaining
closed sentences formulating such claims as, for example,
that the one William thanked is who Sarah is kicking, or
that someone is kicking everything that thanked it.
A central assumption of the present study is that
progressive forms of the verb, 'think’, have a relational
reading. Perhaps it will be granted that there is a certain
reading of these forms upon which any of the following can
be interpreted:
(1) There’s something I was just thinking, but now I’ve
forgotten what it was.
(2) You are thinking what I’m thinking.
(3) Someone else was thinking that, too.
And if, on this reading, the appearance of referential terms
figuring in complement position in (2) and (3), and the
appearance of a quantifier binding that position in (1), are
to be taken at face-value, as I think they are, then we will
have it that the reading in question is a relational one.
4
I noted at the beginning, that a natural way to account
for the truth of claims made by use of sentences similar to
(1) - (3) is to accept that there are thoughts. It seems to
me that the assumption that 'is thinking’ has a relational
reading is at the heart of such an account. In what
follows, I shall commonly use sentences of the form
t is thinking t’
where t and t are terms (variable or constant) in providing
formulations of claims about persons thinking things.
1 • 2 Ob.iects of Thought. So-called
In philosophical discussions, the phrase, 'object of
thought’ is sometimes used as a technical term for thoughts.
Why use a technical term when a word in ordinary language
seems suited? After all, 'thought’ is a perfectly familiar
common noun that we apparently do use to refer to just the
right sort of thing: presumably, when we speak of what a
person is thinking we are speaking of the thought he is
having— the thought j_s what he is thinking; when we say that
something just occurred to a person we are saying that she
just had a thought--the thought i_s what just occurred to
her, and when we say of two people that the same thing
crossed their minds or dawned on them, this means (more or
less) that they had the same thought— the thought j_s what
crossed their minds, what dawned on them.
5
The problem with 'thought’ is that in its ordinary
usage, it is ambiguous in at least a couple of ways:
sometimes it is used to stand for items of the relevant
sort, the sort of thing a person can be said to be thinking;
but sometimes the term is used instead to refer to events of
thinking, instances of activity that consist of particular
people doing some thinking. Frege was careful to point out
that when he used the term ('gedanke’) he was not using it
to apply to such mental phenomena. He argued that the items
to which he did mean to apply the term are things that may
be said to be common to many particular events of thinking,
whereas no event of thinking is itself, in any recognizable
sense, common to various particular events of thinking
.
4 By
using the technical expression, 'object of thought’, the
idea is to make it clear that the intended reference is to
the item that is being thought, rather than to any
particular event that consists of some person thinking that
item.
'Object of thought’ is a reasonable choice of phrase
for the entities in question. 'thought’ is commonly used as
a singular term to denote the relationship a person has to a
thing in virtue of which he or she may be said to be
thinking the thing. And it is customary to refer to the
items in the range of a relation as "objects" of that
relation. In light of these facts of usage, the proposal to
use 'object of thought’ as a common noun for the relevant
things seems quite natural. Nevertheless, I think it might
6
prove misleading in the present study to adopt this use.
Shortly, I will give some indication of why I think so, but
first, I wish to discuss some background concepts that will
be important in several connections as we go along.
1 . 3 Events
I take as basic and familiar the notion of an event.
No particular theory of events is presumed in what follows,
and I would expect (and hope) that any central claims I
shall make involving talk of events could be accommodated by
various, current theories. However, I am operating here
with a certain informal conception, and I should discuss
some of its features that I’ll be taking for granted.
Events may be said to take place, happen or occur.
'Take place’, 'happen’ and 'occur’ are all synonyms
according to my usage. I distinguish the notion of an
event’s occurrence from that of it’s existence. Some events
are not occurring at this moment: Caesar’s conquering
Gaulle, Oswald’s firing a gun at Kennedy. This means, it
seems to me, that there in fact exist such events. The
existence of an event, then, does not entail its present
occurrence; I assume this much. Are there events that have
never occurred, aren’t occurring now, and never will occur?
I am inclined to think so. Are there also events whose
occurrence is a mere metaphysical possibility, perhaps even
some whose occurrence is metaphysically impossible?
7
Although the notion of event is central to this study,
addressing these questions would require far more of a
theory of events than I need, or am prepared to adopt.
I suppose that any event may be thought of, loosely,
as a particular instance of activity, that the event may be
said to consist of this activity. I also suppose that any
given event involves one or more constituents: things that
are essential participants in the activity of which the
event consists. Further, I suppose that there are different
roles that may be occupied by the constituents of an event,
including the roles of subject and object. The idea of
these two roles comes roughly to this: when an event
occurs, a subject of the event is any constituent that
initiates or performs the activity; an object of the event
is a constituent that is subjected to, or bears the brunt of
the activity— a constituent on which the activity is
di rected
.
There are some clear examples of events in which
constituents may be seen to occupy these roles of subject
and object: if I kicked a certain football yesterday, then
there is an event of kicking having me and that football as
constituents— an event that occurred yesterday— and, in the
relevant sense, I am the subject of that event, and the
football is at least one of its objects. It seems clear
that any event of kicking will have one of its constituents
8
one of its
serving in the role of subject and at least
constituents serving in the role of object.
Actually, this claim requires some qualification. We
may correctly describe a situation as being one, for
example, in which a mother pulled her child, kicking and
screaming, away from the TV, even though there isn’t
anything that the child is kicking. In such a situation, we
could say, an event of kicking occurred that involves no
constituent as object. But the verb 'kick’ has both a
transitive and an intransitive entry in the dictionary. So
I take it there are two correspondi ng senses of the verb.
In the first sense, if we cite a fellow, Jones, in response
to the question, "Who was doing the kicking?" and our
citation is correct, then it follows that there was a thing
such that Jones was responsible for kicking it. In the
intransitive sense, to cite a person for having done the
kicking does not imply that there was anything he or she was
kicking. Accordingly, talk of "events of kicking" will be
ambiguous. In one sense, the phrase applies to events that
do, in general, involve objects; in the other sense, the
phrase does not have this application.
Some events do not involve subjects: in the collision
of two rocks in a landslide, for example, neither rock is in
any sense responsible for the activity of which the event
consists; neither one initiated the collision. In this
case, there are only objects of the event. For our present
concerns, though, it is important to note that some events
9
lack objects. Events of persons dancing, smiling, running
or walking, for example, seem not to involve any
constituents other than their subjects; they lack
constituents that are in any way the brunt of the activity
involved; hence such events do not, in the relevant sense,
have objects.
Before proceeding, let me express one caveat about the
notion of constituency at issue. Above I described the
constituents of an event as things that are essential
participants of the activity of which the event consists.
And I character i zed the role of object as that occupied by
the constituents that are, in a certain sense, the brunt of
this activity. This description and character i zati on
presuppose that for any event there is some uni que bit of
activity of which that event consists. I assume this to be
correct. But for any given event, ordinary language may
permit many ways of describing this single bit of activity.
Some such ways of describing the activity of which an
event consists may involve locutions of the form
e is an event of t’s 0-ing
for some possessive form of a singular term as substituend
for ' t’s ’, and appropriate gerund substituend for '0-ing’.
In some such descriptions there may be singular terms
figuring in the gerund substituend, and in some such cases,
it may seem very much as if the thing denoted by the
10
singular term should be counted as a brunt of the instance
of activity being described. It will be tempting then,
concerning such a description, to suppose that the referent
of the singular term in question is a constituent of the
event being described, in particular that it is the object
of that event. But this temptation should be resisted. It
may be correct, accurate and fairly clear to describe an
event as one of a person 0-ing some object x, though it is
not the case that x is a constituent of the event in
question even if, roughly speaking, the gerund, 0-ing,
certainly does make it sound" as if x is the brunt of the
activity being described, and hence an object of the event.
Maybe the following example will illustrate the point.
Suppose that my only chore for the day was to kick a
certain football (readers are welcome to devise a story on
their own in which I do indeed have such an activity as a
chore). Suppose, too, that I did my chore, kicking the
football at some point in the day. So there was this event
that occurred that we may describe as an event of my kicking
that football. But ordinary parlance also allows us to
describe this event as one of my dispatching my sole chore
for the day. To describe the event this way seems to me to
be accurate and tolerably clear, yet it should not be
inferred from this description that the event in question is
one having some item denoted by "my sole chore for the day"
as its object. There may be a unique object of this event,
but presumably it is the football I kicked. Whatever it is
that is denoted by "my sole chore for the day" with respect
to the envisioned context, it is hardly plausible to suppose
that it is the football I kicked. Then it is hardly
plausible to claim that whatever is denoted by "my sole
chore for the day" when I describe that event as an event of
my dispatching my sole chore for the day, is an object—or
any other constituent of the event in question.
Let me summarize this caveat, loosely, by saying that
although I will sometimes describe an event, according to
ordinary usage, as one of x’s 0-ing y, for given x, 0 and y,
it should not be supposed, from any such description, that
the y in question is an object, or any other essential
participant of the activity of which the event being
described consists. It will be worthwhile keeping this
caveat in mind in discussions to follow.
1 .4 Reservations Concerning 'object of thought’
Having said this much about the nature of events, we
may return to consider my reservations concerning use of the
phrase, ’object of thought’. The problem is that there is
this technical sense, discussed just above, in which I will
be speaking of items as "objects of events", characterizing
them as playing a certain role, among other constituents, in
the events in question. Now on the standard usage cited
earlier, ’object of thought’ applies to items of the sort
that persons can be said to be thinking. So in adopting
12
that usage here, I’d risk conveying the idea that I take
items of that sort to occupy the role of ob.iect in events of
thinking, that they have a role in events of thinking akin,
in relevant respects, to that of footballs in certain events
of kicking. But I do not accept the view that the things
persons are thinking, if they are the subjects of occurring
events of thinking, are literally ob.i ects of those very
events, in the sense of 'object’ discussed just above.
It might seem counterintuitive not to accept this view.
After all, one might say, "if an event of kicking is such
that a football is the item being k i cked--what is kicked--
when that event occurs, then the football i_s the object of
that event of kicking." Can’t the same be said, mutat i
s
mutand i s . for events of thinking and so-called objects of
thought? Since 'object of thought’ is intended to apply to
items that are being thought--what subjects are thinking--
when events of thinking occur, can’t we infer that these
things called objects of thought are
.
in the relevant sense,
objects of events of thinking? I think not.
Perhaps one would make such an inference because one
accepts the following:
(*) where 0-ing is the present participle of an event verb,
t and t’ are terms, and [is 0-ing] has a relational
reading, then on that reading, from [t is 0-ing t’],
infer [t’ is an object of an event of 0-ing].
But I am inclined to believe that this rule is fallacious.
13
To explain why, consider how we talk about dances, when we
use the transitive reading of the verb 'dance’.
If the terms 'the Twist’ and 'the Charleston’ are
referring terms, as they occur in such sentences as
John is dancing the Twist,
Sarah is dancing the Charleston,
and if quantification is involved, as it appears to be, in
the claims we express by such sentences as these:
John is dancing something none of us have ever
seen before,
Everything John was dancing the other night Sarah
had taught him
and if, moreover
,
there is a single reading of 'is dancing’
admissible for all of these sentences, then the verb, 'is
dancing’ has a relational reading. I do not have an
argument that the conditions of these " ifs" are met, but I
believe that they are, and consequently, I take it that the
progressive forms of the verb, 'dance’, have at least one
relational reading.
Nevertheless, I suggested above that events of dancing
are examples of events that do not, or at least do not
clearly, involve any constituents in the role of object.
But if such events do not have objects, then the things we
refer to when we speak of what persons are dancing— the
dances denoted by 'the Twist’, 'the Charleston’, etc.
—
cannot be objects of the reported events. Moreover, even if
14
there are objects involved in any events of dancing reported
when someone is said to be dancing the Twist or the
Charleston, or what have you, it seems implausible to hold
that the dances we are speaking of are themselves any such
putative, further constituents of those events— that these
dances are themselves, in addition to the dancers, in some
sense participants in the activity of which such events
consist. (Though ordinary usage would certainly allow us to
describe such events as events "of" persons doing the Twist
or the Charleston.) Rather, I think it more plausible to
see dances as types or manners of dancing— things that may
be said to be exemplified by the reported events. I would
be inclined to deny that such a thing— the sort of thing
having various particular events as examples— is itself a
constituent of any of the events that are its examples; and
if the type or manner is not a constituent of its instances,
it is not an object of those instances either.
Consequently, I am inclined to deny that 'the Twist’,
'the Charleston’, etc., when they figure as complements of
'is dancing’, refer to objects of the reported events of
dancing. So it appears to me that there will be pairs
satisfying
x is dancing y,
whose second members do not satisfy
y is an object of an event of dancing
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rences sanctioned by (*)
If this is right, then not all infe
are valid; the rule is fallacious.
My view is that our talk of what a person is thinking
is, in this respect, more like our talk of what a person is
dancing, and that when we refer to what a person is
thinking, or more colloquially, to what occurred to a
person, or crossed a person’s mind, or dawned on a person,
the items we thus refer to are types of the events reported,
not objects of those events. This idea— that there is such
a similarity between, on one hand, the example of our talk
of what a person is dancing and, on the other hand, talk of
what a person is thinking underlies the view on the nature
of thoughts that I shall be aiming to develop in the course
of the present study. I’ve raised the matter at this point
only to guard against a certain confusion: given the use I
am adopting for the term 'object’— to apply to items
occupying a certain role among constituents of events--si nee
I reject the view that what we are thinking when we are
thinking things are objects of those events of thinking, it
could prove misleading to employ the phrase, 'object of
thought’, for the items at issue.
Instead, it seems to me that we can make do with the
familiar common noun, 'thought’. What of the ambiguity
attaching to the ordinary usage of this term? Well, I cited
two uses earlier. One ordinary use is that on which the
term applies to the items of the sort we are thinking when
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we may correctly be said to be thinking things
—
what is
being thought. The other use is that on which 'thought’
serves as a common noun standing for the events of thinking
themselves, instances of activity consisting of particular
persons doing some thinking. One way we can avoid this
ambiguity is to accept the stipulation that the word
'thought’ be used in the first way hereafter. That is how I
shall proceed here. And hereafter, when I wish to refer,
rather
,
to events of thinking, I’ll just use 'event of
thinking’, or sometimes, too, I’ll use the gerund,
'thinking’, as a common noun applying to such events.
Let me stress that I am not claiming that anyone has
suffered any confusion either resulting from, or resulting
in the use of "object of thought" to stand for thoughts.
For reasons mentioned earlier, this use of the phrase seems
quite natural. My claim is only that in the context of the
present study, the phrase is better left unemployed.
1 . 5 A Criterion for Thoughts
I do not have a definition to offer for the usage of
'thought’ adopted here. There is however a mark of
thoughthood suggested in the preceding discussion, a
criterion employed more or less explicitly since the outset,
that can be formulated:
( T 1
)
Necessarily, for any x, if it is possible tgat
someone is thinking x, then x is a thought.
it is
As I see it, ( T 1 ) expresses an analytic criterion:
part of the very concept of thought that if a thing could be
something someone is thinking, it is a thought. Others who
countenance thoughts may not see ( T 1 ) as expressing an
analytic truth, but I think it would be generally agreed
that there is at least some sense of 'is thinking’ in which
it is correct to say that as a matter of necessity, anything
a person could possibly be thinking is a thought. Moreover,
I think it would be agreed by virtually all who countenance
thoughts that the criterion of thoughthood expressed by (T1)
is in fact exemplified by a vast number of things; only
thoughts of a rather exceptional variety (see remarks
concerning ( D? ) just below) are perhaps not included. So
the criterion has some force.
Can’t the notion of thought be defined along the lines
of ( T1 )? Consider:
( D? ) x is a thought =df it is possible that someone
is thinking x.
But it may be doubted that for any thought whatsoever
. it is
possible that the thought be something someone is thinking.
One consideration that provides grounds for doubt: maybe
there are thoughts so complex or so deep that it would be
impossible for anyone to be thinking any of them.
Could there be such thoughts? The question may seem
rather insignificant, of no importance to the assessment of
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competing accounts of the nature of thoughts. I disagree
with this sentiment. Perhaps it is very difficult to
determine which side is right on the matter—or perhaps the
philosophical concept of thought is vague and it is, in
particular, indeterminate whether or not there could be
thoughts that no one can be thinking. At any rate, although
the (partial) account of thoughts that I shall be proposing
in this thesis will not settle these matters, it seems to me
that a correct and complete account should get these things
right: either determining that there are or at least could
be unthinkable thoughts, or that there couldn’t be such
things, or that it is indeterminate as to whether there
could or couldn’t be. Since I am not sure about which side
i_s right on these matters, and since I do not consider the
matters insignificant, I am going to suspend judgment on
(D?). The criterion formulated in (T1 ) will serve our
purposes well enough.
1 . 6 "In-House" Business
The thesis that there are thoughts is not
uncontroversi al . It has been questioned, for example,
whether there really are any things that we refer to when we
speak of what a person is thinking. It might be questioned
whether, when apparent referring expressions figure as
complements to the verb phrase 'is thinking’, or when idioms
of quantification appear to govern its complement position,
we really are referring to or objectually quantifying over
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any things at all. Nevertheless, the view that there are
such things as thoughts is a very traditional philosophical
perspective, one that I am not aiming to undermine. My
project is parochial in this respect. Instead, my aim here
will be to question certain aspects of what has come to be a
standard conception of thoughts within this traditional
perspective, and to offer a viable alternative. The present
study, then, may be seen as an attempt to straighten out
some "in-house" business that I believe has so far not been
adequately addressed, not even by those of us who are "in-
house
,
who accept that there are such things as thoughts.
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I
1953 ^’ P* 62 ff • It should be noted that as earlyas 1906, Russell had abandoned the view that thinking (or
Uee°Mr[?906])
de) ^ 3 relation of Persons to "thoughts"
Indeed the only example I know of is the considerationgiven by Sosa to a view on thoughts suggested in the
writings of Descartes. See Sosa [1967] pp. 58. RichardMontague has proposed a view on the nature of certain
entities reports, sensations, obligations— that resembles
the one I propose in Chapter 9, concerning the nature of
thoughts. See his "On the Nature of Certain Philosophical
Entities (Montague [1974]).
3. Why not speak of "transitive" rather than "relational"
readings? I take the notion of transitive verbs, and of
transitive readings of verbs, to be largely syntactic
notions. A standard criterion for transitivity is
permissibility of passive transformat i on
. I do not assume
that this feature implies the semantic character i sti cs I
have posited for relational readings.
4. Frege [1970]. At least this is how I read the argument
he gives there, p. 59, to distinguish thoughts (the senses
of sentences) from ideas.
5.
My choice in formulation here is meant to display a link
between the concept of a thought and the concept of a
thing’s being possibly such that someone is thinking it. On
some fairly natural assumptions, however, (T1) and the
following simpler formulation are i nterder i vabl e
:
( T 1
’
)
Necessarily, for any x, if someone is thinking x,
then x is a thought.
The added assumptions are needed to get from ( T 1
’ ) to (T1),
since the embedded antecedent of ( T 1
’
) is stronger than that
of ( T 1 )
.
6
See, for example, A.N. Prior in his Objects of Thought
(Prior [1971]); cf. Chapter 1, and especially, Chapter 2,
pp . 1 6-21 .
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CHAPTER 2
THE PROPOSITIONAL TRADITION AND AN ALTERNATIVE
In this chapter, I would like to give some provisional
idea of the conception of thoughts that I aim to develop in
the course of this thesis. I will do this by contrasting
that conception with what I consider to be the prevalent,
canonical view. I begin by reviewing the latter outlook;
then, I will give a brief overview of some distinguishing
features of the alternative I intend to develop.
2 . 1 The Propositional Tradition
There is a received perspective concerning the nature
of thoughts that will be the "foil" of this thesis--not an
outlook that I wish to refute exactly, but one against which
I will promote my own view as a worthy competitor. The
outlook has been prevalent long enough that adherence to it
may be properly termed a tradi tion--the "Propositional
Tradition" as I shall call it. In the present section, I
shall be discussing various features of this received
perspective; I hope it will be evident enough to the reader
in the course of this discussion that the Propositional
Tradition is indeed a prevalent and long-standing outlook on
the nature of thoughts, and that Propositional
Traditionalists are not straw men.
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There are various points of view encompassed within the
Propositional Tradition that differ amongst themselves
concerning the exact nature of thoughts. Nevertheless, as
camps within this single tradition, they all agree on
certain key tenets. In the remainder of this section, I
want to draw attention to three such tenets that distinguish
the perspective of the Propositional Tradition from the view
to be developed in this study.
2.1.1 ( PT 1 )
One of these tenets is very st rai ghtforward
. According
to the Propositional Tradition, thoughts are to be
identified with propositions. That is,
(PT1) Necessarily Vx( x is a thought iff x is a
proposition )
I think it would be agreed by most proponents of the
tradition that, as a matter of definition, propositions are
things that have truth-values. It may be noted, then, that
adherence to ( PT 1 ) commits most proponents to the view that
all thoughts are truth-val ued
.
The second tenet that I wish to attend to requires a
lengthier discussion; it is implied by another thesis that
all camps in the Propositional Tradition agree on, a thesis
that is commonly put by saying, roughly, that propositions
are the "objects" of "propositional attitudes". Let us
investigate what this latter thesis comes to.
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2,1,2 Propositional Attitudes. So-called
I wish to begin by considering briefly what is meant by
the phrase "propositional attitude". in this connection, it
will be useful to be able to speak of a verb or verb phrase
expressing a relation on a reading, subject to the following
constraint (here, and in other formulations to follow, I use
nec’ to abbreviate 'necessarily’, and I take 'VP’, 'r’ and
'R’ to range over verb phrases, readings and relations,
respecti vel y ) :
(A1) WP Vr VR( if r is a rel ational
,
readi ng of VP and VP
expresses R on r, then if VPv,v is interpreted on r,
R satisfies the following:
[ nec( WW’( v bears R to v’ iff VPv,v ' )) ]
where VP ’ is the result of placing distinct
variables v and v
,
respectively, in the subject and
complement positions of VP.
Take the verb 'runs’, for example. It has a relational
reading (close in meaning to 'directs’). (A1) guarantees
that if runs’ expresses a relation, R, on this reading,
then on that reading it will be correct to say that
necessarily one thing bears R to another iff the one runs
the other.
In addition to (A1), I assume:
(A2) WP VR Vr( if VP expresses R on r, then VR ’ ( if VP
expresses R’ on r, then R’ = R ))
That is, only one relation, if any, is expressed by a verb
phrase on a given reading. 1
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I will occasionally speak of an open formula expressing
a relation on a reading provided that it is obtained from a
verb phrase, VP, by placing distinct variables in the
subject and complement positions, and VP expresses that
relation on that reading.
Some have taken the phrase, "propositional attitude",
to apply to verbs or verb phrases, though more typically it
is taken to apply to certain relations. In what follows, I
adopt the latter usage. There are some fairly clear and
uncontroversial examples of relations of the relevant kind.
Belief and desire, for instance, are said to be
propositional attitudes.
But it is worth considering which relations are
intended by the terms 'belief’ and 'desire’, when it is said
that belief and desire are propositional attitudes (and what
is said is true). Take the case of belief. What I assume,
and what I think is customarily supposed, is that there is a
relational reading of the verb, 'believes’, on which it
expresses the intended relation. And I think it is
sufficient to say that the reading in question is that on
which we get truths expressed by sentences of the form
t bel i eves that 0
where the substituend for ' 0 ' is an indicative sentence.
A similar claim could be made for 'desire’: if the
term is used as a proper name for a propositional attitude,
it denotes a relation expressed by the verb 'desires’ on a
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certain relational reading, the reading on which true claims
are expressed by sentences of the form
t desires that 0
this time with substituends for ' 0 ' being sentences whose
main verbs are in the subjunctive.
There are other relations commonly taken to be
propositional attitudes that we may cite by appeal to the
verbs that express them. Common examples of such verbs are
ones that, like 'believes’ and 'desires’, are used to report
mental states or events and that take indicative or
subjunctive sentential clauses as complements. For
instance, the relations expressed on appropriate readings by
'is wishing’, 'is pleased’, 'knows’, 'hopes’
would commonly be counted as propositional attitudes. Most,
I think, would also count
'wonders’, 'is wondering’, 'doubts’
as examples, along with other verbs that take i nterrogat i ve
sentential complements. I shall do so.
I also suppose that on their relational readings, the
various forms of the verb 'thinks’--in particular, the
progressive forms— all express relations of the type in
quest i on
.
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There are verbs that, on certain relational readings,
express what could be termed psychological attitudes and
have important logical features in common with the
propositional attitude verbs just cited (in particular, the
feature of creating intensional contexts in sentences from
which they are formed), but which, I assume, would not be
counted as expressing propositional attitudes. 'seeks’ and
'worships’ are cases in point. It may be that these verbs
express relations that can be analyzed in terms of
propositional attitudes, nevertheless, I shall suppose, the
relations they express would not be deemed propositional
attitudes themselves.
I do not have an informative set of conditions to offer
that fix the precise boundaries of this concept of
propositional attitude. I will have to assume that the
reader has an acceptable grasp of which relations I mean,
perhaps aided by the sampling of verbs expressing them that
I have just given. On this count, though, I am not worse
than most proponents of the tradition we are reviewing. It
is remarkable how often an idea of what is meant by
propositional attitude is taken to be acceptably conveyed
by a short list of verbs that are supposed to express some
of the relevant relations (the list followed by an ellipsis
or an 'etc.’). Unfortunately, I am not able to do any
better. Probably, the reader can supplement the short list
I have given by examples of other verbs that would without
controversy be held to express relations of the right sort.
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I think it is safe to assume that what I have to say about
propositional attitudes in what follows may be understood to
apply to all such examples.
2.1.3 ( PT 2
)
I think it safe to assume that, when it is cl
propositions are the objects of the propositional
one thing that is meant is that only propositions
ranges of these relations. Thus, for example, in
of belief, the claim could reasonably be taken to
aimed that
att i tudes
,
are in the
the case
imply:
(1) Vx ( if -}y ( y believes x then x is a proposition)
But this is certainly not all that is intended when it is
claimed that propositions are the objects of belief.
Certainly, it would be denied that belief is a relation such
that although in fact everything in its range is a
proposition, one cou 1
d
bear that very relation to trees,
cats or lampposts. Rather, when it is said that
propositions are the objects of belief, the following
stronger claim is intended (here, and in formulations to
follow, 'pos’ abbreviates 'possibly’):
(2) nec Vx( if pos Jy( y believes x ), then x is a
proposition )
The claim is that as a matter of necessity, only
propositions cou 1
d
be in the range of belief.
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a verb may have various
It is worth noting that
relational readings, and express various relations on those
readings. This is true in the case of 'believes’; there is
a sense of the verb on which a person may be said to believe
another person. Does this mean that the thesis expressed in
(2) commits its adherents to the view that some people are
propositions? That would be a Moorean nightmare! 2 The
answer is "no”. The reading of 'believes’ on which I may
correctly be said to believe people is just not the one on
which the verb expresses the relation proponents of the
Propositional Tradition mean by "belief" when they claim
that propositions are its objects.
The claim about belief expressed in (2) can be put in a
convenient way if we introduce the notion of the modal range
of a relation. Let [R(t,t’)] abbreviate [t bears R to t’],
for terms t and t’; we adopt:
( D 1 ) the modal range of R =df {x: pos( R(y,x) )) }
Each member of the modal range of a relation is possibly a
thing to which something bears that relation. In many
cases, the range that a relation actually has will only be a
proper subset of its modal range. For example, the modal
range of the relation expressed by 'is an offspring of’
includes all parents, but includes any two-year-old
potential parents as well.
Using this notion of modal range, we can say something
equivalent to what is expressed by (2), if we say that
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necessarily, propositions make up the modal range of belief.
(But the scope of the description "the modal range of
belief" should be understood to be as narrow as possible.)
Now I think we may say what is intended when it is said
that propositions are the objects of the propositional
attitudes. The thesis is captured by the following
general i zati on
:
(PT2) VR ( R is a propositional attitude -»
nec Vx ( pos( ly R(y,x) ) -> x is a proposition ))
The thesis entails that for any propositional attitude, R,
it would be impossible for anything but thoughts to be in
R’s modal range. (PT2) is the second key tenet of the
Propositional Tradition distinguishing it from the
alternative I sketch below.
2.1.4 A Point of Terminology: "Intentional Attitudes"
I doubt that it would be held within the Propositional
Tradition that (PT2) is true as a consequence of the
def i n i t i on of 'propositional attitude’. I think proponents
would allow that we can agree with them on which relations
are to be referred to as "propositional attitudes", and yet
coherently reject their view as to the make-up of the modal
ranges of those relations. A denial of (PT2) would be
claimed false, but not incoherent. Then perhaps it can be
agreed that the term "propositional attitude" is somewhat
theory- 1 aden . Since the theory with which it is laden is
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one that will be in dispute in what follows, I think it will
prove best to adopt some term that is neutral with respect
to the contending theories in this study.
From here on, I propose to refer to relations of the
sort in question as '‘intentional attitudes" (or occasionally
just attitudes", if it is clear from the context of
discussion that intentional attitudes are in question). I
think that appeal to the terms 'intentional’ and
' intentional ity’ has been common enough in the literature,
in application to matters pertaining to the so-called
propositional attitudes, that my choice of phrase here is
not unreasonable. The phrase 'intentional attitude’,
itself, has already been employed by Chisholm in what would
seem to be the use I am proposing (see, for example Chisholm
[1981 ] , p. 13 ff ) .
At any rate, it will be important to bear in mind that
'intentional attitude’ is posited here simply as a theory-
neutral stand-in for 'propositional attitude’. The two
terms should be understood to have the same application.
Accordingly, although in other contexts our phrase may be
assigned a different usage, on its present usage it does not
apply, in particular, to the relations expressed by 'seeks’
or 'worships’, even if these are to be in some way analyzed
in terms of intentional attitudes. Nor shall it apply to
the relation expressed by 'desires’ that may be said to
relate us to consumer products; nor to the relation
expressed by 'believes’ that may be said to relate one
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person to another. These too, perhaps, can be analyzed in
terms of relations to which 'intentional attitude’ does
apply, but they are not themselves examples of such
rel ati ons
.
2.1.5 (PT3)
There is a further tenet distinguishing the outlook of
the Propositional Tradition from the one I shall be
proposing that is not implied by the claims we have
formulated so far. This third tenet is concerned
specifically with the attitudes expressed by 'believes’,
desires and 'wonders’ (let us call the latter attitude
' wonder i ng
’ ) :
(PT3) VR( if R is an intentional attitude, then
i) nec Vx ( pos( iy R(y,x) )
pos( iy{ y believes x )))
ii) nec V*( pos( iy R(y,x) ) -»
pos( iy ( y desires x )))
iii) nec V*( pos( iy R(y,x) )
pos( iy( y wonders x ))))
Alternately, the claim could be put by saying that belief,
desire and wondering are indiscriminate with respect to
their modal ranges: necessarily, if an item is included in
the modal range of any other attitude at all, you will find
it in the modal range of each of these three.
From (PT3) and (A1) we can derive the following
equ l valences
:
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( 3 ) nec Vx( pos ( Jy( y believes x )) iff
pos( Jy( y desires x )))
nec Vx ( pos ( -}y( y desires x )) iff
Pos( Jy( y wonders x )))
From (3) and (4), in turn, it follows that necessarily the
modal ranges of belief, desire and wondering coincide.
Consequently, anything at all that can be believed is also a
thing that could be desired, and a thing that could be
something someone wonders as well. This result would be
widely accepted without a moment’s hesitation within the
Propositional Tradition.
Now let us turn to consider some main features of an
alternative to this received perspective.
2 • 2 An Alternative Conception
I wish to begin this section by discussing some
apparent points of conflict between the Propositional
Tradition and the alternative I shall be proposing.
2-2.1 A Taxonomy of Thoughts
The alternative is incompatible with the tenets
expressed by ( PT 1 ) and (PT2), as I read them, and with the
tenet expressed by (PT3) as well. Let’s consider each case
in turn..
According to my view,
(Alt 1) Thoughts come in separate species only one of
which includes members that are truth-val ued
.
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But I agree with the Propositional Tradition in
understanding 'proposition’ to apply to truth-valued
thoughts. Consequently (Alt 1) is incompatible with (PTl),
as I read it; according to the new conception, not all
thoughts are truth-valued, hence not all are propositions.
Depending on your view of what counts as a species, you
might accept (Alt 1) with equanimity, if you think there are
any truth-val ue- 1 ess thoughts at all: there’s the truth-
valued species, you might say, and then there’s the non-
truth-valued species. But as I see things, truth-value-
1 essness doesn’t determine a species. The species of
thought that I count are distinguished from one another,
rather, by the intentional attitudes whose modal ranges they
i ncl ude
.
(Alt 1) does not require that any attitudes have modal
ranges that fall outside of the truth-valued species of
thought. Consequently, (Alt 1) is compatible with the tenet
expressed by (PT2), as I interpret it. I agree that with
respect to very many familiar attitudes, it is necessarily
the case that their modal ranges contain exclusively truth-
valued thoughts. Belief is perhaps an example, though I
have some qualms. Knowledge would seem to be a clear case
(by 'knowledge’ I mean the intentional attitude expressed by
'knows’ on the reading yielding true claims expressed by
sentences in which the verb takes indicative sentential
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complements )
.
However, it is a further contention of the
new view that
(Alt 2) is incompatible with the thesis expressed by (PT2)
(as I read the latter).
In fact, the new conception holds that certain quite
familiar attitudes have modal ranges that exclude
also inclined to hold that the attitude of wondering has a
non-proposi t i onal modal range that falls within a species of
thought other than that of desire. Assuming that the modal
range of belief includes at least some proposi ti ons--that
some truth-valued thoughts are at least possibly believed--
we have the following picture:
propositions
.
Desire is an example, or so I claim. I am
Propos i t i ons The m. range of desire
The m. range of belief The m. range of wondering
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The contention that wondering and desire have modal ranges
comprising distinct species is not a firm commitment of the
conception I am proposing. Also, the diagram may suggest,
but the view does not require that the modal range of belief
is disjoint from that of desire. Some intentional attitudes
have modal ranges that overlap more than one of the species
of thought, and perhaps belief is one of these. The view
will require, however, that neither the modal range of
wondering nor that of desire coincide with that of belief.
Consequently the present view is incompatible with the tenet
expressed by ( PT3 ) , for this tenet entails the claim that
the modal ranges of belief, desire, and wondering coincide.
2-2.2 The Nature of the Dispute
In the preceding section, I spoke of ( PT 1 ) - (PT3) as
tenets "distinguishing" the Propositional Tradition’s
conception from the one that I shall propose. Strictly
speaking, this may not be quite right. Let me explain why.
In Chapter 1
,
I took
( T 1 ) nec Vx( pos }y{ y is thinking x ) -» x is a thought )
to formulate what I claimed to be an analytic criterion of
thoughthood. My principal goal in Chapter 4 wi 1 1 be to
isolate one particular reading of the verb, 'is thinking’,
displayed in that verb’s ordinary usage. I shall contend
that if our understanding of (T1) involves this reading,
then the concept of thought conforming to the criterion
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expressed by (T1), so understood, will be a concept whose
features motivate the outlook on thoughts that I am going to
propose. Further, as I shall argue, if we understand
'proposition’ to apply to the truth-valued items in the
modal range of the relation expressed by 'is thinking’ on
this reading, then we have grounds for rejecting the tenets
formulated, on that understanding, by (PT 1 ) and (PT2).
There are several places where a Propositional
Traditionalist might part company with me in these matters.
Let "Pete" name some arbitrary Propositional Traditionalist.
Is it the case that the tenets that Pete expresses with
(PT1) and (PT2) distinguish his conception of thoughts from
the one I’m proposing? Well, that depends; the issue is
somewhat complicated. The matter hinges on whether Pete’s
understanding of 'proposition’ is the same, or at least
necessarily coextensive with the one I derive from the
conception of thought to be developed in the course of this
study. For I assume that Pete and I could agree, at least
for the sake of argument, on the 1 etter of:
( D2 ) x is a proposition =df i) x is truth-valued;
i i ) x i s a thought
.
But though we might agree on this formulation, it remains
open whether we would interpret the second clause of the
right side the same way, or at least in such ways that
necessarily equivalent conditions are expressed. At the
heart of this question, in turn, is the issue of whether
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Pete grants (T 1 ), and whether we understand the occurrence
is thinking in that formulation according to the same
reading, or at least readings on which 'is thinking’
expresses necessarily coextensive relations, or not. if,
after all, Pete and I mean different things by
'proposition’, then perhaps the view I propose does not
conflict with the tenets Pete expresses by (PT1) and (PT2).
It will become clear, I think, that even if we disagree
in our conception of 'proposition’, and even if,
consequently, the view that I propose is compatible with the
tenets expressed by ( PT1 ) and ( PT2 ) , on Pete’s reading of
them, there will still be substantial disagreement between
me and Pete on other related fronts.
2-2.3 A Cartesian Precedent ?
There is a passage in the Meditations where Descartes
espouses what seems to be a view of thoughts akin to the one
I am proposing. The passage occurs in the third
Med i tat i ons
:
considerations of order appear to dictate that I now
classify my thoughts into definite kinds, and ask
which of them can properly be said to be the bearers
of truth and falsity. Some of my thoughts are as it
were the images of things and to these alone is the
title "idea" properly appl i ed ... Other thoughts have
various additional forms: thus when I will, or am
afraid, or affirm, or deny, there is always a
particular thing which I take as the object of my
thought, but my thought includes something more than
the likeness of that thing. Some thoughts in this
category are called vol i ti ons . . . whi 1 e others are
called judgements.
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Descartes goes on to claim that only judgments, not ideas or
volitions, can properly be said to be bearers of truth and
falsity.
I think a natural interpretation of these remarks would
have it that Descartes’ view is quite like the one I have
suggested (apart from his counting "images of things" as
thoughts— I shall set aside the question of what his concept
of idea comes to). it would not be far-fetched to suppose
that what Descartes meant by "judgment" and "volition" are
distinct types of thoughts whose instances are to be found,
respectively, in the modal ranges of belief and desire.
Then Descartes’ contention that truth-value is displayed by
the former and not the latter would be one with which my
view is in agreement.
Indeed, I think it is tempting to see Descartes’ view
as conflicting with the Propos i ti onal Tradition on just the
same counts as does mine: contra ( PT 1 ) , not all thoughts
are propositions (if we take propositions to be truth-valued
thoughts); contra (PT2), not all intentional attitudes have
propositions in their modal ranges (if we suppose Descartes’
volitions to be in the modal ranges of any att i tudes--of
desire, for example); contra ( PT3 ) , the modal ranges of
belief, desire and wondering do not coincide, since those of
belief and desire do not coincide (if we assume that
volitions exhaust the modal range of desire but not that of
belief).
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There is a problem of i nterpretat i on
,
though,
confronting the idea that Descartes’ conception of thoughts
really resembles the one I will propose.
At the beginning of Chapter 1, I mentioned a common
usage of the word 'thought’ on which the term stands, not
for thoughts, but rather for events of thinking. Nothing in
what Descartes says in the passage quoted above rules out
that he is speaking of items of this second sort— of mental
events of a particular variety— and claiming of these
. that
they come in species. Nothing in this passage rules out
that he is claiming of two particular sorts of events
-- the
instances of one denoted by the noun 'judgment’, the other’s
instances denoted by 'volition’— that events of the former
sort, and not of the latter, may be said to be true or
false. For the Latin noun 'cogitatio’ is ambiguous in the
two ways we have noted for the English common noun
thought’. Hence there is no guarantee, none to be
discerned from the passage quoted above, that when Descartes
used ' cogi tationes ’ he meant things of the sort I have
stipulated that we shall mean here by 'thoughts’.
However, Descartes did not confine himself to a simple
taxonomy of the things to which he applied the term
"cogitatio". He also suggested a view as to their nature, a
view concerning the sort of things he took thoughts to be.
According to Descartes, thoughts are "modes of thinking
substances", by which I take him to have meant properties of
th i nkers
:
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As I read this passage, a view on the nature of thoughts is
suggested that is in certain important respects like the one
I shall be proposing. What should be noted for present
purposes is that Descartes is evidently concerned here with
items that could be said to be had in common by various
thinkers. He doesn’t say this, but in drawing this analogy
between thoughts that a mind may have, and ways that a body
may be extended, he does seem to suggest it. Provided
Descartes would have allowed that different bodies may be
said to be extended in the same ways, presumably he would
also have held that different minds could be said to have
the same thoughts. This suggests to me that Descartes was
using ' cog i tat i ones ’ to stand for things of the same sort we
mean here by 'thoughts’. Then if Descartes intended
cog i tat i ones ’ in the same way in both of the passages
quoted above, there would be some reason, after all, to
think that his conception of thoughts was a precedent for
the one that I will be proposi ng--not only because the two
conceptions involve roughly similar taxonomies, but also
because, it would appear, we have the same genus of thing in
mind to which we are attributing these taxonomies.
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the conception of
I would very much like to think that
thoughts that I shall be proposing is a Cartesian one.
Unfortunately, I have been unable to find very many passages
besides the two just quoted where Descartes explicitly
discusses his view of "thoughts". There is consequently not
much basis for attributing to him anything akin to the view
I shall be proposing. The nature of those items Descartes
referred to when he used the word 'cogitatio’ as a common
noun and the distinction of whatever notions might be
expressed by the term, so used, seem not to have been topics
that he chose to attend to in his written work.
2.2.4 Four Central Roles for Thoughts
To conclude this chapter, I would like to mention four
roles that thoughts are standardly assumed to play, roles
that ought to be accommodated, I believe, by any acceptable
account of the nature of thoughts. It is an important
feature of the new conception of thoughts developed here
that one may consistently adopt it without relinquishing the
view that thoughts do serve these four standard roles.
Cons i der
(5) VR ( R is an intentional attitude —
»
nec Vx( pos ( ly R(y,x) ) -» x is a thought ))
(5) is an implication of the first two tenets of the
Propositional Tradition, ( PT 1 ) and (PT2); consequently, the
thesis it formulates is a commitment of the Propositional
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Tradition. But although I reject the claims expressed by
(PT1) and (PT2) (as I read them), the alternative conception
of thoughts that I shall propose is compatible with the
claim formulated by (5); the claim is one that I accept.
(5) captures what I shall refer to as the 'intentional
role" that thoughts are standardly supposed to serve: that
as a matter of necessity, the modal ranges of all the
attitudes are made up exclusively of thoughts; put roughly:
The Intentional RoIp
Thoughts are the "objects" of intentional attitudes.
In addition to this intentional role, thoughts are
standardly assumed to be items to which logical concepts are
applicable. For example, it is assumed that thoughts may be
said to be necessary or contingent, to be incompatible with
or to entail one another, to be the conjunctions,
disjunctions or generalizations of other thoughts. Thus:
2
. The Logical Role
Thoughts exemplify logical properties, and are terms
of logical relations and operations.
A third role that thoughts are taken to serve has to do
with their relationship to language. It is assumed that
there is an important connection between thoughts and the
use of sentences in language, a connection in virtue of
which we manage to communicate our beliefs, desires, wishes,
questions and other concerns about the world to one another.
Ideas along these lines have been put in various ways, but
43
as a provisional stand-in, I shall simply say:
3
• The Linguistic Rnl P
Sentences express thoughts.
Finally, it is standardly supposed that many semantic
properties of and relations among sentences can be accounted
for by appeal to corresponding properties of and relations
among the thoughts that those sentences express. An example
here would be the idea that an ascription of truth or
falsity to a sentence may be understood in terms of the
truth or falsity of the thought that sentence expresses. A
similar account is standardly assumed for various semantic
relations that hold among sentences. Consistency,
implication, and contradi ctori ness are examples. In each
case, it would be maintained, there is a relationship among
thoughts by means of which we may account for the relevant
semantic relationship attributable to sentences. Finally,
then
:
4
. The Semantic Role
Semantic properties of and relations among sentences
can be explained by appeal to correspondi ng properties
of and relations among thoughts.
I hope to give evidence in the course of this thesis
that the conception of thoughts developed here accommodates
each of the four roles just cited. I take as a starting
point the view that thoughts do serve each of these roles;
it is an important constraint on my project that the
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conception of thoughts that I develop in the present study
be compatible with this starting assumption.
There are various features of thoughts required by
these roles that I assume to be familiar to the reader, and
that I have already been taking for granted. In the next
two chapters, I propose to devote some attention to the
intentional role, and in Chapter 5 I shall focus on the
linguistic role, for these two roles— 1 and 3— will be
especially important in the arguments I shall propose that
are designed to show that the new conception is incompatible
with the key tenets of the Propositional Tradition.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 2
1.
Strictly speaking, this notion of a verb or verb phraseexpressing a relation must be understood to be relative notonly to readings but to contexts, since verbs and verbphrases may be indexicals. For discussion of the relevant
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see cha Pter 5, sections
2.
Moore is said once to have had a nightmare
couldn t distinguish propositions from tables.Cartwright [1962], p. 51, and Bergmann [1960],Bergmann attributes the anecdote to Keynes.
in which he
See
p. 3.
3.
The proof requires S5
.
4.
Haldane and Ross, [1931], p.159 The extent to whichEnglish translations of this passage differ is remarkable.
I have chosen the Haldane and Ross rendition, since it is
most amenable to an interpretation that puts Descartes’ view
of thoughts close to mine. The greatest discrepancy among
the different renditions I’ve seen lies in the handling of
the sentence that Haldane and Ross put as:
For example in willing, fearing, approving,
denying, though I always percieve something as the
subject of the action of my mind, yet by this
action I always add something else to the idea
which I have of that thing.
Haldane and Ross note that they have used the French version
in obtaining this rendition. They claim it to be "more
explicit' than the Latin. Here are two other versions I’ve
seen; the following from Cottingham [1986], p. 26:
thus when I will, or am afraid, or affirm, or
deny, there is always a particular thing which I
take as the object of my thought, but my thought
includes something more than the likeness of that
thing.
and the following from Anscombe and Geach [1971], p.78:
when I will, am afraid, assert, or deny, there is
always something that I take as the object of my
experience, by my experience comprises more than
the likeness of the thing in question...
A notable difference is that Haldane and Ross have ’subject’
(of the action of my mind’) where both Cottingham et al . and
Anscombe and Geach have 'object’ ('of my thought’ in
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Fred Feldman suggested to me that theconception of thoughts I am proposing was "Cartesian". At
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suggestion to be merely: that the ideathat thinking applies to a broad range of mental
activities, including more than occurrent believing, was anidea advanced by Descartes. I’m afraid that I may not havepaid careful enough attention to what Feldman was
suggesting. The idea that, apart from having the same views
on the nature of th i nk i ng , Descartes’ conception of thoughts
might actually be a precedent to mine in significant
respects, did not sink in until much later, when I came
across this passage from the Meditations quoted in the essay
by Sosa [1967] on the semantics of imperatives.
5. From article 64 of
Cottingham [1985], p.2
the Principles of Philosophy
,
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CHAPTER 3
OCCURRENT ATTITUDES AND THEIR NON-OCCURRENT COUNTERPARTS
In this chapter, I wish to discuss some matters of
terminology, and some matters concerning the classification
of attitudes, that will be useful in several connections
throughout the remainder of the study.
3 . 1 Occurrent Attitudes
By occurrent attitude" I shall mean, roughly speaking,
any intentional attitude that one bears in virtue of
engaging in some breed of mental activity— any attitude such
that, for some type of mental event, bearing the attitude
3 ust
—
is being the subject of an occurring event of that
type. Examples of what I count as occurrent attitudes are
the relations expressed (on familiar readings) by the
following present progressive forms:
is wishing
is wondering
is thinking
Take the case of 'is wishing’ for example. There is at
least one reading of this verb on which it expresses an
attitude that a person has in virtue of engaging in mental
activity of a particular sort. This is reflected in the
fact that if I say and am right in saying that a person is
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at this very moment wishing that he hadn’t put down a
deposit on some apartment, then I ascribe a certain attitude
to this person which he bears in virtue of being the subject
of an occurring mental event, in particular an event of
wishing.
By contrast, these verbs (and verb phrase):
bel i eves
knows
loves to hear
though they do express intentional attitudes, do not express
what I am calling occurrent attitudes, at least not on any
common usage. To say that the poor fellow knows all too
well that he put down the deposit on that apartment, is to
ascribe to him an attitude which he can have even if there
is no mental activity of any sort in which he is presently
engag i ng--perhaps he is in a deep dreamless sleep at the
moment--at any rate not any sort of mental activity such
that it is in virtue of his engaging in mental activity of
that sort that he bears the attitude ascribed.
It would not be correct to assume that occurrent
attitudes are simply those expressed by the progressive
forms of attitude verbs. In particular, although 'believes’
admits a progressive form, it seems to require a non-
occurrent reading. Consider the following sentence, which I
think is representati ve
:
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His testim° n y was so persuasive that thebelieving everything he tells them.
j urors are
I assume that the most natural interpretation of this
sentence is one involving a reading of the progressive on
which it does express an intentional attitude. Yet on this
interpretation, if the sentence expresses a truth, I would
say that it reports a disposition to believe, not an
occurring event of any sort. It may be that the jurors are
all in a deep and dreamless sleep at the moment, yet still
correct to say of them that they have this disposition, that
they are believing everything the witness tells them. But
then it isn t in virtue of the jurors’ now engaging in
mental events of any sort that we may ascribe to them the
attitude expressed on this reading by the progressive form.^
3 . 2 Occurrent Belief
Some occurrent attitudes may be paired with non-
occurrent attitudes as counterparts in a certain respect.
Here are some examples: the attitude of desire and that of
occurrent wishing (the relation expressed by the present
progressive form of the verb 'wish’) are counterparts of one
another in the relevant sense. The attitude of wondering--
expressed by the simple present form of the verb 'wonderl-
and the attitude of occurrent wonder i ng--expressed by the
present progressive form of the verb--are also counterparts
in this respect. There is, then, a way in which occurrent
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wishing is related to desire and in which occurrent
wondering is related to wondering such that in virtue of
being related in this way, these pairs of attitudes may be
counted as counterparts in the sense in question.
I don’t suppose that every non-occur rent attitude has
an occurrent attitude as a counterpart. For example, these
attitude verbs,
knows
loves to hear
express non-occur rent attitudes for which, I would claim,
there are no occurrent counterparts
. It is important
however, to distinguish the claim, such as I have just made,
that there is no occurrent counterpart of a given attitude
at all, from the claim that there is no occurrent
counterpart that is expressed by any locutions of ordinary
di scourse
.
Consider the case of belief. I noted above that the
present progressive of 'believes’ does not express an
occurrent attitude. Nevertheless, one finds it commonly
supposed in the philosophical literature that there is an
occurrent attitude related to belief in a way relevantly
like that in which occurrent wishing is related to desire,
and in which occurrent wondering is related to wondering in
virtue of which these latter pairs may be said to be
counterparts . "Occurrent belief" is the phrase commonly
used to refer to the attitude at issue. I assume that such
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an occurrent counterpart of belief exists,
clear to me that there is any verb or verb
that expresses it.
yet it is not
phrase in English
There vs a class of English ascriptions that serve to
report exactly the events that, I think, would be considered
to be events of persons bearing this attitude of occurrent
belief. The ascriptions in question are those formed from
the present progressive of the verb 'think’ when it is
complemented by a sentential clause got by prefixing the
word 'that’ to an indicative sentence (from here on I shall
refer to such complements as "indicative clauses"). The
ascriptions, then, include any of the form
( F1 ) t is thinking that 0 ,
where substituends for 't’ are appropriate singular terms,
and substituends for ' 0 ' are indicative sentences.
Consider:
William is thinking that Sarah will not say "yes".
Sarah is thinking that William seems a little
nervous
.
At least on one familiar reading of the progressive, each of
these sentences, if it expresses a truth, reports an event
that would be said to be one of a person—William or Sarah--
bearing the attitude of occurrent belief to a thing.
Hereafter, I shall use the phrase "occurrent believings" to
refer to events of the sort reported by ascriptions that
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instantiate (FI), and I shall assume that these events are
ones of persons bearing the attitude of occurrent belief.
If one accepts that there is a familiar reading on
which instances of (FI), if true, report occurrent
believings, then one might be led to suppose that there is
after all a verb phrase of English that expresses occurrent
belief, namely, the phrase 'is thinking’ on this familiar
reading in question. I am inclined to think that if any
English verb phrase expresses occurrent belief at all, it is
this one, on that very reading. Nevertheless, it does not
follow from the fact that true instances of (FI) report
occurrent believings, that there is any reading of 'is
thinking’ on which it expresses occurrent belief. I simply
do not know whether there is such a reading. Though it
won’t be settled, we shall consider this matter further in
the next chapter.
Since I shall want to appeal to this attitude of
occurrent belief in various claims and discussions to
follow, and since I am uncertain whether there is any verb
already available in English expressing it, I propose to
introduce a technical phrase to serve this function.
Although the terminology is somewhat cumbersome, from here
on I’ll use 'occurrently believe’ as a verb whose present
tense forms shall be understood to express occurrent belief.
I shall assume that the verb and its forms admit subject and
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complement terms of exactly the same syntactic sorts as do
the various forms of the verb 'believes’.
I shall suppose that the present progressive of
' occurrent 1 y believes’ is linked to that of the verb 'think’
by the following two constraints:
For any indicative sentence, 0 , the following
expresses a truth:
[ nec Vx( x is occurrently believing that 0 iff
x is thinking that 0 ) ]
What is expressed by an instance of (FI) is true
with respect to the same circumstances as the
correspondi ng instance of
( F 2 ) t is occurrently believing that 0
(fixed readings for substituends of 't’ and ' 0 ' )
.
(A3) tells us, for example, that the following strict
conditional is true:
nec Vx( x is occurrently believing that Sarah will not
say "yes" iff x is thinking that Sarah will not say
"yes" )
According to (A4), what is expressed by this instance of
( F2 ) :
(A3)
and
( A4
)
Sarah is occurrently believing that William is nervous
and what is expressed by the following instance of (FI):
Sarah is thinking that William is nervous
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are things true relative to precisely the same
ci rcumstances
.
3 • 3 Character i z i ng Counterparts
I have assumed that there is an occurrent attitude that
is a counterpart of belief, a "counterpart" in the same
sense in which occurrent wishing may be said to be an
occurrent counterpart of desire, and in which occurrent
wondering is a counterpart of the non-occurrent attitude of
wondering. What sense of 'counterpart’ is in question here?
I propose, now, to consider this question somewhat more
careful 1 y
.
One might suppose that at least some non-occurrent
attitudes can be analyzed in terms of dispositions to bear
the very occurrent attitudes that I would count as
counterparts
. In the case of belief, for example, such a
proposal would be that to believe a thing is to be disposed
to occurrently believe it. Or, in the case of desire: to
desire something (where the intentional attitude, and not
some other concept of desire, is understood to be at issue)
is to be disposed to be wishing it. Then perhaps we could
say that a pair of attitudes, one occurrent, one non-
occurrent, are counterparts if they are linked by such a
dispositional analysis. But there are problems with these
anal yses
.
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A matter that some would find problematic in such
proposals has to do with the ingredient notion of
disposition. It might be claimed that the idea of a
person’s being disposed to do something is not acceptably
clear and that consequently such dispositional accounts of
the non-occu r rent attitudes are themselves unacceptable.
The relevant notion of disposition does admit of some
vagueness, but it is not clear to me that it is unacceptable
on this count. Is the complaint that, on some occasions,
there is no saying whether a person is disposed, in the
relevant sense, to occurrently believe something? But this
may be so, and yet the proposed analysis entirely proper.
For it may be that, on precisely the same occasions, and for
similar reasons, there is no saying whether the person
be 1 i eves the thing in question. The proposed analysis,
then, might be clear and correct even if it relates two
concepts that do not themselves have a perfectly clear
application. (On this matter, compare Lewis’ discussion, in
his [1973], p. 91 ff, of an analogous objection to his
treatment of counterfactual s in terms of a concept of
relative similarity).
Other objections could be raised, though, to the
proposals I made above, even if the involved concept of
disposition is granted. Let us suppose that we have an
acceptable idea of what it is to be disposed to do
something, if not entirely clear-cut and free of vagueness.
The general line of account suggested above was this:
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(1) VR VR’( if R is an intentional attitude and R’ is the
occurrent counterpart of R, then nec VxVy( R(x,y) iff
x is disposed to bear R’ to y ))
The following is a consequence of (1) concerning belief and
its occurrent counterpart:
(2) nec VxVy( x believes y iff x is disposed to occurrently
bel i eve y )
This formulates pretty closely the dispositional proposal
for the case of belief cited before. But (2) seems subject
to counterexample. Suppose the fellow who knows all too
well that he put down the deposit now wishes to avoid facing
this unpleasant fact for as long as possible. He decides
that he will go to the Bahamas for a month. He resolves not
to consider anything having to do with the deposit until his
return. Under normal circumstances he is quite good at
sticking to his resolve, and we may suppose that the
circumstances are, in this respect, normal. This would
appear to be a case where a person believes something (he
knows it all too well), but is not disposed to occurrently
believe anything at all about the deposit. If this is
right, then we should reject (2).
Since (2) is a consequence of (1), this example alone
suffices to refute (1). But the general problem does not
have to do with any peculiarity of belief: consequences of
(1) concerning desire and wondering— and the occurrent
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attitudes I have cited as their counterparts—woul d seem to
face similar difficulties.
One might suppose we can get around this sort of
difficulty in the following way. In the case of our fellow
heading to the Bahamas, it could be maintained that although
he is not disposed to occurrently believe that he put down
the deposit (indeed, he is disposed not to), and will be
thus indisposed for at least a month, nevertheless, if,
during this month, his busybody accountant were to drop in,
and lead him to consider the thought that he put down the
deposit, then he would be disposed to occurrently believe
it and probably would occurrently believe it, much to his
chagrin. This suggests the following amendment to the
general thesis:
(1 ) VR VR ’ ( if R’ is the occurrent counterpart of an
intentional attitude R, then nec VxVy( R(x,y) iff were
x to cons i de r y . then x would be disposed to bear
R’ to y ))
The idea, in short, is that if a non-occur rent attitude
has an occurrent counterpart, the former may be analyzed in
terms of a certain conditioned disposition to bear the
latter. Employing this idea, one might propose to
characterize the relevant counterpart relationship by saying
that two attitudes, R and R’, are counterparts in the
relevant sense just in case R is non-occur rent
,
R’ is
occurrent, and the pair, <R,R’>, satisfies the main
consequent of (1’). That is, we could put:
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(D3) R is an occurrent counterpart of R’ =df R is
occurrent; R’ is non-occur rent
,
and nec VkVy( R(x y)
bear
W
R^
0
to y°^
onsider y > then x would be disposed’to
I doubt that this characterization would be considered very
appealing. For one thing, I suspect that some would not
find the ingredient notion of a person considering a thought
to be acceptably clear as it stands. Yet this notion, as it
stands, is about as clear as I know how to make it.
Moreover, the subjunctive form that was introduced in (1’)
adds another parameter of vagueness to what some might have
considered an already unacceptable vagueness stemming from
the concept of disposition. What’s more, even if we give
the condition expressed by the definiens a run for its
money--I think I have some working grasp of what condition
that is there seem to be problem cases. Here is a case of
the sort I have in mind.
Jones has always accepted that a certain footbridge she
crosses on her way to town is quite sturdy. For some time,
however, she has been undergoing sessions of hypnosis, and
at the most recent session, the hypnotist told her—while
she was under hypnosi s--that whenever she considers whether
the footbridge is sturdy, she ought seriously to doubt it.
Perhaps he was being a prankster, perhaps he had some
serious reason for not wanting her to occurrently believe
that the bridge is sturdy. At any rate, he did not
explicitly tell her to change her belief about the
59
sturdiness of the footbridge, nor even merely to suspend
judgment on the matter, nor did he suggest that she ought to
have doubts on the matter whenever she crosses the bridge.
His suggestion was only that from that point on, whenever
she does happen to consider the thought that the footbridge
is sturdy, she ought then to occurrently doubt it.
It seems to me that the preceding is a description of a
possible situation and that we may suppose moreover that in
some such situations the doctor’s post-hypnotic suggestion
has in fact taken hold.
I think that with respect to some such circumstances it
would be correct to say that, subsequent to the session in
question, Jones persists in the belief that the bridge is
sturdy. It might be that she continues to cross the bridge
without worry for the rest of her days, provided she has no
occasion to consider whether the bridge is sturdy or not.
She might even be surprised on an occasion if the bridge
wavered as she was crossing it— surprised, in part, because
until this occasion, she would have had the belief that the
bridge is sturdy. Of course, once she does occurrently
doubt that the bridge is sturdy, she may then change her
belief. But for the period following her hypnosis up until
such time as she has doubts, it seems to me that Jones may
correctly be said to persist in the belief that the bridge
is sturdy. Nevertheless, since the post-hypnotic suggestion
has taken hold, this very period is one during which it is
not the case that were she to consider the thought that the
60
bridge is sturdy, she woul
d
be disposed to occurrently
believe it. Indeed, were she to consider it, she would
straight-away occurrently doubt it. This seems to me to be
a tolerably clear counterexample to the proposal in (D3),
for I take it that the definition should not lead us to say
that belief and occurrent belief are not counterparts
.
I do not see any way of amending (D3) that looks at all
promising. Perhaps we had better seek some other way to
characterize which occurrent/non-occurrent attitude pairs
are counterparts in the relevant respect.
It may be noted that in the three cases of counterpart
attitudes that have been mentioned above, if a person bears
the occurrent attitude towards a thought, then that person
also bears the non-occur rent attitude towards it. Take the
case of belief: if someone is at this moment occurrently
believing, say, that he put down a deposit on his apartment,
then it will be correct to say that this person now be! i eves
that he has put down the deposit. He may change his mind,
and come to doubt whether he did or even to believe that he
didn’t; it seems, however, that it is a sufficient condition
for him to be in a state that we report by saying that he
believes that he put down the deposit, that, at the moment,
he is occurrently believing that he did so. Similar points
hold, mutatis mutandis , for the case of desire and
wonder i ng
.
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I think that a relatively simple and clear way of
distinguishing which pairs of attitudes are occur rent/non-
occurrent counterparts is suggested in the preceding
observations. Consider:
( D4 ) R is an occurrent counterpart of R’ =df R is
occurrent; R’ is non-occur rent
,
and nec VxVy( R(x v)
only if R’(x,y) ) *
The idea, roughly, is that an occurrent counterpart of a
non-occurrent attitude, R, is any occurrent attitude that
one cannot bear without thereby bearing R.
It may be noted that this proposal does not guarantee
that if a non-occur rent attitude has an occurrent
counterpart it has only one. In fact I think there will be
cases in which an attitude is counted by ( D4 ) as having
several occurrent counterparts
. The following case is
somewhat fanciful, but it may help to convey the point I
have in mind.
I am inclined to hold that there are distinct occurrent
attitudes expressed by the following two verb phrases: 'is
wishing fervently’ and 'is wishing passively’. Each of
these attitudes, let us call them "fervent wishing" and
"passive wishing", is such that one bears it to a thing only
if one is wishing that thing. Then we should expect that
either one, coupled with the non-occurrent attitude of
desire, satisfies the definiens of ( D4 )
.
From the fact that
a person is wishing something fervently, it follows that she
is wishing it; then it will follow that it is something that
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she wishes. The same goes for passive wishing. But then,
since fervent wishing and passive wishing are distinct
occurrent attitudes, we have it that there isn’t a unique
occurrent counterpart, in the present sense, of the attitude
of des i re
.
I do not see that this is a troublesome result; I think
there is a useful and intuitive concept of counterpart
defined in ( D4 ) . Nevertheless, if we attend again to the
case of desire, I think that it would be generally held
that however many occurrent attitudes are counterparts of
desire according to ( D4 )— among these counterparts, the
occurrent attitude expressed by the present progressive of
the verb 'wish’, unadorned by adverbs or other modifiers, is
distinguished in an important respect. In contrast to
fervent wishing" or "passive wishing", occurrent wishing
s i mp 1 i c i ter is in some sense the principal counterpart of
desire, the other two being counterparts only derivatively,
by virtue of being species of this principal one. A similar
distinction, I think, should be claimed for occurrent belief
among whatever other occurrent attitudes ( D4 ) would count as
counterparts of belief. In general, the idea is that any
attitude that has an occurrent counterpart distinguished in
this way as a principal counterpart, has exactly one
counterpart thus distinguished.
I suggest that this notion of an occurrent attitude’s
being the principal counterpart of a non-occur rent attitude
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is captured by the following:
(D5) R is the principal counterpart of R’ =df R is an
occurrent counterpart of R’, and VR*( if R* -js an
occurrent counterpart of R’, then nec VxVy{ R*(x,y)
only if R ( x , y ) )
K
' y ’
Let us say that one (two-term) relation entails another just
in case necessarily the one holds of a pair only if the
other does. Then the idea expressed by (D5) may be put this
way. an attitude R, is a principal counterpart of a non-
occurrent attitude, R’, just in case R is an occurrent
counterpart of R’, but, moreover, every occurrent
counterpart of R’ entails R.
Does ( D5 ) guarantee, as desired, that if an attitude
has a principal counterpart, it has only one? I am inclined
to think so, but the following objection might be made in
the case of belief (similar objections could be made
concerning desire and wondering). The objector grants us
that there is a relation expressed by our verb 'occurrently
believes’ which, together with belief, satisfies the
definiens of ( D5 ) . But the objector has us consider the
following definition:
( D* ) x is non-seven-i shl y believing y =df x i 7, and
x occurrently believes y
The objector now makes the following claims: i) (D*)
defines an occurrent attitude, call it "non-7 belief"; ii)
non-7 belief is distinct from occurrent belief, but iii) it
is also a counterpart of belief. If all these claims are
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correct, then we cannot hold that our relation of occurrent
belief is the principal occurrent counterpart of belief, for
if there is a relation defined in ( D* ) , it is one that is
necessarily coextensive with occurrent belief; so it will
entail belief, and if it is an occurrent attitude, it will
be a counterpart of belief; and since it is entailed by
occurrent belief, if the latter is a principal counterpart
of belief, it will be too.
In response, I would be prepared to grant that there is
an intentional attitude that is defined in ( D* ) , and that
this attitude is distinct from occurrent belief (the
objection requires, and I am inclined to allow that non-7
belief and occurrent belief are distinct yet necessarily
coextensive). However, I am inclined to think that the pair
consisting of non-7 belief and non-occurrent belief fails to
satisfy the definiens of ( D5 ) . For I am inclined to deny
that non-7 belief is an occur rent attitude; if it is not an
occurrent attitude, then it is not an occurrent counterpart
of any attitude, and hence not a principal counterpart of
belief.
The intuitive characteri zation of occurrent attitudes
offered at the start was this: an attitude is occurrent if
there is some breed of mental event such that in virtue of
being the subject of an occurring event of that breed, a
person may be said to bear the attitude. When I say "in
virtue of" here I do not mean merely that as a matter of
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necessity, a person bears the attitude if and only if
subject to an occurring event of the breed. I mean that an
attitude is occurrent if what it is for a person to bear the
attitude, is for that person to be a subject of the relevant
breed
.
Now the reason I am inclined to deny that non-7 belief
is an occurrent attitude, if it is an attitude at all, is
that, as far as I can see, there is no breed of mental event
such that a person may be said to bear non-7 belief to a
thing, i n virtue of being a subject of an event of that
breed. It is true that there is a type of mental event— in
particular, that of occurrent believings— such that as a
matter of necessity, one bears non— 7 belief iff one is a
subject of an occurring event of that type. But this does
not suffice. If it is asked: what is it, in virtue of
which a person may be said to bear non-7 belief?— if one
wishes to understand what it is to bear this att i tude--the
answer should be that a person bears non-7 belief in virtue
of i) being the subject of an occurrent believing and
additional 1
y
ii) being diverse from 7 . Then it is not
simply in virtue of being the subject of an occurrent
believing that one may be said to bear non-7 belief. Since
I cannot see any other breed of mental event that would fill
the bill, I am inclined to say that non-7 belief is not
itself an occurrent attitude.
In what follows, I shall assume that if an attitude has
a principal counterpart, it has only one, and in particular,
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I assume that belief, desire and wondering each have
principal counterparts, and that these are the occurrent
attitudes expressed, respectively, by 'occurrently
believes’, as I have proposed to use it, and by the present
progressive forms of the verbs, 'wish’ and 'wonder’.
3 * 4 Ihe Modal Ranges of Principal Counterparts
To conclude this chapter, I would like to mention an
assumption I make here concerning the modal ranges of non-
occurrent attitudes and their principal counterparts. What
I assume is that if an attitude has a principal counterpart,
then the attitude and its principal counterpart have the
same modal range. A thesis equivalent to this assumption
may be formulated:
(A5) VRVR’( if R is the principal counterpart of R’,
then nec Vx( pos iy R(y,x) iff pos Jy R’(y,x) ))
I take it to be a consequence of (A5) that the following
expresses a truth concerning the modal ranges of the three
pairs of counterparts to which we have been attending:
(A6) Necessarily, for any x,
i. pos iy{ y is occurrently believing x ) iff
pos Jy( y believes x )
ii. pos Jy( y is wishing x ) iff pos Jy( y desires x )
iii. pos Jy( y is wondering x ) iff
pos Jy( y wonders x )
In the remainder of this study I shall be concerned
primarily with occurrent attitudes and their modal ranges.
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But given (A6), conclusions that we shall reach in
subsequent chapters concerning the modal ranges of occurrent
belief, occurrent wishing and occurrent wondering will be
directly relevant to our assessment of the Propositional
Tradition, and in particular to our assessment of (PT3),
even though that tenet, as it stands, only concerns the non-
occurrent attitudes in the counterpart pairs at issue in
( A6 ) .
Within the Propositional Tradition, attention has been
devoted, for the most part, to non-occur rent attitudes.
However
,
I believe the assumptions formulated by (A5) and
(A6) would be agreed to by many proponents of that
trad i t i on
.
I propose that we turn our attention, now, to some
neglected features of an occurrent attitude expressed by our
ordinary use of the present progressive of the verb,
'think’--a relation that seems to me to be one that we
commonly express when we talk of a person thinking
something, or of two persons thinking the same thing.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 3
1 .
by
The following sort of case was brought toPhillip Bricker. Consider this sentence:
my attention
The judge is believing everything that the
prosecutor is telling him.
We can imagine
prosecutor has
that this is
been feeding
half truths about the defense’s handling of the case
uttered in a situation where the
the judge a pack of lies and
judge is buying each assertion that comes up. Isn’t this acase where the verb calls for a reading on which it
expresses an occurrent attitude? I think not. I believethat there are at least some possible situations concerning
which it would be correct to say of a person that she isbelieving things she’s being told, in the relevant sense ofis believing’, but is not bearing any occurrent attitude.
Let us suppose that a person is not conscious but is in
a deep, hypnotic trance. The hypnotist is telling her
things, issuing assertions which he intends her to accept,
and there is a fancy piece of machinery to which our subject
is hooked up that monitors whether she is coming to believe
is telling her. If we find that
these things, as he asserts them,
we may say, in precisely the same
that our subject is believing
is telling her. This, despite the
the things the hypnotist
she j_s coming to believe
then it seems to me that
sense called for in (a),
everything the hypnotist
fact that she is in a deep sleep and not engaged in any
events that I would count as involving occurrent attitudes.
But if this reading of the verb is one on which the relation
expressed is possibly such that someone bears it, but is not
bearing any occurrent attitude, then the relation expressed
on this reading is not an occurrent attitude. This seems to
me to be the case with the reading of 'is believing’ called
for in ( a ) .
that this point is compatible with it’s
that (a) expresses a truth relative to a
the judge happens to be bearing some
or other in that situation.
Note, however,
being the case both
situation, and that
occurrent attitude
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CHAPTER 4
THE CONCEPT OF GENERIC THINKING
In Chapter 1, I claimed that it is part of the very
concept of thought that if a thing is possibly such that
someone is thinking it, that thing is a thought. The
following was the formulation I offered for this analytic
criterion of thoughthood:
( T 1
)
nec Vx ( pos y is thinking x )
x is a thought )
In order that the reader be in a position to assess this
alleged criterion, I want to try to make it tolerably clear
how I interpret the terms— other than
' thought ’
--that figure
in my formulation of it. We are agreed on which modal
notions we take the operators, 'nec’ and 'pos’, to express,
and I assume that the quantifiers and the material
conditional pose no problem of interpretation. Then the
question of how I am reading (Tl)--of which criterion it is
that I intend it to formulate— hinges on how I understand
the occurrence of the present progressive form of the verb,
think’. In this chapter, I shall isolate and expound the
reading of 'is thinking’ upon which I interpret (T1).
4 .
1
A Generic Reading of Progressive Forms of 'think’
In the last chapter we noted that some of the
expressions that occur as complements of progressive forms
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of the verb 'think’ are sentential clauses formed by
prefixing 'that’ to an indicative sentence— "indicative
clauses as I call them. Thus, we noted the construction
t is thinking that 0
We noted, too, that when ascriptions of this form express
truths, they may be understood to report occurrent
believings, events of persons bearing the attitude of
occurrent belief.
It may also be observed that ascriptions formed by
attaching indicative clause complements to the simple
present tense, including any instances of
t thinks that 0 ,
serve to report states of belief, and will be equivalent to
correspondi ng instances of
t bel i eves that 0 .
Consider, for example,
William thinks that Sarah won’t say "Yes"
William believes that Sarah won’t say "Yes"
I think it is clear that these express equivalent things.
Moreover, apart from ascriptions involving indicative
clauses, there is certainly a natural reading of the b.
sentences in the following pairs on which those sentences
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express things equivalent to, if not identical to the things
expressed by the sentences resulting from replacement of
think by believe’ (the sentences in parentheses):
a. Jones: Is Sarah going to say "Yes"?
b. William: I don’t think so. (I don’t believe so.)
a. Jones: I’m sure Sarah will say "Yes".
b. William: That’s what you think. (That’s what you
be 1 i eve
. )
These observations about the simple present tense, and
about the present progressive form when it is complemented
by an indicative clause, might lead one to suppose that
there are just two closely related "doxastic" readings
attaching to these two forms of the verb 'think’: the
simple present applies to states of belief and expresses the
attitude of belief; the present progressive applies to
occurrent believings and expresses occurrent belief.
There is, however, a common usage on which the
progressive form, 'is thinking’, applies to a very broad
range of mental events, encompassing events of persons
bearing various occurrent intentional attitudes, in addition
to that of occurrent belief. It seems plain to me that
there is a familiar sense in which, if a person is wonde ring
whether something is the case, or wishing that something
would be the case— as well as if he is thinking that
something j_s the case--it is correct to say, whichever of
these conditions holds, that the person is thinking
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something. And if two persons are wondering the same thing,
wishing the same thing, or occurrently believing the same
thing, whichever the case may be, if it is then asked
whether these two people are thinking the same thing, at
least one thing we may be asking has "yes" as its correct
answer. It may be expected that we proceed to specify what
sort of thinking they are engaged in ("they are both
wondering whether...", "they are both thinking that...",
etc.), but "yes" would be a correct initial response.
There are constructions in English in which 'is
thinking’ is followed, not by an indicative clause, but
rather by a displayed sentence, where the sentence can be of
any mood. The following are instances:
(1) Jones is thinking: How am I going to get out of
here?
(2) Jones is thinking (to herself): Catch the ball,
Jones.
Each of these is perfectly acceptable in ordinary English
and each one seems to me to express a perfectly coherent
claim, a claim that is true with respect to quite familiar
circumstances. (1) serves to report an event of wondering,
(2) serves to report an event of wishing, and either will be
true if an event of the appropriate sort is in fact taking
place. Now concerning these two ascriptions and
circumstances relative to which either expresses a truth, if
it is asked: "What is Jones thinking?", "Nothing" would
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surely be an incorrect response. One might answer with
either (1) or (2), or as well with one of these:
Jones is wondering how she is going to get out.
Jones is wishing that she would catch the ball,
the appropriate response depending on which of (1) and (2)
is true, but any such circumstances would be ones with
respect to which Jones could properly be said to be thinking
something; so it seems to me.
There are several colloquial idioms that we sometimes
use more or less interchangeably with 'is thinking’. Rather
than saying that a person is thinking something we may say
(albeit with some variation in meaning) that something has
dawned on that person, or is occurring to the person, or is
crossing this person’s mind. Further evidence for the
existence of a reading of 'is thinking’ on which it applies
to a wide variety of mental events, rather than just to
occurrent believings, lies in the fact that these more
colloquial verbal forms, too, display a similarly broad
application. If a person says:
"Something is occurring to me",
"Something is crossing my mind", or
"Something is dawning on me"
the claim that person expresses may serve to report an event
of occurrent belief, but it may, just as well, serve to
report an event of wishing, or of wondering. I say
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I am thinking: how are we going to get our
money back?”
You could respond with any of these
That question is occurring to me, too."
That question is crossing my mind, too."
That question is dawning on me, too."
It seems to me that each of these responses would be
coherent and that we would both be reporting ourselves to be
wondering something, indeed the same thing. Analogous
examples suggest that something a person is wishing, also,
may be said to occur to the person, to dawn on the person,
to be crossing the person’s mind.
There is, then, a family of locutions
' x is thinking y
’
,
'y is occurring to x’,
'y is crossing x’s mind’,
'y is dawning on x’
that we employ to express a family of seemingly closely
related relations between persons and thoughts. If we claim
that one of the verbs of this family, 'x is thinking y’, has
a generic reading on which it applies to events of a variety
of breeds--wi shi ngs
,
wonderings and occurrent believings
alike— then we might expect to find such an application
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among other verbs in the family; this expectation is
conf i rmed
.
The preceding considerations seem to me to afford
substantial grounds for allowing that there is at least one
reading of the present progressive of the verb, 'think’, on
which this particular form of the verb applies broadly to
mental events of a variety of breeds, events of persons
wishing things and wondering things, as well as to those of
persons occurrently believing things. From here on, I shall
assume that there is such a reading of progressive forms of
the verb, 'think’, a "generic" reading, as I shall call it
.
1
In the examples considered so far, the ascriptions for
which I have claimed that a generic reading is available
have principally been ones in which the complement position
of the progressive is occupied by a quantifier phrase; I
have been considering claims to the effect that a person is
thinking somethi ng . It is also fairly clear that the same
reading of the progressive applies to sentences in which,
apparently at least, the complement position of the
progressive is instead occupied by referring terms. Thus,
if I say
I am thinking: how are we going to get our
money back?"
you might respond in one of the ways noted above, but you
could also say:
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I am thinking that, too.
or
Then I am thinking the same thing you are.
Again these responses seem to me to express perfectly
coherent claims, and it would appear that the word, 'that’,
and the phrase, 'the same thing you are’, that figure as
complements in these sentences refer to a thing that you are
thinking, if these responses are true.
If we take the idioms of reference and quantification
in these examples at face-value, then we are led to the view
that there is a generic reading available for the present
progressive that is re 1 at i ona
1
in the sense specified in
Chapter 1 (1.1). I mentioned at the end of the first
chapter that some would resist such a proposal. But the
evidence here that the generic reading of the progressive of
think is relational seems to me to be precisely on a par
with the intuitive evidence standardly offered in the case
of any other readings of forms of the verb 'think’, or, for
that matter, with such evidence standardly offered in the
case of any other verbs of attitude. Take the verb,
'believe’ for example. It is standardly observed that we
often speak of persons believing things, or of several
people believing the same thing, and that we can
meaningfully say such things as that everything a certain
person believes is false, or crazy, or unwarranted, etc.
Then it is noted that such ways of speaking apparently
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involve quantification over a complement position. This in
turn is taken as pH ma-facie support for assuming that there
is genuine objectual quantification involved in speaking in
these ways, and it is taken as well to be sufficient
motivation for semantic accounts of how 'believe’ functions
that accord relational readings to the verb.
It is hard for me to see any motivation, then, for
allowing that objectual quantification and genuine reference
is involved in all these other cases, while insisting that
the apparent quantification and reference j_s merely apparent
when a generic reading of the progressive of 'think’ is in
question
.
In keeping with my starting assumption from the first
chapter, I propose, in the present connection, that we allow
that a generic reading of the present progressive form of
'think’ is available on which this form admits objectual
quantification over, and introduction of genuine, referring
terms into a complement position. This is to grant that
there exists a generic reading of 'is thinking’ that is
relational
.
It has been noted (amply) that there is a reading of
the progressive of 'think’ on which an ascription of the
form
(FI) t is thinking that 0 ,
serves to report an occurrent believing. It was noted,
also, that on this particular reading, any instance of (FI)
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and the corresponding instance of
(F2) 1 is occurrent 1 y believing that 0 .
will express equivalent things-given the interpretation for
this latter construction proposed in the previous chapter.
But if I am right that there is a generic reading on which
ascriptions formed from the present progressive of 'think’
may apply to events of wishing and wondering, as well as to
occurrent believings, then we may expect that it will not in
general be the case that an instance of
(FI ) t is thinking t*
interpreted on a generic reading, and the correspondi ng
instance of
(F2 ) t is occurrently believing t*
,
will express equivalent things. For example,
(3) Jones is occurrently believing something.
implies but is not implied by
(2’) Jones is thinking something.
(2’), but not (3), expresses something true relative to any
circumstances in which Jones is wondering something, or
wishing something. Or at least, this is so if a generic
reading is attached to the occurrence of 'is thinking’ in
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(2’). So understood, (2’) expresses a thing that is
implied, for example, by the claim that there is something
crossing Jones’ mind, or that something is occurring to her.
Either claim may be true, whether Jones is occurrently
believing anything or not.
In order to place certain features of this concept of
generic thinking into sharper focus, I think it may be
worthwhile to consider what other forms of the verb,
'think’, besides the present progressive, may exhibit a
generic reading, and also to consider what other readings,
apart from any generic ones, are available for various forms
of the verb.
4 • 2 Transitive and Intransitive Readings
The various forms of the verb, 'think’, have transitive
and intransitive readings. One common transitive reading is
the relational, generic reading of the present progressive
discussed above. But intransitive readings are also
commonly called for. With each of the following remarks,
the most natural i nterpretati on involves an intransitive
reading of the relevant form of 'think’:
(4a) We have to be quiet. Jones is thinking.
(4b) It is not true that we humans are distinguished
from all other animals by our ability to think.
(4c) Max thinks for a moment, then he hastens to the
door
.
(4d) We had to think fast; the guard was due to arrive.
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In all these various forms, the verb 'think’ takes an
intransitive reading that appears to be generic. Consider
the present progressive as it figures in the second sentence
of (4a). I think it is plain that this sentence may well
express a truth Jones may be "deep in thought"— though she
is engaged in occurring mental events of any of a variety of
sorts: she may be wondering things, wishing things, making
decisions, etc. Similar remarks hold for the other forms
displayed in (4b) - d). In (4d) for example, the claim
expressed by the first sentence could be fairly paraphrased
this way: we had to do some thinking fast. As I understand
it, such a claim allows that the thinking required of us
might include some wishing, some wondering, some deciding,
etc. Then the reading at issue is a generic one. I have
not been able to find any examples at all suggesting that
there are any intransitive readings of forms of the verb
'think’ apart from such generic ones. If it is indeed the
case that there are on 1 y generic intransitive readings, this
is a somewhat remarkable fact.
It is worth noting too that all intransitive readings
of forms of the verb 'think’ appear to be event readings.
By an event reading, very roughly, I mean a reading on which
the verb applies to events of thinking, or to states that
have to do with the occurrence of events of thinking. Some
evidence for the idea that all intransitive readings are
event readings comes from the following observation. For
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any ascription in which a form of 'think’, say think*,
occurs, if that occurrence requires an intransitive reading,
it appears that we may arrive at a roughly synonymous
ascription by replacing that occurrence of think* with an
occurrence of a form of 'do some thinking’ where the form of
the verb 'do’, itself, has the same tense and inflection as
think
. The point is that there is activity in question,
some doing at issue, when we employ the concept expressed
by a form of 'think’ on an intransitive reading. We have
seen this to be the case just above in connection with (4d);
let us consider (4b). With the substitution just proposed
we get:
(4b ) It is not true that we humans are distinguished
from all other animals by our ability to do some
thinking.
I take it that this is fairly close in meaning to (4b). And
here the connection with events is manifest. The ability in
question is one that consists in our being able to engage in
a certain type of activity, that of thinking. Paraphrase
along these lines of (4a) and (4c) also yields sentences
that express claims having in a similar fashion to do with
events of thinking. Moreover, I think that these examples,
(4a) - d), are fairly representat i ve of constructions in
which forms of the verb 'think’ call for intransitive
p
readings.
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I wish to turn now to a question concerning the
relationship between the intransitive and transitive
readings of forms of 'think’. With some verbs, their
transitive and intransitive readings are logically related
in a way that we shall make explicit, shortly. For the
moment, consider the verb 'eat’. In my edition of
Webster’s, a principal transitive sense of this verb is
claimed to be: "to take in through the mouth as food". The
principal intransitive sense is: "to take food or a meal".
Now it seems to me that if we are allowed just a little
leeway in interpreting these entries, instead of taking the
proposal for the intransitive at its letter, we could accept
in its place: to take in food or a meal through the mouth
as food
. If this is acceptable then the concept expressed
by eat on its principal intransitive reading is plainly
derived from the transitive reading cited above. To eat
(v.i.) is just to eat (v.t.) food or a meal. Then we could
expect the following inference to be valid (with superscript
i or '
t
’ to indicate the intended reading, transitive or
intransitive, respectively):
( I ) ( 5 ) x i s eating 1
:: There is something that x is eating 1"1
.
And indeed on suitable intransitive and transitive readings
this inference does seem an acceptable one. Of course it is
important to separate the "habitual" intransitive reading
available for (5), from the "occurrent" reading on which it
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serves to report occurring events of eating. The "habitual
reading is the one called for more evidently by the
f ol lowing
Jones is eating these days; her anorexia seems
under control
.
But even in this case there is a correspondi ng habitual
transitive, manifest for
Jones is eating things these days; her anorexia
seems under control
.
Let me use a superscript 'h’ to indicate an habitual
reading; then the following seems an acceptable inference:
(II) x is eat i ng h ’ ^ these days.
:: There are things that x is eating h,t these days
Let us say that an intransitive reading of a given
verb, VP, supports complement quantification for a
transitive reading of VP if the two readings are related in
such a way as to warrant the introduction of an existential
quantifier (with singular or plural inflection) as displayed
in inferences (I) and (II). Then we may say that there are
at least some intransitive readings available for forms of
the verb 'eat’ that support complement quantification for
certain available transitive readings of those forms. Let
me add that I am not claiming that every intransitive
reading of a verb that supports complement quantification of
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a transitive reading is derivative, got from the transitive
reading of the verb in the manner of this intransitive
reading of 'eat’
.
Not all verbs that admit both transitive and
intransitive readings have intransitive readings that
support complement quantification for any of their
transitive readings. We considered a case in point in
Chapter 1. Whatever exactly the relationship may be between
the intransitive and transitive readings of 'kick’, it does
not warrant the following inference:
x is kicking 1
:: There is something that x is kicking1
.
Timmy may be kicking and screaming as he is dragged from the
TV room to his bedroom, even though there isn’t anything
that he is managing to kick.
Does the intransitive reading of 'think’ support
complement quantification for the generic, relational
reading? In other words, attending to the present
progressive, does the following inference hold, if the
conclusion is understood according to the relational,
generic reading of 'is thinking’ noted above:
(III) x i s th i nki ng 1
:: There is something that x is thinking 1 .
Perhaps it will be of interest to consider a case of the
sort that inclines me to think that this inference fails.
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Suppose that a connoisseur of antique furniture, let us
call him, ‘'Max", has been administered a drug which causes
him to have extremely real-seeming hallucinations of things
he would like to possess. He is staying in a hospital room
that in fact has nothing but dull, institutional
furnishings, but he is having a very vivid hallucination at
the moment and this hallucination is of an ornate,
immaculately preserved, 18th-century Chippendale chair
sitting in a corner of the room. The corner is, in fact,
quite empty. Max stares in amazement; he is thinking: That
1 s a mint-condition, late 70’s Chippendale. There is
nothing else that is crossing his mind at the moment; he
isn’t engaged in any wondering or wishing, though he might
be soon enough. To put it roughly, the complete text of
Max s thinking at the moment is reported by the ascription I
made just above:
(6) Max is thinking: That is a mint-condition, late
70 ’s Chippendale.
I am inclined to say, concerning such cases, that there
needn’t be anything that Max is occurrently believing. To
get an idea why I am so inclined, I invite the reader to
consider what proposition it is that Max could be said to be
occurrently believing in this case. And keep in mind that
there shouldn’t be any ad-hoc variation in which proposition
we claim Max to be occurrently believing, as we go from this
case of hallucination to veridical cases in which there j_s a
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chair that he is looking at, and he’s actually managing to
think of it that it’s a mint-condition Chippendale, though
the complete text of what is on Max’s mind is still reported
by (6). I assume such veridical cases are possible. My
inclination is to say that, in contrast to such veridical
cases, in the case of hallucination, there needn’t be any
proposition that Max is occurrently believing.
Isn’t he believing the proposition that there is a
chair before him, or the proposition that furniture exists?
I grant that in such cases, it is most likely that he does
bel i eve that there is a chair before him, and that furniture
exists. But I would be inclined to deny that it follows,
simply from the description of the case as it stands, that
either of these propositions— that there is a chair before
him or that furniture exists— are ones that he is
occurren tly believing
. What about the proposition that that
chad r is a mint-condition, late 70’s Chippendale? Isn’t Max
at least occurrently believing i
t
? But which proposition
are we supposed to be picking out here? One concerning some
chair of which Max is having an hallucination? But in the
description of the case, the corner of the room he is
attending to is in fact quite bare. Then I would claim that
in this case, there’s no proposition about any such a chair
O
for Max to occurrently believe.
At any rate, if there are cases meeting the above
description in which there isn’t any proposition that Max is
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occurrently believing, then he isn’t occurrently believing
anything. And if this is the case— if he isn’t occurrently
believing anyth i ng— then he surely isn’t thinking anything.
After all, according to the description of the case, he
isn’t wondering anything, or wishing any th i ng . . . he is
thinking something in this situation only if he is
occurrently believing something, and in this situation, that
condition isn’t met; or so I’m inclined to say.
Nevertheless, Max is thinking. He is engaging in some
mental activity properly reported by (6), and the activity
in question seems to me just as clear a case of thinking as
any other mental activity in which one could be engaged. If
this is right, then there are circumstances with respect to
which Max satisfies the premise of (III) (for 'x’), but with
respect to which he does not satisfy the conclusion of
(III). So, I am inclined to think that (III) is not valid,
and consequently that the intransitive readings available
for a given form of the present progressive of 'think’ do
not support complement quantification for any available
transitive readings. But I haven’t intended here to give
the reader much grounds to share this inclination; I propose
to leave it as an open question whether the intransitive
reading of the present progressive supports complement
quantification for any transitive readings that may be
available for this form of the verb. 4
In Chapter 1, I proposed to use the gerund 'thinking’
as a common noun to stand for events of thinking, "instances
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Of activity involving particular persons doing some
thinking". If, in this characterization of the activity in
question, 'persons doing some thinking’ is understood to
mean the same thing as 'persons thinking’ on the
intransitive reading of the verb— this is how I think it is
to be understood in common parlance—then I can continue to
abide by my stipulation. And it is worth noting that if
what I have said in this section concerning the intransitive
reading is correct, then events of occurrent believing,
wondering and wishing alike may be counted as examples of
what I am referring to as "thinkings".
^ ^ Readings Available for Pi spl aved-sentence Ascriptions
Let me use the phrase di spl ayed-sentence ascription"
for any sentence of the form
( F3 ) t ...think...: 0
where substituends for 't* are referring terms, substituends
for '...think...’ are suitably inflected forms of the verb
'think’ and where substituends of 0 are sentences (of any
mood). It is worth noting that a variety of forms of
'think’ may figure in such ascriptions. We have already
noted d i spl ayed-sentence ascriptions formed with the present
progressive; but the main verb may be a progressive of any
other tense as well.
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The simple present can figure in such ascriptions, too,
though as far as I have been able to discern, a certain
usage— the so-called " report! ve" usage— is required. This
reportive usage is one on which the simple present tense of
an event verb serves to describe a situation, whether
present, past, future, or even hypothetical or fictional, as
if it were unfolding before the describer’s very eyes— in
the manner of a sports-caster describing the unfolding
events of, say, a baseball game: “McElroy returns to the
mound. He winds up. Wilson raises his bat. The
pi tch.
. .Wi Ison swings; he connects
... i
t
’
s
a hard line-drive
to center field...", etc.
In a similar fashion, we could describe a scene by
say i ng
:
Ernie stops in his tracks. He thinks: How am I going
to get out of here? Suddenly he begins to retrace his
steps
.
The second sentence in this passage
He thinks: How am I going to get out of here?
is an instance of (F3) formed with the simple present. I
don’t see that there is any way to interpret such a sentence
without understanding it on the reportive usage.
It also seems to me that, in general, these displayed-
sentence ascriptions require generic readings for whatever
forms of the verb 'think’ they contain. If we fix
appropriate substituends for *t’ and '...think...’ in (F3),
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say t* and think*, we will have the schema
[ t* think*
: 0 ]
.
It seems to me that think* will be univocal across all
instances of this schema, and yet these instances serve to
report events of wondering, wishing and occurrent believing
alike (or to report the past or future occurrences of events
of these various sorts, depending on the tense of think*).
The sort of event reported will vary depending on what
sentence is the substituend for'0' in the instance at hand,
but there is, I would claim, no correspondi ng variance in
the reading of think
. Consequently, a generic reading is
i nvol ved
.
But which generic reading? In section 4.1, I attended
to a relational, and hence transitive generic reading, but
in the previous subsection, we noted that that there are
intransitive as well as transitive generic readings
available for various forms of 'think’. Is it plain which
of these is involved in our i nterpretat i on of displayed-
sentence ascriptions? Let us consider this matter, briefly.
Perhaps a plausible initial perspective would be the
following. In our i nterpretati on of any given displayed-
sentence ascription, the substituend of '...think...’ calls
for a relational, generic reading, one on which the verb
expresses a relation, call it "R". Further, the displayed
sentence--the substituend for '0’— serves as a referring
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term in such ascriptions, designating a certain thought, x.
(One would presumably want to say that the reference of a
given substituend for ' 0' may vary with context of
utterance; we may set this point aside for the present.)
Then, as this view would have it, if the given instance of
( F3 ) expresses a truth, the thing expressed is true because
the referent of the substituend of 't’ bears R to x.
Let us confine our attention to instances of (F3)
formed with the present progressive. Points analogous to
those I shall make in what follows would hold concerning
displayed-sentence ascriptions in which some other form of
think figures as main verb. Now, in fact, in the case of
any of a large number of present progressive displayed-
sentence ascriptions, if a given ascription expresses a
truth, the subject of the ascription may properly be said to
be thinking something that is indicated in some fashion by
the displayed sentence. If the following, for example,
expresses a truth
Ernie is thinking; How am I going to get out of
here?
we would say, I think, that there is a thing indicated by
the displayed i nter rogat i ve
,
and this thing is something
that is crossing Ernie’s mind or occurring to him; it is
something Ernie is thinking. And in this latter claim--that
this thing is something Ernie is thi nki ng--the relational
reading of 'is thinking’ is surely involved.
92
Such observations may be thought to lend credence to
the general view of displayed-sentence ascriptions cited
just above, that a relational reading of the contained form
of 'think’ is called for, and that the displayed sentence
serves as a device of reference, and denotes, if the
ascription expresses a truth, an item in the modal range of
the relation expressed by the relevant form of 'think’ on
its relational reading. However, I am inclined to think
that this view is mistaken and my reasons for thinking so
are connected to considerations canvassed in the preceding
section
.
Let me continue to attend to the case of displayed-
sentence ascriptions formed from the present progressive
(3rd person singular). I am inclined to believe that such
an ascription,
[t is thinking: 0]
for suitable t and sentence, 0, may be true and the
following true as well:
[There isn’t anything that t* is thinking.]
Recall the case of the hallucinating antique collector
discussed before. Such cases suggest that the view outlined
just above is incorrect. For I suggested, with respect to
the case described, that the sentence:
(6) Max is thinking: that is a mint-condition, late
70 ’s Chippendale.
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expresses something true in the situation, while the
sentence
(8) There is something that Max is thinking,
does not. Then I am inclined to say that (6) and
There isn’t anything that Max is thinking.
express things that may be true with respect to the same
situation. And I take it that if this is the case then,
contrary to the view under consideration, (6) may express
something true even though there isn’t anything to which Max
bears the relation expressed by the progressive, on its
relational, generic reading.
Let me stress that although I am inclined to think that
(6) expresses something compatible with what is expressed by
(9)
,
I am not claiming that this has been established; I
have left it an open question. Consequently, I do not take
these considerations to settle— in the negative— the
question of whether (6) has an i nterpretati on involving a
relational, generic reading.
However, if it is not the case that (6) has an
i nterpretat i on involving a relational reading of 'is
thinking’, and we retain my suggestion above that the
reading of 'is thinking’ will be univocal throughout
di spl ayed-sentence ascriptions in which the present
progressive is the main verb, then in general the reading
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available for such an ascription will not be a relational
one. And I think a similar conclusion would be sug 9ested
concerning readings of other forms of 'think’ figuring as
main verbs in di spl ayed-sentence ascriptions, such as the
simple present figuring in (7).
Perhaps a natural view to adopt in response to these
considerations is that a given di spl ayed-sentence ascription
should be understood to take the intransitive reading of its
main verb. The displayed sentence itself, then, could be
viewed not as a referring phrase denoting something thought,
but rather as an adverbial modifier, its function
assimilated to that of the prepositional phrase, 'with great
concentration’, or the adverb, 'fast’, in such ascriptions
as
Max is thinking with great concentration
Ernie thinks fast
On this view, we take the occurrence of the present
progressive and the simple present figuring in (6) and (7),
respectively, to have their intransitive readings, and we
take the displayed sentence in either case to indicate, not
something the subject is thinking, but rather a way or
manner in which he is thinking. Whether this is the correct
view to take concerning the reading of the form of 'think’
contained in a d i spl ayed-sentence ascription, and whether
this is the correct view concerning the semantic function of
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am not
the displayed-sentence itself, are questions that I
as yet able to answer.
4 ‘ 4 ~adlnqs Avail able for In di c ative-Clause Ascri nt.innc
Let me use the phrase "indicative-clause ascription" to
stand for any ascriptions of the form:
( F4 ) t ...think... that 0
where substituends for 't’ are referring terms, substituends
for '...think...’ are suitably inflected forms of the verb
'think’ and where substituends for * 0 ' are indicative
sentences. What reading of the contained form of 'think’ is
available or called for in such ascriptions?
4 *4.1 The Belief-Relational Account
One might well suppose that with indicative-clause
ascriptions, we have the clearest case where forms of the
verb, 'think’, take doxastic readings. The idea, alluded to
et the outset of section 4.1, is that there is a reading of
these forms on which they either express occurrent belief or
else the non-occurrent attitude of belief, and that
instances of (F4) require i nterpretati ons that involve this
doxastic, relational reading of progressive forms of
'think’. This proposal would account for the fact noted in
the preceding chapter that instances of (FI) have an
i nterpretat i on on which they serve solely to report
occurrent believings, for it is just this i nterpretat i on
,
so
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the idea goes, that involves a reading of the progressive
forms of 'think’ on which these forms express occurrent
belief. Let me try to convey this idea somewhat more fully.
We may distinguish two types of reading available for
forms of the verb, 'think’: event readings and state
readings. The first type has already been cited in our
discussion of intransitive readings—event readings are ones
on which the verb applies to events of thinking or to states
having essentially to do with the occurrence of such events.
(Habitual readings are examples of the latter sort; for
instance, "Jones thinks strange things these days" is
ambiguous; one i nterpretat i on of the sentence involves a
state reading, but another available interpretation involves
an habitual reading on which the claim expressed is more or
less this: it tends to be these days that the things Jones
is thinking, when she is thinking things, are strange. With
this paraphrase, the concern with events thinking on Jones’
part is manifest.) State readings, by contrast, are ones on
which a given form of 'think’ applies to states, but not
states that essentially concern the occurrence of any events
of thinking; on these readings forms of the verb are close
in meaning to cor respond i ng forms of 'believe’.
As far as I have been able to tell, readings of either
type are available for any form of 'think’, as it figures in
instances of (F4), and as well in other constructions. With
the simple present, the most likely i nterpretat i on of an
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instance of ( F4 ) is one that involves a state reading. Thus
(10) William thinks that Sarah will not say "Yes."
would normally be taken to report a belief that William has.
But an event reading is available if we take the sentence on
a report l ve usage. This i nterpretat i on can be elicited by
features of the surrounding discourse. So for example, in
William looks up Sarah’s phone number. He picks up thephone, and begins to dial. Suddenly, William thinksthat Sarah will not say "Yes." He hesitates; puts thephone down resignedly, and begins to pace again.
Here, the occurrence of (10) calls for an interpretation
involving an event reading of the simple present. The most
likely i nterpretat i on is not (merely) that William believes
that Sarah will not say Yes. but that he suddenly has the
thought that this is so. 5
Progressive forms in indicative-clause ascriptions may
also take either event or state readings. So far we have
concerned ourselves with i nterpretat i ons of such ascriptions
on which they serve to report events. By contrast,
cons i der
:
(11) His testimony has been so persuasive that those
close to the case are thinking that the .jury will
acquit him .
Here, the most likely i nterpretat i on of the underlined
clause is one on which the claim expressed does not entail
that those close to the case are engaged in events of
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thinking at the moment; on the most natural interpretation
of this clause, the claim expressed could be true even if
(11) were uttered in the middle of the night, and all
concerned were sleeping a deep and dreamless sleep. Rather,
on this interpretation, the clause serves to report a state
of mind of those close to the case: that these people are
all of a mind" that the person in question will be
acquitted
.
This state reading for the progressive can be rendered
unlikely if we change the sentential context. If the
subject phrase is singular, and the indicative-clause
ascription at issue is standing alone, it is very difficult
to get an interpretation on which the ascription reports a
state of belief rather than an event of occurrent believing:
( 12 ) The defendant is thinking that the jury will
acquit him.
This is not to say that the only i nterpretat i on available
for (12) is one involving an event reading of 'is thinking’,
only that an interpretation on which (12) serves to report a
state of belief is far less likely here than it is for (11).
I should emphasize that by "event reading", I do not
mean solely readings that may be said to apply to presently
occurring events. An event reading is likely for the past
progressive figuring here:
The defendant was thinking that the jury would
acquit him.
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though there is a sense in which one might say that this
ascription serves to report a state: on one likely
interpretation at least, it could be said to report the
defendant’s being such that at some time in the past he was
thinking that the jury would acquit him. I assume that
there is such a state. Still, this state is one that the
defendant is in now (assuming the ascription expresses a
truth), in virtue of the past occurrence of an event of
thinking, and the above ascription serves as well to report
that event. Accordingly, I would count the reading of 'was
thinking’ involved as an event reading. Similarly, the main
clause underlined here,
The moment court is adjourned, the defendant will
be thinking that the jury will acquit him .
on one natural i nterpretat i on
,
could be described as
reporting a present state of the defendant, but it is a
state that the defendant is in, in virtue of a future
occurrence of an event of thinking. The reading of the
future progressive involved here is again an event reading.
Now the idea proposed above concerning the
i nterpretat i on of indicative-clause ascriptions can be
expressed more fully. For simplicity, let me restrict
attention here to such ascriptions in which the simple
present or the present progressive is the main verb; I shall
call these "present-tense ascriptions":
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—
Be 1 i ef Relational Account.
i ) In any present-tense ascription, the
one or the other of two readings* a
an event reading;
main verb takes
state reading and
ii) both readings are relational, and
i i i ) the main verb expresses belief
occurrent belief, on the event
on the state
read i ng
.
read i ng
,
Belief and occurrent belief are counterparts in the
sense discussed in Chapter 3. There, we noted that some
verbs of attitude are such that their progressive forms, on
event readings, express occurrent counterparts (the
principal occurrent counterparts) of the attitudes
expressed, on state readings, by the simple present forms of
those verbs. Wish’ and 'wonder’ were the cases we
considered then. From the standpoint of the Belief-
Relational account, the verb 'think’ is another example. On
the event and state reading involved in the most likely
interpretations of, say
William is thinking that Sarah will not say "Yes."
William thinks that Sarah will not say "Yes."
(respectively), the present progressive expresses the
principal counterpart of the attitude expressed by the
simple present form. In this regard, the Belief-Relational
account sees the verbs in the preceding two instances of
(F4) as related in their behavior in these contexts in a way
quite analogous to the way in which the corresponding forms
of the verb 'wonder’ are related as these figure in pair
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William is wondering whether Sarah will say "Yes."
William wonders whether Sarah will say "Yes."
On first pass at least, this view on the relation between
event and state readings of the present progressive and
simple present (respectively) of the verb 'think’ may seem
quite plausible.
4 ’ 4 * 2
-
Reservations Con cerning the Belief-Relational Account
Despite its initial plausibility, there are two
considerations that lead me to doubt the Belief-Relational
account; though I do not say it is plainly mistaken. The
two considerations may in fact be closely connected. Let me
canvass them first; in the next subsection, I shall suggest
the way in which I suspect they may be connected. The first
point can be put very briefly; the second consideration is
more telling, I think, but requires a lengthier exposition.
1) If there is an event reading that expresses
occurrent belief, as proposed by this account, it seems odd
that it should appear, as I noted in 4.2, that all
intransitive readings available for forms of the verb,
'think’ are gener i
c
. If the Belief-Relational account were
right, one might expect there to be an intransitive reading
more closely connected to the purported relational event
reading on which the present tense forms of the verb are
supposed to express occurrent belief.
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2) There is what seems to me a somewhat striking fact
about certain sentences obtained from indicative-clause
ascriptions by removing their main indicative clauses, and
either binding the complement position with quantifiers or
introducing expressions of other sorts as complements; the
fact in question is not very easily accommodated by the
Belief-Relational account.
Let me attend first to cases where we begin with an
indicative-clause ascription, and extract its main
indicative clause, binding the complement position of the
main verb by a preceding quantifier. And for simplicity,
let me confine my attention to ascriptions formed with the
present progressive. A representat i ve example of the sort
of operation in question is displayed in going from (12) to
( 12a)
:
(12) The defendant is thinking that the jury will acquit
him.
(12a) There is something the defendant is thinking.
What is striking is this: in general, it appears that the
only event reading available for the main occurrence of the
progressive in the resulting ascription will be a gener i
c
reading. In the case of (12)/(12a), it seems to me that the
latter ascription may be so interpreted that it serves to
report an event of wishing or wondering, as well as an event
of occurrent believing. If the defendant is wondering at
the moment whether the judge will give him a light sentence,
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so
,
or
or if he is wishing that the judge would do
occur rent 1 y believing that the judge will do so, however the
case may be, it seems to me that such mental activity is
properly reported by (12a). And as long as an event reading
for the progressive in (12a) is fixed, so that our
interpretation of the ascription is one on which it serves
to report some ongoing mental activity (it is hard to get a
state of mind" interpretation in this case anyway; cf. the
interpretation of (11) noted above), I cannot detect any
such interpretation on which this sentence serves to report
exclusively occurrent believings. The only available
i nterpretati on seems to be this one on which the sentence
serves to report occurrent believings, wishings and
wonderings alike. Then I take it that the reading of the
main verb involved in this i nterpretat i on is the generic
read i ng
.
This is striking because the introduction of an
existential quantifier would seem to be entirely innocuous;
its introduction in (12a), binding the complement position
formerly occupied by an indicative clause, ought not
eliminate a relational reading available for 'is thinking’
as it occurs in (12). We would seem to have a
strai ghtforward case of existential general i zati on-- i ndeed
,
what is expressed by (12) does entail what is expressed by
(12a)--yet the only event reading available for 'is
thinking’ in (12a), it seems to me, is a generic one.
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alleged occurrent
We find a similar absence of the
belief reading when the complement position of (12) is
altered in other, seemingly innocuous ways. Rather than
bind the complement position by an antecedent quantifier, we
may instead replace the indicative clause with a wide
variety of suitable complement phrases— demonstrati ves
,
quantifier noun phrases, definite or indefinite
descriptions. By and large, the result is the same: we
obtain a sentence such that if it is interpreted to report
an event, that i nterpretat i on would seem to require a
generic reading of 'is thinking’. 6
Consider the following:
(12b) The defendant is thinking something strange.
(12c) The defendant is thinking the same thing you are.
Either of these, it seems to me, may be so interpreted that
it serves to report an event of wishing or wondering as well
as an event of occurrent believing. If the defendant is
wondering at the moment how he’s ever going to find a
certain pair of polka-dot swimming trunks when he’s in jail,
and the man knows he is about to be sentenced to death for
murder
,
I think we may properly report his current mental
activity by issuing (12b). Perhaps you don’t agree that
this would be a strange thing for the defendant to be
thinking; but that doesn’t affect the central point, namely,
that the question on his mind, what’s occurring to him at
the moment,
_i_s a thing for him to be thinking, whether its a
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strange thing for him to be thinking or not. And if at this
very moment the defendant is wishing that the judge would
give him a light sentence, and that is what I am wishing at
the moment too, then it would be appropriate for you to
utter (12c), addressing me. Under the circumstances
described, it seems to me that this sentence serves to
report, correctly, the mental activity in which this
defendant and I are engaged, though it is not fully specific
as regards what sort of mental activity we’re engaged in.
Moreover
,
if we attend just to interpretations of these
sentences on which they serve to report events, I do not see
that anything but a generic reading is available for the
contained occurrences of 'is thinking’. For it seems to me
that if we interpret (12b) and (12c) to be reporting
occurring events at all (as opposed to states of belief, as
in the case of (11) considered above), our i nterpretat i on
will not be one on which these sentences serve exclusively
to report events of occurrent believing. Then I take it
that a reading of the verb on which it expresses occurrent
belief is not involved in this interpretation.
Yet in either case, the replacement of the indicative
clause in (12) by the relevant complement seems innocuous:
it is hard to see why such replacement should result in a
shift in the reading required of 'is thinking’, if the
reading involved in (12) is itself a relational reading, as
the Belief-Relational account suggests.
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Perhaps
,
consider some
for contrast, it will be worthwhile to
examples involving other verbs where
modification of flanking positions can be expected to result
in a shift in available readings. There are certainly cases
Where substitution of one noun phrase for another in the
subject or complement position of the main verb of a
sentence affects what interpretations are available for the
resulting sentence. I have been able to think of three
general cases where this phenomenon might be expected to
arise:
1) Id ioms Some clear examples of this phenomenon are cases
where the main verbs figure in idioms. There are
i nterpretat i ons available for sentences of the form
t bought t*
in which 'the farm’ is the substituend for * t* ’ that are not
available for other instances of this form. Consider
(13a) Maggie bought the farm.
(13b) Maggie bought that red dress.
Here the substitution of the complement 'that red dress’ for
the farm is not innocuous since the resulting sentence no
longer contains the idiomatic expression 'bought the farm’.
The idiom functions as an independent lexical item, and is
not interpreted by way of any relational reading of the verb
'bought’. On the other hand, (13a) does admit an
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i nterpretation that involves a relational reading of
'bought'; perhaps Maggie bought a dairy farm in Minnesota.
But this is the very reading still aval lable-and presumably
most likely—for the occurrence of 'bought’ in (13b).
2) Grammatical Agreement Hebrew provides another class of
cases where substitution in a flanking position of the main
verb may be expected to affect what interpretations are
available for the resulting sentence. There are certain
nouns in Hebrew that, when occurring as subject terms of
verbs, require agreement in gender with those verbs. For
example, there is a verb that means 'to float’ whose
feminine simple present inflection, 'tsafa’, has the same
spelling as the masculine simple past inflection of a verb
that means 'to observe’ (the pronunciation involved is
different, I’ve been told). Then sentences in which 'tsafa’
occurs as main verb may lack an i nterpretati on on which they
report present floatings, or they may lack an i nterpretati on
on which they report past observings, depending on whether
the subject term requires the masculine or feminine
inflection. 7 If we substitute the feminine 'sirah’ for the
masculine 'mashkif’ in
(14a) Hamashkif tsafa (The observer observed),
obtai ni ng
(14b) Hasirah tsafa (The ship floats).
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Thus
,
we are forced to shift our reading of the main verb,
substitution of a noun phrase of feminine gender for
'mashki in (,4a) is not innocuous. In this case the shift
in available reading is due to a lexical feature of the
subst l tuend
,
and the grammatical rule of Hebrew requiring
gender agreement in this case between subject and verb. 8
3) Semantic Constraints We can find cases in English, I
believe, where substitution of one expression for another in
the complement position requires a shift in readings of the
main verb, and the shift is forced by a semantical feature
of the substi tuend
. I am inclined to think that the reading
involved when we may correctly say that someone believes a
£grson is d_i fferent from the reading on which 'believes’
expresses the intentional attitude of belief. I assume that
the latter is involved in
(15a) Jones believes that the defendant will be
acqu i tted
.
So when we proceed from (15a) to
(15b) Jones believes him
a shift in how we read 'believes’ seems required. Then
replacement of the indicative clause in the first ascription
by the personal pronoun, 'him’, would not be innocuous; in
this case a semantic feature of the substituend— that it is
restricted in its denotation to things that are male--would
force the shift in readings.^
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I can think of one other sort of example from English
that I think falls under the present class of cases, where
semantic constraints determine available readings. Many
event verbs have transitive readings on which they express
relations between the subjects of the events to which they
apply, and things that are not constituents of those events.
An example of the sort of reading I have in mind is
available for the verb 'hit’. One transitive reading,
plainly a relational reading, of this verb is one on which
it expresses a relation between things that can be subjects
of events of hittings and things that can be objects of such
events--physi cal objects. Let me call this the "corporal"
reading of the verb. I believe there is another transitive
reading however that is operant when we speak of someone
hitting a home run. I take it that 'home run’ applies to
particular events in baseball games. I am not quite
confident that this is the proper classification. At any
rate, whatever sort of thing home runs may be, they are not
the sort of thing one can be said to hit in the corporal
sense, they are not physical objects, they are not spatially
extended (though presumably, like events of many sorts, they
may be said, at least roughly speaking, to have a spatial
location.) Then since what we say when we speak of people
hitting home runs is often true, there must be some other
sense, besides the corporal one, in which persons may be
said to hit things.
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It might be suggested that talk of hitting home runs is
idiomatic. I think this is not very plausible, for a couple
easons. First, we may bind the complement position with
quantifiers, and the usage is not tongue in cheek. Plainly
we may speak of a person hitting several home runs in a
given game; we may say that there were some that he hit in
the second inning, but that most were hit in the third. We
can say that he hit something in the ninth but we can’t
remember what (was it a home run, a ground-rule double?)
All this strikes me as normal usage. By contrast, if I say
bought'^t ?wo
C
dly
y
s
0
agor
rm ^ bOU9ht Und She
and intend by this that Maggie died (two days ago), I am
engaging in a play on words; the usage is not standard.
Second, there is a class of complements that are
intersubstitutible, sal va i nterpretati one We may speak of
a person hitting a line drive, a ground-rule double, etc.
There seems to be something that the verb 'hit’ commonly
means as it figures in any such ascription. This seems to
me to suggest that a genuine relational reading is available
for the verb in these ascriptions, and that the usage is not
i d i omat i c
.
If this is right then we have a fairly clear case where
altering the complement will affect the readings available
for the verb: a corporal reading is available for 'hit’
it figures in
1 1 1
as
(16a) Babe Ruth hit it.
but not in
(16b) Babe Ruth hit the last home run of his career.
Thus the substitution of 'the last home run of his career’
’ n * 16a ( i s not innocuous. I assume that the shift
in interpretation here is due to a semantic constraint tying
the readings available for 'hit’ in these occurrences to the
meanings of terms occupying its complement position.
To sum up, I have considered three sorts of cases where
the substitution of one term for another in complement
position (or the introduction of a quantifier binding that
position) may not be an innocuous operation: cases
involving idioms, cases in which there is grammatical
agreement between verb and complement, and cases involving
semantic constraints. If a verb and complement term figure
together as part of an idiom, then it seems likely that no
substitution for the complement will be innocuous: with any
substitution we lose the idiom. But in some cases involving
grammatical agreement and semantic constraints, we can
anticipate that the substitution of certain terms into the
relevant positions will be innocuous, no matter the prior
occupant
.
There are dual-gender nouns in Hebrew that can
accompany verbs with masculine as well as feminine
1 1 2
inflection.
'shemesh 1 (Sun) is an example. Substituting
this term for either 'mashkif or ’sirah’ in (14a) or b)
above does not eliminate the reading originally available
for the main verb (But see note 8). Thus,
(14c) Hashemesh tsafa.
is ambiguous; the sentence may be interpreted to mean either
that the sun observed, or that the sun floats.
In the case of 'believes’, we can replace the
complement of either (15a) or b) by the pronoun, 'it’, and
clearly not rule out the reading called for in the original.
If Jones has been consulting an oracle, the following may
express a truth,
(15c) Jones believes it
with 'it’ denoting the oracle and 'believes’ taking the
reading it has in (15b). On the other hand, if Jones has
just heard that oracles are generally unreliable, again,
(15c) may express a truth, this time with 'it’ denoting the
thing that Jones has just heard about the reliability of
oracles, and 'believes’ taking its i ntent i onal -att i tude
reading. Thus, 'believes’, as it figures in (15c), has
either reading available. Substitution of 'it’ for either
the personal pronoun in (15b) or the indicative clause in
(15a) is innocuous: it doesn’t rule out any reading
available for the sentence prior to substitution. The same
1 1 3
point holds concerning the substitution of 'it' for 'the
last home run of his career’ in (16b).
Introduction of quantifiers may or may not be
innocuous. Binding the complement position of ‘believes’ in
(15a) with the antecedent quantifier 'There is someone' may
not be innocuous. It is at least not clear to me that the
intentional attitude reading is available for 'believes' as
it occurs in
( 1 5d ) There is someone Jones believes
(but see reservations concerning (15b) expressed in Note 9 ).
Binding the complement position of ‘hit’ by the quantifier,
'There was a home run’, won’t be innocuous. The occurrence
of ’hit’ in
(16c) There was a home run Ruth hit in 1922 that no one
will forget.
cannot take the corporal reading.
On the other hand, introducing the quantifier 'There is
something’ to bind the complement position, either in the
case of 'believe’ or 'hit’, seems pretty clearly innocuous.
(16d) There was something Ruth hit in the third inning.
is ambiguous. The corporal reading is possible, but I think
the "home run" reading is more likely. Was it a home run he
hit, or a double, or was it that sacrifice fly?
(15e) There is something Jones believes.
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is ambiguous too. The thing in question satisfying
Jones believes x
may be either the oracle Jones has been consulting, or
rather the thing that Jones heard about the reliability of
oracles, depending on which reading of 'believe’ is at
i ssue
.
Now let’s return to the matter of readings available
for is thinking’, as that verb figures in (12) and (12a) -
c). I shall confine my attention to the case of (12)/(l2a).
I can see no reason to suppose that introduction of the
quantifier, 'there is something’, binding the complement
position should, in this case, rule out readings available
for the main verb, when the introduction of this quantifier
in the case of (15e) and ( 1 6 d ) has no such effect.
Moreover, it is hard to see what reason could be offered by
a proponent of the Belief-Relational account. That account
itself proposes a relational reading of the verb as the one
involved in the relevant i nterpretat i on of (12); this would
seem to rule out the possibility that the shift in
i nterpretat i on arises because the verb is figuring there as
part of an idiomatic expression. In contrast with the case
of (14a) and b), there are no apparent syntactic constraints
that could be expected to require a shift in readings in
going from (12) to (12a). And presumably, in contrast with
are no semantic
the case of (15d) or (16c), there
restrictions accompanying the introduction of the quantifier
that could call for a shift in readings. It seems to me
that if there were a relational reading involved in our
interpretation of ( 12 ) on which the progressive expressed
occurrent belief, we ought to expect there to be some such
reading discernible for (12a), a reading on which we could
expect (12a) to assert, in effect, that there is something
Jones occurrently believes. Yet no such reading seems
avai lable.
Let me summarize the present line of argument against
the Belief-Relational account by formulating it with
explicit premises and conclusion. Here is an argument:
An_ Argument Agains t the Belief-Relational Arm. mi-
i ) If the Belief-Relational account is correct, then
any event read i ng avai 1 abl e for 'is thinking’ in(12) is one on which it expresses occurrent
bel ief
.
ii) There is an event reading available for the
occurrence of 'is thinking’ in (12)
i i i
)
The event readings avai lable for the occurrence of
'is thinking’ in (12a) are precisely the event
readings available for the verb as it occurs in
(12).
There is no event reading available for the
occurrence of 'is thinking’ in (12a) on which it
expresses occurrent belief.
There is an event reading for 'is thinking’ as it
occurs in (12) on which it doesn’t express
occurrent belief
The Belief-Relational account is incorrect.
iv)
:: v)
:: vi)
I am not sure that this argument is successful. I think i)
and ii) are clearly true. I am inclined to accept iv)
because I cannot myself detect any occurrent belief reading
for (12a). Yet I am not certain about this. I am inclined
to accept ni)— that the introduction of the quantifier in
(12a) does not affect available readi ngs--but again I am not
certain of this. Nevertheless, these considerations seem to
me to provide at least some reason to question whether the
Belief-Relational account of indicative-clause ascriptions
is correct.
It may be that both sets of considerations against the
Belief-Relational account canvassed in this subsect i on— the
point about intransitive readings that I mentioned briefly
at the start, and the present point about lack of any but
generic event readings available for (12a) - c)— are
consequences of the same general feature of event readings
of the verb 'think’. In the following subsection, I shall
discuss this possibility.
4.4.3 A Conjecture Concerning Event Readings
If we look beyond indicative-clause ascriptions, we
find that i nterpretat i ons i nvol vi ng event readings of
various forms of the verb 'think’ are often called for.
Contrast the following two sentences containing the simple
present form:
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(17a)
(17b)
Jones thinks some strange things on occasion.
Jones thinks some strange things at present.
My impression is that one natural interpretation of (I7 a )
involves an event reading of 'thinks’. On this
interpretation, the sentence (if it expresses a truth)
reports a fact about thinkings to which Jones is
occasionally subject; we are saying, more or less, that
Jones engages from time to time in some events of
thinking and the things she is thinking at those times are
strange. I think it is plain that this event reading is
generic. (17a), so understood, will express a truth if
Jones occasionally occurrently believes strange things, but
it will express a truth as well, on this i nterpretat i on
,
if
it has occasionally been the case that Jones is wondering
strange things, or wishing strange things.
With (17b), by contrast, such an event reading is
difficult. The most natural i nterpretat i on of this sentence
seems to be one on which what is expressed amounts more or
less to: Jones has some strange beliefs at present. As far
as I can tell, the only way to get a reading for the verb as
it figures in (17b) on which the sentence would report
something about events of thinking, in the manner of (17a),
is to take the sentence on a reportive usage. But such an
i nterpretat i on is somewhat hard to get in this case, I
think, because of 'at present’; we don’t commonly apply this
adverb to the simple present on the reportive usage.
suggests a general
This difference between (17a) and b)
distinction between those cases where forms of 'think’
actually take readings on which they express belief, and
cases where a generic reading is called for. One might
conjecture
:
Event readings of forms of the verb 'think’ areprecisely the generic readings.
If this conjecture is right, it not only accounts for the
intuitive difference noted just now between interpretations
of (17a) and b), but also explains both sets of
considerations advanced above against the Belief-Relational
account
:
1 ) If (T ) is right, we would have a simple
explanation for the apparent feature of intransitive
readings noted in section 4.2, that all such readings are
generic. For as we observed there, all intransitive
readings are event readings.
2) If (T ) is right, and if i nterpretati ons of
indicative-clause ascriptions involve event readings of
progressive forms of the verb, 'think’, then those readings
will be generic. Then, it is no longer surprising that if
we consider sentences obtained from indicative-clause
ascriptions by replacing the indicative clauses with certain
other complements, we find that, if we fix on
i nterpretat i ons of the sentences involving event readings of
the contained forms of 'think', the involved event readings
are generic. For the relevant readings of those forms
figuring in the indicative-clause ascriptions themselves are
gener i c
.
Since ( T* ) entails that there is no event reading of
the main verb in a present-tense indicative-clause
ascription on which that verb expresses occurrent belief,
(T ) and the Belief-Relational account cannot both be true.
I am not convinced that ( T* ) is true, but I think that the
matters cited above weigh in its favor. I leave the
conjecture as an open question.
4 . 5 Summary of 4.1 - 4.4
I have been concerned with what I am calling "generic"
readings of forms of the verb 'think’. Roughly speaking,
these are readings on which the verb applies equally to
thinkings of various breeds: to wishings, wonderings and
occurrent believings alike. Such readings are ubiquitous;
they appear to be available for any tense and inflection of
the verb. There are intransitive generic readings, and in
fact al
1
intransitive readings appear to be generic (4.2).
Indeed, there is some reason to believe that all event
readings of the verb, in any of its forms, are generic
readings (see discussion of (T*) just above in 4.4.3).
In section 4.1, I was especially concerned to isolate a
relational, generic reading available for the present
progressive. I think it is clear that there is such a
reading, and there are certain cases where such a reading is
clearly available for a given occurrence of the verb.
However, it is not entirely clear whether it is available in
all constructions in which a present progressive form of
'think’ figures as main verb. In particular, it is not
clear to me what to say about indicative-clause ascriptions
with the progressive. If ( T* ) is true, then since such
ascriptions certainly do allow event readings, we should
have to allow that generic readings are at least available
for the verb as it occurs in indicative-clause ascriptions;
but I am not sure that ( T* ) is correct. However, it is also
not at all clear whether there is a relational reading
available for the progressive in these ascriptions on which
it expresses occurrent belief— contrary to the proposal of
the Belief-Relational account proposed in 4.4.1. I remain
uncertain whether there is any verb of ordinary discourse
that has a reading on which it expresses occurrent belief.
I do not see a way of demonstrating that there is only
one relational, generic reading available for the present
progressive. I know of no evidence to the contrary,
however. In what follows I shall assume that there is only
one such reading, and it will be useful to have a phrase
with which to refer to the relation expressed by present
progressive forms on this reading; I shall call it, "generic
thinki ng"
.
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way of making it clear when
useful to have a
intend to express this relation of generic thinking in
claims to follow. In the formulation of principles and
assumptions, then, and occasionally in informal discussions
where the intention may not be clear enough from the
context, I Shall prefix a superscript 'gen’ to the
participle, 'thinking’, when the relational, generic reading
of the progressive is intended. So we shall employ
ascriptions of the form
(^5) t
. .
.
9en th i nk i ng t
*
where
. .
.
9en thi nki ng ’ is any present progressive form of
think with ' 9en ’ attached. I propose to accept instances
of ( F5 ) in which the substituends for 't*’ include a wide
variety of expressions that normally figure as complements
of the progressive of 'think’: demonstratives, quantifier
phrases, descriptions. Also I shall employ open formulas
obtained by putting variables in for 't’ and 't*’ in (F5),
as well as sentences that result by binding the variables in
these positions with appropriate quantifiers.
I propose, however, to avoid instances of (F5) formed
with sentential complements. There are two kinds of
sentential clauses that may occur as complements of the verb
'think’ itself (or of any of its forms). We have already
considered cases involving indicative clauses.
Interrogati ve clauses may also figure as complements of the
verb in certain forms, e.g.,
We were trying to think
Sarah to marry him.
whether William should ask
Interrogative clauses seem to be more clearly
complements of the infinitive. For example,
sentence was counted acceptable by all speake
consulted; by contrast, the following
acceptable
the precedin
rs I’ve
as
9
I was thinking whether I should tellher
.
William to ask
was considered acceptable by some but not all.
I do not know how sentential clauses function when they
appear as complements of forms of the verb 'think’. And I
am not sure what readings of the verb can be had as it
figures in ascriptions in which it has such complements.
And I do not know, in particular, whether a relational,
generic reading is available for the progressive form of the
verb as it occurs in any of these sentent i al -cl ause
ascriptions. Consequently, I would not have any idea how to
interpret instances of
t is gen thi nki ng that 0
or
t is genthinking whether 0 ;
whether the correspond i ng instances of
t is thinking that 0
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and
t is thinking whether 0
express coherent claims or not.
On occasion, I will employ other tenses and inflections
°f the verb 'think' with the 'gen' prefix, we can say that
a person was ^"thinking the same thing I was the other day;
that the person will be 9en thinking some intriguing things
in the future. On the reportive usage, we can say that a
person suddenly stops, 9enthinks something, and starts to
run away from us. I assume that the concepts expressed by
such ascriptions can be grasped well enough if one has a
grasp of the concept of generic thinking that is expressed
by the present progressive forms. In what follows, whenever
a form of the verb 'think' occurs without the 'gen' prefix,
and the verb is not accompanied by any sentential
complement, it will be safe to assume that I intend to
express the generic relation.
4 • 6 The Modal Range of Generic Thinking
Considerations advanced in 4.1 suggest that the
relation of generic thinking has the following property:
whether a person is occurrently believing something, wishing
something or wondering something, either way, the person is
genth inking something. That is:
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( 18 )
i )
i i )
i i i )
Necessarily, for any
Jy( x is occurrent
1
y
iy ( x is wishing y )
( x is wondering y
believing y ) -»
* jw ,2( - X iln 9enthinkin 9 z
-> }z( X is 9e th inking
) iz( i s 9enth inking
)
)
(18) proposes a particular link relating each of the modal
ranges of occurrent belief, wishing and occurrent wondering
to that of generic thinking. But there is a stronger claim
to be made, in the case of each of these three occurrent
attitudes, concerning the relationship of its modal range to
that of generic thinking. m 4.6.1, I shall pursue this
matter, in 4.6.2, I shall consider the question of what
other intentional attitudes besides these three have modal
ranges that are related, in the way to be discussed, to the
modal range of generic thinking.
4
- 6
-
1 1A7) and the Modal Range of Generic Thinking
For simplicity, when I wish to speak of the attitudes
of occurrent belief, wishing and occurrent wondering
jointly, let me refer to them as "the three attitudes".
Note that it will suffice for the truth of (18) that there
be some distinguished item, x, such that whenever we bear
one of the three attitudes to anything at all, it is x that
we are genthinking and no other. But positing such a
distinguished item does not conform to certain intuitions we
have concerning the relation of generic thinking. Surely,
if I am occurrently believing something and you are
occurrently believing something else, then on the generic
reading, it will be correct to say that there are distinct
things that we are thinking. A similar claim may be made
with respect to our wishing or wondering distinct thin.
So we have:
igs
(19)
( V?Vvf
n
^°je j°t/ th? three atti tudes, R,
n
f iZ
*geb R(x ’ z ^ R(y,z’), and z t z ’ )V,Z * < V s thinking z; y is ^"thinking z 5
nec
the
and z t z’ ) )
)
(19) rules out the possibility of some single distinguished
object" of thought that we are thinking whenever we bear
one of the three attitudes towards things. However, it
doesn’t rule out the possibility that there are precisely
two such "objects" of generic thinking. I think that a
stronger assumption than (19) is warranted by intuitions
concerning the "objects” of these three attitudes and of
generic thinking.
Take the case of occurrent wondering. Suppose that at
this moment, William is wondering whether Sarah will say
yes". Then there is something he is thinking. But I think
we may also say that at least one thing William is thinking
is something any others would be thinking too, provided they
too are wondering whether Sarah will say "yes" (same Sarah
in mind). If this is right, it suggests that for anything,
x, that a person can be wondering, there’s a thing that can
be 9 thought, y, such that whenever a person is wondering
x, that person is 9enthinking y. I think that the same
claims, mutatis mutandis
, are warranted concerning occurrent
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ranges
belief and wishing, an d the relationship of the modal
Of these two attitudes to that of generic thinking.
What seems to be required, minimally, is an assumption
ong these lines. for each one of the three attitudes, R,
there is a one-one correspondence, f, between R’s modal
range and the modal range of generic thinking such that
necessarily, a person bears R to a thing x only if the thing
to which f maps x is something that person is 9en thinking:
( 20 )
i )
i i )
VR( if R is
f : m- range
(
nec Vx Vy (
one of the three attitudes, then if:
R) one-one-* m-range( generic thinkin
R(y,x)
-* y is genthinking f(x) ))
9 )
There are several questions that can be stated clearly
by appeal to such presumed one-one cor respondences
,
questions that are left unsettled by (20) itself. Consider
occurrent belief; (20) guarantees that there is a function
mapping each thing in the modal range of occurrent belief to
a (perhaps proper) subset, call it "OB", of the modal range
of generic thinking. Moreover, concerning this set, OB,
( 20 ) implies:
(21) Vx( if pos z is occurrently believing x ),then Jy ( y is in OB, and nec Vz( if z is occurrently
believing x, then z is 9enthinking y ))
But this fact about OB doesn’t settle certain questions. We
may still ask: i) are the members of OB themselves in the
modal ranges of any occurrent attitudes? Perhaps they
comprise some breed of thing disjoint from any kind to which
we may bear intentional attitudes. Does OB overlap with the
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modal range of ocourrent belief itself? Perhaps, OB just, i*
the modal range of ocourrent belief. Each of these
possibilities is compatible with ( 21 ), but not settled by
i t
.
The questions just raised may be put, somewhat more
loosely, m the following way: if (20) is correct, then
whenever we occurrently believe things, there is an
associated set of things we are thinking, in the generic
sense. What is the connection between the things
occurrently believed and these associated things that we are
thinking? Are the latter items "objects" of attitudes at
all? Maybe the things we may be said to be thinking
comprise some entirely separate category of item, disjoint
from the modal ranges of any intentional attitude. On the
other hand, perhaps the things we are genthinking when we
occurrently believe things are themselves "objects" of
attitudes; indeed perhaps they are the very things that we
are then occurrently believing. None of these suggestions
is ruled out by any of (18) - (20).
One way to settle these matters is to assume that for
each of the three attitudes, R, the one-one correspondence
satisfying the two clauses of the main consequent of (20) is
an identity function. This is in fact a consequence of the
main assumption I propose to make here. On the view I
adopt, the "objects" of the three attitudes are themselves
"objects" of generic thinking. In the remainder of this
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as a starting
study, I shall be developing a position that,
point, views the relation of generic thinking as an
intentional attitude, albeit a generic one. And moreover,
on the view to be adopted here, it will in general be the
case that when one may be said to be thinking something in
virtue of bearing one of the three attitudes to a thing, x,
one thing one will then be thinking is x itself.
Accepting (20) does not force this perspective on us.
Just above, I noted several alternatives to this view that
one might adopt instead. One might deny that generic
thinking is an intentional attitude at all— it is compatible
with (20) that the modal range of generic thinking is
disjoint from that of any intentional attitude.
Nevertheless it seems to me intuitively plausible to assume
that the things we may be said to be thinking, in virtue of
occur rent 1 y believing, wishing or wondering things, are just
those things occurrently believed, wished or wondered
themsel ves
.
So I propose to adopt the following:
(A7) nec Vx nec Vy
:
i) x is occurrently believing y x is genthinking y
i i ) x is wishing y x is geftthinking y, and
iii) x is wondering y -> x is genthinking y
Roughly, (A7) tells us that any of the three attitudes is
such that necessarily, if a person bears it to a thing, then
that thing is something the person may be said to be
thinking, in the generic sense. This assumption implies
(20), and consequently (18) and (19) as well.
4 ' 6 ' 2 ^U-£h_ Attitudes Are SnP r.i cc
We may say that an attitude
according to the following:
Generic Thinking?
requires generic thinking
( D6 ) R requires R* =df nec Vx( Jy R(x,y)
fy’R (x,y’) )
(Here and in the following definition, 'R’ and
'
R*
* are to
be taken as ranging over relations generally.) Roughly, an
attitude may be said to require generic thinking if a person
can’t bear the attitude to a thing without thinking
something. An attitude’s requiring generic thinking should
be distinguished from its being such that whenever one bears
it to a thing, one is thinking that very thing. The latter
property is entailed by an attitude’s being a species of
generic thinking, which may be understood according to:
( D7 ) R is a species of R* =df nec VxVy:
1 ) R ($>y) -> R*(x,y)
,
and ii) R does not require R
Specification is stronger than requirement: the claim that
an attitude is a species of generic thinking, implies but is
not implied by the claim that it requires generic thinking.
The thesis we started with in this section, the one
expressed by (18), implies merely that the three attitudes
require generic thinking. The assumption captured in (A7),
however, together with the claim, which is surely correct,
that generic thinking does not in turn require any of the
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three attitudes, implies that each of the three attitudes
are species of generic thinking.
Are there other intentional attitudes for which there
is reason to claim that they are species of generic
thinking? I think it is clear that many familiar, non-
occurrent attitudes will not have this property. For
example, consider belief, desire and wondering. Each of
these is such that one may bear it at a time without being
engaged in any mental activity at the time. I may correctly
be said to believe that the defendant will be acquitted,
even though I am i n a deep and dreamless sleep; William may
correctly be said to wonder whether Sarah will say "yes" (on
a state reading of the present tense), even though he is in
a deep and dreamless sleep. Examples concerning many other
non-occurrent attitudes will go the same way. But a person
is thinking something only if he or she is engaged in some
mental activity. So one can, for example, believe something
without thinking anything; plainly then, one can believe
something without thinking that very thing.
I know of no familiar occurrent attitude that is
required by generic thinking, except for generic thinking
itself. Then can we say that all occurrent attitudes apart
from generic thinking are species of generic thinking?
Perhaps we may accept not only (A7) but:
(A?) For any occurrent attitude, R, nectfxVy( R(x,y) -»
x is genthinking y )
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Then we
requi red
thinking
could say at least that any occurrent attitude
by generic thinking is a species of generic
• But I think it may be doubted whether (A?)
not
i s
correct
.
I am inclined to think that there is an occurrent
attitude expressed by the present progressive of 'doubts':
when we say that a person is doubting something (and an
event reading is intended), I think we imply that the person
is engaged in an instance of a certain type of mental
activity, that of doubting. But I also suppose that the
sort of thing to which one may be said to bear this
occurrent attitude of doubting are by and large the things
that can be occurrently believed. The modal ranges of
occurrent belief and occurrent doubting surely overlap to a
great extent; I am inclined to think that they coincide.
But now suppose I am doubting something, x, that you
are occurrently believing. Should we say that x is
something I am thinking? Well, (A7) implies that x is
something you are thinking, for according to (A7), occurrent
belief is a species of generic thinking. So if we do
suppose that x is something that I am thinking, we should
have to say that there is a thing, namely x, that both of us
are thinking. More generally, we would have to say that
anytime there is something that one person is doubting and
that another is occurrently believing, there is something
the two people are thinking in common. But this seems
counterintuitive.
a certain
Keep in mind that we are dealing here with
familiar concept of thinking-a concept involved when we
say, for example, that two people are thinking the same
thing, and mean more or less that the two persons are having
the same thought, that the same thing is occurring to them,
or crossing their minds. If I am doubting something that
you are occurrently believing, it is surely not plausible to
say that it fo llows that we are thinking the same thing.
These considerations lead me to reject (A?). I do not
deny that it is possible for one person to be doubting what
another is occurrently believing, while the two are thinking
something in common. Here is a case: you are occurrently
believing that William will be happy and that Sarah will say
"yes". I am occurrently believing that William will be
happy, but doubting that Sarah will say "yes'*. This seems
to me to be a possible situation. Then there is something
that I am occurrently believing and that you are doubting—
that Sarah will say "yes"--but at the same time it is true
that there is something that both of us are thinking in
common, a thought that both of us are having: that William
will be happy. But in this case the common thought is not
the thing that you are occurrently believing and that I am
occurrently doubting.
I also do not deny that if a person is doubting a
thing, it follows that there is someth i ng that person is
thinking. Suppose again that I am doubting that Sarah will
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say yes". I am inclined to think that there will be
something I am thinking; perhaps it is what I would express
by uttering:
Maybe Sarah won’t say "yes" after all.
I am inclined to think that the occurrent attitude of
doubting does require generic thinking. Indeed I am
inclined to think that all occurrent attitudes require
generic thinking. But it is the property of being a sner.ip*
of generic thinking that is my concern at present. I doubt
that all occurrent attitudes have this property.
I have not been able to discover any informative
criterion that distinguishes those attitudes that are
species of generic thinking from those that are not. So I
do not see any significant way of generalizing (A7).
However, in the remainder of this study, I shall be
primarily concerned with these three attitudes of occurrent
believing, wishing and occurrent wondering. So, the claim
formulated in (A7) will suffice here.
Although I think that (A7) is a very natural
assumption, it is a substantial one. It will prove crucial
to the arguments I present in Chapter 8, by means of which I
shall seek to join issue with the Propositional Tradition.
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4 . 7 Thesis 1
Let us consider again
nec P°s iy( y is thinking x ) -»
x is a thought )
In Chapter 1
,
I claimed that this expresses an analytic
criterion of thoughthood. The labors of this chapter
prepare us to consider a more guarded claim: if the
occurrence of 'is thinking’ is taken on its generic,
relational reading, then (T1) expresses an analytic
criterion of thoughthood. I think that we should accept
this claim. It is part of the very concept of thought I am
concerned with in this study, a concept that I think is
familiar from ordinary discourse, that if one may be said to
be thinking a thing, in the generic sense, that thing is a
thought
.
We have seen that there is a state reading available
for the progressive forms of 'think’ in English on which it
is close in meaning to 'believes’ (see 4.4.1 re "His
testimony has been so persuasive that those close to the
case are thinking that the jury will acquit him"). And in
fact I think that the claim expressed by (T1) with this
reading of the progressive is true. But the claim expressed
on this i nterpretat i on is not what I am counting an analytic
criterion. We may say that a person is thinking something
and mean more or less that something is occurring to him or
her, that something is crossing his or her mind, that the
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Person is having a thought. What I claim to be an analytic
truth is that anything a person may be sa,d to be thinking-
m this sense-is a thought. I believe it is clear that an
event reading of 'is thinking’ is involved here.
We have considered grounds for doubting whether there
is any event reading available for progressive forms of
'think’, apart from its generic reading (see 4
. 4
. 4 ). of
course this is not to say that one could not devise some
such other reading, by a definition, and propose to
interpret (T 1 ) by means of it. I would have to see a
proposed definition, before I could have anything to say
about whatever thesis would be expressed by (T1) on the
resulting i nterpretat i on
.
The criterion I accept may be unambiguously formulated
as foil ows
:
nec Vx ( pos iy( y is 9en thinking x ) -»
x is a thought )
Hereafter, I shall call the criterion thus expressed,
"Thesis 1 "
.
Thesis 1 and (A7) jointly imply
(23) Necessarily, for any x,
i) pos iy ( y is occurrently believing x ) -» x is a
.
.
thought,
l l ) pos iy ( y is wishing x ) -» x is a thought,
iii) pos iy{ y is wondering x ) x is a thought.
And from (23), together with the assumption,
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( A6 )
i )
Necessarily, for any x,
pos
-}y ( y is occur rent 1 y believing x ) iff
\\U ill i i s
s wisir 9 * > x
!
iii; pos
-jy ( y wondering x ) iff
pos iy{ y wonders x )
(proposed in Chapter 3, section 3.4, p.20), we get:
(24)
i )
i i )
i i i )
Necessarily, for any
pos iy{ y believes x
pos iy( y wishes x )
pos iy{ y wonders x
x,
) x is a thought,
x is a thought,
x is a thought.
At the end of Chapter 1, I considered four roles that are
part of the standard philosophical conception of thought.
One of these I called "the intentional role": the idea that
thoughts are the "objects" of the intentional attitudes.
This was formulated as follows (the sentence number is
changed to accord with numbering of the present chapter):
VR( if R is an intentional attitude, then
nec Vx( pos ( iy R(y,x) ) -» x is a thought ))
(25) implies both (23) and (24). Since this "intentional
role expressed by (25) is part of the guiding conception of
thoughts with which this study began, I consider the fact
that (23) and (24) are consequences of Thesis 1 (together
with (A6) and (A7)) something to be welcomed.
Before proceeding to the next chapter, let me bring
this very, very long chapter to a close by digressing just
briefly to discuss a matter that I find somewhat puzzling;
the matter has to do with the circumstances under which a
person should be said to be thinking more than one thought.
^ ® How Many Thoughts A re You Thinking ?
It is traditionally assumed that thoughts can be terms
of standard logical operations; in particular, it is held
that thoughts may be said to be conjunctive, formed by
conjunction from other thoughts. It would be natural to
suppose that such a conjunctive thought is what I am
thinking in some circumstances in which the following is
true
:
(26) Aronszaj n is thinking that politicians lie and cheat.
Can it ever be the case that (26) is true in virtue of my
thinking just one thought, a conjunctive one, intuitively:
the thought that politicians lie and cheat? It seems
natural enough to suppose that I could be thinking just this
one conjunctive thought and no other, and that, if this were
the case, (26) would be true. Indeed it is tempting to
think that the following expresses a claim true with respect
to such a situation:
(27) Aronszaj n is thinking only one thing. Aronszajn is
thinking: Politicians lie and cheat.
On the face of it, it seems that such situations are
perfectly possible— that it is possible that I be thinking
the conjunctive thought that politicians lie and cheat, and
thinking that thought alone.
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Nevertheless, there is an argument that seems to show
that wheneve r (26) is true, I am thinking more than one
thought, and consequently, whether or not there is such a
conjunctive thought as the thought, that politicians lie a nH
cheat, and whether or not there could possibly be a
circumstance in which I am thinking that thought and that
thought alone, (26) will never be true with respect to such
a circumstance. Moreover, the argument would show, contrary
to what seems to me a natural first impression, that the
claims expressed in (27) are literally contradictory. For I
think it is plain that the second sentence of (27) implies
(26), which, according to the argument, implies that I am
thinking more than one thing, yet the first sentence of (27)
asserts that I am thinking only one thing.
Roughly, the argument goes as follows. It seems
plausible to claim that there is a certain thing I am
thinking whenever I’m thinking that politicians lie, and a
certain thing I’m thinking whenever I’m thinking that
politicians cheat such that it is possible for me to be
thinking the former and not thinking the latter. After all,
can’t I be thinking that politicians lie and not thinking
that politicians cheat ? But if we accept the
i ndi scerni bi 1 i ty of identicals (along with some fairly
natural modal assumptions), then I think we should also
accept
(Inld) nec VxVy( x = y -» nec( Aronszajn is thinking x
iff Aronszajn is thinking y ))
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From this, and our previous contention, we get that there is
a certain thing that I’m thinking whenever I’m thinking that
politicians lie that is distinct from a certain thing I’m
thinking whenever I’m thinking that politicians cheat. Now
suppose that ( 26 ) is true, that I am thinking that
politicians lie and cheat. Then is it not correct to say
that I am thinking that politicians lie and also thinking
that politicians cheat? I am inclined to think that this is
correct. That is, I am inclined to accept that 'Aronszajn
is thinking’ distributes over 'and’, thus:
(DIST) Aronszajn is thinking that politicians lie and
cheat
.
Aronszajn is thinking that politicians lie and
Aronszajn is thinking that politicians cheat.
But if I am both thinking that politicians lie and thinking
that politicians cheat, then our previous reasoning leads to
the conclusion that there are two things I am thinking. So,
no matter the ci rcumstances with respect to which ( 26 ) is
true, in such circumstances I am thinking more than one
thing.
The argument may be laid out somewhat more carefully;
the conclusion will be that necessarily, if I am thinking
that politicians lie and cheat, then there are two things I
am thinking:
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The Plurality of Thoughts Argument (PTA)
i) There is an x and y, such that:
he's tMnk?ng
2
x
J
);
iS tMnMn9 that Politicians lie,
he’s tMnking
2
y)? Ind
thinkin9 that P° liticians
P°s( Ar°nszajn is thinking x and not thinking y ).
ii) ( Inld
)
:: in) There is an x and y such that
nec( if Aronszajn is thinking thathe s thinking x );
nec( if Aronszajn is thinking thathe s thinking y ), and x i y.
pol i ti ci ans
pol i ti ci ans
lie,
cheat
,
SH0W
:
nec( if Aronszajn is thinking
and cheat, then Jx-}y{ Aronszajn
Aronszajn is thinking y, and x i[by necessity-intro, with the
that politicians lie
is thinking x;
Y ))
following sub-proof 10 ]
SHGW: If Aronszajn is
cheat, then JxJy(
thinking y, and x
thinking that politicians lie and
Aronszajn is thinking x; Aronszajn is
t y )
[by Conditional Proof as follows]
iv) Aronszajn is thinking that politicians lie and cheat
[Assumption]
Aronszajn is thinking that politicians lie, and
Aronszajn is thinking that politicians cheat.
[from iv) by (DIST)]
:: vi ) JxJy( Aronszajn is thinking x;
y, and x j. y )
Aronszajn is thinking
[from i i i ) and v )
]
The argument can be readily generalized of course; with
appropriate amendments, a parallel result can be reached
concerning you and your thinking, say, that politicians are
honest and fair
. The result seems to be that whenever such
reports as (26) are true, the subject of the report must be
thinking more than one thing, and consequently, any pair of
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sentences relevantly like the pair in (27) will be
contrad i ctory
.
Perhaps I may be engaged in two simultaneous events of
thinking, one reported by
Aronszaj n is thinking: Politicians lie.
the other by
Aronszajn is thinking: Politicians cheat.
If this is a possibility, then presumably it is a case
concerning which we should be inclined to say that I am
thinking two things (at least) and that in virtue of my
thinking these two things, (26) is true. But it is somewhat
remarkable to find out that it is impossible for (26) to be
true, unless I am thinking more than one thought.
PTA depends essentially on premise i), (Inld) and the
rule, (DIST). Surely (Inld) is beyond reproach, so we must
either deny premise i), reject (DIST) or accept the
conclusion of this argument. It may be noted, too, that on
a certain assumption about the semantic treatment of the
main indicative clauses of indicative-clause ascriptions
(see 4.4), premise i) can be reached by a subsidiary
argument with a single extremely plausible premise. The
semantic assumption is:
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(A?) For any true or false indicative,
t, the main indicative clause in'
0 , and any term,
[t is thinking that 0 ]
rigidly designates. 11
Perhaps, intuitively, for relevant indicative, 0 , we might
think of the designatum of [that 0] as the thought we'd
refer to by [the thought that 0] ; but it makes no difference
to the argument what we take the designatum to be. What is
essential is that we suppose that if the main indicative
clause of an indicative-clause ascription is formed from a
true or false sentence, then the occurrence of that clause
in that ascription rigidly designates someth i ng .
The single premise of this subsidiary argument is:
1
a ) P°s ( Aronszaj n is thinking that politicians lie
and not thinking that politicians cheat )
This seems indisputable. Now we proceed as follows: we
derive the following necessi tati ons
,
i b ) nec ( Aronszajn is thinking that politicians lie ->
Aronszajn is thinking that politicians lie )
i
c )
nec( Aronszajn is thinking that politicians cheat,
Aronszajn is thinking that politicians cheat )
Then, conjoining i
a )
- i
c ), if (A?) is correct, we may
derive premise i) simply by appropriate application of
existential introduction. 12,13
If this subsidiary argument is accepted, we are faced
with the choice of either rejecting (DIST) or accepting the
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conclusion of PTA— that, whenevex ( 26 ) is true, and
presumably whenever I am thinking a conjunctive thought that
can be reported by such a sentence as ( 26 ), I must be
thinking more than one thing. I do not consider either of
these choices to be very satisfactory. Nevertheless, I see
no motivation for the first alternative, and find the
reasoning behind the subsidiary argument fairly compelling.
So I am tentatively inclined to accept the conclusion of
PTA. This issue of whether ascriptions of thought such as
( 26 ) imply that the subject is thinking more than one thing
will arise to bother us (me at least) at several points in
subsequent chapters. Be forewarned.
In the next chapter, we shall turn our attention to
what I called "the semantic role" of thoughts, and the
central concept involved in this role: that of a sentence’s
expressing a thought.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 4
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Shich suc^nouns ZpVyTo spec“f theth, ngs to wh,ch they ..apply on them "nCn- 9eneMc ? readingse.g. Dogs bark
,
Do computers think?" I use the term
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just because, on the (family of) readings I have in mindforms of the verb 'think' apply to events of a variet) of
Tents of ^ 3 C°mn"° n 9e " US: that of
2. Paraphrasing instances of the matrix
. th i nk
. .
by corresponding instances of
... do some thinking.
.
.
doesn’t always work. Here is an example due to Lee Bowie:
( a ) I do some thinking slowly
is not close in meaning to
( b ) I thi nk si owl
y
The use of the gerund, 'thinking’, as a "mass" noun in (a)
seems to rule out an habitual or dispositional reading which
is the most natural reading for (b). Nevertheless, a close
paraphrase of (b) is available with "do" which brings out
the "eventive" character of the relevant habitual reading:
(c) I do (my) thinking slowly
I stick to my main point which is that, in general
,
intransitive readings of forms of 'think’, including such
habitual readings as that available for (b), are event
readings, in the relevant sense.
3. Russe 1 1 i ans/F regeans might contend that for some
description 'the F’, perhaps contextually determined, Max is
occurrently believing a proposition in these ci rcumstances--
a proposition expressed by
(a) The F is a mint-condition, late 70’s Chippendale.
Here is where my point enters in, that there be no ad-hoc
variation in the accounts one proposes in Max’s case and in
145
cases ^Kripke^as offe^ed
1^ th
^
.concerning veridical
classics is in KMpkrMsanTw 11 " 9 9rOUnds (the ^cus
Russel 1 isn/crliL P L 1 980] ) for rejecting such
hav
3
' f"„ P:° P?sals . as ?o which thought Max ising. Let
i 1 1 ustrati on
us fix on a particular choice for^the"?
’
°as anOppose it is "The chair before me now". Now
sSr
r
„
r
«;;^ i,S£\;;«s „
itself is a mint
i°hs depends precisely on whether or not x
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express thi s'thCuah^h
Chippenda1e
’ But then (a) doesn'tought he is having. But if (a) dopqn’t
sort"? n
haVin9 iP
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a thought he ?s Lv? propose that this sentence does express
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T
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rhaps 1ess controversial cases that callto question the idea that intransitive readings of 'think’support complement quantification. The cases I^ow have inmind trade on a fact not noted in the text: that on theirintransitive readings, forms of 'think’ seem to expressproperties that persons may have without bearing any
In this respect, the intransitive
broad in their application. One
in virtue, simply, of doing a
attending to a melody that one is
think it is not so plausible to
it would be correct to say that
attitudes towards things,
generic readings are quite
may be said to be thinking
lengthy calculation, or of
humming to oneself. Yet I
hold that in any such case
one is thinking someth i ng .
5. Barbara Partee has pointed out that a frequentative
event reading is also available for this and other instances
of (F4). The reading in question is that involved in the
most likely i nterpretat i on of (10) as it figures in
Whenever his hypnotist commands him to do so,
William thinks that Sarah will not say 'Yes’.
6. There are certain exceptions in which the indicative
clause complement is replaced by a phrase that is itself
formed from that clause, and whose reference is determined
by that of the contained clause. For example, if we replace
the complement of
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(a) The defendant
acquit him.
is thinking that the jury will
with the thought that the jury will acquit him’, we get
<b)
iurv
d
wn?
dant jinking the thought that thej y
i
1
1
acquit him.
IndYLkf ir?nSty1 ?’ bUt 1 suppose <b> to be grammatical
ocruJ-rentiv h ^
mply
’
as does < a >. that the defendant isc r entlybelieving that the jury will acquit him.
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Hebr(
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notes that
yare aCh ’ (m<) and ' levana ’ (f.). Fine
Levana tsafa rakeia
may be true, which he translates "The moon floats in (sic )the sky.
,
while
Yare’ach tsafa rakeia
is false, which he translates "The moon observes the sky".(Pop quiz for the reader: Is this an example of a failure
of substitutivity?)
8.
Perhaps this case is best viewed not as one in which
there is a shift in available readings of a single verb, but
rather in which there is a shift, given the grammatical
rules of agreement, in what the main verb of the sentence
is there are two verbs that count 'tsafa’ among there
inflected forms in Hebrew. Still, the case motivates the
general concern here which is that sometimes, there may be a
different i nterpretat i on available for the result of
substituting one noun phrase for another in subject position
of a given sentence. Some substitutions in subject position
are not innocuous.
9.
If indeed the shift is forced; I am not quite sure that
we can’t get either reading with (15b). Let p be some
proposition to which Jones in fact bears the attitude of
belief. Now suppose that Smith is suffering a conceptual
confusion: though he knows that p is a proposition to which
Jones bears belief, he also thinks that p is Jones’ husband.
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With
nec(
he ’ s
that
if Aronszajn
thinking a );
pol i t i c i ans c
is thinking that politicians lie
nec( if Aronszajn is thinking
heat, he’s thinking b ), and a + b.
necessi tation of the last conjunct, we have:
nec( if Aronszajn is thinking that politicianshe s thinking a ). lie,
neet if Arcnszajn is thinking that politicians
cheat, he s thinking b ).
nec( a i b )
.
We may import the content of each of these modal claims intothe necessity introduction subproof (after the first SHOWline). From these and line v), PC yields vi).
11. This assumption is intended to apply to de dicto
i nterpretat i ons of such ascriptions. I think it is
plausible, if it js right that indicative clauses designate
when they occur as complements in ascriptions of form
(El) t is thinking that 0,
to claim that on the de dicto i nterpretat i on of such
ascriptions, the indicative clauses designate rigidly.
Consider a particular example:
( a ) Jones is thinking that some shrewd spy is wealthy.
Let us refer to what La) expresses, on its de dicto
i nterpretat i on
,
as "A d ". If indicative clauses are
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(FI ’ ) t is thinking that t’ VP
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.expresses the same thing as the followinga ripti , which is taken to be more
logical form: perspicuous as to
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Here there are three principal referential positions, thefirst occupied by a term referring to the subject of the
attribution, the second, by a term designating the propertybeing attributed, the third, by a term designating the thingto which the property is being attributed. On this account,the de re l nterpretat i on of (a) would consist of a
strai ghtforward existential quantification on the third
position, thus:
( a ’) There is some shrewd spy, x, and Jones is
attributing the property of being wealthy to x.
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x fears concerning y that 0 etc.
derived fairly (!) strai ghtforward 1 y from the original
ascription. There is a lot more to say on the matters
raised here, but I am not prepared to do such mattersjustice on the present occasion.)
There is another account that has been proposed of de
—
l nterpretat i ons of attitude ascriptions. On this
account, instances of (FI) do report relations between
persons and thoughts, interpreted de re
. but the thoughts
reported are not in general the ones designated, on the de
^-! c t0 i nterpretat i on
,
by their indicative clause
complements. On this account, it would be claimed that the
logical form of (a), interpreted de re
. is best reflected by
the fol lowing:
(a’’) There is some shrewd spy, x, and Jones is thinking
that x is wealthy.
A proponent of this view might hold that the occurrence of
th© indicative clause in ^ .
there is still no occurrence in U’ Butclause of (a). So (a) would sti 1 not L lndlcatlvea relation between ^ ^ ' . b be seen as asserting
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free logic, it would be required, additionally,at there is an x such that x = that politicians lie and
ere is a y such that y = that politicians cheat. This
requirement may sound odd, but isn’t it an obviousimplication of the following, which doesn’t sound odd at alland is surely true: one thing that can be thought is thatpoliticians lie, and one thing that can be thought is thatpoliticians cheat.
13. I should stress that nothing in what I have assumed inthis study so far requires that indicative clauses are
designators, let alone that they are rigid designators. Ihave assumed that there is a relational reading of 'is
thinking
; then it follows that the verb, on that reading,
admits introduction of referential terms in a complement
position. I am prepared to allow, further, that indicative
clauses occur as complements of the verb, on the relevant
reading. Does it clearly follow that when indicative
clauses occur as complements of 'is thinking’, on that
reading, those occurrences are referential? Consider an
analogy. 'is kicking’ takes referring terms as complements,
as i n
William is kicking his favorite football.
and, in the same sense , the verb admits prepositional
complements, as in
William is kicking with his right foot.
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CHAPTER 5
A CONCEPT OF SENTENTIAL EXPRESSION
«v,^h?f0n : shin9 what 1a"9ua9® can do. With a few
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e
‘
^
hOU9ht «r“P»a ^ a terrestri^th ver y first time can be put into a formwill be understood by someone to whom
ent i re 1 y new
.
the
of thoughts,
being for
of words which
thought is
Frege 1
Virtually all philosophers who accept that there are
such things as thoughts, would hold, too, that there is an
important sense in which a vast number of thoughts— if not
all— are things that can be said to be ’’expressed" in
language. Some such idea is commonly taken for granted in
philosophical discussions; regimented versions of such an
idea figure time and again as cornerstones in work in
Philosophy of language, philosophical logic, linguistic
theory, and related areas of study.
Moreover, the concept of expression that philosophers
have had in mind—what Frege meant, for example, when he
spoke of language being able to express an incalculable
number of thoughts is intuitively grounded in ordinary
discourse. Or so I believe. It is certainly an acceptable
way of speaking to say that a person can express what he or
she is thinking by a certain sentence. For example, if what
William is thinking—what’s occurring to him, what’s
crossing his mind— is that Sarah will not say "yes", then we
would say that William can express this thing—what he’s
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thinking, what’s occurring to him, what
— by uttering:
s crossing his mind
Sarah will not say "yes".
That such a concept exists in ordinary discourse is also
evident from our use of constructions of the sort I called
"di spl ayed-sentence ascriptions", that were discussed in the
preceding chapter. We allow ourselves to report the
thoughts that people are having simply by displaying
appropriate sentences. For example, we may report something
William is thinking by issuing:
William is thinking: Sarah will not say "yes"
.
An ascription of this sort will be counted true only if the
displayed sentence is one that the subject could use to
express what he or she is thinking.
I do not say that any familiar notion involved here is
precisely the concept that philosophers employ when they
speak of the expression of thoughts. I do not believe there
is anything answering to the description "the concept of
expression of thoughts that philosophers employ".
Nevertheless I think there is surely a family of more or
less closely related notions to be discerned from both
ordinary and philosophical discourse. In this chapter I
wish to lay out the main features of at least one concept in
154
this family that will be important throughout the remainder
of the study.
^ • ** What Things Do the Expressing ?
There has not been complete agreement among
Philosophers on just which things may be said, in the sense
they have in mind, to express thoughts. One natural view—
a
view suggested by the sort of instances of ordinary usage
cited just above— is that pe rsons express thoughts, doing so
in a variety of ways, but commonly, and perhaps
paradi gmat i cal 1 y , by uttering sentences. In the philosophy
of language though (and in other fields where this
relationship of language to thought is deemed important to
theory), it is common to find talk of sentences expressing
thoughts. This, perhaps, results from a certain
abstraction: a shift for the sake of simplicity (to avoid
any parameters unnecessary for tasks at hand) from
One expresses x by uttering S
to
x is expressed by S
Strictly, abstracting in this way is acceptable only if the
thought expressed doesn’t vary depending on who is doing the
uttering. We shall soon see that for some sentences there
i
s
such variance in which thought is expressed, and that our
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concept of sentential expression must be understood to
involve a parameter that, roughly speaking, takes who is
doing the uttering into account. In any case, some
Philosophers have been unwilling to accept talk of sentences
expressing thoughts, and have maintained that other items
be seen as the things that do the expressing, some
holding that persons do it, some holding that utterances of
sentences are the responsible items, others preferring to
speak of uses of sentences as the things that do the
expressing
.
Still, on each of these various conceptions—whether
the idea is that persons do the expressing by uttering
sentences, or that sentences themselves express thoughts, or
that utterances of sentences do the job— the relationship
posited is one that does connect sentences to thoughts.
There may well be significant differences separating these
various conceptions; and perhaps one of these points of view
is conceptually fundamental, the other conceptions being
definable in terms of it. For our purposes, though, what is
important is that an intuitive link of the relevant sort can
be discerned between sentences and thoughts; the fact is
that in a vast number of particular cases, the question— Is
this sentence linked, by the relation of expression, to that
thought? will be answered the same by proponents of any of
these conceptions, however much these conceptions may differ
from one another. Present purposes, then, do not dictate a
choice as to which things do the expressing, and I will
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typical ly settle hereafter for speaking of sentences
expressing thoughts. In any example or contention important
for subsequent discussions, when I say that some sentence
expresses a thought, I expect that the case at hand will be
one about which proponents of these various conceptions of
expression would be in agreement ... not about what thing,
strictly speaking, is doing the expressing, but about
whether the sentence and thought in question are connected
according to their respective conceptions of expression.
5 2 Some Parameters of Expression
We want to be able to speak of the thought expressed by
a sentence, and to express this functional relationship by
some basic locution...
S expresses x
would be a natural proposal. However, it can be seen,
strictly speaking, that it is not sufficient to speak of a
sentence expressing some particular thought, simpl iciter .
Intuitive considerations show that it is only relative to a
variety of parameters that we can speak of any thought being
uniquely expressed by a given sentence. 2
5.2.1 Interpretat i ons
I assume that some languages may be said to have
sentences in common. And I assume that in the case of
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certain sentences, it will be sufficient to posit which of
the languages containing that sentence is in question, to
determine which thought is expressed. In such cases, then,
it would suffice to have a parameter for language:
s expresses x in L
With some sentences, specifying language will suffice, but
not all. A natural language typically contains ambiguous
sentences sentences that have more than one available
i nterpretat i on in the language. And typically, the
i nterpretations that an ambiguous sentence has in a language
will be ones relative to which the sentence expresses
different thoughts. 3
If an expression is ambiguous in a given language, then
roughly speaking there is more than one set of rules and
conventions each of which governs some one strict and
literal usage for that expression in the language (I count
sentences as expressions here). I shall speak of any such
set as a particular meaning that the expression has in the
language. 4 Then an interpretation may be understood to be
any function, i, such that, for some language L: 1) the
domain of i is the set of sentences in L, and 2) i(S) is a
meaning that S has in L. Any functions related in this way
to a language, L, shall be termed "L i nterpretations"
. Any
two L interpretations will agree in their assignments to the
unambiguous sentences of L; they may agree in their
assignments to different sentences as well (in the case of
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synonymous sentences). But there will be L interpretations
that disagree in their assignments to any ambiguous
sentence
.
In preceding discussions, I have spoken of ambiguous
sentences having several available interpretations, as if
such sentences were distinguished by there being several
interpretations with those sentences in their domains. But
an* sentence of a given language, L, figures in the domain
of everjr L interpretation. When I say that ambiguous
sentences have more than one available interpretation, I may
be understood to mean that, where L is the language in
question, these sentences each have more than one meaning to
which L interpretations assign them.
The concept of i nterpretati on at issue here is subsumed
by the general notion of the reading of an expression in a
language, and consequently akin to the notion of a reading
of a verb or verb phrase introduced in Chapter 2. In a full
account of these concepts, one would want to develop the
idea that readings in general are governed by a principle of
compos i t i onal i ty , and that, in the case of interpretations,
the interpretations available for a sentence will be
determined at least in part by the readings available for
the constituents of the sentence.
If we incorporate a parameter for i nterpretati ons
,
we
may drop the reference to language. Then our locution would
be
:
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S expresses x on i
With the assumption that for any S, x and i, s expresses x
on i only if s is a sentence of a language L, and i is an L
interpretation.
5 -2.2 Index i cal i tv and iiqo
If an L i nterpretati on is specified for a given
sentence, one particular meaning that the sentence has in L
is thereby determined. And with many sentences, this will
suffice to determine what thought is expressed—wi th many
sentences, but not all. 5 in English and other natural
languages, there are certain expressions, so-called
indexicals, that have the following character i sti c : if a
sentence of the language contains such an expression, 0 ,
then which thought is expressed by the sentence will not be
determined once and for all by the meaning of the sentence
alone, but will vary from one use of the sentence to
another, in a way having to do with certain features of
involved uses of 0 . Personal pronouns ('I’, 'You’, 'me’,
'yours’, etc.) and demonstratives ('that’, 'these’, 'then’,
etc.) along with certain adjectives, adverbs and adverbial
modifiers ('present’, 'now’ 'here’ 'actually’ etc.) are
standardly taken to be examples of English indexicals.
Before discussing the connection between indexicals,
uses and the expression of thoughts, let me mention a few
background assumptions. I take a use of an expression
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(sentence, word or phrase) to be an event of a certain kind,
and I propose to confine attention here to linguistic uses
of expressions. 6 I suppose that typical examples are events
of a person’s uttering a sentence or a word, in the course
of-as we might intuitively describe it-expressing a
thought. 7 Also, I assume that a use of a sentence, of the
sort I am considering, may be said to involve events each of
which is a use of one of the words that make up that
sentence; any such involved events will, then, also be uses
of the sort relevant here. Finally, we assume that if S is
a sentence of L, then it makes sense to speak of S
expressing a thought on a use (for given L interpretation).
Briefly, let’s consider a case that serves to
illustrate the point that if a sentence contains an
indexical, then which thought is expressed by the sentence
will vary from use to use, depending on features of involved
uses of the indexical. I shall assume that
( 1 ) You are ill.
is an acceptable example of an unambiguous sentence in
English. In this connection, it is important to see that
the word 'you’ itself is unambiguous; the one meaning it has
in the language is indicated (well enough?) by noting that
it is a pronoun whose denotation is restricted in such a way
that, on any occasion of use, it denotes the person or
persons being addressed. Then, if it is granted that (1) is
unambiguous (in English), and yet there is found to be an
161
intuitive variation in which thought can be expressed by ( , )
(in English), this variation will not be attributable to any
sh i ft from one of the sentence’s English interpretations to
another
.
Now let u and u’ be two uses of ( 1 ), and suppose that I
am the one being addressed by the use of 'you’ involved in
u, whereas you are the addressee of the use of the pronoun
involved in u’. I think it is intuitively clear that there
is a unique thought expressed by (1) on either of these
uses, but that the thought expressed by ( 1 ) on u is distinct
from the thought expressed by (1) on u’. The first thought
concerns me not you; the second concerns you not me. 8
Note that the selection of u and u’ was arbitrary,
subject only to the provision that the two uses are ones
involving uses of the personal pronoun addressed to
people, you and me. And the choice of distinct
addressees was arbitrary as well. So, it appears to be a
sufficient condition for getting distinct thoughts expressed
by (1) (in English) on given uses that the involved uses of
'you’ have different addressees. Moreover it appears to be
a necessary condition as well: If uses are picked that have
i n common who is addressed by the involved uses of 'you’, it
is intuitively clear that the same thought is then expressed
on those uses. Consider, for example, which thought we
should say is expressed by (1) on either of two uses, one
where the user is you, the other having me as the user, but
162
both involving uses of 'you' addressed to me (I am facing a
mirror, perhaps, persuading myself not to go out for the
evening). I think it is clear that the same thought is
expressed by ( 1 ) on either use.
Consequently, which thought is expressed by ( 1 ) does
not depend solely on what meaning the sentence has (on a
given interpretation). Rather, there are different thoughts
expressed by the sentence on different occasions of its use,
despite the fact that it has only one meaning in English,
and which thought is expressed on a given use may be seen to
depend on a particular feature of the involved use of ’you’,
nam6ly
’ person is the rnirtr..... of that use
. Like
considerations suggest an analogous dependence on features
of use in determining which thoughts are expressed by
sentences containing other expressions standardly considered
to be indexicals. Which thought is expressed on a given use
by a sentence containing 'I’, for example, will depend on
who is the user (of the involved use of 'x’) ; which thought
is expressed on a use by a sentence containing 'that cat’,
will depend on what thing is the demonstrandum (of the
involved use of 'that cat’).
More generally it appears that with any indexical term,
0 , we may associate a family of features of use, F, such
that if a sentence contains occurrences of 0 , which thought
the sentence expresses on a use, u, will depend on which of
the features of F is exemplified by the uses of 0 involved
in u. In the case of 'you’, for example, the relevant
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res
> f
, such
family of features includes exactly those featu
that for some x,
f = the property of being a use addressed to x. 9
5 2 . 3 Contexts
I propose to accommodate this variation in which
thought a sentence expresses in a way that has become pretty
much the standard, by adopting a parameter slated for
contexts of use. Some possible situations are such that for
a given sentence, s, there is a single use of that sentence
in the situation. I shall call such a situation a context
of use for s . 10 I shall suppose that by specifying a
context of use for S, we may determine a set of features of
use of whatever families are relevant to the use-to-use
variation in which thought this sentence expresses.
Then, the locution I shall adopt for the concept of
sentential expression will be:
S expresses x on i with respect to (wrt) c.
It is important to keep in mind that the sole function of
this added parameter of context is to fix, for any sentence
containing indexicals, whatever features of a given use of
the sentence are relevant in determining the thought
expressed on that use.
We make the following assumption concerning the concept
expressed by this locution:
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(A8) VS Vx Vi Vc ( if s
context of use
sentence of L,
expresses x on i wrt c, then c
•
anc* L a language,
and i is an L interpretation ).
s a
S i s a
Before proceeding let me consider some matters of
terminology: suppose that we are concerned with the thought
expressed by a sentence that is unambiguous in a certain
language L, and we are interested in the thought expressed
by this sentence on its L interpretations. It is simpler to
speak of the thought expressed by the sentence in L (wrt a
context), rather than saying "on any given L interpretation"
or like phrase. Provided that the sentence is unambiguous
in L, this procedure will suffice. So, for example, with a
given context, c, we may speak of the thought expressed by
(1) In English wrt c, and which thought we are speaking of
will be well defined, assuming that (1) is indeed
unambiguous in English. In what follows, I will
occasionally omit reference to interpretation (or language)
or context altogether in speaking of the thought expressed
by a sentence. On such occasions, there will always be some
language, interpretation or context, as the case may be,
that is pretty obviously the one intended. If the omission
occurs in my formulation of a principle or definition, it
may be assumed (unless otherwise noted) that I have a
generalization in mind that holds with respect to any
interpretation and context.
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Consider the following sentence
There are at least three dishonest politicians.
I assume that ( 2 ) is unambiguous in English, and that it
involves no indexical elements. Then on the present
conception we may say that this sentence expresses the same
thought in English wrt one context as it does wrt any
other. 11 But is this an intuitively acceptable result?
What about contexts of use for (2) in which the uses of
the sentence are in other languages that happen to count (2)
as a sentence? 12 Does (2) express the same thought wrt
those contexts? On the present conception of sentential
expression there will be cases with respect to which it is
correct to say that a thought expressed by a sentence in a
given language, and wrt a given context, is distinct from
any thought expressed by that sentence in the language used
in that context. This may seem counterintuitive and perhaps
it will be worthwhile to consider such a case.
I suppose that for any linguistic use of an expression
there is some language that may be properly identified as
the language of use. Intuitively, this will be the language
In which the user is doing the uttering. Concerning some
uses, it may be difficult to determine which language is the
one of use; presumably, the matter depends principally on
the user’s intentions in uttering the sentence, though
exactly how it depends on such intentions I don’t propose
(nor am I prepared) to say. And I suppose that it is
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possi bl
e
counting
is rather
for there to be a language, call it English*,
(2) as a sentence but in which the meaning of
the English meaning of
( 2 )
12*) There are at most four roast dumplings
What is expressed, according to the present conception,
by (2) wrt a context in which the use of (2) is in English*?
(A cook, we may imagine, is warning the waiters about the
shortage in dumplings.) Let 'c 2 ' denote the context in
question. It may seem somewhat counterintuitive to say that
the thought expressed wrt c 2 is one that has to do with the
number of dishonest politicians. Indeed, this is not what
we should say if the intended question is: what thought is
expressed by (2) in English* wrt c 2 ? A proper answer to
this question is rather what we would expect: that the
thought expressed is the same one expressed by (2*) in
English— a thought having to do, not with the number of
dishonest politicians, but with the number of roast
dump! i ngs
.
But there is also, on the conception I am proposing, a
clear question posed by asking: what is expressed by (2) in
English wrt c 2 . The answer to this question is that (2)
expresses the same thought in English wrt c 2 as it does wrt
any other context: a thought concerning dishonest
politicians, true relative to and only to those situations
where there are at least three of them. It may seem odd to
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say that any thought at all is expressed by ( 2 ), in Fna „. h
with respect to some context where the sentence is used in
another language. But as long as there is not contextual
variation in which thought the sentence expresses,
specification of a context is otiose. in the case of (2),
we already have our thought in hand, independent of fixing
the contextual parameter; it’s been determined by the
meaning of (2) in English. Imagine that we are viewing the
situation in which the chef is uttering (2), speaking
English*, and it is put to us: "what has just been
expressed in English?" I take there to be one clear sense
of this interrogative such that, if we know the meaning of
(2) in English, even if we haven’t the slightest idea of
what language is being used, the question asked is one that
we can answer. 13
5 • 3 A Not Purely Semantic Conception
The notion of sentential expression that I have
intended to isolate is, in a certain sense, a purely
soiftQn t i
c
conception. What is expressed by a sentence is
determined as far as possible by the meaning of the
sentence— by the rules and conventions governing its strict
and literal usage. It is true that in the case of a
sentence containing indexicals, meaning alone does not
suffice to determine what is expressed. However, by
indicating a context, we specify all features of use
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relevant for the contained indexicals; the meaning of the
sentence, together with this information supplied by the
context, does suffice to determine which thought is
expressed. It is a feature of the present concept of
sentential expression that considerations having to do with
what the speaker in a given context intends to be conveying
to his or her audience will not, in general, be relevant to
which thought is expressed
;
14
a point that can be seen from
the example above concerning the cook’s English* use of (2).
Also, considerations concerning pragmatic principles will
not, in general, be relevant in determining which thought is
expressed. These are two marks of the notion of sentential
expression adopted here in virtue of which it may be said to
be a purely semantic conception, two marks that distinguish
this notion from a certain other conception of "what’s
expressed" that is also familiar and that also has a fairly
clear application to certain cases. It will be worthwhile
to consider an example that highlights the difference
between our concept and this other one.
Consider a case of irony: Sarah and I are having a
conversation at a party and she has made it clear that she’s
operating in a facetious mode; she’s made plenty of
obviously sarcastic remarks already. I have just exclaimed
that I am very unhappy at how many of our country’s
politicians are dishonest, to which Sarah replies (with a
nudge), "Oh Aronszajn, there aren’t any dishonest
pol i ticians.
"
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I take it that
(3) There aren’t any dishonest politicians.
is unambiguous and free of indexicals, and (like (2) above)
a paradigm of the sort of sentence that does not vary in
which thought it expresses from context to context. It
expresses just one thought with respect to any situation in
which it is uttered, no matter what the utterer is thinking,
no matter what he or she means to convey to an audience, and
no matter what features are displayed by any conversation in
which the utterance is made. The thought this sentence
expresses is one that will be true relative to all and only
those situations that are free of dishonest politicians.
These are all things that can be said concerning what is
expressed by (3), in the sense of 'express’ that has been in
question so far. Let us call the thought expressed by (3),
in this sense, "T3“. Nevertheless, it is plain enough that
Sarah is agreeing with me in her facetious way, and it is
clear that, in uttering (3), the thought she means to
convey, call it "T3*"
,
is one that is not true in situations
where there are no dishonest politicians. Plainly, then,
T3* and T3 are different thoughts.
Now I think it must be acknowledged that there is a
familiar sense in which, in the case of irony described
above, it would be uncontroversi all y correct to say that
Sarah has expressed T3*, and not T3. If, in response, I
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were to ask Sarah:
po^i Jcians^? 9 are l0tS °f disho"*st
I could expect her to pat me on the back, congratulating me
on catching her drift;
-yes" would be the correct answer to
my question. It seems to me that there is, derivatively, a
sense in which it would be proper to say that the sentence
Sarah has uttered expresses T3*, and not T3, in this
situation. I shall suppose that there is such a sense. It
should be clear, however, that for a thought to be expressed
with respect to a situation, in the purely semantic sense I
have been concerned with, is not for that thought to be
expressed in the situation, in this derivative sense I have
just now suggested. In the former sense, T3 j_s what’s
expressed, in the latter sense, not.
To determine which thought is expressed in a given
situation, in this other sense now at issue, it i
s
necessary
to consider which thought the user intends to convey or
express. The fact that it is, in this sense, T3* that is
expressed stems in part from the fact that Sarah is being
facetious; I take it that this depends in turn on what it is
that Sarah means or intends to express or convey in the
situation. Also, that Sarah successfully expresses T3* in
this situation, and hence, in turn, that her sentence may be
said, in a derivative sense, to express that thought in the
situation, depends on features of the conversation she and I
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are having. The conversation must accord with certain
pragmatic principles, in particular, with maxims governing
the proper use and expression of irony. I suppose that one
such principle or maxim sets certain standards of
explicitness: if Sarah had not made it sufficiently
explicit that she was being facetious, then her remark would
not be (or at least not so clearly be) counted as having the
desired effect: that of expressing T3*. in these respects,
then, this other conception of what’s expressed differs from
the purely semantic one I have been concerned with up to
now
.
I believe that both of these notions of sentential
expression may figure in our intuitions concerning which
thoughts are expressed in everyday contexts of use.^ In
what follows, though, any principles, assumptions or
contentions that involve a concept of sentential expression
should be understood to involve the original, purely
semantic notion. I have attempted, here, to draw attention
to the existence of another, not purely semantic conception
of what’s expressed mainly as a preventative measure.
Suppose I claim at some point that a sentence, S, expresses
a certain thought, x, with respect to some context, c. The
reader may envision situations fitting my description of c
(exemplifying the same features relevant to the
contributions of any contained indexicals, etc.), yet find
there to be a plain sense of 'expresses’ such that it is
clearly true to say, in thi
s
sense, that S does not express
x in those situations. Then the reader may be tempted to
suppose that my claim as to which thought is expressed by S
with respect to c has been refuted. But this is too hasty.
To refute my claim, it doesn’t suffice to adduce situations
such that, in some sense or othe r (perhaps quite familiar),
it is clearly true to say that S doesn’t express x in those
si tuati ons
.
5 • 4 Some Final Provisos
Before proceeding, it is worth stating a few provisos
concerning the range and application of this purely semantic
concept of sentential expression.
5 * 4,1 Thought, Expression and Utteranrp
Perhaps the most familiar occasions on which we would
ordinarily speak of thoughts getting expressed by sentences
are those in which a person has been thinking a certain
thought, utters a sentence, and thereby, as we would
intuitively put it, expresses what he or she has been
thinking. Sarah is thinking that the chairman has put on a
little weight, and she tells me so, uttering:
"The chairman has put on a little weight."
Certainly a thought has been expressed. The reader would be
correct to anticipate, however, that on the present
conception of sentential expression, there are sentences
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that express thoughts that have never been, are not, and
will never be what anyone is thinking, and there are
thoughts expressed by sentences that have never been, are
not being, and will never be uttered.
5 ‘ 4
- 2 Expressin g Emotions, etc.
There are a lot of things besides thoughts that, in
some sense or other, may be said to be expressed by
sentences: we may speak of expressing emotions (anger,
happiness, frustration), of expressing various attitudes
(intentional or otherwise— bel ief, desire, disdain, pity),
and odd and sundry other things (rumors, opinions, ideas).
Some such talk is to be found in preceding chapters of this
study. it is a feature of the concept of sentential
expression adopted here, that if a sentence expresses a
thing, for a given interpretation and context, that thing is
a thought. I do not propose to examine whether these
various other uses can be understood by appeal to the
present notion.
Two last provisos concern some limitations on the link
established, by the present notion of expression, between
the domains of sentence and thought.
5.4.3 Performati ves
There are sentences that we might be inclined to say do
not serve the purpose in ordinary use of expressing
thoughts. So-called performati ves are cases in point.
Instances of the following schema are examples:
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(FI ) I hereby promise to 0 .
It may be observed that in normal contexts of use, the
speaker does not intend to express a thought when he or she
utters an instance of (FI); rather, the purpose is normally
that of making a promise. Some might conclude from this
observation that such sentences do not express thoughts at
all (l.e. with respect to any contexts); they are just not
sentences of the appropriate sort.
Let me set aside the question of what should count as a
normal context of use, and of whether it would follow from
the fact that no thought is expressed in any normal context,
that no thought is expressed in arvy context. I am prepared
to allow that there is a sense in which, concerning typical
cases of the use of an instance of (FI), it would be correct
to say that the sentence does not express a thought. I have
in mind some sense of 'express’ akin to the not purely
semantic one discussed in 5.3. However, from the fact that
no thought is expressed, in th i
s
sense, by such a sentence
in a given context, it does not follow that there isn’t a
thought expressed by the sentence, in our sense, with
respect to that context. I am inclined to think that there
are contexts and thoughts such that instances of (4) express
those thoughts with respect to those contexts. Consider
(FI’) He thereby promised to 0 .
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Aren't there plenty of contexts relative to which instances
of this schema should be said to express thoughts? And
wouldn’t it be proper to say that corresponding instances of
(FI) and (FI') express the same thought relative to contexts
c and c’ (respectively) such that the user in c = the
demonstrandum of 'he' in o’? (Some further constraints on c
and c’ are required, I suppose, concerning the contributions
of 'hereby' and 'thereby'.) I am inclined to think so. 16 - 17
5 • 4
4
Inexpressible Thouflhts ?
It is not universally agreed that for every thought
there is a sentence that expresses it. Perhaps some
thoughts are somehow too complex or too "large” to even
possibly be expressed in any language. The Propositional
Tradition and the alternative to it that I describe in
Chapter 9 are both mute on this matter. Moreover, it’s not
as if, to put it roughly, the spirit of either account of
the nature of thoughts suggests any generalization that
would rule out one side or the other of the present issue.
So I think it is safe and best for present purposes to
suspend judgment on whether, for every thought, it is at
least possible that there be a sentence in some language
that expresses it. I think the matter is important and
interesting, and one that ought to be settled by any
adequate, complete account of the nature of thoughts and of
the relationship of language to thought. Such an account
does not lie within the intended scope of the present study.
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The two provisos just considered in 5.4.3 and 5 . 4.4
concern certain limitations that some might wish to impose
on the relation of sentential expression. Despite these
provisos, it is still safe to say that virtually all
philosophers who have accepted that there are such things as
thoughts would hold i) that sentences do express thoughts
(in a sense of 'expresses’ relevantly like the one I have
sought to isolate in this chapter), and ii) that the set of
things expressed, in that sense, by a vast number and wide
variety of sentences coincides with a vast and varied
(though perhaps proper) subset of thoughts. In the next
chapter, I shall present and discuss what I believe is an
important addition to this thesis that sentences express
thoughts, an addition that, broadly speaking, connects
certain types of sentence to certain types of thought by
appeal to our relation of sentential expression.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 5
1 • Frege [1963]
, p.537.
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To use a worn and weary example,
thought is expressed by
we may note that what
Jones owns both banks.
will depend on how we disambiguate theits interpretations we pick: on one of
meaning close to that of
sentence, on which of
these it has a
(al) Jones owns both river sides;
not close to that of
(a2) Jones owns both financial institutions.
On another available interpretation, (a) has a meaning closeto that of ( a2 )
,
not close to that of (al). And these two
sentences, (al) and ( a2 )
,
in virtue of having thesedifferent meanings, express different thoughts.
Another way of accomodating ambiguity relies onindividuating sentences (and other expressions) more finely.
In the case just discussed this way of handling ambiguity
would claim that there are two words spelled the same, B-A-
N-K, and two correspondi ng sentences either one of which is
exhibited in (a) above. Disambiguation, then, will be an
operation mapping, not sentences to meanings, but rather
spellings to sentences, since on this way of handling
matters, each sentence of the language has exactly one
meani ng
.
I believe that the approach taken in the text, of
supposing that one and the same word or sentence may be said
to have several meanings relative to varying
i nterpretat i ons
,
is acceptable for purposes at hand.
4. The term 'meaning’ has a history of conflicting usage
in philosophy. Some have used the term in such a sense
that, when they speak of the meaning of a sentence, they are
speaking of what I would say is the thought expressed by the
sentence. It should not be expected that this usage
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matter
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? A fairly simple argument can be given for the claimthat the thoughts expressed by ( 1 ) on u and u’ are distinct
l we appeal to the notion of a thought’s being true orfalse relative to situations. Let ’T(me)’ denote thethought expressed by (1) on u, and 'T(you)’ the thought
expressed by (1) on u’. The question is whether T(me) =
T(you). But it seems intuitively plain that T(me)— the
thought expressed by (1) when I am being addressed— is a
thought that is true relative to any situation provided
that, in that situation, X am ill; T(me) may be true
relative to situations where you are as healthy as can be.
On the other hand, it seems just as clear that T(you)— the
thought expressed by (1) when you are the addressee—will be
true relative to a situation only if you are ill in the
situation. So, there are situations relative to which T(me)
is true while T(you) is false, ones where I am ill and you
are not; let s* be such a situation. Then I take it that
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A clear example of this, as I see it, is in the case nfimpede sentences in English. I believe these are “
ind^v?
1
?
Se s®nsitlve
> but imperatives needn’t contain anyexicaTs. An imperative free of indexical terms is use-sensitive in virtue of its being an instance of a particulargrammatical construction. I will discuss the matter ofimperative sentences expressing thoughts in the following
section. My point here is only that, as I see it, an
explanation of use-sensitivity by appeal to an associationfamilies of features of use to certain lexical items willnot be adequate.
10. This is a departure from a certain canonical
conception. Standardly, when contexts are introduced indiscussions of formal semantic theory, they are taken to be(or to be idealizations of) situations, but not generally
situations in which some sentence or other is being uttered
or otherwise used. (See Kaplan [1989b] pp. 492-512, and[1989a], pp. 591-98; also Cresswell [1973], especially pp.109-19, and Lewis [1980].) And there are some good reasons,for semantic and logical purposes, for not requiring that
contexts involve uses of sentences, generally. (Again, see
Kaplan [1989b], p. 522.) Still, I think any intuit ions we
have concerning what a sentence (in particular, a sentence
with indexical constituents) expresses with respect to a
situation are guided by consideration of situations in which
that sentence is used. It will not undermine any central
points in what follows if we continue to conceive of
contexts as bona-f i de contexts of use.
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am developing here. I shall set thisdispute aside in what follows and proceed with the
assumption that such time-indicationless sentences as (a)are not use-sensitive. 7
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^
ket of issue s that I find puzzling here.Suppose that I say That is a sentence of English,"
referring to a sentence tokened by some batch of chalk markson a blackboard. Suppose what I say is true. The next day
I say That was a sentence of English.", referring to a
sentence tokened by a bunch of sounds produced by my wifeduring a conversation at the dinner table. Suppose againthat what I’ve said is true. Could the same English
sentence be at issue on the two occasions? Presumably so.Then whatever English sentences are, they must be items that
can have both batches of chalk residue and bunches of sounds
as tokens.
Cal 1 the batch of chalk marks and the bunch of sounds
cited above, t and t
s , respectively, and suppose that they
are tokens of the same English sentence. Could some
language have a sentence of which t
c
is a perfectly good
token, but of which t
s
is not? I would think so. And we
might be inclined to say that this will be the case i_f the
sentence of which t
c
is a token is a sentence of both
languages but is pronounced differently in the other
language than it is in English. But is this a necessary
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Fortunately, we needn’t (I hope) address thesequestions for present purposes. What I shall suppose ishat an event, e, and item, S, may be so related that i) eis a 1 inguistic use of S and ii) S is a sentence of somelanguage. I think there are many familiar examples of pairsof event, e, and item, S, related in this way and that in
many cases we have no problem in telling when such a pair
are thus related or not, even if we don’t have a clear idea
what sort of item one (or either) of the pair is. I do nothave any proposal of informative conditions under which this
relation holds or of informative conditions under which anitem may be said to be a sentence of a language.
13. What should we say is expressed by a sentence in a
language, L, with respect to a given context, when the
sentence contains a term that is an indexical according to
L, but not according to the language of use? Consider the
following case: A person utters (1), 'You are ill’, but she
is speaking a language, call it "Minglish", just like
English except that the English meanings of 'you’ and 'ill’
are switched, respectively, with those of 'monkeys’ and
'crazy’. Let us call the context in which this woman’s
Minglish use of (1) occurs, "c^"
.
Then what is expressed by
(1) in Minglish with respect to c. is the same thought
expressed in English, with respect any context, by
(1*) Monkeys are crazy.
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Consider the following case (a resemblance
case and that of Max, the hallucinating antiquedescribee! in the preceding chapter (section 4.2
should be clear). I am suffering a vivid
seeming hallucination; I think I have justtemperature of a person seated in front of
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pp. 16-19)
utterly real-
taken the
me, and that I
say (to this
am
"You are ill
The fact is that I really do utter the sentence (and no
other use of the sentence occurs, so we have a context of
use of the sentence) but there is no addressee of theinvolved use of the pronoun. I take the underdetermination
in this case to be entirely analogous to that involved in
c i* Then, on the present conception, we should say that nothought is expressed by (1) in English with respect to this
context. The fact that English happens to be the language I
am speaking in this case makes no difference.
In cases where an indexical is associated with a family
of features of use such that it is essential to any use that
it possess some one feature of that family, cases of under-
determi nat i on will not arise involving uses of that
indexical. It seems plausible to suppose, for example, that
necessarily if an event occurs, then there is a specific
time at which it occurs (or perhaps period during which it
occurs). So, any use of an expression will have some unique
time of occurrence. Then, consider the following case. A
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term pnH » fj^nce contains a directly referentiala d a use of that sentence in a context, c, involves ause of the term lacking a referent, then no thought isexpressed by the sentence with respect to that context,am using the term 'directly referential’ in the sensedeveloped by Kaplan; see Kaplan [1989b]. Salmon alsoprovides a very clear discussion of the relevant notionSalmon [1981], Chapter 1. Yet I do not think that allirectly referential terms are indexicals; proper names
example, are directly referential, but are not indexicals.Failure of expression of thought in such cases due to non-
referring proper names, then, cannot be accounted for by
appeal to an underdetermi nat ion of relevant features of useSome (Strawson perhaps is one) might even hold that
this failure of expression is true not only in cases where
there are uses of directly referential terms which fail todenote, but more generally, whenever there is a failure of
reference in what he calls the "referential use" of a
referring term (see Strawson [1956], p. 220-1). A full
discussion of this matte r wou Id involve not only further
consideration of the present conception of sentential
expression, but some consideration of questions about the
l n
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nter P retation (or language) andntext) for sentential expression. Kripke [1977] draws adistincticDn between two notions that may be intended whenone speaks of the referent of a term in a situation: whathe calls semantic reference and speaker’s reference. I
suspect that a further parallel between the concepts of
reference and sentential expression is that this distinctionKripke proposed, separating semantic reference from
speaker
’ s reference, is paralleled by a distinction betweentwo notions of sentential expression, two notions that maybe intended when one speaks of the thought expressed by a
sentence in a situation. I suspect, also, that if there isthis parallel to Kripke’s distinction, it separates notions
that are close to the two concepts of sentential expression
that have been under discussion in the present section. In
this connection, see Salmon’s distinction of speaker
assertion and semantic content in Salmon [1982].
16. Is it safe at least to assume that if an unambiguous
sentence does express a thought with respect to a given
context, then there is only one thought that this sentence
expresses with respect to that context? That is:
(A ) nec VSV!x,yVc( if S is unambiguous, then if S
expresses x wrt c and S expresses y wrt c
y = x )
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Details aside, why accept the premise that (L&C)expresses the thoughts expressed by (L) and (C)? We mightordinarily say that if a person has expressed the thoughtthat pol lticians lie and cheat by uttering (L&C), the personhas thereby said that politicians lie, and also said that
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I would say, however, that concerning situations inwhich a person may be said to express the thought thatpolitTcians lie and cheat by uttering (L&C), all that can be
aimed, generally, is that the person expresses something
JJI1P
—
y. 1 n 9 the thought that politicians lie and also implvinathe thought that politicians cheat. And I would maintainthat, in the sense of 'expresses’ I have intended to
i s° ate, we should say this: (L&C) expresses a thought (inbnglish) that imp 1 i es any thought expressed by (L) or by(C), but does not express a thought identical to anv
expressed by (L) or by (C).
17. The suggestion here is that the "normal" function of
these performat i ves be relegated to pragmatics, and that
their perhaps not-so-normal function of expressing thoughts
be taken^to be their only genuinely semantic role. Perhaps
this isn’t right. There are two alternatives that I think
are worth looking at in this connection (the following is
very rough; related matters are discussed in Chapter 6, pp.
19-23; also see Notes 5 and 6 to Chapter 6).
Let us stick with the assumption that our concept of
sentential expression links sentences exclusively to
thoughts. But perhaps:
1) the semantics of performatives should allow that such
sentences are ambiguous: on one class of i nterpretati ons
,
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Both of these possibilities incorporate the "normal"performative uses of performative sentences into their
semantics. I do not have a settled opinion as to which ofthe three alternatives
— the pragmatic one suggested in thetext, and these two semantic ones suggested here— ispreferable, but I don’t believe that any matters central tothe present study hinge on this question.
187
CHAPTER 6
WHAT INDICATIVES, IMPERATIVES AND INTERROGATI VES EXPRESS
6 ' 1
—g Expression of Thoughts by Non- i nd i cat.i
Although 'indicative’ is commonly used as an adjective
applying to forms of verb or verb phrase, I shall use the
term here as a noun, standing for a class of English
sentences which I shall assume to be familiar to the reader.
The simplest, though certainly not the only , examples of
what I am calling "indicatives" are sentences formed with a
noun phrase subject term succeeded by an indicative verb
phrase
;
There are exactly two dishonest politicians.
Sarah will not say "yes".
Somebody has been eating the cookies.
are all examples of the sort of sentence I have in mind. By
'imperative’ I shall mean any sentence of English having a
naked infinitive as a main verb phrase. Examples here
would be
Go get that shovel
.
Somebody lend me a dime.
See that you don’t do it again, Jones.
I assume that there are compound imperatives formed with
various sorts of connectives ("Get that shovel and be snappy
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about it") but for my purposes it will be safe to set aside
consideration of these. By 'interrogative' I shall mean any
sentence of English obtained from an indicative by
interrogative transformation (interchanging subject and main
verb or auxiliary), or by introduction of wh-terms— such
terms as 'who', 'where', 'when', 'which', 'which 0 '
,
etc. I
would count the following as examples:
Will you get that shovel?
Does anyone have some spare change?
Which woman will reach the finish line first?
As in the case of imperatives, I assume there to be more
complex interrogatives, but I shall only need to be
concerned here with the simplest examples.
When I speak of grammatical moods, hereafter, I may be
understood to mean the categories of English sentences
suggested above; and when I say that a sentence is of a
certain grammatical mood, I may be understood to mean that
it is a member of one of these categories.
6.1.1 Some Examples
Throughout the preceding chapter, the examples I cited
of sentential expression involved indicatives. But
considerations of ordinary usage support the view that
thoughts are expressed by sentences of all three grammatical
moods
.
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At the outset of the previous chapter, I cited the
following sort of case: If William is thinking that Sarah
will not say "yes", he can express what he’s thinking by the
indicative
Sarah will not say ‘‘yes M
.
Cases of this sort are commonly and reasonably used to
convey what is meant when we speak of sentences expressing
thoughts. The sentence in this example happens to be an
indicative. Analogous cases afford just as much motivation
for the view that sentences of the other grammatical moods
express thoughts too.
For example, if Rachel has just knocked Carl’s
Stradivarius to the floor and I am wishing that she would
pick it up, then if my wishing is sufficiently demanding in
character, what I am thinking (in at least some situations
fitting this description) is expressed, with respect to this
situation, if I utter:
( 1 ) Rachel, pick up Carl’s violin.
It seems natural to say that this is a case in which a
thought--someth i ng I am thinking--is expressed by a non-
i ndi cat i ve
.
As another example, if I am presently wondering whether
Carl will have to pick up his violin, what I am wondering,
at least in some cases, is expressed by an i nterrogati ve
:
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( 2 ) Will Carl have to pick up his violin?
Again, it seems plain enough that we have
something I am thinking is expressed by a
Of course these two examples are not
If one grants that ( 1 ) or (2) express thi
when we are wishing or wondering things,
granted concerning a vast number of other
a case in which
non- i nd i cat i ve
.
isolated cases,
ngs we are thinking
the same should be
imperatives and
interrogati ves.
Before proceeding, there is a special point to be made
about the claim that (1) expresses something I am wishing.
There are common circumstances in which it is quite
definitely the case that we are wishing things
—
perhaps
these are even the circumstances most naturally described as
ones in which we are wishing things--yet in which it is not
clearly right to say that the things we are wishing are
expressed by imperatives. Suppose for example that rather
than being "demanding" in character, my wishing that Rachel
would pick up Carl’s violin is forlorn. I have no strong
desire that she do it since I know that her doing it is
beyond reasonable hope--she’s such an obstreperous child.
Still, in wishing that Rachel would pick up Carl’s violin,
there is something that I’m wishing. We might be inclined
to say that what I am wishing in this situation is expressed
not by an imperative like (1), but rather by an optative—
a
sentence like:
(1’) If only Rachel would pick up Carl’s violin,
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or this rather more archaic form:
(1 ) Would that Rachel would pick up Carl’s violin.
It is not clear to me that we should say that ( 1 ) expresses
something other than what is expressed by (i») and (1’’).
Perhaps there are two kinds of wishing to be distinguished
by the nature of their "objects": if one is engaged in one
kind of wishing, one is wishing one sort of thing— a thing
expressed by an imperative— if one is engaged in the other
of these kinds of wishing, one is wishing a thing of some
different, non-overlapping sort, a thing expressed by an
optative. On the other hand, perhaps we ought to say that
(1) - (1”) express the same thing. There is an intuitive
difference in what one would intend to convey to an audience
by using the optatives instead of the imperative, but it is
not determined by this fact alone that the thing (things?)
expressed by (1’) and (1’’) should be distinguished from
what is expressed by (1).
What does seem natural enough to say, though, is that
there is something expressed by (1), and that at least some
wishings are such that in virtue of the occurrence of such a
wishing, its subject may be said to be wishing this thing
that (1) expresses. And I take it that the same point of
view is as natural as well concerning other imperatives and
other cases of what persons are wishing.
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In fact, I think there is a pretty simple, intuitive
procedure for cooking up relevant cases. Where 0 is an
imperative, sometimes we are wishing something and our
wishing may be properly reported by a displayed-sentence
ascription, a sentence of the form:
(FI ) NP is thinking: 0
The relevant instance in the case of ( 1 ) would be:
(3) Aronszajn is thinking: Rachel, pick up Carl's
V io 1 in
I think it is very natural to say, concerning any such case
where the wishing is correctly reported by an instance of
(FI), that at least one thing the wisher is wishing is
expressed by the imperative, 0. Cases in point will include
those, like the one above, where the wishing is sufficiently
demanding in character
. It is not essential for my
purposes to settle whether all cases of wishings are cases
in point, and I am suspending judgment on whether, in such a
case with respect to which (3) does express something true-
-what I am wishing is also expressed by the optatives, (1’)
and (1 ). From here on, I shall leave the case of optatives
and their connection to imperatives open.
6.1.2 Qualms?
Some, though willing to grant that (1) and (2) express
things that one can be, respectively, wishing and wondering
might contend that neither (1) nor (2) (nor any other
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imperatives or i nterrogat i ves ) express thoughts
. From the
fact that I am presently wishing that Rachel would pick up a
violin, some might claim, it doesn’t follow that there is
anything I am tJnjnMj^. And even if I happen to be thinking
something as well as wishing something, the contention might
be: what I am thinking is not expressed by ( 1 ); (i) is not
the sort of sentence that can ever express something a
person is thinking. Consequently, the claim would go, (i)
does not express a thought. My assessment of such a claim
is: If what is meant by 'thinking’ and 'thought’ is,
respectively, 'occurrently believing’ and 'thing occurrently
believed’, then I agree entirely, but this is not what I
mean, nor is it the only thing one can coherently mean, by
'thinking’ or 'thought’
.
In Chapter 4, I distinguished what I called "generic"
readings of progressive forms of the verb, 'think’. On such
a reading, it does follow from the fact that I am wishing
something, that I am thinking something. Moreover, I have
assumed (for supporting discussion, see Chapter 4, section
4.6), that on this reading, anything that a person is
wishing is itself something that person is thinking.
Suppose that a friend, Grant, is also presently wishing that
Rachel would pick up Carl’s violin. In that case, it
follows, I claim, not only that Grant and I are wishing
something in common, but that this thing we are wishing is
at least one of the things we are both thinking. Perhaps in
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ordinary discourse, when two people are wishing the same
thing, the thing would normally be referred to as a "wish";
it is a thought nonetheless.
An analogous point applies to the case of the
i nter rogat i ve
, (2). In that case we would ordinarily speak
of the thing expressed by this sentence as a "question",
but, it is nevertheless something a person may be said to be
wondering; hence, in the generic sense at issue, it is
something a person may be said to be thinking; hence it is a
thought
.
Consider d i spl ayed-sentence ascriptions, again. in
such a construction, we have seen, the displayed sentence
may come in a variety of grammatical moods; but whatever the
mood of that sentence, the resulting ascription may be
appropriate for reporting something a person is thinking.
Thus, if I am asked to report what I was thinking on a given
occasion, each of the following might express a correct
report
:
(3) Aronszajn was thinking: Rachel, pick up Carl’s violin.
(4) Aronszajn was thinking: Rachel isn’t going to pick up
Carl’s violin.
(5) Aronszajn was thinking: Will Carl have to pick up his
vio 1 in?
It should be apparent that whichever of these is my report:
i) the report may be true; ii) in many cases at least (we
noted a possible class of exceptions in Chapter 4, section
4.2) if the report is true, there is something that I may be
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said to have been thinking on the reported occasion, and
iii) it would be natural to say that what I was thinking on
the reported occasion is expressed by the displayed sentence
(perhaps with respect to a context, as with (3)). This
seems to me good reason to grant that imperatives,
interrogatives and indicatives alike may properly be said to
express thoughts.
It might be contended that although there is a sense in
which imperatives and i nterrogati ves may be said to express
things, this should not be identified with the sense of
express’ discerned in the preceding chapter, in which, in
the examples considered there, various indicatives were said
to express thoughts (relative to i nterpretati on (or
language) and context). There presumably is some notion we
might intend when we speak of sentences "expressing"
thoughts such that, if i_t is the intended notion of
expression, then it would be incorrect to speak of
imperatives or i nterrogat i ves expressing anything at all.
For example, I take there to be a clear sense in which a
sentence may be said to express a thought subject to the
fol lowing:
S expresses* x =df S is an indicative; x is a
thought, and there is some familiar reading or other of
'expresses’ such that on that reading, the pair, <S,x>,
satisfies
[ 0 expresses v ]
where 0 and v are variables.
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Not that expression* is any familiar concept of expression,
but it is a concept of expression as clear as any. if by
'express’ one means express 3*, then one could not say that
y imperative or i nter rogati ve expresses anything at all.
Nevertheless, it seems to me that there is a familiar
sense in which we may be said to express what we’re wishing
by imperatives and to express what we’re wondering by
l nter rogati ves
. The sense in question seems to me to be
just as familiar as any in which we may be said to express
what we believe by indicative sentences. I see no reason
not to suppose that there is one sense of 'express’ common
to all of these ways of speaking. Now alongside this
familiar sense in which a person may be said to express
things by sentences of any of the three moods, it seems to
me that we may discern, in the manner of the preceding
chapter, a sense in which those sentences themselves may be
said to express those things. Moreover, it seems to me that
one such concept of sentential expression that can be
discerned here is a purely semantic concept.
After all, in the preceding chapter, in the course of
character i z i ng the purely semantic conception, I made no
assumptions concerning what sort of sentence was under
discussion although the examples happened to concern
indicatives. All the considerations raised there,
concerning distinctive features of the purely semantic
conception, could have been addressed with respect to
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imperatives and i nterrogat i ves
; or so it seems to me. which
thoughts we would intuitively be inclined to say are
expressed by given imperatives and i nterrogati ves will, at
least in one discernible sense, depend on the meanings that
these sentences have in English (perhaps coupled with
information supplied by specifying context), and not on
the sort of pragmatic considerations that were then in
question, having to do with speaker’s intentions or
conversational maxims. I do not see any knock-down argument
for the contention, but there seems to me no reason not to
allow that there is a general, purely semantic concept of
sentential expression according to which ( 1 ) and (2) and a
vast number of other imperatives and i nterrogati ves
,
as well
as indicatives, may be properly said to express thoughts
(relative to i nterpretat i on (or language) and context).
There seems to be such a concept available for the taking.
At any rate, I shall suppose that there is such a concept,
and the reader may presume that I intend such a notion to be
operant in all discussions to follow.
6 • 2 Thesis 2— A Partial Answer to an Old Problem
A long standing, recalcitrant problem in philosophy of
language has had to do with the proper semantic treatment of
non-indicative sentences— imperatives and i nterrogati ves
,
in
particular. It is commonly assumed in semantic treatments
of indicatives that semantic values assigned to sentences
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ought to serve to represent the items that we would
intuitively say those sentences express. 1 When this
assumption has been carried over to the treatment of non-
indicatives. the problem has been that no straightforward
answer has suggested itself to the question: what, if
anything at all, is expressed by these sentences (in
particular, by imperatives or interrogates)?
From the perspective gained here, however, the answer
seems plain and simple, at least for imperatives and
interrogates: imperatives and i nterrogati ves do express
things, and, like indicatives, what they express are
thoughts. Moreover, from the considerations advanced just
above, it should be plain that we can be somewhat more
specific on the matter. We have seen that at least
sometimes an imperative expresses what a person is wishing,
and that at least sometimes, an interrogative expresses what
a person may be said to be wondering. Further, if we
reflect on any of a wide variety of ordinary cases, we find
that the thoughts expressed by indicatives are the things a
person may be said to be occurrently believing.
® ^ •
1
Jhes i s 2, A Provisional Formulation
These observations suggest a certain generalization
which I will formulate shortly. First, though, I think it
will make the formulation more scrutable, and make
subsequent discussions somewhat easier, if we introduce some
termi nology
.
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The common nouns, 'wish’ and 'question’, are ambiguous
in ordinary usage; in each case, the ambiguity is analogous
to that of the common noun "thought", noted in Chapter 1
(section 1.2). Consider, for example, what we refer to when
we speak of a wish: on one usage we might be referring to
some particular instance of someone doing some wishing; on
what is surely another acceptable usage, however, we would
be referring instead to what a person is wishing. An
analogous ambiguity affects our use of the common noun,
'question’; it may stand for particular acts of persons
wondering or asking things, or it may be applied instead to
that thing the person is wondering or asking. Philosophers
might employ 'occurrent belief’ as a common noun: it could
suffer an analogous ambiguity. 2 I have been using gerunds
to refer to particular acts of thinking, thus, 'wishing’,
'wondering’ and 'occurrent believing’ serve as common nouns,
respectively, for particular events of wishing, wondering
and occurrent believing. I propose to use 'wish’,
'question’ and 'occurrent belief’ to apply, rather, to what
is, respectively, wished, wondered and occurrently believed.
Although the notions I shall propose here are technical
ones, I do not think we stray much from a fairly familiar
usage if we put: 2
(D8) a. x is an occurrent belief =df pos ly( y is
occurrently believing x )
b. x is a wish =df pos Jy( y is wishing x )
c. x is a question =df pos Jy( y is wondering x )
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In other words, 'occurrent belief, 'wish' and 'question',
when used as common nouns, shall stand for items in the
modal ranges of occurrent belief, wishing and occurrent
believing (respectively).
Now the observations made just above can be
generalized, provisionally, in the following way:
Thesis 2 a. indicatives express occurrent beliefs;
b. imperatives express wishes;
c. i nterrogati ves express questions.
It seems to me that there is an idea embodied here that is
extremely natural, though it has not been widely considered.
Not even those who have been most concerned with the problem
of providing a semantic treatment of non- i ndi cati ves have
given it much attention. I shall propose refinements of
each of the clauses a - c), but this provisional formulation
offers an intuitive and fairly accurate grasp of the basic
idea which will serve as a cornerstone for much work in the
rest of the thesis.
6.2.2 Ref i nements
As a start, let us consider the following formulations
(in each, the parameter for i nterpretat i on is suppressed;
assume ' 0 ' restricted to unambiguous sentences):
(T2a) For any indicative, 0 , if there is a context with
respect to which 0 expresses something, then for
any context, c, and thought, x, if 0 expresses x
wrt c, then x is an occurrent belief.
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(T2b)
f°
r
t
ny
«
imPerat ive, 0, if there is a context wrt
c and thoSah?
SSS S°^hin 9' then for any context,
is a wish?
9
’ ’
lf 0 expresses x wrt c, then x
( T2c
)
For
wrt «
r°9atlVe
’ 0 ’ if there is a context
wh
;
ch 0 expresses something, then for any
context, c, and thought, x, if 0 expresses x wrtc, then x is a question
What these clauses assert, roughly, is that as long as a
sentence of one of the grammatical moods expresses something
at some context, then it expresses a thought of the
appropriate sort with respect to any context at all.
It will be worthwhile to consider a sample implication.
The following consequence of (T2a), with
(6) You are a noisy bird
for 0, is fairly representati ve
. Perhaps it is safe to
assume that there is a context with respect to which (6)
expresses something; 4 then (T2a) implies:
For any context, c, and thought, x, if 'You are a noisy
bird’ expresses x wrt c, then x is an occurrent belief.
That is, (6) expresses an occurrent belief, if anything,
with respect to any context. Since (6) contains the
indexical, 'you’, what the sentence expresses will vary from
context to context depending, essentially, on what person
(or bird, etc.) is being addressed. Surely, though,
whatever type of addressee a context may have, the thought
expressed by (6) with respect to that context could be
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something someone is occurrently believing. Let c be any
context with respect to which (6) does express a thought;
can’t we imagine a context, perhaps distinct from c, with
the same addressee, but in which the speaker is using (6) in
current English to express sincerely and literally what he
or she is thinking? It seems that we can; and it seems to
me that we ought to say, concerning any such context, c’,
that there is a thing, x, that the speaker of c’ is
occurrently believing that (6) expresses, not only with
respect to c’, but with respect to the original context, c,
as well. But by (D8), since this thing, x, is at least
possibly such that it is being occurrently believed, it is
an occurrent belief. Cases much like this one ( mutat i
s
mutandis) motivate particular consequences of clauses (T2b)
and c ) as well.
Things are not quite so neat and tidy, though.
Consider:
(7) Will you please bring us a menu and a couple of
glasses of your house red?
I count this as an interrogative, yet it seems to me that
(7) expresses a wish--and not a question—with respect to
any context, contrary to (T2c).
A generalization of this example seems to be that
whenever ’please’ is incorporated in "yes-no" i nterrogat i ves
whose main verb phrase is formed with certain auxiliaries
—
'will’ 'would’ 'can’ 'could’ (but not 'should’ or 'ought’)
—
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the resulting interrogatives express wishes, not questions.
However, I don’t have confidence that this particular class
of cases involving the word, ’please’, in interrogatives
exhausts counterexamples along this general line. An
antecedent restriction in (T2c), then, ruling out this
particular group of interrogatives, seems an exceedingly ad
hoc way of avoiding the problem. Nevertheless, I think it
would be a mistake to suppose that there is simply no
coordination, along the lines suggested in (T2a) - c),
between sorts of things expressed—wishes, questions,
occurrent beliefs and our three grammatical moods. The
coordination may not be neat and tidy, but it exists.
I think it best to avoid the class of counterexamples
noted above by adopting parallel amendments to the
antecedents throughout (T2a) - c). I propose the following
( T2a )*
(T2b )*
(T2c )*
These clauses tell us that if a sentence of a particular
grammatical mood expresses a thought of the appropriate sort
For any indicative, 0 , if there is a context with
respect to which 0 expresses an occurrent belief,
then for any context, c, and thought, x, if 0
expresses x wrt c, then x is an occurrent belief.
For any imperative, 0 , if there is a context wrt
which 0 expresses a wish, then for any context, c,
and thought, x, if 0 expresses x wrt c, then x is
a wish.
For any i nterrogati ve
, 0 , if there is a context
wrt which 0 expresses a question, then for any
context, c, and thought, x, if 0 expresses x wrt
c, then x is a question.
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any context at
(appropriate according to Thesis 2), then at
which it expresses any thought at all, it expresses a
thought of that sort. (7), though an interrogative, does
not express a question, but rather a wish; contrary to
( I20 ) • However, counterexamples to the present version,
( T2c ) > Wl11 arise only if there are i nterrogati ves that do
express questions with respect to some contexts, but express
thoughts of some other sort with respect to other contexts.
I do not think that (7) affords any such case.
One further line of objection to these clauses is worth
considering. (T2a)* - c)* imply that sentences of each
grammatical mood will express thoughts of the relevant,
associated type with respect to every context, provided that
those sentences express thoughts of that type at some
context or other. This may seem too strong. Consider the
following case. Rachel has just knocked the Stradivarius to
the ground. In a stringent tone of voice, I address Rachel,
uttering
:
(8) You are going to pick up Carl’s violin.
( right this minute, young lady" I might add). I count this
sentence as an indicative. And I think that there are
contexts with respect to which this sentence expresses
occurrent beliefs. Then (T2a)* implies that with respect to
every context at which something is expressed by the
sentence, what is expressed is an occurrent belief. But
205
what about the context just envisioned? Shouldn’t we say
that with respect to this context, my sentence expresses
something I am wishing ?
Generally, the sort of case I have in mind here is a
situation in which a sentence is used and, although in other
situations the sentence does express thoughts of the
appropriate type ("appropriate" according to (T2a)* - c )*,
given the sentence’s grammatical mood), in the situation at
hand, the sentence seems, intuitively, to express a thought
that is of some type other than the appropriate one. Let us
cal 1 any such case where a sentence expresses a thought of
the appropriate type (according to (T2a)* - c )*) with
respect to one context, but expresses a thought of another
type with respect to another context— a case of "type-
switching". In the example just considered, an indicative
was seen to express occurrent beliefs with respect to some
contexts, but, apparently, to express wishes with respect to
others. There are plenty of other examples of similar
phenomena: cases of imperatives expressing wishes at some
contexts, apparently expressing occurrent beliefs at others
( Go to the corner; turn left and go down one block",
uttered in response to "How do I get to the post office?"),
cases of i nterrogat i ves expressing questions in some
contexts, apparently expressing wishes in others ("Could you
bring us some cookies and tea?"). Are any of these cases
genuine type-switchings, or are they merely apparent ones?
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There are matters raised at this point that hinge on
the distinction between pragmatics and semantics, and on
empirical questions about the nature of English that we
needn't settle (and that I’m not prepared to address). I am
inclined to think, however, that the cases suggested in the
above examples are merely apparent type-switchings, or at
least do not pose fatal problems for the claims formulated
in (T2a) - c)
. (It should be noted that even if we allow
that cases of genuine type-switching exist, this is not
inconsistent with (T2a)* - c)*. Take the case of ( T2a )*. A
type-switching here will be a case in which an indicative
expresses an occurrent belief with respect to some contexts,
and either a wish or a question with respect to other
contexts. The existence of such a case will conflict with
(T2a) only on the additional assumption that one and the
same thing expressed by the given indicative can’t be both a
wish and an occurrent belief, or can’t be both an occurrent
belief and a question. These particular assumptions do seem
to me well motivated; the matter will be addressed at length
in Chapter 8.) I am inclined to think that each case of
type-switching can be handled in one of two ways, neither of
which requires much amendment to any of (T2a)* - c )*
.
First, take the case cited above in which I utter (8).
Perhaps there is a semantic principle governing the strict
and literal use of future tense according to which: if a
sentence is formed with that form of an action verb together
with a second-person pronoun, the sentence may be understood
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to express the speaker’s wishes. I am not sure about thi
Even if there is such a principle, though, the semantics
governing such sentences as (8) surely guarantee as well
that these sentences may be used to express occurrent
s
.
beliefs. Then I would be inclined to say that sentences of
the forms
( F2 ) You are going to VP.
( F3 ) You will VP
are ambiguous, and that the appearance of type-switching,
and the intuitive variation in which type of thought is
expressed, is due to variation in i nterpretati ons of the
sentence in question. This would suggest the following
amendment to (T2a)
,
with the parameter for interpretation
unsuppressed
:
(T2a) For any indicative, 0 , and i nterpretati on . i, if
there is a context such that 0 expresses an
occurrent belief on i wrt that context, then for
any context, c, and thought, x, if 0 expresses x
°D i wrt c, then x is an occurrent belief.
Similar amendments could be made to (T2b)* and c)*. It may
be that a semantic ambiguity is at play in the intuitive
variation in the type of thought expressed by instances of
(F2) and (F3). I am not sure.
Second, there may be an apparent case of type-switching
in which there is pretty clearly no ambiguity involved.
Then the intuitive variation in which thought is expressed
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cannot result from a variation in the interpretations of the
sentence in question; consequently, our intuitions
concerning such a case will not be accommodated by (T2a)**
or by like amendments to (T2b)* and c)\ There are such
cases I believe. Take, for example, the following case; a
teacher utters:
(9) Are you sure that you want to circle that answer?
She is speaking to a student taking a quiz, and intends to
convey, by an unsubtle hint, that the answer he is about to
circle is incorrect. I think the sentence may be said, in a
certain sense, to express an occurrent belief in this
situation (roughly): the occurrent belief that the answer
this student is about to circle is incorrect. However, from
the fact that a sentence serves to convey an occurrent
belief that the speaker has in mind in a context--f rom the
fact that j_n—some sense or other (however familiar) it would
be proper to say that a sentence expresses what a person is
occurrently believing in a context— it does not follow that
in our purely semantic sense, the sentence expresses that
occurrent belief with respect to that context. There is, I
think, a fairly familiar sense in which (9) may be used in
certain situations to convey an occurrent belief. Still,
although I am not confident about this point, I am inclined
to say that the sentence does not express an occurrent
belief with respect to such a situation, and that if
anything j_s expressed with respect to a context by (9), in
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the relevant semantic sense of 'express', then in that sense
what we ought to say is that what is expressed is a
question
.
5
In sum, there may cases of apparent type-switching in
which, in virtue of a genuine semantic ambiguity of the sort
suggested in connection with (8), an indicative (say)
expresses something other than an occurrent belief with
respect to a particular context. Then the amendments
suggested by (T2a)** will suffice to accommodate our
intuitions about which thought is expressed. Otherwise, I
am inclined to think that the appearance of type-switching
arises, as, I think, in the case of (9), from the
encroachment of some not-purely semantic notion of
sentential expression— some concept that has to do
essentially with what the speaker intends to convey, and is
not determined (apart from the contribution of any indexical
elements) by the rules governing strict and literal usage.
But it is a purely semantic notion that has been my
principal focus and that should be employed in testing
(T2a)* - c ) *
.
6
It might be maintained that (T2a)* - c)* (or amendments
along the lines of (T2a)**) do not express very substantial
claims. Someone skeptical of any of the original clauses in
our provisional formulation may be quite content to accept
the present refinement as it stands, only because, so it
might be claimed, the current versions of whichever original
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"You claim"
clauses they did not like are vacuously true,
the skeptic says, "that for any interrogative [for example],
— ^ t ex P resses a thing of the type you’re calling 'a
question’, it expresses a thing of that type with respect to
every context; I heartily agree with that: no
i nterrogati ves ever express questions (if indeed there are
such things ) !
"
Of course this is not the sort of acceptance one likes
to get for one’s cornerstone principles. If, in particular,
(T2b) and c) are thus only vacuously true, we would not
have a very interesting relationship established between
non-indicatives and thoughts, nor much of an interesting
answer (of any sort, partial or not) to the old question of
what non-indicative sentences should be taken to express.
Consideration of cases of the sort produced at the
start of this section, however, show that it is at least
extremely natural, and prima-facie reasonable to hold that
for each of the three grammatical moods, a vast number and
wide variety of sentences of that mood do express thoughts
of the relevant type. I think there is a plain sense in
which it is correct to say that what the indicative
(6) You are a noisy bird
expresses at a context is an occurrent belief, something
possibly such that it is occurrently believed. It seems
just as natural to me to say that the imperative
(1) Rachel, pick up Carl’s violin
expresses a wish— a thing possibly such that someone is
wishing it. Likewise, it seems quite natural to hold that
the interrogative
Will Carl have to pick up his violin?
expresses a question— a thing possibly such that someone is
wondering it. And as I mentioned at the start, it’s not as
if such examples are isolated cases, due to some
peculiarities of (1), (2) and (6). Relevantly similar
examples may be readily multiplied by attending to any of a
vast number of sentences of these three grammatical moods.
Perhaps then it is best to think of Thesis 2 as the
conjunction of (T2a)* - c)* (or perhaps a** - c)**) with the
f ol lowing:
(T2 ) A vast number of indicatives express occurrent
beliefs, a vast number of imperatives express
wishes, and a vast number of i nterrogati ves
express questions.
From here on, then, when I refer to Thesis 2, strictly
speaking, I shall mean the conjunction of (T2a)* - c)* and
( T2* ) (or perhaps of (T2a)** - c)** and (T2*). 7
My principal claim here is that Thesis 2 formulates
what ought to be seen as a very natural outlook, a starting
perspective for addressing the question of what non-
indicatives express that is at least prima-facie quite
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plausible, even though it has not been much attended to in
discussions of that question.
That this outlook captured by Thesis 2 hasn’t been
widely shared is, I think, the result of a certain lacuna
separating the attentions and concerns of writers taking one
or the other of two rather different approaches in the
Philosophy of language. By and large, those who have been
most concerned with the semantics of non- i ndi cat i ves have
not been among those concerned with a careful, systematic
account of the nature of thoughts, or with the construction
of semantic frameworks in which the notion of thought plays
a central role. Most writers whose work may be placed under
the banner of speech act theory seem, unfortunately, to fit
this description. On the other hand, those who have been
concerned with a systematic account of thoughts, and have
appealed, centrally, to some concept of thought in their
work in semantics have not been among those most concerned
with the semantics for non-indicative sentences. Many
semant i c i sts
, philosophically-minded logicians and
logically-minded philosophers fall into this camp. What I
wish to stress here is that absence of attention to the idea
expressed by Thesis 2 does nothing to diminish its
plausibility, which seems to me to be quite great.
6.2.3 Summary
The leading idea behind Thesis 2 is that a link exists
between each of various sorts of sentence and one of several
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types of thought. The idea may be depicted as follows:
things
expressed by
i ndi cati ves
things
expressed by
i mperati ves
things
expressed by
i nterrogati ves
occurrent
bel iefs
wishes questions
Consider the leftmost intersecting pair: I believe there
are indicatives that do not express occurrent beliefs (and
perhaps some that do not express any thoughts at all), and
there may be occurrent beliefs not expressed by any
indicatives (nor by any other sentences, for that matter).
The claim I wish to make is only that there is a substantial
and significant overlap between those things expressed by
indicatives and the things that can be occurrently believed,
and I would make the same claim, mutatis mutandis , for the
other intersecting pairs depicted in this diagram.
Before proceeding to the next chapter, a few last
remarks are in order concerning the ideas that we have been
discussing. In looking at things in the way suggested by
the above diagram, are we, perhaps, suffering from triple
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vision? Maybe if we got the situation into proper focus, we
would find that we are looking at just one intersecting
pair; let me explain.
I have spoken in preceding discussions of occurrent
beliefs, wishes and questions as "types" of thought,
suggesting (sometimes by outright assertion) that these
types are not coextensive. Indeed, I am inclined to see
wishes and questions as entirely disjoint, and to see each
of these two types and that of occurrent beliefs as forming
largely non-overlapping, if not disjoint, classes. (The
view that these three types form disjoint classes is
suggested by the diagram, but I do not commit myself to it.)
This outlook is not required by Thesis 2 itself. Indeed,
the view that these types are coextensive— in fact
necessarily so— is a consequence of the third tenet of the
Propositional Tradition (together with the assumption, (A6),
accepted in Chapter 3, according to which non-occurrent
attitudes and their principal counterparts share modal
ranges )
.
According to the Propositional Tradition ( modulo ( A6 ) )
,
there is a single category, that of propositions
. any member
of which is of the appropriate sort to be occurrently
believed, to be wished, and to be wondered. In the next
chapter, I shall present and discuss this particular
consequence of the Propositional Tradition, and look at some
considerations that might be proposed in support of it.
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but the same concept iste ded, I think, and he takes the information contents ofsentences to be the thoughts those sentences express.
??^VakeS this basic perspective for granted in his
L 1 987a J , though he uses "semantic contents".
2.
I continue to use 'occurrent belief’ in the way proposedin Chapter 3, as an abstract singular term denoting theprincipal occurrent counterpart of belief. The ambiguity inquestion here would attach to the use of the expression as a
common noun
.
3. The definitions here may be more restrictive than what
some might think is called for by the concepts of belief,
W-lsh» ar>d Question : see the discussion of (D?) as adefinition of "thought", section 1.5, p. 8.
4. The antecedent condition common to all of (T2a) - c),
requiring that there be something expressed by the sentence
at some context, is intended to rule out cases in which a
sentence does not express anything at all (no matter the
context). Sentences that might (for various reasons) be
alleged to be cases in point would be:
The sentence immediately following the last occurrence
of a colon is not true.
Don’t let Santa Claus know that I’ve been naughty.
Does quadrupl i ci ty drink procrastination?
5. In this connection it is worth noting just one of the
many difficulties I find there to be in figuring out what to
say (9) expresses, in the purely semantic sense. One might
hold that there is an interpretation available for (9) on
which it expresses a belief, and not a question, if one
takes the emphasis indicated by the underlining to have
semantic import. Surely it is natural to interpret what a
person means to convey by an utterance if he or she has
stressed certain components differently than we would if no
stress, or else different stress had been added. Compare
(9) with
(9’) Are you sure that you want to circle that answer?
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9 ). ely so. But it doesn’t follow from this that thPemphasis has a semantic import. Perhaps it is a device
^rned solely by pragmatic conventions concerning how aspeaker may convey, and how listeners are to underlta™,what the speaker intends.
pmnhadcef ral question to be asked, in determining whethere p sis is a semantic phenomenon of English, it seems tome, is this: is emphasis a device essential to properEng ish usage or merely an accidental feature of the wayEnglish is used? Isn’t it possible that there be a
rnrroni £ °(.
^uage users who have a language exactly likecu e t Engl ish in lexical and syntactic features, and whose
use of the language is just like ours except that they do
not use stress and lack any devices of emphasis? And if
such situations are possible, couldn’t it be that at least
some such situations are ones in which the language of the
community is English? For what it’s worth, my owninclination is to say that there are such possible
situations and that at least some of these are ones in which
the, language being used is current English— the people justdon t use it like we do. If this is right, then I aminclined to infer that emphasis or stress is not a device
that requires interpretation by a semantics of English, and
that consequently, the presence of such devices in the
utterance of a sentence of English doesn’t affect what is
expressed by that sentence, in the purely semantic sense.
This line of reasoning is suggested by Kripke in his
"Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference" (Kripke
[1977], see in particular, section (3c), p. 264 ff),
although his concern there is with a different topic than
that of the semantic i nterpretati on of stress or emphasis.
6. Perhaps a preferable way to proceed here would be not to
attend to grammatical moods (identified by particular
syntactic form), associating types of thought with these,
but rather to attend to kinds of uses of sentences,
associating types of thought with these . Perhaps we can
distinguish what we could call assertive
.
vol i t i ve and
questioni ng uses. Then, whatever syntactic restrictions
apply governing which of these various uses given sentences
may be put to, we say that a thought of one of the relevant
types is expressed by a sentence (of whatever syntactic
type) relative to a context if the context is character i zed
by the appropriate, corresponding type of sentential use.
We could have it that a sentence expresses an occurrent
belief with respect to a context in which it receives an
assertive use, while the same sentence expresses a question
with respect to a context in which it receives a questioning
use, and expresses a wish, with respect to a context in
which it receives a volitive use. Or perhaps there might be
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syntactic constraints placed on which of these types of usea given sentence could be put to: certain indicatives mightserve as instruments for either assertive or volitive usesbut not for questioning uses; certain i nterrogati ves might’serve interroggitwe or volitive uses but not assertive ones.
f 4.
proposal
«
we suppose there to be genuine caseso type switching with such sentences as
(6)
( 7 )
You are going to pick up Carl’s violin.
Are you sure you want to circle that answer?
but such cases will be accounted for by contextual variation
acknowledged in the semantics. This is very rough, butperhaps a formulation appealing to these notions of
assertive, imperative and interrogative uses, would afford abetter way of capturing the basic idea behind Thesis 1.
I am not sure what to say about this proposal. Let metry to make the idea somewhat more definite. Let us supposethat whether a use of a sentence (in a context) is
assertive, volitive or questioning, in the ways required,has to do with the intentions of the speaker of the context.
In particular, say that a use is assertive, volitive or
questioning if and only if, respectively, the speaker
intends to express a belief, a wish, a question by that
The present proposal, then, has it that such intentions
be semantically relevant in determining what thought a
sentence expresses-- i n the purely semantic sense--with
respect to a context.
seems to me to be a difficulty with this
Plainly the following thesis is not acceptable:
expresses (in the purely semantic sense) a
a certain kind with respect to a context _vf the
intends to express a thought of that kind by his or
of the sentence in that context. To see that this
use
.
will
There
proposal
.
a sentence
thought of
speaker
her use
is unacceptable, consider the intentions of incompetent
speakers, or the intentions of sarcastic speakers, etc.
Thus, not just any old intention you may have as regards
what sort of thing you are expressing will be relevant in
determining what sort of thing you are expressing— in the
purely semantic sense. But then there should be some reason
given by advocates of the present proposal why a speaker’s
intentions to express a belief, wish or question— those
intentions that determine whether a use of a sentence is
assertive, volitive or questioning
—
are semantically
relevant in determining what is in fact expressed. Why
should this one particular class of intentions have semantic
import when other intentions, seemingly of the same general
kind, have only pragmatic relevance (if any relevance at
all)? I do not see what plausible explanation could be
given on this point.
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inclined to think so. Consider the case of
thV c?t ’ .* am inclined to accept a claim to the effect
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What is wanted is a claim roughly to the effect- ifis an indicative, and 0 expresses an item, x, then if aperson is occurrently believing x, that person is
occurrently believing that 0. That is the basic idea; itvep roughly put, and not exactly right. The following
metalinguistic formulation expresses the claim I want asprecisely as I have been able to manage:
( T2a )+ For any indicative, 0 , if the sentence
0
i s
E Mc( 0 expresses x wrt c & nec Vy( y is occurrentlybelieving x -» y is occurrently believing that 0 )) ],
expresses something with respect to a context, c’, then
what it expresses with respect to c’ is (in fact) true.
To get a better grasp of what this claim comes to, and whatit adds when conjoined to (T2a)
,
consider a particular
consequence: say, with 'You are quiet’ for 0. (T2a)+
implies that, with respect to any context, if the following
sentence expresses something, it expresses something true:
(a) }xjc( 'You are quiet’ expresses x wrt c & nec Vy( y is
occurrently believing x -> y is occurrently believing
that you are quiet ))
Suppose that (a) does express something with respect to a
context, ca . Then there is an addressee for the involved
use of 'you’; suppose this is Henry. Then what (a) says, in
effect, is that there is some context with respect to which
'you are quiet’ expresses a thought necessarily such that if
a person is occurrently believing it, the person is
occurrently believing that Henry is quiet. Surely this is
the case. I assume that there is a context in which 'you
are quiet’ is addressed to our fellow, Henry. Then, with
respect to that context, 'you are quiet’ expresses just such
a thought: intuitively, the thought that Henry is quiet. I
take it, then, that (a) expresses a truth with respect to
ca . Since selection of c a was arbitrary, we have our
particular consequence of (T2a)+.
I think that the conjunction of (T2a)+ and (T2a)*
approximates reasonably well the idea that for any
appropriate indicative, 0, 0 expresses the occurrent belief
that 0. I am inclined to think that the conjunction is
true, and that analogous strengthenings of (T2b)* and c)*
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old as well. (Roughly, these strengthenings may be put as
tUlZ * h I
b +: lf 0 is an imPerative (with no subjecterm), and 0 expresses an item x, with respect to a context
n wh-, ch you are the addressee, then necessarily if a personis wishing x, that person is wishing you would 0. (T2c)+:
& is an i nter rogati ve whose indicative counterpart is 0*
anti 0 expresses an item x, then necessarily, if a person is*
wondering x, that person is wondering whether 0* .
)
An objection may be raised to (T2a)+, however
Consider
Hesperus is visible in the evening
This sentence expresses a certain thought, call it M H".
But, one might claim, it is not necessarily the case that if
a person is occurrently believing H, the person is
occurrently believing that Hesperus is visible in the
evening. Perhaps one would claim this if one thought that
an ascription of the form
t is occurrently believing that 0.
does not merely imply that the subject (the denotation of
the substituend of ' t
’
)
is occurrently believing the thought
expressed by the embedded sentence. Such an ascription, the
idea might be, also implies something about the way in which
the subject grasps the thought expressed by 0, something
about the manner in which the subject is thinking this
thought. With such a view, one might claim that it is
possible for a person, say Henry, to be occurrently
believing H and yet not occurrently believing it in the
manner implied by
Henry is occurrently believing that Hesperus is
visible in the evening.
Perhaps Henry is occurrently believing H, rather, in the
manner implied by
Henry is occurrently believing that Venus is
visible in the evening.
If such an outlook is correct then (T2a)+ would have to be
rejected, for the thesis would have a false implication,
namely, that with respect to any context, if the following
expresses something, it expresses a truth,
Jxic( ’Hesperus is visible in the evening’ expresses x
wrt c & nec Vy( y is occurrently believing x -» y is
occurrently believing that Hesperus is visible in the
even i ng ) )
.
We may assume that there is a context with respect to which
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this sentence expresses somethi ng— the same thing, we mavassume, with respect to every context. What is expressed
vilih p’in
S
th
hat the tt
?
OU9ht expressed by 'Hesperus iss ble e evening is necessarily such that if a personoccur rentl y believes it, he or she occurrently believes that1S
.T
ls
^
b
l
e in the evening. But this is precisely
th?o
th® outlook in question denies. Thus, if we accept
M
^ n
°" t1o °
'
must re J ect ( T2a )+
. And plainly, thisoutlook would also require rejection of the analogous
strengthenings of (T2b)* and c)* alluded to before.
I do not have a settled opinion on these matters, andpropose just to suspend judgment on (T2a)+ (and analogous
strengthenings of (T2b)* and c)*).
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CHAPTER 7
THE RECEIVED VIEW
It seems natural to say one believes a proposition and
unnatural to say one desires a proposition, but as a
matter of fact that is only a prejudice. What youbelieve and what you desire are of exactly the same
nature
.
Russel 1 1
7 • 1 The Propositional Tradition. Again
At the end of Chapter 2, I cited four roles that
thoughts are standardly supposed to serve, roles that, as I
see it, should be accommodated by any acceptable account of
the nature of thoughts:
1
.
The Intentional Role
Thoughts make up the modal ranges of intentional
attitudes
.
2 The Logical Role
Thoughts exemplify logical properties, and are terms of
logical relations and operations
3 The Linguistic Role
Thoughts are the things expressed by sentences
4 The Semantic Role
The semantic properties of and relations among
sentences can be accounted for by appeal to
correspondi ng properties of and relations among the
thoughts expressed by those sentences.
Given that this is the standard conception, one might well
suppose that an investigation of the nature of thoughts
should be considered an important project in the philosophy
of logic and of language. But this is not precisely a
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project that most who work in these fields have taken upon
themselves, at least, not as I see it. Rather, since the
turn of the century, almost without exception, philosophers
of logic and of language have restricted their attention
instead to an investigation of the nature of proposi ti ons .
I use this term in the sense proposed in Chapter 2,
according to:
(D2) x is a proposition =df x is a thought, and x is
either true or false.
This practice of restricting attention to propositions is
character i sti c of the tradition discussed in Chapter 2; what
I called there the "Propositional Tradition". It is
character i sti c of this tradition to suppose that
propositions, and only propositions, play the four roles
cited above.
Of course it begs the question against the
Propositional Tradition to claim, without further argument,
that there is any restriction of attention involved in their
attending to propositions when thoughts are at issue; for
according to that tradition, thoughts just are propositions.
Still it is coherent to ask whether the proponents of this
tradition are right about this identification. And in this
connection, it is important to separate the view of the
Propositional Tradition on this matter from the one that has
served as the starting position of the present study, which
is that the entities that perform roles 1 ) - 4) are
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thoughts, in the sense of 'thought’ governed by Thesis 1:
Thesis 1
nec Vx ( pos fy( y is genthinking x ) x is a thought )
It is not clear whether the concept of proposition employed
by proponents of the Propositional Tradition may be defined
according to (D2), if it is understood that this notion of
thought is the one involved in the definiens. For the time
being I shall assume that this is the case. This matter of
interpretation is significant (as I suggested in Chapter 2,
see section 2.2.2 The Nature of the Dispute ), and I shall
return to examine it more carefully in the next chapter.
7 . 2 The Received View
There is a certain perspective distinctive of the
Propositional Tradition that I have not discussed yet, but
which underlies all three of the tenets of that tradition
that were formulated in Chapter 2. I shall refer to this
perspective as "the Received View". The Received View
concerns the nature of the "objects" of intentional
attitudes, and has to do, more specifically, with which
things a person may be said to bear those attitudes to under
given conditions. One consequence of the view is that the
"objects" of all attitudes are propositions. This
consequence was formulated in (PT2). Another consequence of
the Received View is that, in the case of quite many
intentional attitudes, the "objects" of any one of them will
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be precisely the objects of any other— the attitudes in
question have the very same modal range. A restricted
version of this consequence, concerning the attitudes of
belief, desire and wondering, was captured in (PT3). (Both
( PT2 ) and ( PT3 ) will be restated shortly, in 7.2.1.) But
the Received View would have it that a host of other
attitudes have the same modal range as the three of concern
in ( PT3 )
.
It is remarkable how commonly The Received View--or
some consequence of it--is simply taken for granted. And we
shall see that there are some good reasons why this view has
been so widely accepted. Nevertheless, I believe that if we
reflect on certain facts about the concepts of generic
thinking and of sentential expression, intuitive
considerations arise that call the Received View, and
consequently the Propositional Tradition, into question. I
shall present and discuss these considerations in the
following chapter.
In the present chapter, I propose to formulate two
principles that jointly constitute the Received View’s
pronouncement concerning the attitudes of occurrent belief,
wishing and occurrent wondering. One of these two
principles, ( RV 1 ) , is a consequence of (PT2), (PT3) and one
further assumption that was attributed to the Propositional
Tradition earlier. The second thesis, (RV2), is independent
of any tenets or assumptions of the tradition formulated so
225
far. I think it is safe to say, however, that this second
principle would be counted a firm commitment by any follower
of the Propositional Tradition. I shall discuss these two
principles in turn.
7.2.1 ( RV 1 )
In Chapter 2, I noted that the following tenets of the
Propositional Tradition distinguish it from the alternative
that I wish to propose:
(PT2) VR( if R is an intentional attitude, then
nec Vx( pos( ^y R(y,x) ) only if x is a
proposition )))
(PT3) VR( if R is an intentional attitude, then
i) nec Vx( pos( ly R(y,x) ) only if
pos( fy( y believes x )))
ii) nec Vk( pos( ly R(y,x) ) only if
pos( ly( y desires x )))
iii) nec Vx( pos( ly R(y,x) ) only if
pos( ly{ y wonders x ))))
It is a consequence of ( PT2 ) that the "objects" of belief
are propositions:
(1)
nec Vx( pos ly( y believes x ) only if x is a
proposition )
And it is a consequence of (PT3) that the attitudes of
belief, desire and wondering have the same modal ranges;
this is captured by the following two formulations:
(2) nec Vx( pos ly( y believes x ) iff
pos ly{ y desires x ))
(3) nec Vx( pos ly{ y believes x ) iff
pos ly{ y wonders x ))
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I think that the conjunction of (1) and (2) is a fair
formulation of the outlook Russell was promoting in the
remarks quoted at the start of this chapter. I see the
influence of the Received View in those remarks. And
although Russell only cited the cases of desire and belief
there, I suspect he would have had similar things to say
concerning the relationship between belief and wondering. I
believe he would have said (to paraphrase him): it may seem
unnatural to say that one wonders a proposition, but as a
matter of fact, that is only a prejudice; what we believe
and what we wonder are of exactly the same nature. 3
Now recall that in Chapter 3, we made an assumption,
( A6 )
,
implying that each of the three non-occurrent
attitudes of belief, desire and wondering has the same modal
range as its principal occurrent counterpart. I believe
that this assumption would be accepted by and large within
the Propositional Tradition as well. From (1) - (3) and
( A6 )
,
we get:
(1*) nec Vx( pos ly{ y is occurrently believing x ) -»
x is a proposition )
(2’) nec Vx( pos Jy( y is occurrently believing x ) iff
pos Jy( y is wishing x ))
(3’) nec Vk( pos y is occurrently believing x ) iff
pos Jy( y is wondering x ))
The conjunction of these three is equivalent to the first
component principle of our version of the Received View.
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^ 1 ^
^ jointly imply that the three occurrent attitudes
at issue have the very same modal range, and that this
common modal range is made up exclusively of propositions.
If we apply the definition of "occurrent belief" "wish" and
question provided in the preceding chapter (see (D8),
Chapter 6, p.7), we can simplify:
( RV1 ) a- nec V*( if x is an occurrent belief, then x is a
t . .
proposition )b. nec Vx( x is an occurrent belief iff x is a
wish )
c. nec Vx( x is an occurrent belief iff x is a
question )
This shall be our formulation of the first component
principle of the version of the Received View that I shall
be examining in what follows.
7.2.2 ( RV2 )
The second component principle of the Received View has
to do with which proposition it is that we may be said to be
occurrently believing, wishing or wondering, as the case may
be, when given ascriptions of occurrent belief, wishing or
occurrent wondering are true of us. To get an idea of what
this second principle asserts, let me begin by considering
how it applies to a particular case; then we shall consider
how to generalize from the example.
Suppose that A is occurrently believing that Jones will
arrive on time, that B is wishing that Jones would arrive on
time, and that C is wondering whether Jones will arrive on
time. There is a particular proposition such that our
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second principle, given only these assumptions, entails that
A is occur rentl y believing that proposition, B is wishing
it, and C is wondering it. The proposition in question is
the one we would normally take ourselves to be referring to
when we speak of 'the proposition that Jones will arrive on
time’, having some particular Jones in mind. 4
Before attempting to formulate a suitable
generalization, it will be helpful to have some further
terminology. Let us say that a sentence is context-
sensitive just in case it does not express the same thought
from context to context. If an indicative is not context-
sensitive and moreover
,
the thought it expresses is true or
false (i.e., a proposition), I shall say that the indicative
is "standard"; thus:
(D9) 0 is standard =df 0 is an indicative; 0 is not
context-sensitive & icjx( 0 expresses x wrt c & x
is a proposition )
I believe that very many indicatives are not context-
sensitive, and moreover, that among indicatives that are not
context-sensitive, very many are standard in the present
sense. (It is controversi al whether these sentences are
, ,
c
quite so common as I am here making out. So it might be
claimed that "standard" is a misleading choice of phrase,
but I have not been able to think of a better term for
sentences that are not only context-insensitive, but such
that the things they express are truth-valued.)
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We are interested in generalizing the claim above
concerning conditions under which persons may be said to be
occurrently believing, wishing or wondering the proposition
that Jones will arrive on time. The generalization should
assert, to put it loosely, that for every standard
indicative, 0 t the item we speak of as "the proposition that
0" is necessarily such that someone is occurrently believing
it, wishing it or wondering it, respectively, if he or she
is occurrently believing that 0 , wishing it would be that 0
or wondering whether 0. So instances of this generalization
will involve proposition-denoting terms of the form
the proposition that 0
where 0 is a sentence. Before formulating the relevant
generalization, then, let me try to make the relevant use of
this last bit of terminology clear. I propose to adopt the
following:
(DIO) For any indicative, 0 , we shall take
[the proposition that 0]
to be a singular term i) rigidly designating the
thing satisfying the following open sentence
( for * x
’
)
:
[Jc( ' 0' expresses x wrt c; x is a proposition
and
Vc’VyC ' 0 ' expresses y wrt c’ iff y = x )) ]
if there is such a thing, and ii) designating
nothing otherwise.
Note that the following holds:
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(4) If 0 is standard, then there is a thing uniquely
satisfying the open sentence (for 'x’),
[fc( ' 0' expresses x wrt c; x is a proposition
and
Vc’Vy( * 0' expresses y wrt c’ iff y = x )) ]
For suppose S is standard. Then there is a unique thought
that it expresses from context to context; moreover, this
thought is a proposition. So there is a proposition
uniquely such that it is expressed by S at any context.
This thought satisfies the above square-braced open sentence
when S is the substituend for ' 0' . From (4) and (DIO), it
follows that [the proposition that 0] rigidly designates a
proposition, provided that 0 is standard.
With this terminology set, the second component
principle of the Received View may be put:
(RV2) for any standard 0, the following expresses a
truth (at any context):
[ a) nec( Vx( x is occurrently believing that 0 x
is occurrently believing the proposition that 0 ))
b) nec( Vx ( x is wishing that it would be the case
that 0 -» x is wishing the proposition that 0 ))
c) nec( Vx( x is wondering whether 0 -» x is
wondering the proposition that 0 )) ]
g
I assume that 'Jones will arrive on time’ is standard.
Then ( RV2 ) implies that if persons, A, B, and C, are such
that A is occurrently believing that Jones will arrive on
time, B is wishing that it would be the case that Jones will
arrive on time, and C is wondering whether Jones will arrive
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on time, then there is at least one thing, the proposition
that Jones will arrive on time, such that A is occurrently
believing it, B is wishing it, and C is wondering it. This
is the result we wished to generalize.
(RV2) implies that the proposition that Jones will
arrive on time, call it "PJ" for short, is one thing I am
occurrently believing, wishing, or wondering, if I am,
respectively, occurrently believing that Jones will arrive
on time, wishing that he would or wondering whether he will.
Can’t we identify PJ
,
simply, as what I am occurrently
believing, wishing or wondering under these conditions? But
this would imply that there is a unique thought such that,
say, my occurrently believing that Jones will arrive on time
is a sufficient condition for my occurrently believing it.
It is not clear that this is correct. I warned the reader
at the end of Chapter 4 that the Plurality of Thoughts
Argument (PTA) would bother us again (see Chapter 4, section
4.8). Here is a case in point. An analogue of PTA leads to
the conclusion that there are rather at least two thoughts
each such that my occurrently believing that Jones will
arrive on time is a sufficient condition for my occurrently
believing it; intuitively, two such thoughts would be: the
thought that Jones will arrive on time, and the thought that
Jones will arrive. 7 I find PTA itself fairly compelling;
its analogue in the present case is surely just as
compelling. If we aim at least to suspend judgment on the
soundness of PTA, then I think we ought not commit ourselves
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to the claim that PJ is uniquely such that one’s occurrently
believing that Jones will arrive on time is a sufficient
condition for occurrently believing it.
The conjunction of ( RV1 ) and ( RV2 ) shall serve as our
formulation of the Received View in what follows.® Let us
turn to consider what grounds there might be for accepting
this doctrine.
7 . 3 Motivation for the Received View
It is not surprising that the Received View has enjoyed
widespread acceptance; there are certainly some
considerations that lend it prima-facie credibility. The
considerations I have in mind may be separated into three
groups
.
7.3.1 A Semantic Rule for Sentential Complements
In connection with PTA, we considered a semantic rule
that one might suppose governs the behavior of indicative
clauses in certain constructions (see Chapter 4, section
4.8, discussion of (A?), p.75 and ff.). Although this rule
is independent of principles embodied in the Received View,
it is nevertheless a very natural accompaniment to that
view. The rule asserts that indicative clauses, when they
figure as complements in ascriptions of the form
(FI) t is thinking that 0 ,
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are rigid designators. The rule didn’t pronounce on what
things are rigidly designated by indicative clauses in these
contexts, but I suggested that one might suppose that a
given clause [that 0] , for appropriate 0 , rigidly designates
the thought we refer to by the phrase
the thought that 0 .
Let us consider a related thesis:
(R) If 0 is standard, t is an appropriate singular term,
and V is the appropriate form of an attitude verb
(or verb phrase) taking indicative clauses as
complements, then the following expresses a truth:
[the occurrence of 'that 0 ' in 't V that 0 '
rigidly designates the proposition that 0]
Roughly speaking, the idea is that, in the relevant contexts
and for suitable 0 , the indicative clause, [that 0] , rigidly
designates the proposition that 0 . I think this is a
plausible idea. 9,10
(R) entails the first clause of ( RV2 ) . For according
to (R), if 0 is standard, then the occurrence of [that 0 ] in
the open sentence:
[x is occurrently believing that 0 ]
rigidly designates the same proposition designated by [the
proposition that 0] . From this fact, we can establish the
truth of:
nec( Vx( x is occurrently believing that 0 -» x is
occurrently believing the proposition that 0 ))
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for any standard 0 . And if we instantiate (RV2), for any
standard 0 , this is precisely what we get in clause a) of
the result. Then if one finds (R) plausible, one ought to
find that what (RV2) implies concerning occurrent belief is
plausible too.
However, (R) as it stands does not guarantee what is
required by the last two clauses of ( RV2 ) : that for any
standard 0 , the proposition that 0 is necessarily such that
a person is wishing it or wondering it, if he or she is,
respectively, wishing that it would be that 0 or wondering
whether 0 . In any (grammatical, English) ascription formed
from 'is wishing’, the complement clause will not have an
indicative main verb; the main verb of the complement
clauses in such ascriptions will either be in the
subjunctive or else be formed from one of the modal
auxiliaries, 'could’, 'would’ or 'might*. Indicative
clauses ( that-cl auses formed with indicatives) cannot figure
as complements of the present progressive of 'wonder’
either. Consequently, (R) does not imply either clause b)
or c) of any instantiation of (RV2), for given standard 0 .
Still it may seem a natural step from (R) to suppose
that what (R) says about indicative clauses may be said,
mutatis mutandis , of any sentential clauses that figure as
complements of attitude verbs. Thus, we could adopt the
fol lowing
:
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(R ) If 0 is standard, t is a singular term, and V is theappropriate inflection of an intentional attitude verb(or verb phrase) taking sentential clauses as
complements, then where S-clause is a grammatically
appropriate sentential clause obtained from 0 , thefollowing expresses a truth:
[The occurrence of ‘ S-clause ’ in 't V S-clause
rigidly designates the proposition that 0] ' '
(R ) implies each clause of (RV2), and it proposes a simple
and uniform treatment of the sentential complements figuring
in many and various attitude ascriptions: those to which
(R) appl ies— including ascriptions formed with the verbs
thinks
,
is occurrently be lieving’
,
'hopes’ 'doubts’
,
knows
,
asserts
,
etc. but as well to a host of other
sorts of attitude ascriptions, including any having the
following as their main verb phrases: 'wishes’, 'is
wishing
,
desires’, 'is adamant
’, 'wonders’, 'guesses’, 'is
trying to think’, etc.
(R ) is a very simple and general rule. This fact by
itself does not constitute grounds for accepting any of its
consequences. However, if other considerations provide
independent motivation for accepting ( RV2 ) , the fact that it
is the view required by such an attractively simple and
general semantic thesis may well add to (RV2)’s appeal.
7.3.2 What is Occurrently Believed (etc.) to be the Case
The following possibility might be noted: that one and
the same thing is such that one person is occurrentl
y
believing that it is the case, some other person is wishing
that it were the case and yet another is wondering whether
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it is the case. One might suppose that such
is realized, for example, under the following circumstances:
Jones is thinking that Bush is honest; Sarah knows he isn’t,
but wishes he were, and William has always thought that Bush
was honest, but has now come to have some doubts; at this
very moment, in fact, he is wondering whether Bush is
honest. And one might suppose that in this case, one thing
such that— i) Jones is occurrently believing it is the case,
ii) Sarah is wishing that it were the case, and iii) William
is wondering whether it is the case— is a thing such that i)
Jones is occurrently believing it, ii) Sarah is wishing it,
and iii) William is wondering it. Then we would have it
that one and the same thing is an occurrent belief, a wish
and a question.
And plainly the point here is not limited to thoughts
concerning Bush’s honesty; it is plausible to suppose that a
relevantly similar claim could be made concerning anything
one is thinking when one may be said to be occurrently
believing that something is the case, wishing that it would
be the case or wondering whether it is the case. Indeed it
is natural to think that anytime one is occurrently
believing anything at all, there is something one is thereby
occurrently believing to be the case and this thing is also
such that one could wish that it would be the case and also
wonder whether it is the case. This in turn might naturally
be taken to show that anything that can be occurrently
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believed is a thing that could be wished and as well a thing
that could be wondered. Similar considerations suggest that
anything that can be wished can be occurrently believed and
wondered, and that anything that can be wondered can be
occurrently believed and wished. Thus, an important part of
the Received View would be secured concerning occurrent
beliefs, wishes and questions: these three sorts of thought
are in fact coextensive.
This point, by itself
,
does not show that occurrent
beliefs, wishes and questions are all propos i t i ons . But if
there is adequate reason to suppose that any of these types
have propositions as their instances, the above line of
consideration apparently supports the view that all three
types do. Coupled, then, with adequate reason to think that
any one of these sorts of thought are propositions, the
present considerations may be viewed as affording direct
support for (RV1). And, indeed, the claim that occurrent
beliefs may be identified with propositions has substantial
plausibility; I shall discuss this matter in 7.3.5 below.
There are considerations which tend to confirm the
Received View having to do with that view’s passing some
tests of adequacy to which any account of the nature of
thoughts should be submitted. I will mention two such
tests; I think it should be fairly clear that our restricted
version of the Received View passes each of these.
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- 3 -3 Test 1 : Thoughts Can Be Shared
Thoughts are things that can be shared, had in common.
For example, it is possible for you and me both to be
occurrently believing that President Bush is an honest man.
In such circumstances it will be correct to say that you and
I are thinking the same thing: we share a thought.
Parallel remarks apply concerning shared wishes and
questions. If you and I are both wishing that Bush were
honest or both wondering whether he is, either way, it would
be correct to say that we are thinking the same thing;
again, we share a thought. If a theory identified certain
items as thoughts— as occurrent beliefs, wishes and
quest i ons--and those items couldn’t correctly be said, in
the present sense, to be shared under such circumstances,
then the theory just doesn’t afford an acceptable conception
of thoughts.
The test could be put this way: if an account of the
nature of thoughts is adequate, it ought to capture
faithfully our intuitive judgments concerning occasions with
respect to which we would be inclined to say that persons
are having the same thought--the theory ought to imply that
there is a shared thought with respect to most cases
concerning which our intuitions say there is a shared
thought
.
( RV2
)
meets this requirement. It implies, for example,
that any circumstances in which you and I are both
occurrently believing that Bush is honest are circumstances
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in which there is a thing the proposition that Bush is
honest that you and I are occurrently believing. The
thesis guarantees that if I am wondering whether Bush is
honest and you are wondering whether Bush is honest then
there is a thing again, the proposition that Bush is
honest that both of us are wondering. Then as long as the
proponent of the Received View uses 'thought’ so that it
applies to such "objects" of attitudes, that proponent will
have the desired result that thoughts can indeed be shared.
Plainly, ( RV2 ) does not apply to all cases in which we
would want to say that there is a shared thought. It can
only predict shared thoughts with respect to cases in which
our thinking may be reported by instances of
(FI) t is occurrently believing that 0
(F2) t is wishing that it would be that 0
or
( F3
)
t is wondering whether 0
in which the substituends for ' 0 ' are standard. But within
this limited range (RV2) may seem to capture our intuitions
exactly. A fully general formulation of the Received View
could be expected to capture our intuitions in this matter
with respect to an even broader class of cases (on this
point
,
see Note 8 )
.
The present test does not require that the items that
can be commonly occurrently believed, wished and wondered
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will be of any particular sort; it only requires, regarding
cases concerning which we would intuitively say that there
is a shared thought, that the theory (by and large) says so
too
.
It may be noted that this test does not weed out
unreasonable theories. It is passed for example by a theory
according to which the only thought in the world is some
particular telephone pole in Pocatello Idaho, and everybody
is always "having" it. So, passing the present test is not
in itself much of a recommendation of a theory;
nevertheless, the test places a necessary condition on
adequacy for theories about the nature of thoughts, and it
is a test that our version of the Received View passes.
7.3.4 Test 2: Identifying Occurrent Beliefs with
Propositions .
A second test of adequacy for any account of the nature
of thoughts concerns the relationship proposed between
occurrent beliefs and propositions. The proposal of the
Received View in this connection is afforded by the a)-
clauses of ( RV1 ) and ( RV2 )
,
by which I mean the following:
( RV1 a ) Necessarily, for any x, if x is an occurrent
belief only if x is a proposition.
(RV2a) For any standard 0 , the following expresses a
truth
:
[nec( Vk( x is occurrently believing that 0 -•» x is
occurrent! y believing the proposition that 0 ))]
Consider (RVIa). I think it is plain that of the many and
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various cases in which a person could be said to be
occur rent 1 y believing something, a vast number of such cases
are ones concerning which we would say that whatever the
person is occurrently believing is a true or false thought,
hence a proposition. I also take it that if a thought is
true or false, and is in the modal range of any intentional
attitude at all, then we would be inclined to say that this
thought is at least possibly in the modal range of occurrent
belief, and so, is an occurrent belief. These observations
afford some support for
,
and make it very natural to accept
the idea that the modal range of occurrent belief is made up
exclusively of propositions, as required by (RVIa). 12
There is also some presumption in favor of (RV2a).
Take the indicative, 'Henry is a noisy bird’, for example.
It is standard (in my idiolect at least; Henry is our pet
cockatiel). It is not implausible to hold that,
necessarily, if a person is occurrently believing that Henry
is a noisy bird, one thing the person is, then, occurrently
believing is the thing that is in fact expressed by this
sentence. Consider any possible situation in which a person
is occurrently believing of our Henry that he is a noisy
bird. Isn’t it correct to say, concerning such a situation,
that what we express by our use of 'Henry is a noisy bird’
is something this person is occurrently believing in that
situation? I think so. If I am right, then so is the
instantiation of (RV2a) for this particular sentence.
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Similar considerations support the consequences of (RV2a)
concerning other standard sentences.
We should expect an acceptable account of the nature of
thoughts to predict at least that a vast number and wide
variety of occurrent beliefs are propositions. Also, I
think we should expect any viable account to predict that
when one’s occurrent believing is properly reported by the
ascription
[t is occurrentl y believing that 0]
for some standard indicative, 0 , the proposition we would
refer to as [the proposition that 0] will be among the
things that one is then occurrently believing. Plainly,
(RVIa) and (RV2a) meet these expectations.
7 . 4 Summary
In the next chapter, I shall discuss grounds for
questioning the Received View. My focus will be on (RV2)
but I think it will become clear enough that if there is
reason to question that component of the view, there is
reason as well to question ( RV 1 ) . In turn, these
considerations provide motivation for considering some
alternative to the Propositional Tradition that does not
commit itself to the Received View (or to the conjunction of
(PT2) and (PT3)). In Chapter 9, I propose such an
alternative. However, any viable alternative to the
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Propositional Tradition that eschews the Received View ought
to accommodate the considerations raised in the previous
section
.
This accommodation can be furnished in various ways.
It seems clear that any account of the nature of thoughts
ought to pass the two tests of adequacy discussed in 7.3.3
and 7.3.4. But in the case of the considerations raised in
7.3.1 and 7.3.2, there is some leeway. Concerning either of
the latter two groups of considerations, if we are
supporting some alternative to the Propositional Tradition
that rejects the Received View, we ought to show either i)
that the considerations do not really offer support for the
Received View, contrary to appearances, or ii) that they
support the proposed alternative just as well. In any case,
we ought to be able to show that whatever real support these
considerations provide for the Received View is, one way or
another, counterbalanced by benefits derived from accepting
the alternative. Since I shall be proposing an alternative
view of the sort in question here, I shall have to address
these matters sooner or later.
To conclude this chapter, let me mention a further
reason why the Received View may strike one as such a
natural view to accept. Virtually everybody (whether
philosopher or philosophically-oriented linguist or
logician) has been brought up within the Propositional
Tradition. Within that tradition, research concerning so-
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called propositional attitudes has been dominated by the
Received View. Consequently, the problems and projects that
have arisen within this research have been largely those
having to do with the analysis of belief or, on the semantic
side, with proper treatment of belief ascriptions. For the
Received View leads one to suppose that in looking at the
’objects" of belief, one is looking at the very things that
are objects of all the other attitudes.
I do not deny that there are problems to be faced
concerning intentional attitudes and attitude ascriptions,
generally, that can be addressed by restricting one’s
attention to belief and belief ascriptions. Nevertheless,
with the focus of research directed so exclusively to
problems parochial to the study of belief (or to the study
of the semantics of belief ascriptions), it is not
surprising that one does not come across much evidence
contravening the claim that all intentional attitudes are
relations we bear to propositions, or contravening the claim
that other attitudes (desire and wondering, and their
occurrent counterparts
,
for example) have the very same
modal range as belief.
Under these circumstances, then, it is not so
surprising that the Received View continues to enjoy
widespread acceptance.^ But of course these circumstances,
though making acceptance of the view quite natural and
something to be expected, don’t constitute good grounds for
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accepting it. I wish
that I think call the
to turn now to discuss some matters
Received View into question.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 7
1. Russell in his "Philosophy of Logical Atomism", Russell
[1956], p.218
2. Perhaps some would accept a stronger definiens,
requiring that propositions be necessarily true or false.
Perhaps some would claim that the present definiens is too
strong, and that it should only be required that
propositions are possibly true or false. Surely some link
to truth-val uedness along these lines would be required.
The present formulation will suffice and is most convenient
for purposes of exposition here.
3. It should be noted, however, that Russell goes on, in
this very essay, to promote what is called the "multiple
relation" account, according to which it is denied that
propositions are the objects of the attitudes. Since this
essay is a compilation of a series of lectures that Russell
gave over a period of many weeks, it is possible that he
adhered to the propositional account at the point in the
course of his lectures where this passage occurs. It is
also possible that he was appealing to the propositional
account as a simplifying picture, at this point, just to get
across the view--common to both the multiple relation and
the propositional accounts—that all the attitudes should be
accounted for in a uniform way.
4. There is a question here that I have not addressed, and
for which I have simply assumed an answer: which
propositions are such that, according to the Received View,
it follows from the fact that a person is wishing that Jones
would arrive on time, that the person is wishing those
propositions? Take the case just cited in the text. I am
assuming that according to the second component of the
Received View now in question, it follows from B’s wishing
that Jones would arrive on time, that B is wishing a
proposition, x, which in turn is such that from A’s
occurrently believing that Jones wi 1
1
arrive on time, it
follows that A is occurrently believing x. One such
proposition is, I claimed, the proposition that Jones will
arrive on time.
The case of occurrent belief is not at issue here. I
think it would be agreed by all that the proposition that
Jones will arrive on time is a proposition, x, such that it
follows, from A’s occurrently believing that Jones will
arrive on time, that A is occurrently believing x (more on
this in section 7.3.5). What is not clear is whether this
proposition— the proposition that Jones will arrive on time-
-is also such that, from B’s wishing that Jones would arrive
on time, it follows that B is wishing it. Just to give some
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here are some other possibilities:
what Bis wishing is rather the proposition thatJones is arriving on time, or the proposition that Jones
^es arrive on time, or the proposition that Jones is qoinato arrive on time, etc. a H
Presumably, some of the relevant propositions will beones expressed by indicatives formed with 'Jones’ as subjectand some form of arrive on time’ as verb phrase. But thisleaves open the possi bi 1 i ti es noted just above. It’s not as
a 1 such indicatives express the same proposition. For
example, the following two do not: 'Jones will arrive ontime
,
Jones is arriving on time’.
In my formulation of ( RV2 ) , I opt for the first of thetwo choices just mentioned. At least, this is what Iintend. I assume the following strict equivalence:
(a) Necessarily, for any x:
( x is wishing that it would be the case that Jones
will arrive on time iff x is wishing that Jones would
arrive on time ).
Actually, x is wishing that Jones would arrive on time’ is
ambiguous; on one reading, I take (a) to express a truth.
See Note 11 below (part B.), for further discussion of the
ambiguity in question here and of the general topic raised
in this note. As far as I can see, the choice one makes
among the above candidates for which proposition is being
wished makes no difference to the considerations that I
raise in the next chapter against (RV2).
5. Richard and Soames would certainly count fewer
indicatives standard than I do. See Note 11 to Chapter 5
for references and a brief description of their view.
6. Actually, this seems questionable. I think that on its
most natural i nterpretati on
,
'Jones will arrive on time’ is
context-sensitive. For I think we would normally and
properly take it to be saying, with respect to some
contextually determined occasion in the future, that Jones
will arrive on time on that occasion. It is not clear to me
that there is an i nterpretati on of the sentence on which it
is not context-sensitive in this way. Does the sentence
have an i nterpretati on on which it can be used merely to
assert of some future occasion or other, that Jones will
arrive on time on that occasion? I’m inclined to think so,
but perhaps it is not clear. Perhaps there is an habitual
interpretation that is context- i nsensi ti ve
,
an
interpretation on which the sentence may be used to assert
that Jones can generally be relied on to arrive on time. At
any rate, the natural interpretation mentioned first is the
one intended in all the discussions to follow.
Still, I shall proceed with the assumption that 'Jones
will arrive on time’ is standard. Though it is
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questionable, for purposes of illustration, it seems
harmless enough.
7. The conclusion of PTA implies that it is not the case
that there is any thought, x, uniquely such that necessarily
if I am occurrently believing that politicians lie and
cheat, then I am occurrently believing x. But I assume that
the sentence, 'Politicians lie and cheat’, is standard. So
we already have a case against the claim that for any
standard 0 , the following expresses a truth:
[ there’s a unique thought, x, such that necessarily if
one is occurrently believing that 0 , then one is
occurrently believing x ].
The argument is fairly compelling (I won’t repeat it here,
see Chapter 4, section 4.8). But we can construct a
parallel argument for the case of our sentence 'Jones will
arrive on time’. The parallel depends on the following
inference rule, which seems to me to be as plausible as its
analogue in PTA:
(DISTj) For any appropriate singular term, t, from
[t is occurrently believing that Jones will arrive on
time]
i nfer
:
[t is occurrently believing that Jones will arrive],
The parallel argument aims to establish that no thing is
uniquely such that I am occurrently believing it whenever I
am occurrently believing that Jones will arrive on time.
An analogous argument casts doubt on whether, roughly
put, for any standard 0 , there is a thought that can be
properly identified as what I am wishing, whenever I am
wishing that it would be the case that 0 . For shouldn’t we
accept the following inference?
( DISTo ) For any appropriate singular term, t, from
[t is wishing that Jones would arrive on time]
i nfer
:
[t is wishing that Jones would arrive]
If ( DISTo ) is accepted, then again we have a line of
reasoning parallel to that of PTA leading to the conclusion
that no thing is uniquely such that I am wishing it whenever
I am wishing that Jones would arrive on time.
In the case of wondering, however, it is clear that the
analogue of PTA does not go through; consider:
(DISTo) For any appropriate singular term, t, from
[t is wondering whether Jones will arrive on time]
infer:
[t is wondering whether Jones will arrive]
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Instantiating with 'Aronszajn’, (DIST 3 ) tell s us that from
Aronszajn is wondering whether Jones will arrive
on time
we may infer
(b) Aronszajn is wondering whether Jones will arrive.
But surely there may be some occasions on which I am
wondering whether Jones will arrive on time, but have no
doubt that she will arrive eventually. So there are
situations with respect to which (a) is true, while (b) is
false. So (DISTg) is not in general valid.
At any rate, the two analogues to PTA involving (DIST..)
and (DIST
2 )
call into question whether, for every standard
0 , there is some thought uniquely satisfying the following
open sentence (for ' y’):
[ nec Vx( x is occurrently believing y, wishing y or
wondering y, respectively, rf x is occurrently
believing that 0 , wishing that it would be that 0 , or
wondering whether 0 ) ]
And it is worth noting that related considerations
suggest that it may also not be the case, generally, that,
for any standard 0 , there is a thought uniquely satisfying
the fol lowing:
[ nec Vx( x is occurrently believing y, wishing y or
wondering y, only if x is, respectively, occurrently
believing that 0 , wishing that it would be that 0 , or
wondering whether 0 ) ]
Again, there would seem to be more than one thought
satisfying the resulting open formula, for at least some
choices of 0 . The problem may be intuitively put as
follows: the proposition that Jones will arrive and the
proposition that Jones will arrive on time are distinct;
yet— take, for example, the case of occurrent believing
—
these two propositions would each seem to be such that one
is occurrently believing it only if one is occurrently
believing that Jones will arrive.
8. In passing, let me mention two ways in which I take
( RV 1 ) and (RV2) to formulate only restricted versions of the
two component principles that make up the Received View.
First, there are many other attitudes besides desire and
wondering (and their principal occurrent counterparts) that
would be claimed to share the modal range of belief. (RV1 )
is a restricted version of a thesis that would assert, of
all of these attitudes, i) that they have the same modal
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range, and ii) that this common modal range is made up
exclusively of propositions.
I do not have any criterion to offer that would
properly pick out the other attitudes that would be counted
as sharing the modal range of belief. Certainly, not all
attitudes would be counted. Here is an argument that shows
why not. Either it is possible for contradictions to be
believed, or it is not. (I would assume that it is
possible; but for the sake of argument, let us suspendjudgment.) Suppose it is possible. Then the modal range of
belief and knowledge cannot be the same, for there are
contradictions in the modal range of belief and none in that
of knowledge. On the other hand, suppose that it is not
possible to believe contradictions. Then there will be
contradictions in the modal range of di sbel ief (and
doubting, too, presumably) that are not in the modal range
of belief. Still, it is safe to say that, according to a
fully general version of the first component principle of
the Received View, there would be very many attitudes, both
occurrent and non-occurrent
,
that should be counted as
having the same modal range as belief.
(RV2) is restricted in another respect. It is intended
to formulate a version of the second component principle of
the Received View, a principle that tells us, roughly, which
proposition it is that a person bears an attitude to, given
that what is expressed by an attitude ascription of the
appropriate sort is true of that person. But (RV2) concerns
itself with only three particular sorts of attitude
ascriptions: those expressing the attitudes of occurrent
belief, wishing and occurrent wondering, and of these
ascriptions, only those that have sentential complements
obtained from standard indicatives. A fully general version
of the Received View would concern itself with the
implications of what is reported by a much wider variety of
attitude ascriptions: ones formed from a wide variety of
attitude verbs (all those expressing attitudes that have the
same modal range as belief) and ones containing sentential
clause complements obtained from any sort of indicative, not
just the standard ones.
So (RV1 ) and ( RV2 ) formulate substantially restricted
versions of these two component principles of the Received
View. This should not affect the considerations to be
raised against the Received View in the following chapter.
Despite the restrictions, (RV1) and (RV2) formulate
principles that capture central aspects of that view.
9. The rule is not plausible for de re interpretations of
the relevant attitude ascriptions. On this point, see the
remarks in Note 11 to Chapter 4 concerning the rule, (A?),
similar to (R), that was cited in discussing PTA.
10. There are grounds for accepting (R). To begin with, it
is very natural to hold that indicative clauses are
251
referential terms. Logical and syntactic behavior of such
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t0 existentia1 generalization, as in the move
(a) Many kids kicked that tin can
(h) There is something that many kids kicked.
Likewise, the move from (c) to (d) seems acceptable and maybe counted as a strai ghtforward case of existential
generalization, provided that indicative clauses are
referenti al
( c ) Smith doubts that Jones will arrive on time
(d) There is something that Smith doubts
A syntactic operation, passive transformati on
,
allows the
move from (a) to
(e) That tin can was kicked by many kids.
Likewise a passive transformation allows the move from (c)
to
( f ) That Jones will arrive on time is doubted by
Smi th
.
(Although awkward, (f) is nevertheless grammatical). This
behavior is character i sti c of noun phrases generally, but
apart from quantified expressions would seem to be otherwise
characteristic of referential terms in particular, terms
that purport to refer. Unless indicative clauses are in
some heretofore unforeseen way to be analyzed as expressions
of quantification (as Russellian theory of sentential
clauses?), their behavior with passi vi zation would seem to
be most naturally accounted for by taking them to be
referent i al
.
There are also grounds for thinking that the items
designated by indicative clauses are just what (R) says they
should be. For some evidence in this connection, see the
discussion of the plausibility of (RV2a) in 7.3.5. More
generally, it certainly seems natural to suppose that such
clauses figuring, for example, as complements in instances
of the forms
(Fa) t believes that 0
(Fb) t doubts that 0
(Fc) t hopes that 0
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serve to specify those things to which the subjects of such
attitude ascriptions bear the ascribed attitudes. Thisfunction is strai ghtforwardl y accommodated if we accept (R)
and suppose that indicative clauses are terms designatingthings satisfying open sentences of the forms
(Fa’ ) t bel i eves x
(Fb* ) t doubts x
(Fc’ ) t hopes x
.
As to whether indicative clauses designate rigidly,
there is reason to think that they do. We have just noted
that when such clauses occur as complements of attitude
verbs, as in ascriptions of forms (Fa) - (Fc), they serve to
specify what things the subjects of the ascriptions bear the
ascribed attitude to, what things the subjects are thinking.
We may note, then, that whether or not such an occurrence of
an indicative clause lies within the scope of a modal
operator seems to make no difference to its function in this
connection. Consider, for example:
(g) Smith is thinking that some shrewd spy is wealthy,
and
(h) It is possible that Smith is thinking that some
shrewd spy is wealthy.
There seems to be no difference between, on one hand, what
is claimed, in (g), to be a thing in fact such that Smith is
occurrently believing it, and, on the other hand, what
claimed, in (h), to be a thing possi bl
y
such that Smith is
occurrently believing it. This appearance is accounted for
if we suppose that indicative clauses are rigid designators
when they occur as complements in such attitude ascriptions.
Further support for this account comes from
consideration of inferences like the following:
1) Smith is thinking that some shrewd spy is wealthy.
2) It is possible that Aronszajn is thinking that
some shrewd spy is wealthy.
:: 3) There is something that Smith is thinking, and it
is possible that Aronszajn is thinking it too.
The inference seems valid. The inference will be valid if
we suppose that in the two premises, the indicative clauses
figuring as complements of 'is thinking’ rigidly designate.
In sum, (R) seems to me a plausible thesis.
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11. Two points of clarification concerning certain
concepts involved in (R ):
A. a point should be made concerning the "grammatical
appropriateness of a sentential clause as a complement of agiven attitude verb. It is clear that we cannot freely
interchange sentential clauses as complements from one such
verb to another. Sentential clauses come in various forms;
attitude verbs are highly selective in which forms they
accept as complements. Let me briefly survey some examples
of such selectiveness.
The following are pretty clearly unacceptable:
(al) ? I am wondering that Tom was finished with dinner.
( a2 ) ? I am wishing whether Tom was finished with dinner.
( a3 ) ? I believe whether Tom was finished with dinner.
'Determine’, 'see’, 'decide’, 'try to think’,
'remember’ all take either indicative or 'whether’ clauses,
but do not accept subjunctive clauses; thus, the following
are unacceptable:
( b 1 ) ? I remember that Tom were going to the store.
( b2 ) ? I saw that Tom go to the store.
The following is perfectly acceptable, but does not contain
a subjunctive sentential complement
( b3 ) I saw Tom go to the store
Here, 'go to the store’ is a so-called "naked infinitive",
not a subjunctive form.
In current English, indicative clauses are coming to be
acceptable as complements of 'wish’ and 'is wishing’; for
example, it’s getting so that one would be counted
inordinately picky if one held
(cl) Jones wishes that McGovern was elected back in
1972.
to be unacceptable, and insisted, rather, on
(c2) Jones wishes that McGovern had been elected back
in 1972.
The following, however, is unacceptable to my ears as
yet:
( c3
)
Jones wishes that McGovern is president.
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(Quine used
ix( Witold wishes that x is president ),
but recall his antecedent apology for "violence to grammar"
•
Quine [ 1976]
,
p. 186.
)
The subjunctive clause plainly acceptable in (c2) seems
pretty clearly unacceptable in
( d) ? Jones believes that McGovern had been elected in
1972 .
I do not know what rules determine the grammatical
appropriateness of a given sentential clause as complement
to a given verb. I am inclined to think our intuitions of
acceptability in these cases reflect lexical constraints at
work, but I am prepared to believe that semantic factors are
involved too.
B. A second point of clarification should be made
concerning which sentential clauses are "obtained from"
which indicative sentences. Let me consider three cases:
i) whether-cl auses
,
like that in
(e) William is trying to think whether Sarah said
" yes"
.
(I am leaving out an enormously varied group of
i nterrogat i ve clauses here, including for example all those
beginning with 'if’, 'how’ or with the wh-terms, 'who’,
'when’, 'where’, 'which’, 'why’, etc. Making (R*) as
plausible and clear as possible is hard enough without
considering these cases.)
ii) present-tense subjunctive clauses, like that in
(f) Sarah insists that Jones arrive on time.
(Note that I am not counting verb phrases formed with 'were’
or 'had’ as present-tense subjunctives, but only those
spelled the same as their corresponding naked infinitive
forms, e.g., 'arrive on time’, 'be prompt’, 'have cleaned
the table in time for dinner’.) And
iii) clauses whose main verbs are either subjunctive and
formed with 'were’ or 'had’, or else formed from one of the
modal auxiliaries, 'would’ and 'could’, as in
( g 1 ) Sarah wishes that Jones were prompt
( g2
)
Sarah wishes that William could get the message
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(g3) William is wishing that Jones would arrive on time
Please bear in mind with the following proposals that I am
only attempting to clarify the notion of a clause being
obtained from an indicative well enough so that the reader
can give (R ) a run for its money. The details of what this
notion comes to, and any improvements needed for proposals
suggested here (and any defense of (R*) against criticism),
I leave to proponents of (R ) and the Received View. I am
engaging in a bit of Devil’s advocacy in what follows.
i) let us suppose that a whether-cl ause is "obtained from"
an indicative 0 iff the clause is [whether 0] . Thus,
whether Sarah said "yes"
is obtained from the indicative
Sarah said " yes"
.
It follows from this assumption and ( R* ) that the clause,
’whether Sarah said "yes" ’, as it figures in (e), for
example, rigidly designates the proposition that Sarah said
"yes". Note that this proposal does not associate the
clause, 'whether anyone left’, with any indicative since
'anyone left’ is not a sentence of English. The following
is an i ndi cat i ve— ' Wi 1 1 i am is owed anything valuable that is
recovered’— consequently, there is one i nterpretati on of
the clause, 'whether William is owed anything valuable that
is recovered’ on which it is associated with that
indicative, but there is also an i nterpretati on of the
clause on which it is not associated with any indicative.
The two interpretations are brought out by considering two
corresponding i nterpretat i ons of
(h) Sarah is wondering whether William is owed
anything valuable that is recovered
On one reading of (h), Sarah’s question comes to this: Are
at least some of the valuable things recovered owed to
William? On the other reading of (h), Sarah’s question is
rather: Are all of the valuable things recovered owed to
William? So the notion of obtaining a clause from an
indicative must be taken to be relative to an interpretation
of the clause. We shall see shortly that this parameter for
i nterpretati on has to be acknowledged as well in the case of
sentential clauses whose main verbs are formed with the
auxi 1 i ary ' would ’
.
ii) Let us suppose that, where t is a singular term and VP
is the present subjunctive form of a verb with suitable
inflection, the clause [that t VP] is obtained from the
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indicative [t will VP]. So, for example, the clause
that Jones arrive on time
is obtained from the indicative
Jones will arrive on time,
and (R ) implies that the clause, as it occurs, for example,
in (f), rigidly designates the proposition that Jones will
arrive on time.
i i i ) Let us suppose that
a. if the main verb of the clause is subjunctive and
formed with ’were’ or ’had’, then the clause is
obtained from the correspondi ng present- tense
indicative,
for example: 'that Jones were prompt’ is obtained from
'Jones is prompt’; 'that Jones had some money’ is obtained
from 'Jones has some money’. And let us suppose
b. if the main verb of the clause is formed with the
auxiliary, 'could’, then the clause is obtained
from the indicative form of the verb with the
auxi 1 i ary ' can
’
,
for example: 'that William could get the message’ is
obtained from 'William can get the message’. (But contra
b.
,
what about 'that John could be with us now’?)
If the main verb of the clause is formed with the
auxiliary, 'would’, there is an ambiguity to be dealt with.
The indicative sentence from which the clause is obtained
may well have the correspondi ng future indicative form of
the verb, formed with the auxiliary 'will’, but it needn’t;
it might contain the simple present form, understood on its
habitual reading. For example, on the most natural
interpretation of
(i) Jones is wishing that McGovern would run for
office again.
I take it that the Received View will say that what (i)
expresses implies that Jones is wishing the proposition
expressed by the sentence 'McGovern will run for office
again’. But consider (g3) from above:
William is wishing that Jones would arrive on time.
This sentence is ambiguous. On one interpretation, it
reports William’s wish concerning some particular timely
arrival on Jones’ part. I take it that the Received View
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will say that what is expressed by (g3), on this
i nterpretat i on
,
implies that William is wishing the
proposition expressed by 'Jones will arrive on time’. On
the other hand, there is an interpretation of (g3) on which
it reports William’s concern for Jones’ lack of promptness.
I suppose that the Received View will say that on this
interpretation, what is expressed by (g3) implies that
William is wishing the proposition expressed by 'Jones
arrives on time’, on the habitual interpretation of this
i nd i cat i ve
.
My suggestions here are intended to make (R*) as
plausible as possible given appeal to the intuitive test
outlined at the end of note 3. Here is one case: If Jones
is wishing that McGovern would run for office again, we can
ask: which proposition is it that Jones is wishing would be
true (assume that Jones is familiar with the concept of
truth)? Presumably: the proposition that McGovern will run
for office again (at some relevant future time). Applying
this test to (g3): suppose William is wishing that Jones
would arrive on time, and he’s only concerned about her
punctuality, not about any particular upcoming arrival.
Then we can ask—Which proposition is it such that William
is wishing that it would be true?--a natural answer (from
the perspective of the Propositional Tradition) would be:
the proposition that Jones arrives on time (is so disposed).
The results of this test suggest that we adopt the
following proposal:
c. if the main verb of the clause is formed with the
auxiliary, 'would’, then the sentence from which
it is obtained either contains as its main verb
the simple present indicative or the future
indicative formed with the auxiliary 'will’,
depending on the i nterpretati on of the clause.
On assumptions a. - c., (R*) tells us that the clauses
that Jones were prompt
that William could get the message
that Jones would arrive on time
as these occur in (gl) - (g3), designate, respectively,
the proposition that Jones is prompt
the proposition that William can get the message
and either
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the proposition that Sarah arrives on time,
the proposition that Sarah will arrive on time,
or
depending on interpretation.
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actually, I have reservations with (RVIa) as it stands.
I think it is plain that there are people (I am one) who
satisfy the following open ascriptions:
x believes that the Mona Lisa is beautiful.
x believes that President Bush ought to change his
policy in the Persian Gulf crisis.
I also take it to be clear that there are thoughts expressed
by the following (perhaps with respect to a given context;
let us set the matter of indexicality aside):
(c) The Mona Lisa is beautiful
(d) President Bush ought to change his policy in the
Persian Gulf crisis,
Call the thoughts expressed by (c) and (d), "T" and "T d ",
respectively. Moreover, I take it that if a person, s,
satisfies either (a) or (b), then the pair <s,T
c >,
or as
well the pair <s,T d >, satisfies the following formula (forf
x* and *y*, respectively):
(e) x believes y.
Then by (A6) (see Chapter 3) and ( D8 ) (see Chapter 6), we
get the result that T„ and T d are occurrent beliefs. It
seems clear to me that this is right, as long as we are
taking (e) to express the intentional attitude expressed by
the verb 'believe* in ordinary English (what else?). What
is not clear to me, however, and what is certainly
controversi al
,
is the matter of whether T
c
and T d are either
true or false. T
p
is a value judgment; Td , a normativejudgment. Many philosophers would deny that such items have
truth-value. If they are right, then T
c
and T d are
counterexamples to (RVIa).
I happen to think that if a person satisfies (a) or
(b), then the person is either incorrect (mistaken, wrong)
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in so believing, or else correct (unmistaken, right). And Ithink that this will be so just in case what this personbelieves in such cases are things that are either true orfalse. But these considerations would not persuade any whotake the other side on the issue of whether T r and T H aretruth- val ued
. In what follows, I shall set this controversy
aside, and stick with (RVIa) as it stands. The questions I
raise concerning the Received View in the next chapter do
not hinge on any of the matters raised here.
13. Roderick Chisholm and David Lewis have (independently)
arrived at a certain account of intentional attitudes which
might be thought to be incompatible with the Received View.
See Chisholm [1981] and Lewis [1979a]. But care is required
on this point. Let me confine my attention to the case of
Lewis. It is not clear to me that parallel remarks may be
expected to hold for Chisholm’s views.
It is a consequence of Lewis’ view that "objects" of
the attitudes are properties; this i_s incompatible with the
view that "objects" of the attitudes are items of the sort
he speaks of as "propositions". Thus, on his present view,
Lewis would no longer identify the "objects" of attitudes
with sets of his possible worlds (and likewise, Chisholm
would no longer identify the "objects" of attitudes with
what he speaks of as "states of affairs"). But I use
"proposition" to apply, by stipulation, to any truth-valued
thought. So if there are any items in the modal range of
belief that may be assigned truth-values, my use of
"proposition” does apply to them. And I think that Lewis
would allow that there are such items. (I have in mind
certain "vacuous" properties: there is the property, for
example, of being such that grass is green, true just in
case grass is green, and the property of being such that
there are two gods, true just in case there are two gods.
These properties are objects of belief and truth-valued
according to Lewis.) So I am inclined to think that Lewis
would grant that there are at least some occurrent beliefs
that are propositions. Still, it is fairly clear that he
would reject the more general claim— that all occurrent
beliefs are proposi tions--expressed in clause a. of ( RV 1 )
.
At any rate, I suspect that Lewis would fully accept
the b. and c. clauses of (RV1), and accordingly, would
except (PT3) and its analogue concerning occurrent attitudes
--the conjunction of (2’) and (3’) in the text. And I
suspect that both Lewis and Chisholm retain the outlook of
the Propositional Tradition in this respect: that the
attitudes of belief, desire and wondering have precisely the
same modal range, as do their occurrent counterparts. If
this is right, then their current views are still subject to
the considerations to be raised against the Received View in
the next chapter, for the principal targets of those
considerations are (PT3), (2’) and (3’).
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CHAPTER 8
AGAINST THE RECEIVED VIEW
8 . 1 Preface
In the previous chapter, I suggested that a test of
adequacy for any account of thoughts would be that it
accommodate a relationship between propositions and
occurrent beliefs along the lines proposed by the Received
View, in the a. clauses of ( RV 1 ) and ( RV2 ) . Those clauses
assert that all occurrent beliefs are propositions, and more
specifically, that if a person’s occurrent believing is
correctly reported by the ascription,
[t is occurrently believing that 0] ,
for some standard indicative, 0 , then at least one thing the
person is occurrently believing is the proposition denoted,
according to (DIO), by [the proposition that 0]
.
The question remains: Can analogous relationships be
plausibly asserted between wishes and propositions, or
between questions and propositions? (RV1 ) implies that
occurrent beliefs are propositions. We may accept this
without accepting the separate claim, also implied by (RV1),
that wishes and questions are occurrent beliefs. Roughly
put, ( RV2 ) identifies the proposition that 0 as a thing not
only such that a) necessarily, I am occurrently believing
it, if I am occurrently believing that 0 , but also such that
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b) necessarily I am wishing it, if I am wishing that it.
be that 0> and such that c) necessarily, I wondering
it, if I am wondering whether 0 . Even if we should accept
a), it remains open whether we should accept a thesis that
implies b) and c) as well.
8.1.1 A Proviso
In this chapter, I shall address some considerations
that I believe motivate an alternative to the Propositional
Tradition, considerations that suggest that the Received
View should be abandoned. How these considerations would be
viewed by Propositional Traditionalists depends, in part, on
some questions of i nterpretati on—on whether we differ in
our understanding of the philosophical locutions figuring in
(RV1) and (RV2). Only upon interpreting these formulations
a certain way— a way that I think is quite natural but that
nevertheless may not be the way intended by all
Propositional Tradi ti onal i sts--do we get principles
expressed that I claim are called into question by the
considerations to be raised in what follows.
For now, to make matters clear let me stress that I
shall be concerned with what I think are philosophically
familiar and central uses of the following locutions:
x is a thought x is wishing y
x is thinking y x is wondering y
x is occurrently believing y x expresses y
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On the uses in question, these locutions express concepts
that I assume are related to one another in ways discussed
in the course of Chapters 3-6. I shall try to make these
assumed relationships explicit whenever I appeal to them.
8.1.2 (RV2. 1 )
In sections 8.3 and 8.4, I shall consider two lines of
argument for claims that conflict with ( RV2 ) ; one of these
—
"The Linguistic Argument" as I’ll call it— depends on
intuitions concerning the concept of sentential expression;
the second line of argument--The Argument from Sameness of
Thought"— relies on intuitions concerning the conditions
under which persons may properly be said to be thinking the
same thing.
Both lines of argument call into question the following
consequence of (RV2):
(RV2.1) The proposition that Jones will arrive on time is
an x such that:
a. nec Vy( y is occurrently believing that Jones
will arrive on time -» y is occurrently
believing x )
,
b. nec vy( y is wishing that it would be that
Jones will arrive on time -> y is wishing x )
c. nec Vy( y is wondering whether Jones yill
arrive on time -> y is wondering x )
This formulates the contention with which we began our
discussion of ( RV2 ) in the preceding chapter: whether one
is occurrently believing that Jones will arrive on time,
wishing that she would or wondering whether she will, in
either case, one thing one is occurrently believing, wishing
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or wondering, as the case may be, is the proposition that
Jones will arrive on time. The conclusions of the arguments
we shall be considering are in direct conflict with this
particular consequence of (RV2).
But I take the choice of embedded sentence in (RV2.1)--
Jones will arrive on time’--to be arbitrary among, and
representati ve of standard indicatives generally. As I see
it, then, the considerations I shall be raising in the
following sections suggest that ( RV2 ) fails in the case of a
vast number if not all standard indicatives. I should
mention, too, that I shall be contrasting just the cases of
occurrent belief and wishing—examining only the
implications of clauses a. and b. of (RV2.1). Still, I
think it will be clear enough that considerations parallel
to those we shall address in 8.3 and 8.4 provide equal
grounds for questioning the Received View on wondering— for
questioning whether the proposition that Jones will arrive
on time is a thing that one is wondering whenever one is
wondering whether Jones will arrive on time.
Before discussing these difficulties for the Received
View, I need to so some stage-setting. The considerations I
wish to raise have to do with a particular class of possible
situations that I want to describe now in some detail.
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8 . 2 Setting Stage: *-Si tuat i ons"
Imagine a situation in which two persons, O’Brien and
Witold, are awaiting the arrival of another person, Jones.
0 Brien has utter confidence in Jones’ promptness; at this
very moment, he’s occurrently believing that Jones will
arrive on time. Witold is not at all confident about Jones’
arriving on time, but he is presently wishing that it would
be that Jones will arrive on time--he has a plane to catch,
and Jones is supposed to take him to the airport. So the
situation is one relative to which the reports expressed by
these two ascriptions are true:
(1
)
0’ Brien i s occurrent!
y
believing that Jones will
arrive on time.
(2) Witold i s wishing that it would be that Jones will
arr i ve on time.
So far, surely, we have a description of a possible
situation
.
8.2.1 The Analogues of PTA, Again
It would be good if we could further constrain the sort
of situations at issue by assuming them to be ones in which,
roughly, the occurrent belief that Jones will arrive on time
is all that is on O’Brien’s mind and, likewise, the wish
that Jones would arrive on time is all that is on Witold’s
mind—situations, then, in which each is having just one
thought. Then we could properly speak of "what O’Brien is
occurrently believing” and "what Witold is wishing , and
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investigate whether, as the case is described, there is
reason either to maintain or to deny that O’Brien’s
occurrent belief is identical to Witold’s wish. This would
be good, because it would allow a simpler exposition of the
case and a simpler formulation of my arguments.
Unfortunately, the analogues of the Plurality of Thoughts
Argument (PTA) alluded to in the last chapter show, if they
are sound, that no constraint of the sort envisioned is
possible. Briefly, let’s consider why this is the case.
One of the two relevant analogues of PTA, call it "PTA.,"
,
relies on the following inference rule
(DIST<) For any singular term, t, from
[t is occurrently believing that Jones will arrive on
time]
i nfer
:
[t is occurrently believing that Jones will arrive],
From this, together with some further premises analogous to
those involved in PTA, we get:
Conclusion of PTA
.,
Necessarily, if O’Brien is occurrently believing
that Jones will arrive on time, then there are at
least two things that O’Brien is occurrently
believing
The other analogue, call it "PTA2", appeals to the rule
( DISTp ) For any singular term, t, from
ft is wishing that Jones would arrive on time]
i nfer
:
[t is wishing that Jones would arrive],
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and again, with premises analogous to those in PTA, yields:
Conclusion of PTA
2
Necessarily, if Witold is wishing that it would be
that Jones will arrive on time, then there are at
least two things that Witold is wishing.
These two arguments, PTA^ and PTA
2 , are surely just as
compelling as PTA itself; and I think that PTA is fairly
compelling. But—to return to our situations involving
O’Brien and Witold— the conclusions of PTA
1
and PTA 2 imply
that in those situations there is no single thing that is
"what" O’Brien is occurrently believing, and no one thing
that is "what" Witold is wishing. The very description of
the case requires, if these arguments are sound, that
O’Brien is occurrently believing at least two things and
that Witold is wishing at least two things. The reader will
get an idea of how this result complicates the matters I
wish to discuss once we undertake the discussion.
Nevertheless, I propose to grant here that PTA., and
PTA 2 are indeed sound. I don’t think that the resulting
complications in exposition will affect the intuitive force
of the arguments against (RV2.1) that we shall be
discussing. I do think that those arguments can be
presented in a more clear-cut fashion, however, if we pare
down, as much as possible, what things O’Brien and Witold
may be said to be occurrently believing or wishing. There
are some constraints that can be added to our description of
the case that serve this purpose and that are nevertheless
267
compatible with the conclusions of PTA
1
and PTA
2 . So, to
set the stage, let me present and discuss these constraints.
8.2.2 *-Si tuati ons
First, I would like to give an intuitive idea of which
situations the added constraints are supposed to corral. So
far
,
I have said that we are considering situations in which
O’Brien is occurrently believing that Jones will arrive on
time, and Witold is wishing that it would be that Jones will
arrive on time. But now I propose that we confine our
attention to a proper subset of such situations in which, to
put it intuitively, what is crossing O’Brien’s mind at the
moment is exhausti vel
y
reported by the following displayed-
sentence ascription:
(1’) O’Brien is thinking: Jones will arrive on time.
By saying that (1’) reports "exhaustively" what is on
O’Brien’s mind, I mean to rule out that he is, say, wishing
or wondering anything, or bearing any other attitude not
required by his occurrently believing things. And I mean to
rule out that he has any "stronger" occurrent beliefs than
what is reported by (1’). Thus, although it might be
accurate to use (1’) to report what O’Brien is thinking if
he is thinking: Jones will arrive on time and out of breath
as usual
.
(1’) would not, in such circumstances, report
exhaustively what is crossing his mind. Put another way,
the idea is that these are situations in which, if you asked
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O Brien what he is thinking, he would report by saying
something like "I’m thinking that Jones will arrive on
time. and if you ask, Well, what else are you thinking",
he d say: That s it; I was just thinking: Jones is going
to arrive on time
,
and nothing else was on my mind at all".
(He might well consider it frivolous, even if true (if he
accepts PTA
1
) , if we pointed out to him that he must also be
thinking that Jones will arrive ( tout court ) .
)
Likewise for Witold: the situations I wish to attend to
will be ones such that
(2’) Witold is thinking: Arrive on time, Jones.
reports exhaustively what is crossing Witold’s mind. I take
this to rule out situations in which Witold is bearing other
attitudes not required by the wishing reported by (2’).
Also, as in O’Brien’s case, I understand the restriction to
rule out cases in which Witold is wishing anything stronger
than what is reported by (2’). Ask Witold what he was
thinking at the time, he will say "I was just wishing that
Jones would arrive on time, that’s all I was thinking,
that’s all that was crossing my mind.
That’s the idea, roughly put. From here on, I shall
refer to the situations I have in mind, described here
roughly and intuitively, as "*-si tuations" . Next, I propose
to state some constraints that corral these situations
somewhat more precisely.
269
8-2.3 Constraints on *-Si tuati ons
The first constraint that I wish to impose may be put:
Constraint 1
! ^-situations are ones in which
I
I
a. O’Brien is thinking, concerning Jones: Jones will
\ arrive on time.
I
I
!
b. Witold is thinking, concerning Jones: Arrive on
! time, Jones.
I take the conditions of this constraint to imply that (1),
(1*), (2) and (2’) express things that are true relative to
those situations. It would not have sufficed simply to say
that the situations are ones relative to which the things
expressed by (1) and (2) are true. For I believe that this
would not capture all that follows, concerning these
situations, from the truth, there, of the things expressed
by (1’) and (2’). And the features that, as it seems to me,
would get left out, are ones that I wish to require.
Then why not simply put that the situations in question
are ones relative to which the things expressed by (1’) and
(2’) are true? I used to think that this would be enough,
and I thought so because I used to think that (1) and (2)
were implied, respectively by (1’) and (2’), and that the
adverbial, "concerning Jones", was not needed. And indeed
if the implication of (1) by (1’) (and of (2) by (2’)) di_d
hold (so to speak), it would be sufficient in the present
connection to require that ^-situations are ones relative to
which the things expressed by (1’) and (2’) are true. But I
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are
think it is open to question whether (1) and (2)
implied, respectively by (1’) and (2’). 2
Then why not simply require that ^-situations are ones
relative to which the conjunctions— of (1) and (1’) and of
(2) and (2 ) express truths? The problem with putting the
constraint this way, roughly put, is that the things
expressed by the di spl ayed-sentence ascriptions might be
true relative to some situations on grounds independent of
the grounds of truth at those situations of the things
expressed by ( 1 ) and (2). Take the case of ( 1 ) and (1’). I
wish to require, roughly speaking, that in a ^-situation,
O’Brien is occurrently believing of Jones that she will
arrive on time, and that he pulls off this bit of occurrent
believing in a way indicated by the truth of the displayed-
sentence ascription, (1’). *-si tuati ons
,
then, are to be
understood, roughly, as ones where the same bit of thinking
makes the claims expressed by both (1) and (1’) true. The
same idea goes, mutatis mutandis , for the case of (2) and
(2’). I hope that the constraint stated above captures
clearly enough, something at least in the neighborhood of
the desired requirement.
In order to state the second constraint, it will be
useful to have some further terminology. We say that one
attitude requires another (from (D6), Chapter 4, p.31)
roughly if bearing the one attitude to a thing, x, entails
bearing the other attitude to something (though perhaps not
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x). Then, where V-ing is the present participle form of any
verb whose present progressive expresses an occurrent
attitude, R, I propose to use ascriptions of the form,
[t is only V-ing t’]
to assert of persons (or any things denoted by substituends
of ' t
’ ) that they are bearing R to things (denoted by
substituends of t’ ), and that the only occurrent attitudes
they are bearing to those things are ones required by R. I
assume that occurrent belief requires neither wishing nor
occurrent wondering. Then, for example, to say that a
person is only occurrently believing, does not imply that
she isn’t also brushing her teeth, combing her hair or
getting breakfast under way, but it does imply that she is
neither wishing anything, nor wondering anything (nor
bearing any other occurrent attitude not required by
occurrent belief).
One further piece of terminology relating to the
character of Witold’s wishing will be useful in stating the
second constraint. In Chapter 6, I noted that in certain
cases, what a person is wishing might be thought expressed
by an optative rather than by an imperative. I noted as an
example that depending on the character of my wishing, if I
am wishing that Rachel would pick up Carl’s violin, it might
be plausible to say that what I am wishing is expressed (wrt
a context in which Rachel is addressee) with an optative,
1 i ke
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If only you would pick up Carl’s violin
or the more archaic
Would that you pick up Carl’s violin
and not by the imperative
Pick up Carl’s violin.
I do not propose to settle the question of whether the
optatives in such triples express the same thing as the
imperative. But when I raised this matter in Chapter 6, I
also noted that at least in some cases where one’s wishing
is, as I put it then, "sufficiently demanding" in character,
what one is wishing i_s pretty clearly expressed by an
i mperat i ve
.
I don’t have a precise account of conditions under
which a wishing may be said to be demanding, in this sense,
to a sufficient degree. I assume that we can say this much,
however: roughly, that an event of wishing has this
demanding character if that event is properly reported by an
ascription of the form
t is thinking: 0
in which the substituend for f t’ denotes the subject of the
wishing, and the substituend for ' 0 ' is an imperative. Let
me call such sentences "displayed-imperati ve ascriptions".
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It seems to me that any such ascription, if it expresses a
truth, does report a wishing, and it seems to me, as well,
that circumstances in which such ascriptions would be
clearly counted as expressing truths are fairly familiar
(even if the truth conditions for such ascriptions are
themselves not exactly clear).
I suggest that we view wishings of the sort in question
here as involving a particular, distinguishing occurrent
attitude: an occurrent attitude, R, such that i) an event
of wishing is sufficiently demanding in character iff it is
an event of someone’s bearing R to a thing, and ii) R is a
species of wishing. (The notion of spec i es relevant here was
defined in (D7), see Chapter 4, p . 3 1 ; roughly, one attitude
is a species of another if bearing the first to a thing, x,
entails bearing the second to x, and the second does not
require the first.)
Now I want a verb phrase that will serve to express
this occurrent attitude. Though I think that events
involving this species of wishing are very familiar, there
isn’t, as far as I know, any verb in English that expresses
the attitude precisely. On one of the more familiar
interpretations of instances of
t wants t’ to VP
('Mark wants Rachel to pick up Carl’s violin’, for example)
these sentences report states that persons are in in virtue
of bearing what I would say is a non-occur rent counterpart
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of the occurrent attitude in question. But I don’t think
any form of the verb 'want’ expresses the species of wishing
in question. Nor do I know of any adverb in English that
can modify 'is wishing’ so that the resulting verb phrase
expresses this attitude.
I propose to expropriate the adverb 'imperatively’, and
prefix it to the present participle in progressive forms of
wish
,
obtaining such locutions as
is imperatively wishing,
were imperatively wishing, etc.
and I shall take any such verb phrase to express the species
of wishing in question (or else some directly related
attitude, in the case of progressive forms that are not
present- tense ) . To have a name for the attitude, I’ll call
it "imperative wishing".
Now the second constraint on ^-situations can be put,
simpl
y
Constraint 2 3
! ^-situations are ones in which:
I
I
a. O’Brien is on 1
y
occurrently believing;
I
!
b. Witold is only imperatively wishing.
In *-si tuat i ons
,
Witold may believe that Jones is never
prompt, but this can’t be something that he is occurrentl
v
bel ievi ng . For I suppose that occurrent belief is not
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required by wishing and Witold is onl
y
wishing, and in fact
onl_y wishing imperatively. Consequently, there are no
situations meeting Constraint 2 in which Witold occurrently
believes anything at all. Likewise, there is nothing that
O’Brien is wishing in such situations, though it is
compatible with Constraint 2 that there be things that he
desi res (I mean the non-occur rent attitude of desire).
Constraint 2 captures part of what I meant when I said
in the intuitive description offered in 8.2.2, that (1’) and
(2’) serve to report exhaustively what is on Witold’s and
O’Brien’s minds in *-si tuati ons . The third constraint
captures another feature of these situations that was
supposed to be conveyed by that remark; it concerns which
occurrent belief and wish may be said, intuitively, to be
the strongest that O’Brien and Witold are having in the
situations in question. The constraint may be put as
fol 1 ows
:
Constraint 3
J
^-situations are ones in which
I
I
!
a. Vx( if O’Brien is occurrently believing x, then
nec Vy( if y is occurrently believing that Jones
will arrive on time, then y is occurrently
J
bel i evi ng x ) )
,
I
b. Vx( if Witold is wishing x, then
nec Vy( if y is imperatively wishing that it would
be that Jones will arrive on time, then y is
!
wi shi ng x ) )
.
I
I —
—
Let us consider briefly what this further constraint is
supposed to accomplish.
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It will be useful to have the following notions:
(Dll) a. x is as strong an occurrent belief as y =df
i) x and y are occurrent beliefs;
ii) nec Vz( if z is occurrently believing x,
then z is occurrently believing y )
b. x is as strong a wish as y =df
i) x and y are wishes;
ii) nec Vz( if z is wishing x, then z is
wishing y )
One occurrent belief (wish) is as strong as another,
roughly, just in case whenever you are occurrently believing
(wishing) the one, you are occurrently believing (wishing)
the other. There are some notions closely related to these
that I shall employ as well: we may say, for example, that
an occurrent belief is stronger than another (it is as
strong as the other, but the other is not as strong as it),
or that two wishes are independent of one another (neither
is as strong as the other).
Finally, it will make subsequent discussions easier if
we adopt the following terminology. There are things
necessarily such that a person occurrently believes them if
he or she is occurrently believing that Jones will arrive.
I shall refer to any of these as a "Jones belief".
Similarly, there are things necessarily such that a person
occurrently believes them if he or she is occurrently
believing that Jones will arrive on time . Let us call any
of these a "Jones-on-time belief". And I propose to use
"Jones wish" and "Jones-on-time wish understood in
analogous ways. If PTA
1
is sound, we must grant that every
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Jones belief is a Jones-on-time belief but not vice-versa .
An analogous point holds concerning Jones wishes and Jones-
on-time wishes, if PTA 2 is sound.
With this terminology, then, we may characterize the
effects of Constraint 3 as follows: i) it rules out any
situations in which O’Brien is occurrently believing
anything that is independent of or stronger than any Jones-
on-time beliefs, and ii) it rules out any situations in
which Witold is wishing anything independent of or stronger
than any Jones-on-time wishes. Let’s consider how this
affects what Witold may be said to be wishing.
I am inclined to think that there are possible
situations conforming to the first two constraints relative
to which the report expressed by
(2*) Witold is thinking: Arrive on time, Jones, and
please have the tickets in hand.
is true. Let us call these " ( 2* )-si tuat i ons" . Although the
open formula
(2**) y is imperatively wishing that it would be that
Jones will arrive on time
is satisfied by Witold relative to ( 2*
)
— s i tuati ons
,
there
are things Witold is wishing in such situations some of
which are stronger than, others independent of, anything one
is wishing whenever one satisfies (2 ). Intuitively put,
there’s an imperative wish that Jones will arrive on time
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and have the tickets in hand, and there’s also an imperative
wish, simply, that Jones will have the tickets in hand.
Each of these is a wish Witold has in ( 2* ) — si tuations
,
yet
the first is stronger than, the second independent of any
Jones-on-time wishes. Consequently, ( 2* )-si tuati ons do not
meet Constraint 3, and cannot be counted among *-si tuati ons
.
Analogous points apply concerning the effect of
Constraint 3 on what O’Brien may be said to be occurrently
believing. For example, the constraint rules out situations
in which O’Brien is occurrently believing that Jones will
arrive on time and out of breath, for in such situations, he
has an occurrent belief— intuitively, the belief that Jones
will arrive on time and out of breath— stronger than any
Jones-on-time beliefs.
Hereafter, when I speak of ”*-si tuati ons"
,
I may be
understood to mean all and only those situations conforming
to Constraints 1-3. I believe that these constraints do
capture the situations fitting the intuitive description I
gave in 8.2.2. We have O’Brien thinking: Jones will arrive
on time ; we have Witold thinking: Arrive on time, Jones,
and moreover, given Constraints 2 and 3, I think these
situations are ones concerning which each of these
di spl ayed-sentence ascriptions I’ve just used may be said to
report exhaustive!
v
what the person is thinking, what is
crossing his mind, what’s occurring to him. I assume that
some such situations are possi bl
e
.
Although I don’t have an
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argument to buttress this assumption, it seems plausible to
me on the face of it.
Next, in the following two sections, I wish to present
some intuitive considerations concerning these ^-situations
that form the basis for two separate lines of argument
against ( RV2 . 1 )
.
8 . 3 The Linguistic Argument
In the last section of Chapter 6, I was concerned to
develop and motivate a certain thesis about what sentences
express. Loosely, the thesis can be put:
Thesis 2
a. Indicatives express occurrent beliefs
b. Imperatives express wishes
c. Interrogati ves express questions
Further reflection suggests that in the case of many
sentences of each of the three varieties in question here,
there isn’t any latitude in which of these three breeds of
thought those sentences may be said to express. That is to
say: in the case of a large number of indicatives, it
appears that they do not express anything besides occurrent
beliefs; in the case of a large number of imperatives, it is
implausible to hold that they express anything besides
wishes, and in the case of very many i nterrogati ves , it is
not plausible to hold that they express anything besides
questions. Intuitions supporting these generalizations form
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the basis of what I shall call the "Linguistic Argument"
against ( RV2
. 1 )
.
8.3.1 First Pass
I take it to be clear and uncontroversi al that in any
® i tuat i on
,
one thing that O’Brien is occurrently believing
is the thing in fact expressed by
(3) Jones will arrive on time.
I am assuming that there is a unique thing expressed by (3)
in English. The import of Thesis 2, concerning (3), is that
this very thing— the thing expressed by (3)— is such that
there are possible situations in which it is something
someone is occurrently believing. What I am here claiming
to be plain, additionally, is that ^-situations are examples
of such possible situations, and that, in particular, the
thing expressed by (3) is one of O’Brien’s occurrent beliefs
in such situations. Also, if we accept the intuitions that
motivated Thesis 2, then we will grant that in any *-
situation, one thing that Witold is wishing is the thing
expressed by the following imperative:
(4) Arrive on time, Jones.
Again, as in the case of (3), I am assuming that there is a
unique thing expressed by (4), and it seems extremely
plausible to me to say that this thing (4) expresses is
something Witold is wishing in *-si tuat i ons
.
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However, it is surely counterintuitive to claim that
the thing O’Brien is occurrently believing, and that (3)
expresses, is also the very thing expressed by (4). The
claim seems counterintuitive in two ways.
First, I have assumed (with (A7), Chapter 4, p.30) that
what a person is occurrently believing at a time, are among
the person’s thoughts at the time— the things he or she is
genthinking. This seems plausible prima-facie
. and in
particular it seems plausible to say that O’Brien’s
occurrent belief that is expressed by (3) is among the
things he may be said to be thinking in these *-si tuati ons
.
By contrast, however, it seems to me quite implausible to
say that (4) expresses anything that O’Brien is thinking in
*-si tuati ons . For although it does seem to me that there
are situations relative to which it would be correct to say
of a person that (4) expresses something he or she is
^•^thi nki ng (Witold, for example, in our *-si tuati ons ) , to
say this of a person seems to me to imply that the person is
wishing something in those situations, indeed imperatively
wishing that it would be that Jones will arrive on time,
that the person satisfies the open sentence
x is thinking: Arrive on time, Jones
relative to such situations. But this can’t be the case
with our situations involving O’Brien, for by Constraint 2,
si tuati ons are ones where O’Brien is on 1
y
occurrently
believing, and isn’t wishing anything. So it seems that (4)
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can’t be said to express anything O’Brien is thinking. If
this is right, and we wish to maintain that the occurrent
belief expressed by (3) j_s among O’Brien’s thoughts, then we
have to allow that the latter occurrent belief is not what
(4) expresses.
Second, if (4) expresses this occurrent belief
expressed by (3), we should have to say that (3) and (4)
express the same thing. This seems implausible on the face
of it; if one understands the strict and literal usage of
these sentences and has a proper grasp of the concept of
sentential expression, one will not be inclined to equate
what these sentences express. But if an argument is wanted,
here is one. If two sentences express the same thing, then
if a person has complete command of the proper usage of each
sentence, and is not ignorant of what things the referring
terms in the sentences denote, or of what properties or
relations are expressed by constituent verbs, this person
will be prepared to utter one of the two sentences literally
and sincerely only if he or she is prepared to utter the
other sentence sincerely and literally as well. It seems to
me as clear as anything can be that a person may have
complete command of proper usage of (3) and ( 4 )--understand
what 'will arrive on time’ means, and understand the
imperative form 'arrive on time’--and know, moreover , who is
denoted by 'Jones’, and yet sincerely utter either (3) or
(4), intending the utterance to be taken literally, yet not
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be willing to utter the other sentence sincerely and intend
that utterance to be taken literally. Then (3) and (4) do
not express the same thing.
In sum, it seems counterintuitive to say that (4)
expresses the same occurrent belief that O’Brien has in
these ^-situations that i_s expressed by (3). At this point,
if only it were right to speak of the thing O’Brien is
occurrently believing and the thing Witold is wishing, we
would have a result that conflicts with (RV2.1). For if (3)
expresses what O’Brien is occurrently believing in *-
situations, and (4) expresses what Witold is wishing in such
situations, then we would have it that there are possible
situations in which a person is occurrently believing that
Jones will arrive on time, another person is wishing that it
would be that Jones will arrive on time, yet in which it is
not the case that there is any item, in particular not the
proposition that Jones will arrive on time, that the one is
occurrently believing and the other wishing— contrary to
(RV2.1). Unfortunately, the effects of PTA
1
and PTA2 ,
complicate matters. Still, Constraints 1 - 3 serve to keep
the matters manageable, and the considerations raised just
above concerning (3) and (4) and what they express in these
^-situations can be generalized. Let me explain how.
8.3.2 The General Case
The main thing to see is that in *-si tuati ons , there
just aren’t that many things that it is plausible to think
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that O’Brien is occurrently believing or that Witold is
wishing, besides the occurrent belief and wish expressed
respectively by (3) and (4). Let us consider the case of
each person in turn.
If PTA
1
is sound then there are at least two things
that O’Brien is occurrently believing in *-si tuati ons . But
one gets the idea of which beliefs are in question; they
must be Jones-on-time beliefs. One of these is expressed by
(3), and there is a weaker one that is expressed by
(3’) Jones will arrive.
Perhaps there are yet other Jones-on-time beliefs that
analogues of PTA will require us to grant that O’Brien is
occurrently believing in these situations. I am not sure of
this, even conceding the sort of intuitions that underlie
PTA. 4 At any rate, whatever occurrent beliefs O’Brien must
be said to be having in *-si tuati ons
,
I would claim that any
occurrent beliefs O’Brien is having in these ^-situations
will be such that, if they are expressed by sentences of
English at all, they are expressed by i ndi cati ves . It seems
to me extremely plausible that we can say at least this much
about O’Brien’s beliefs in those situations.
Now consider Witold’s case. If, as we are assuming,
PTA2 is sound, then it is true that
there is no unique thing
that Witold is wishing. But still, in virtue of Constraints
2 and 3, he is not bearing any other occurrent attitudes
besides any that are required by his imperatively wishing
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things, and moreover
,
the only things he is imperatively
wishing are Jones-on-time wishes. We have seen that one of
these is expressed by (4), and I think it is clear, too,
that there is a weaker wish he is having that is expressed
by
( 4 ’ ) Arri ve
,
Jones
.
And maybe there are other Jones-on-time wishes that we must
allow that Witold is wishing if we accept analogues of
PTA along the lines of PTA 2 . (But see note 5.) However,
since, according to Constraint 2, Witold is only
imperatively wishing in these situations, and moreover, by
Constraint 3, there is nothing that he is imperatively
wishing apart from Jones-on-time wishes, it seems extremely
plausible to me to say that anything Witold is wishing in
these situations will be such that, if it can be expressed
by a sentence of English at all, it is expressed by an
i mperati ve
.
But if we grant these contentions concerning the
thoughts O’Brien and Witold are having in *-si tuati ons , then
it seems to me that considerations parallel to those raised
above concerning (3) and (4) will show that none of the
things O’Brien is occurrently believing is expressed by any
of the imperatives that express things that Witold is
wishing. Again, there are two separate grounds. Let OB be
an arbitrary occurrent belief that O’Brien is having in
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these *-si tuations
; and suppose that 0 is any one of the
imperatives that expresses something Witold is wishing. I
claim 0 does not express OB. For two reasons:
First, whatever imperative 0 happens to be
— (4), (4’)
or any other— if it expresses something O’Brien is
occurrently believing, then it expresses something he is
9enthinking. But if it expresses something he is
9enthinking we ought to be able to report that thought by
the d i spl ayed- i mperat i ve ascription
[O’Brien is thinking: 0]
And I claim that if this ascription expresses a report that
is true, then it follows that O’Brien is wishing something,
indeed imperatively wishing something, and this contradicts
our description of *-si tuati ons
.
Second, suppose 0 does express OB. If what I have said
about O’Brien is right, then anything he is occurrently
believing that can be expressed in English at all is
expressed by an indicative. Then there must be some
indicative, 0* , that expresses OB, and consequently,
expresses the same thing as 0 . But this, I claim, is
implausible; an argument analogous to the one considered
above, concerning (3) and (4), can be constructed to show
that 0 and 0* do not express the same thing. Briefly:
whatever indicative and imperative 0* and 0 may be, surely
it could be that an ideally competent English speaker could
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sincerely utter the one, yet not be prepared to utter the
other sincerely. So it can’t be that 0 expresses OB.
These considerations support the second premise of the
following argument. To simplify formulation, let me use '$’
to denote an arbitrary ^-situation; then we may put:
The Linguistic Argument (LA)
i) Whatever Witold is wishing in $ is in fact
expressed by an imperative, if it can be expressed
by a sentence of English at all.
ii) No imperative expresses anything O’Brien is
occurrently believing in $.
:: iii) Whatever Witold is wishing in $, if it is in fact
expressed in English at all, is distinct from
anything O’Brien is occurrently believing in $.
But we have already seen that in general, ^-situations are
ones in which whatever Witold is wishing, if it can be
expressed in English at all, it is expressed by an
imperative. So it seems to me that we have intuitive
support for both premises. And the argument is valid. So I
think we have some compelling grounds for accepting the
conclusion of this argument.
It is easy to see, however, that the conclusion of LA
conflicts with (RV2.1). Let me use ' J
’
to denote the
proposition that Jones will arrive on time. (RV2.1) implies
that necessarily, anyone occurrently believing that Jones
will arrive is occurrently believing J, and also
necessarily, anyone who is wishing that it would be that
Jones will arrive is wishing J. But from (DIO) it follows
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that J is a thing that is expressed in English— it is
expressed by (3). From this fact and (RV2.1), then, we get
the result that there
_i_s a thing--this proposition, J--that
can be expressed in English, such that in any *-si tuati ons
(indeed in any possible situations relative to which the
reports expressed by (1) and (2) are true), O’Brien is
occur rent 1 y believing J, and Witold is wishing J. This
result contradicts the conclusion of LA. Consequently, we
must either give up (RV2.1) or else one or the other of the
premises of this argument.
In section 8.5 below, I shall examine these options
more closely, and address the question of how a proponent of
the Received View might respond to LA. Before proceeding to
these matters, there is another line of argument that I
would like to present and discuss whose conclusion conflicts
with (RV2.1). This second argument hinges on intuitions
concerning the conditions under which two persons may
properly be said to be genthinking the same thing. The
intuitions in question are brought out fairly clearly, I
think, in connection with O’Brien’s and Witold’s thoughts in
*-si tuations
.
8 . 4 The Argument from Sameness of Thought
8.4.1 What Would a Mind-Reader Say?
Imagine that we are mind-readers and that we re in the
company of O’Brien and Witold, in a *-si tuati on as described
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above. Suppose in fact that we are reading their minds, and
that we are being careful to read all of what’s crossing
their minds. Then I think we would know that the
ascr i pti ons
(1 ) 0 Brien is thinking: Jones will arrive on time.
and
(2’) Witold is thinking: Arrive on time
,
Jones.
express truths under the circumstances. Moreover, if we are
good mi nd- readers--abl e to read anyone’s mind accurately and
thoroughly— and are exercising our abilities with O’Brien
and Witold, then presumably we would know that (1’) and (2’)
report exhaust i vel
y
what things are crossing O’Brien’s and
Witold’s minds at the moment. We would know that O’Brien is
on 1
y
occurrently believing, that Witold is onl
y
imperatively
wishing, and that neither of them has any wish or occurrent
belief stronger than, or independent of the ones reported by
(1’) and (2’). Let us suppose that we are good mind-readers
in this sense and that we do know these things about
O’Brien’s and Witold’s thoughts in these circumstances.
Imagine, next, that another person, Smith, joins our
company. Smith is a mind-reader too, and is reading
O’Brien’s mind, but for some reason is drawing a blank with
Witold; he cannot tell what Witold is thinking. Yet he
wants to know. What can we tell Smith that’s relevant and
true? Of course one way to tell him what he wants to know
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IS by issuing (2’). Perhaps just a mental utterance would
suffice; perhaps we could just think: Witold is thinking:
Arrive on time, Jones. If we added that this report is a
thorough and exhaustive one, Smith would have the whole
truth on the matter of what O’Brien is thinking. But
suppose we don’t tell him so much; I wish to emphasize two
separate points.
First, I think it is clear, on one hand, that there is
a familiar reading of progressive on which, in these *-
situations, if we told Smith that both O’Brien and Witold
are thinking things, we would be telling him the truth. The
reading is that on which the progressive expresses
^enthinking. In other words, if we take the occurrence of
the verb figuring in
(5) O’Brien is thinking something and Witold is
thinking something.
on this reading, the report expressed by (5), so
interpreted, is strictly speaking true relative to the
situations under consideration. It is not clear to me, on
the other hand, whether there is any familiar reading of 'is
thinking’ on which i) the verb applies to mental events (as
we should want in these circumstances, since Smith wants to
know what Witold is thinking at the moment, what thoughts he
is having), yet on which ii) the report expressed by (5) is
not strictly speaking true relative to *-si tuations . If
there were an occurrent belief reading of the progressive as
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it figures in (5), these conditions would be met, for the
report expressed, on this interpretation, would imply that
Witold is occurrently believing something, and that is not
the case. But I think it is very questionable whether such
an occurrent belief reading exists. (For a summary of
considerations relevant to this issue, see Chapter 4,
section 4.5.)
Second, if the progressive is understood to express
gen thinking, it seems plainly i ncorrect to say that there is
anything that O’Brien and Witold are both thinking in these
*-si tuati ons
,
anything that they are thinking in common. If
we were to tell Smith that Witold is thinking something that
O’Brien is thinking, surely it would be proper for Smith to
infer from our claim, together with what he knows (keep in
mind, he knows what O’Brien is thinking) that Witold is
occurrently believing somethi ng--perhaps the belief that
Jones will arrive on time, perhaps the belief, simply, that
Jones will arrive, perhaps some other Jones-on-time belief--
but in any case, Smith could properly infer that Witold is
occurrently believing somethi ng . But this conclusion is
false under the envisioned circumstances; Witold is not
occurrently believing anything. Since the inference is
proper, our claim must itself be false. Any mind-reader who
claims, concerning these *-si tuati ons , that Witold is
thinking something that O’Brien is thinking is either a poor
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mind reader, or a deceitful one (or perhaps a Propositional
Traditionalist under tow of the Received View).
8-4.2 Two Features of Generic Thinking
I find that appeal to considerations of mind-reading
has some heuristic value here, because I think most of us
have pretty clear intuitions— concerning situations where we
suppose ourselves to be reading people’s minds— about which
cases are ones where we could correctly say that the people
in question are having the same thoughts, or not. These
intuitions hinge in turn, I think, on our intuitions about
the things that persons may be said to be thinking, in the
relational, gener i
c
sense, and these are intuitions of just
the sort that I have wished to bring to the fore. But
perhaps the reader finds thought-experiments that appeal to
mind-reading unhelpful. It is worth stressing then that the
possibility of mind-reading is not essential to the point I
wish to make. The point is this:
It seems to me clearly false to say that O’Brien and
Witold are thinking any of the same things in these *-
situations. At least, this seems clearly false, if the
relational, generic reading of the progressive is intended,
and I we have seen it to be questionable whether there is
any other event reading available in ordinary English usage.
Consider any ^-situation and assume that you know (whether
by mind-reading or any other means) what O’Brien and Witold
are thinking. Ask yourself whether it would be correct to
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say that these two have any thoughts in common, whether it
would be correct to say that there are any things that are
crossing both of their minds, occurring to them both. It
seems to me to be clear that the answer to these questions
is No. Then I take it that there isn’t anything that both
can be said to be thinking, in the generic sense in
question
.
Somewhat more formal and general grounds for this point
may be put as follows. It seems to me a plain feature of
the generic reading of the progressive of 'think’, that if
we are told that one person is thinking something that
another is thinking, and moreover, we know that this other
is bearing some species of generic thinking, R, and is not
bearing any other occurrent attitude (apart from any that
happen to be required by R), then it is proper for us to
infer that both people are bearing R to something in common
too
.
More specifically, I claim that the following theses
capture two clear features of gen thinking by which it is
related to the attitudes of occurrent belief and wishing:
( A9
)
a. nec VxVy nec( if Jz( x is genthinking z, and y is
gen thi nki ng z ), and x is only occurrently
believing, then Jz( x is occurrently believing z
and y is occurrently believing z ))
b. nec VxVy nec( if lz( x is genthinking z, and y is
gen thi nki ng z ), and x is only wishing, then
x is wishing z and y is wishing z ))
Roughly, a) if two persons are thinking something in common
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and one of them is only occurrently believing, then there is
something that both of them are occurrently believing, and
similarly for wishing, b) if two persons can be said to be
thinking something in common, and one of the two is onl y
wishing (whether imperatively or optatively, or in any other
manner), then there is something that both of them are
wishing (in some manner or other).
Let me try to bring out some intuitions relevant to
these assumptions without appeal to mind-reading. Suppose
that O’Brien and Witold are accompanied in these *-
situations by some partners, O’Brien* and Witold*, and let
us suppose that the following express reports that are true
relative to the situation in question:
(6) O’Brien* is thinking: Jones will arrive on time
(7) Witold* is thinking: Arrive on time, Jones
I think that most of us might ordinarily be inclined to say,
concerning such a case, that O’Brien and his partner are
thinking the same thing, and also that Witold and his
partner are thinking the same thing. And if it weren’t for
considerations of the sort raised by PTA^ and PTA 2 , and
other analogues of PTA, I would contend that these things
we’d ordinarily be inclined to say might well be correct.
But we are granting that such arguments are sound, and so I
take it that, strictly speaking, we must deny that they are
thinking the same thing. A similar point goes for Witold
and his partner. Moreover, the truth of (6) and (7)
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relative to given ^-situations does not even suffice for
it’s being the case that either O’Brien and his partner, or
Witold and his, are thinking the same things. For take the
case of Witold*: perhaps (7) isn’t an exhaustive report of
what is on his mind. Perhaps the following expresses a
truth as well:
(7*) Witold* is thinking: Arrive on time, Jones and
have the tickets in hand.
Then I think it would be incorrect, strictly speaking, to
say that Witold and Witold* are thinking the same things.
Nevertheless, the following claims do seem to me
clearly true:
(8) O’Brien and O’Brien* are thinking some things in
common
.
(9) Witold and Witold* are thinking some things in
common
By contrast, the following expresses a report whose
truth, I think, is not guaranteed by our description of the
case so far:
( ) o ) O’Brien* and Witold* are thinking some things in
common
.
This sentence does express a report true relative to some
situations conforming to our description. For I suppose
that we may consistently add to that description that in
addition to the thoughts reported by (6) and (7), the
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partners are both thinking: Jones has a tendency to be late
in a crunch.
However, on any i nterpretati on available in English, I
think it is plain that the following expresses a report that
is false given just the description of the case so far:
(11) O’Brien and Witold are thinking some things in
common
.
It seems to me that this assessment is clear if we
understand the description of the case; and it seems to me
that adequate grounds for this assessment are that we know
by description of ^-situations that O’Brien is only
occurrently believing, we know that Witold is on 1
y
wishing,
and it can’t be that one person is only occurrently
believing, and another is on!
y
wishing, and yet there are
any things the two may both be said to be thinking. For the
claim that either is thinking some things the other is
implies that they share one of these two attitudes, and by
description of the case, they do not. Behind this reasoning
lie the assumptions expressed in clauses a. and b. of (A9).
I do not have an argument to offer to establish that
what these clauses assert is true; nevertheless, it seems
plain to me that the claims formulated there do in fact
govern the concept of thought expressed with the generic
reading of 'think’ in English. I assume them to be true.
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8-4.3 The Argument
I take it that occurrent belief, wishing and wondering
are all species of generic thinking (this follows from the
definition of 'is a species of’, together with (A7) and some
other very natural assumptions about these attitudes). But
if this is right, then the claim that O’Brien and Witold are
not thinking any things in common can be seen to conflict
with (RV2.1). For we have the following argument (again,
suppose '$’ to denote some arbitrary *-si tuation )
:
The Argument from Sameness of Thought (AST)
i) Whatever O’Brien is occurrently believing in $ is
something he is genthinking in $, and whatever
Witold is wishing in $ is something he is9en thi nki ng in $. [from (A7)]
ii) There is nothing that O’Brien and Witold are both9en thi nki ng in $. [from (A9) and Constraint 2]
:: iii) Whatever Witold is wishing in $ is distinct from
anything O’Brien is occurrently believing in $.
Plainly this conclusion conflicts with (RV2.1). If (RV2.1)
is correct, then in any ^-situation (indeed in any situation
where O’Brien is occurrently believing that Jones will
arrive on time, and where Witold is wishing that it would be
that Jones will arrive on time), there is a thing— the
proposition that Jones will arrive on time— that O’Brien is
occurrently believing, and that Witold is wishing. So
according to (RV2.1), there j_s a thing such that O’Brien is
occurrently believing it in $ and Witold is wishing it in $.
This contradicts iii). Since the argument is valid, we must
either give up (RV2.1), or the first premise (together with
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(A7) from which it is derived), or else premise ii) which is
supported by the intuitive considerations raised above
concerning the conditions under which two people may be said
to be thinking something in common.
In the next section, I propose to point out ways in
which the considerations that motivate LA and AST can be
generalized. If those considerations are right, much more
is shown, I believe, than merely that (RV2.1) is wrong with
respect to a few isolated cases.
8 . 5 Generalizing the Results of the Arguments
8.5.1 That No Instance of (RV2) Holds
I claimed at the end of 8.1, after formulating (RV2.1),
that since the thesis was an arbitrary and representative
instantiation of (RV2)--by choice of the (assumed) standard
i ndi cati ve
,
( 3 )
:
Jones will arrive on time
for '^’--the arguments I was about to propose against
(RV2.1) would count against any instance of (RV2) at all.
Briefly, here’s why I think that this is so.
No matter how one proposes to instantiate (RV2)— no
matter which indicative one puts in for ' 0' --I am inclined
to think that there are possible situations analogous to *-
situations in the following respects: for the selected 0,
i) the claims expressed by the following pairs of standard
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ascriptions and di spl ayed-sentence ascriptions will be true
relative to those situations:
Standard
:
[ O’Brien is occurrently believing that 0 ]
[ Witold is wishing that it would be that 0 ]
Di spl ayed-Sentence
:
[ O’Brien is thinking: 0 ]
[ Witold is thinking: Let it be that 0. ],
ii) the claims expressed by these sentences are true
relative to these situations in virtue of the occurrence,
there, of the same bit of occurrent believing on O’Brien’s
part, and the same bit of wishing on Witold’s part, 5 and
iii) the claims expressed by the di spl ayed-sentence
ascriptions are not only true, but exhaustive as well. In
saying that the claims are "exhaustive" I mean that
analogues of Constraints 2 and 3, discussed in 8.2, will
apply.
A choice of standard indicative, 0 , then, will
determine a class of such ^-situation analogues, and
concerning that class of possible situations, a pair of
arguments paralleling LA and AST may be formulated; where
"$" denotes any situation in the class:
300
LA0
i) Whatever Witold is wishing in $ is in fact
expressed by an imperative, if it can be expressed
by a sentence of English at all.
i i ) No imperative expresses anything O’Brien is
occurrently believing in $.
: : i i i ) Whatever Witold is wishing in $, if it is in fact
expressed in English at all, is distinct from
anything O’Brien is occurrently believing in $.
AST0
i) Whatever O’Brien is occurrently believing in $ is
something he is genthinking in $, and whatever
Witold is wishing in $ is something he isgenthinking in $. [from (A7))
ii ) There is nothing that O’Brien and Witold are both9enthinking in $. [from (A9) and Constraint 2]
: : i i i ) Whatever Witold is wishing in $ is distinct from
anything O’Brien is occurrently believing in $.
It seems to me that the intuitive support available for the
premises of any of these arguments will be precisely on a
par with that afforded for the premises of LA and AST
themselves by the considerations raised in 8.3 and 8.4.
Entirely analogous considerations can be raised in each
case. To put it briefly, choice of indicative ' 0 ' simply
fa
makes no difference to the intuitive support available.
And I take it to be plain, that if every such analogue
of LA or AST is sound, then we will have it (put roughly)
that no matter the choice of indicative, 0 , there are
possible situations in which, although O’Brien is
occurrently believing that 0 and Witold is wishing that it
would be that 0 , nevertheless, whatever Witold is wishing,
if it can be expressed in English at all, it is distinct
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from anything O’Brien is occurrently believing. Then we
will have the result, contrary to the relevant instantiation
of (RV2), that it is riot the case that the proposition that
0 is an x such that necessarily, if a person is occurrently
believing that 0 , that person is occurrently believing x,
and necessarily, if a person is wishing that it would be
that 0 , that person is wishing x.
I assume, then, that if the considerations raised in
the previous sections in support of the premises of LA and
AST are to be accepted, then not only (RV2.1) but any
instance of ( RV2 ) should be rejected as well. Consequently,
if all LA- and AST-anal ogues cited above are indeed sound,
then a first generalization of this result could be put as
fol 1 ows
:
(12) For any standard indicative, 0 , the following
expresses a truth:
[ It is not the case that the proposition that 0 is
an x such that:
nec vy( y is occurrently believing that 0 —» y is
occurrently believing x ), and
nec Vy( y is wishing that it would be that 0 —
>
y is wishing x ) ]
8.5.2 The Proposition that 0 Is Not an Isolated Case
(12) is only a start at generalizing the results of the
preceding sections. If LA# and AST# are indeed sound
concerning any relevant situation, $ (determined by our
choice of #) , then if we consider the conclusions of those
arguments, it will be apparent that a much more substantial
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generalization can be made. For those conclusions suggest
that the proposition that 0 is no isolated case in this
regard: more generally, in the relevant situations, there
simply j_s no thing such that O’Brien is occurrently
believing it, and Witold is wishing it. Put a little more
carefully, the view that emerges is this:
( 1 3 ) For any standard indicative, 0 , the following
expresses a truth:
[ There is no thing, x, such that:
nec Vy( y is occurrently believing that 0 -» y is
occurrently believing x ), and
nec Vy( y is wishing that it would be that 0 -»
y is wishing x ) ]
No matter the choice of standard indicative, 0 , there is no
thought, x, such that i) occurrently believing that 0
entails occurrently believing x, and al so , ii) wishing that
it would be that 0 entails wishing x. This result is one
important generalization of the considerations raised in
sections 8.3 and 8.4.
Strictly speaking, the conclusions of the LA-analogues
do not support this view expressed in (13). Rather, those
arguments, if sound, merely yield the view that, for any
standard, 0 , there is no x expressible in English such that
occurrently believing 0 entails believing x, and wishing
that it would be that 0 entails wishing x. Still, it would
be an odd result if it turned out that there is some thought
not expressible in Enolish-- and only such a thought--that
has the property of being an x such that necessarily, if one
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is occurrently believing that 0 , one is occurrently
believing x, and necessarily, if one is wishing that it
would be that 0 , one is wishing x. It might well be
wondered what other thoughts could plausibly be supposed to
have this property if no thoughts expressible in English do.
The attitudes in question are themselves reportable in
English with the very ascriptions employed just above
embedding an Engl i sh indicative, 0 . One might have thought
that if there are any thoughts such that, for some Engl i sh
i nd i cat i ve , 0 , occurrently believing that 0 entails
occurrently believing those thoughts, and wishing it would
be that 0 entails wishing those thoughts, then at least some
thoughts expressible in English would be among them. At any
rate, the conclusions of the AST-anal ogues do support the
claim expressed in (13), for they involve no restriction at
all to thoughts expressed by any particular class of
sentences
.
8.5.3 Choice of 0 Not Restricted to Standard Indicatives
But (13), too, can be generalized on the basis of
considerations akin to those already raised. The analogues
of *-si tuati ons we have been envisioning are situations in
which, for some standard indicative, 0 , one person is
occurrently believing that 0 , and another, wishing that it
would be that 0 . But the restriction here to standard
indicatives was introduced because (RV2) was formulated by
appeal to ascriptions embedding only such sentences, and
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this latter restriction was only imposed on (RV2) in order
that we could employ the "proposition that 0" terminology in
formulating the Received View. But this was a matter of
convenience in formulation. The considerations raised
against (RV2) in the preceding sections do not hinge on
choosing standard indicatives as the embedded sentences in
the attitude ascriptions by which ^-situations were
character i zed . Relevantly analogous considerations can be
raised regarding situations in which O’Brien is occurrently
believing that 0, and Witold is wishing that 0, whether 0 is
standard or not.
Consider for example, the following context-sensitive
i ndicati ve
(14) You are noisy.
I take there to be situations relative to which the claims
expressed by the following are both true and exhaustive:
(15) O’Brien is thinking, concerning Henry: You are
noisy.
(16) Witold is thinking, concerning Henry: Be noisy.
I believe it is fairly plain, upon reflection, that
analogues of LA and AST concerning such situations will be
just as compelling as LA and AST themselves.
Then I take it that the intuitive support for the
following generalization of (13) will be just as compelling
as the support for (13) itself:
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( 17 ) for any indicative, 0 , if c is a context, and 0
expresses something wrt c, then the following
expresses a truth with respect to c:
[ There is no thing, x, such that:
nec Vy( y is occurrently believing that 0 —
>
y is
occur rentl y believing x ), and
nec Vy ( y is wishing that it would be that 0 —
>
y i s wi shi ng x ) ] '
Roughly, (17) asserts that whether 0 is standard or not,
there is no thought such that i) occurrently believing that
0 entails having that thought as an occurrent belief, and
yet also such that ii) wishing that it would be that 0
entails having that thought as a wish. If the relevant
analogues of LA and AST are indeed sound, I believe it
should be granted that this much is established.
8.5.4 Thesis 3
(17) is the view that emerges if we are attending
solely to cases involving, roughly, a person’s occurrently
believing that 0 , and another’s wishing that it would be
that 0 . But considerations still quite parallel to those
raised in sections 8.3 and 8.4 arise regarding cases in
which one person is occurrently believing that 0 , and
another is wondering whether 0 , and as well regarding cases
in which one person is wondering whether 0 , and another is
wishing that it would be that 0 . In brief: any pair of the
three occurrent attitudes at issue in (RV2) will be
affected. So, in particular, considerations relevantly like
those raised so far support the view that there is no thing,
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x, of which it is both the case that occurrently believing
that 0 entails occurrently believing x, and wondering
whether 0 entails wondering x. Likewise, analogous
considerations support the view that there is no thing, x,
of which it is both the case that wishing that it would be
that 0 entails wishing x, and wondering whether 0 entails
wondering x.
As an illustration, let us consider the latter view
concerning wishing and wondering. It seems clear to me that
no matter which indicative, 0 , one picks, there will be
possible situations relative to which the reports expressed
by the following pairs of standard and di spl ayed-sentence
ascriptions will be true, exhaustive and true in virtue of
the same bit of wondering on O’Brien’s part and in virtue of
the same bit of wishing on Witold’s:
[ O’Brien is wondering whether 0 ]
[ Witold is wishing that it would be that 0 ]
[ O’Brien is thinking: Is it the case that 0? ]
[ Witold is thinking: Let it be the case that 0. ]
(On this point, though, see notes 6. and 7.) Then again,
arguments precisely parallel to LA and AST may be
formulated, this time with the assumption that "$" denotes
one of the presently envisioned situations:
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LA*#
i ) Whatever Witold is wishing in $ is in fact
expressed by an imperative, if it can be expressed
by a sentence of English at all.
ii ) No imperative expresses anything O’Brien is
wondering in $.
: : i i i ) Whatever Witold is wishing in $, if it is in fact
expressed in English at all, is distinct from
anything O’Brien is wondering in $.
AST*#
i ) Whatever O’Brien is wondering in $ is something he
is genthinking in $, and whatever Witold is
wishing in $ is something he is genthinking in $.
[from ( A7 )
]
ii) There is nothing that O’Brien and Witold are bothgenthinking in $. [from (A9) and Constraint 2]
:: iii) Whatever Witold is wishing in $ is distinct from
anything O’Brien is wondering in $.
If the premises of the relevant instances of LA*# and AST*#
(determined by the choice of 0 ) are understood to concern
any one of the situations now envisioned, it seems to me
that the intuitive support for those premises will still be
as strong as in preceding cases; in particular, it seems to
me that it will be just as strong as the intuitive support
for LA and AST afforded by the considerations raised in
sections 8.3 and 8.4.
Then the view that emerges is this:
(18) for any indicative, #, if c is a context, and #
expresses something wrt c, then the following
expresses a truth with respect to c:
[ There is no thing, x, such that:
nec Vy( y is wondering whether 0 -» y is
wondering x ) , and
nec Vy( y is wishing that it would be that 0 ->
y i s wi shi ng x ) ]
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(18) asserts just what was proposed above, that no matter
the choice of indicative 0 , there is no thought, x, such
that both i) wondering whether 0 entails wonder i ng x, and as
well ii) wishing that it would be that 0 entails wishing x.
I think it should be plain enough that relevantly
similar considerations, but regarding cases in which one
person is occurrently believing that 0 , and another is
wondering whether 0
,
will provide motivation for a principle
parallel to (18) concerning the attitudes of occurrent
belief and wondering. Perhaps it is safe by now not to
rehearse the steps for this case.
Let me gather the generalizations that I have proposed
so far into a single broad claim:
Thesis 3
For any indicative, 0 , and context, c, if 0 expresses
something with respect to c, then the following
expresses a truth with respect to c:
[ a. There is no thing, x, such that
nec Vy( y is occurrently believing that 0 —» y is
occurrently believing x ), and nec Vy( y is wishing
that it would be that 0 -» y is wishing x );
b. There is no thing, x, such that
nec Vy( y is occurrently believing that 0 —» y is
occurrently believing x ), and nec Vy( y is wondering
whether 0 y is wondering x );
c. There is no thing, x, such that
nec Vy( y is wondering whether 0 -> y is wondering x ),
and nec Vy( y is wishing that it would be that 0 -»
y is wishing x ) . ]
I submit that, whatever intuitive appeal the reader finds in
considerations of the sort raised in sections 8.3 and 8.4,
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in support of the premises of LA and of AST, similar
considerations, with equal intuitive force, can be raised in
support of each of the clauses here in Thesis 3, no matter
what indicative, 0 , one picks for the instantiation.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 8
1. Strictly, (RV2.1) is not a consequence of (RV2) alone,
but rather of (RV2) together with (DIO), and some semantic
assumptions, including the assumption that 'Jones will
arrive on time’ is standard. For questions concerning this
last assumption, see Note 11 to Chapter 5, and Note 6 to
Chapter 7.
2. I think it is fairly clear that the following inference
schemes, of which ( 1 *)/::( 1 ) and (2 ’)/::( 2
)
are instances,
have some invalid instances:
i ) t i s thi nki ng : 0
:: t is occurrently believing that 0
i i ) t i s thi nki ng : 0*
:: t is wishing that it would be that you 0*
where substituends of ' 0 ' are indicative sentences, and
substituends of ' 0* ’ are verb phrases (serving as displayed
imperatives in premises of i i ) )
.
The following instance of i), for example, is open to
counterexamples
:
i M ) (a) Max is thinking: That is a mint-condition
Chippendale
.
:: (a’) Max is occurrently believing that that is a mint-
condition Chippendale.
Suppose that Max is having a vivid hallucination and that
there isn’t anything that he is demonstrating, in thinking:
that is a mint-condition Chippendale. I mean a case like
the one I described in Chapter 4 where I was concerned to
give some idea of the grounds I had for questioning the
inference (the subscripts, i and t, indicate, respectively,
that intransitive and transitive readings are called for):
III) t is thinking^
:: t is thinking^ x )
I noted then (in effect) that the premise of i M ) , (a),
implies
(b) Max is thinking^
And I suggested that, in some circumstances of the sort
envisioned, although (a) expresses a truth, what is
expressed by
(c) ^x( Max is thinking^ x )
is false. Then III) fails. But I am inclined to believe
that if the conclusion of i^), (a’), expresses a thing thatis^true relative to a situation, then so does (c). But if(a’) implies (c), and (a) does not imply (c), then (a) does
not imply (a’), and the inference, i M ), fails. So i) itselfis not an inference scheme whose instances are in general
valid. Similar counter-examples, I believe, show that some
instances of ii) are not valid as well. It may be that
cases of this sort defeat the claim that (1) and (2) may be
inferred, respectively, from (1’) and (2’). I am not sure.
It is worth contrasting i) with a similar inference
rule relating direct to indirect quotation:
i i i ) t sai d
,
" 0"
: : t sai d that 0
One might suppose that instances of i) will stand or fall
with correspondi ng instances of iii) (having the same
substituends for 't’ and ' 0 ' )
.
Well-worn examples involving context sensitivity show
that instances of iii) are not in general valid. Consider
the following:
i i i w ) William said, "Someone wants you to say 'yes’."
:: William said that someone wants you to say "yes".
Let a context, c, be fixed that assigns Nancy Reagan to
'you*. Now consider a situation in which William has never
said anything about Nancy Reagan, and in particular, has
never said that anyone wants her to say "yes" to anything.
But suppose too that in this situation, William has, a
moment ago, asked Sarah if she’ll marry him, and after a
pause, told her that someone wants her to say "yes". I am
inclined to say that what is expressed by the premise of
iii
w ), with respect to c, is true relative to some such
situations. Let "s" denote one such. Yet surely what is
expressed by the conclusion of i i
i
w )
with respect to c is
false relative to s. Then iiiw) fails.
The point here is that although we keep a context fixed
in determining what is expressed by both the premise and
conclusion, the occurrence of 'you’ figuring in the premise,
in contrast with that figuring in the conclusion, does not
have it’s semantic contribution determined by context. So
the conclusion, but not the premise, will be context-
sensitive. With variation of context, then, we find that
what is expressed by the premise remains constant but what
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is expressed by the conclusion will vary, and do so with
attendant variation in truth-value relative to selected
situations. I believe that similar cases ( mutatis mutandis lhinging in this way on context-sensitivity of the
conclusions yield counterexamples to certain instances ofboth i ) and ii) as well. But if the inference of (1) from
(1 ) fails, it will not be due to such examples since, I
take it, (1) is context— i
n
sens itive, and the same goes for
the inference of (2) from (2’).
However, perhaps it is worth noting that there are some
instances of iii), with context- i_nsensi ti ve conclusions,
that are invalid as well. Consider:
iii F ) Benjamin Franklin said: "President Bush will
never order an invasion of Iraq"
:: Benjamin Franklin said that President Bush will
never order an invasion of Iraq.
I assume that the conclusion here is not context-sensitive.
Now suppose that back in the early 1800’s, Benjamin Franklin
had uttered these words: "President Bush will never order
an invasion of Iraq". Then I take it that the premise of
i i
i
p
)
expresses a truth, just by virtue of Franklin’s
utterance. But I am inclined to say that the conclusion of
i i i p ) does not, by that fact alone, express a truth. There
wasn’t and had never been, as of Franklin’s time, any such
person as President Bush, nor any such country as Iraq. It
perhaps doesn’t follow
,
given this, that it is incorrect to
assert of Franklin that he said Bush will never order an
invasion of Iraq. Perhaps, under the following
circumstances, even though there had never been a president
Bush, nor any such country as Iraq, the conclusion of iiip)
would express a truth: imagine that Franklin said, "Listen,
I’m telling you that there will be a 41st president of our
country, and in 1990 there will be a foreign country that
occupies the region ... [lengthy specification of longitudes
and latitudes follows that picks out the region in fact to
be occupied by Iraq (pre-annexation of Kuwait)]..., and I’m
telling you that he, that president-to-be, will never order
an invasion of i_t, that country-to-be. Maybe relative to
such circumstances, the conclusion of iiip) expresses a
truth
.
However, it seems clear to me that it does not follow,
merely upon the truth of what is expressed by the premise of
iiip), that what is expressed by the conclusion of iiip) is
true. Then if I’m right about iiip), and moreover,
corresponding instances of i ) and iii) stand or fall
together, then I think we should have to grant that the
inference of (1) from (1’), in particular, is not valid.
It is not clear to me that instances of i) and iii) do
stand or fall together, but the validity of the inferences,
(
1
’ ) / : : ( 1 ) , (
2
’ )/ : : ( 2 )
,
remains unclear to me as well.
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3. I think it is plausible to claim that Witold can’t be
wishing that Jones will arrive on time unless he believes
some things; in particular, wishing that Jones will arrive
may entail believing that someone exists. If one accepts
this claim, one might be tempted to infer that situations
meeting Constraint 1 are not possible. For I say that
Witold is only wishing, yet from the description of the case
it follows that he is also believing something. But this
reasoning is based on a confusion. Constraint 2 does not
require that Witold lacks any beliefs at the moment; it
requires only that he isn’t bearing any occur rent attitudes
apart from those required by that of imperative wishing.
Imperative wishing does not require occurrent belief. Then
if Witold is only wishing, he can’t be having any occurrent
beliefs. But that is not incompatible with the description
of the case.
Belief and occurrent belief seem plainly to be
different in this respect: it is plausible to claim that
bearing the attitude of wishing or wondering (or as well any
of a host of other attitudes) to a thing entails having a
belief (though perhaps only a quite minimal belief, such as
that something exists); bearing that same attitude to that
same thing, however, does not entail occur rent!
y
believing
anything
.
4. It is not clear to me that there are such other
occurrent beliefs that we should acknowledge that O’Brien is
having in *-si tuations. (Similar points apply, I believe,
to the question of whether Witold is having other wishes
besides the two expressed by (4) and (4’); see note on
following page in the text.) The matter depends on what
other analogues of (DIST^) must be accepted. One might
find the following plausible, for example:
(DIST?) t is occurrently believing that Jones will arrive
on time
:: t is occurrently believing that someone will
arrive on time
If (DIST?) is correct, we should allow that the following
ascription also expresses a report true relative to *-
situations, in addition to (3) and (3’):
(a) O’Brien is occurrently believing that someone will
arrive on time
However, conclusions of inferences sanctioned by (DIST?) are
ambiguous and may be interpreted either de re or de
—
d i ctQ •
Assessment of the validity of a given instance of (DIST?),
then, must await disambiguation.
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On one hand, if the conclusions are to be understood asde chcto ascriptions, with the quantifier 'someone’ nottaking wide scope over 'O’Brien is occurrently believing’,
then it is not clear to me that inferences sanctioned by(DIST?) are in general valid. The case is different withinferences involving non-occurrent belief. I grant that if
a person believes that Jones will arrive on time, then thisperson may be ascribed de dicto the belief that someone will
arrive on time. But with occurrent belief, I do not see
that matters go the same way. I grant as well that if a
person is occurrently believing that Jones will arrive, then
that person may be said to believe, non-occurrentl y , dedicto
,
that someone will arrive. But that is not an
entailment relevant to the inferences with which we are
concerned
.
On the other hand, if the ascriptions that figure as
conclusions to instances of (DIST?) are to be interpreted de
.re, then I am inclined to think that such inferences are
questionable for other reasons. Consider the parallel:
(DIST?’) t is occurrently believing that Santa Claus will
arrive
:: ix( t is occurrently believing that x will arrive)
Surely, instances of (DIST?’) are not in general valid.
Then we should say the same for (DIST?), if the conclusions
of its instances are to be interpreted de re .
5. In Note 2. it was observed that some instances of the
pai r
( f 1
’
)
t i
s
thi nki ng : 0
(f2’) t is thinking: 0*
do not imply the corresponding instances of
(fl) t is occurrently believing that 0
(f2) t is wishing that it would be that you 0*
And although in some cases this is due to the relevant
instances of (fl ) and (f2) being context-sensitive, this is
not always so. One case was considered above deriving from
the choice of the standard indicative, 'President Bush will
never order an invasion of Iraq’, for 0 . So there are cases
where the truth of the di spl ayed-sentence ascription does
not guarantee the truth of the corresponding standard
ascription. Any such case will be one where it does not
suffice, for the constraint presently at issue, to require
that the ^-situation analogues be ones relative to which the
di spl ayed-sentence ascription alone is true.
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So I am putting a lot of weight on the present clause
and the requirement expressed loosely in it, that the claims
expressed by corresponding standard and di spl ayed-sentence
ascriptions are to be true relative to these situations in
virtue of the same bit of occurrent believing or wishing, asthe case may be. In formulating Constraint 1
,
I avoided
this (or meant to avoid it) by adding the adverbial clause,
concerning Jones’, to ( 1 * ) and (2’). The resulting
displayed-sentence ascriptions (clauses a. and b. ) seem to
me to do the trick. In general
,
however, I do not see any
clear, principled way to produce, for any given indicative,
0, a pair of displayed-sentence ascriptions that will
suffice in this connection: ones that express claims such
that it is enough to require that those claims be true
relative to a situation, in order to impose a constraint, in
the case of 0 , with an effect analogous to that of
Constraint 1, in the case of 'Jones will arrive on time’.
Suppose, for example, that the indicative, 0, selected
for instantiating (RV2), contains occurrences of two proper
names. Suppose 0 is 'Henry won’t bother Laurie’. In such a
case, I do not see how the addition of adverbial clauses to
instances of (fl’) or (f2’) will do the trick. It will not
do to say that the ^-situation analogues in this case are
situations relative to which the claim expressed by the
following is true:
(a) Witold is thinking, concerning Laurie and Henry
Let it be that Henry won’t bother Laurie.
Briefly, the problem that I see with this particular
proposal is that it might be that Witold uses the name
'Laurie’ for Henry, and 'Henry’ for Laurie. Some such
situations will be ones relative to which the claim
expressed by (a) is true, though they are not ones in which
Witold is wishing that Henry wouldn’t bother Laurie, but
rather, ones in which he’s wishing that Laurie doesn’t
bother Henry. Plainly, similar problems would confront
other appeals to instances of (fl’) or (f 2 ’) with these
"concerning x" modifiers.
It may be that a proposal can be fashioned that gets
around this sort of difficulty by employing the concept of
event-character i zati on introduced in the next chapter
(section 9.2). For any standard indicative, 0, an event of
occurrent believing may be said to have the conjunctive
property ("P5 ") of being an event of O’Brien’s occurrently
believing that 0, and as well an event of O’Brien’s
thinking: 0. Likewise, an event, of wishing may be said to
have the conjunctive property ("P^") of being an event of
Witold’s imperatively wishing that it would be that 0, and
as well an event of Witold’s thinking: Let it be that 0. I
believe that for each of these properties it is possible
that an occurring event has it; moreover , I think that it is
possible for two events, each one having one of these
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properties (and not the other) to co-occur. I claim, in
particular
,
that there are two such co-occurring events in
any ^-situation; I believe this is guaranteed by the
condition imposed by Constraint 1.
The idea, then, would be to require that, for the
selected 0 , the relevant ^-analogues are situations in which
(b) there are two occurring events, e and e’, such that e
has P£ and e’ has P{J.
(the analogue of Constraint 2 will guarantee that only one
of the events has each property). I be 1 i eve that a precise
and adequate analogue of Constraint 1 can be stated in
generality along these lines. I am not sure.
6. There is a difficulty confronting my appeal to instances
of
( f 1 ) t is thinking: Let it be that 0,
in stating analogues of Constraint 1. The difficulty is of
the sort of problems raised in the preceding note, and has
rather to do with the choice of displayed imperative.
To illustrate the problem, take 0 to be
(a) No bird is noisy
In this case, I do not believe that the problems discussed
in the preceding note arise in stating an analogue of
Constraint 1. I am inclined to think that it suffices to
say, in O’Brien’s case, that the relevant ^-situation
analogues are ones relative to which the following expresses
a truth:
(b) O’Brien is thinking: no bird is noisy
For I take it that (b) implies
(c) O’Brien is occurrently believing that no bird is
noisy.
and also that (b) is compatible with what would be the
counterpart of Constraint 3 in this case: that O’Brien does
not have an occurrent belief stronger than any required by
(c). (For this notion of an occurrent belief (or wish)
being stronger than another, see discussion of Constraint 3
in the text.) And I suppose that, in general, if i) an
instance of
( f 2
’
)
t i
s
thi nki ng : 0
or
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( f 3 * ) t is thinking: 0*
( subst i tuends of ' 0* ’ being imperatives) implies the
corresponding instance of
(f2) t occurrently believes that 0
or
(f3) t is wishing that it would be that 0,
and in addition, ii) the instance of (f2’) or ( f 3
’ ) is
compatible with the counterpart of Constraint 3— if it does
not require an occurrent belief or wish stronger than any
required by the corresponding instance of ( f 2 ) or (f3), as
the case may be
—
then to express a constraint (for the
relevant substituend of ' 0'
)
whose effect is parallel to
that of the a. or b. clause of Constraint 1 (for the
indicative, 'Jones will arrive on time’), it will suffice to
require that the instance of ( f 1
’ ) or (f2’) at hand
expresses a truth relative to the ^-situation analogues at
i ssue
.
But it is perhaps not clear, for any indicative, 0 ,
whether the constraint in Witold’s case can be expressed by
an instance of (fl). In particular, it may be questioned
whether
(d) Witold is thinking: Let it be that no bird is
no isy.
impl ies
(e) Witold is wishing that it would be that no bird is
noisy.
I am inclined to think that there is at least one available
interpretation of (d) on which it does imply (e), but this
inclination, and the inclination to hold, more generally,
that instances of (f3) are implied by corresponding
instances of (fl), may be questioned.
It may be claimed that, strictly speaking ( modulo the
difficulty of the preceding note), instances of (fl) imply,
not the corresponding instances of (f3), but rather the
correspondi ng instances of
( f 4
)
t is wishing that you will let it be that 0
The contention would be that, taken strictly and literally,
imperatives of the form
Let it be that 0
should be understood to involve the reading of 'let’ that is
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involved in literal i nterpretati ons of indicatives of theform
t will let it be that 0.
The problem then is that, strictly speaking, the claim
expressed by (d) with respect to a context, c, would imply
the claim expressed, with respect to c, by
( f ) Witold is wishing that it would be that you let it
be the case that no bird is noisy.
but not that expressed by (e). If this contention isL right,
then the conclusions of the relevant instances of LA^ and
AST will not conflict with (RV2
a ). For there would be some
situations satisfying the analogues of Constraints 1-3
relative to which the claim expressed by (e) is false .
Consequently, (RV2
a ) will not yield, concerning all such
situations, that there is a proposition (that no bird is
noisy) such that O’Brien is occurrently believing it, and
Witold is wishing it.
It seems to me, too, that if the present objection to
employing instances (fl) is correct, then we cannot employ
those instances in formulating analogues of Constraint 1
along the lines suggested at the end of the preceding note.
Employing the instance of (fl), got with (a) in for ' 0 '
,
that proposal would require that the relevant ^-situation
analogues be situations where
(g) there is an occurring event that is both an event of
Witold’s wishing that it would be that no bird is
noisy, and as well, an event of Witold’s thinking: Let
it be that no bird is noisy.
I am inclined to think that at least on one interpretation
this expresses a claim that is possibly true and compatible
with the relevant analogues of Constraints 2 and 3. But if
the present line of objection is right, and (d) does not
imply (e), then I think we should have to say that there
couldn’t be any single occurring event that has this
conjunctive property, at least not in situations that also
meet the analogues of Constraints 2 and 3. For the analogue
of Constraint 3 will require that the strongest thing Witold
is imperatively wishing in such situations is (intuitively
put) the wish that no bird is noisy. But if there is an
occurring event of Witold’s wishing that someone (referent
of 'you’) would let it be that no bird is noisy, then there
is this other wish--( intuitively put) the wish that you
would let it be that no bird is noisy— that is i ndependent
of the previous one; neither one is a stronger wish than the
other
.
Two responses to this line of questioning do not seem
to me satisfactory. One might dismiss the problem, claiming
319
that it is clear enough which imperative wishes are supposed
to be captured by requirements formulated using instances of
( f 1 ) : th® ones reported by instances of ( f 3 )
.
But it seems
to me that this just begs the line of questioning at issue.
The contention at hand is that instances of (fl) do not
imply corresponding instances of (f3). If that claim is
right, then whether or not one "gets the idea" of which
constraints I want by employing instances of (fl), those
constraints are not, strictly speaking, expressed by those
appeals. I am interested in how, strictly speaking, those
constraints may be expressed.
Another response might be to claim that (f) itself
implies (e) (and more generally, that instances of (f4)
themselves imply correspondi ng instances of (f3)). I don’t
think that from the fact that I am occurrently believing
that you will let it be the case that one bird escapes, that
I am occurrently believing that one bird will escape (though
I think it would follow that I bel i eve this). And I doubt
too that it follows from the fact that I am wishing that you
would let it be that no bird is noisy, that I am wishing
that it would be that no bird is noisy (though, it perhaps
does follow that I desi re this). On the discrepancies noted
here between belief and occurrent belief, and between desire
and (occurrent) wishing, see notes 3. and 4. above. Also,
this response would leave us with the obstacle discussed
just above for the proposal I offered at the end of the
previous note: even if (f) implies (e), it presumably
requires a wish stronger than any required by (e). Then
there won’t be any situations (not possible ones anyway)
that conform to the analogues of Constraints 2 and 3, yet at
which any event is occurring that is one of Witold’s wishing
that it would be that no bird is noisy and also one of
Witold’s thinking: Let it be that no bird is noisy.
Perhaps it is not possible to find, for any standard
indicative, some displayed-imperative ascription that serves
to express the desired condition on situations (along the
lines of clause b. of Constraint 1). Similar problems would
arise in connection with other imperative forms that one
might employ in this connection: for example, 'See to it
that 0\ 'Make it the case that 0' , 'Bring it about that 0' ,
etc. Perhaps the Yiddish form, [ that 0 ], for subjunctive
0 ( as in 'That a radish grow on your navel, God forbid’)
would work. I believe that French allows such constructions
in ordinary usage, and that the sentence [ Que 0 ] for
(French) subjunctive 0 , serves just the called for function,
of expressing an imperative wish. If such forms are to be
found in French and happen not to have proper translations
in English, perhaps it would not be unwarranted to
appropriate instances of (fl) (or one of the other forms
just cited) for the purpose.
At any rate, there are very many cases where displayed-
sentence ascriptions (instances of (f2’) and (f3’)) are
available which imply the corresponding instances of (f2)
320
and ( f 3 ) (surely, clauses a. and b. of Constraint 1
constitute one case among very many relevantly similar
cases). In all of these many cases, analogues of
Constraints 1 - 3 can be formulated, and ^-situation
analogues can be specified consideration of which motivates
analogues of LA and AST that are just as compelling as the
originals. Reflection on this fact by itself, it seems to
me, should provide some grounds for allowing that if. LA and
AST are to be accepted, then we may doubt whether there is
any standard indicative, 0 , such that the instantiation of
(RV2) for 0 expresses a truth.
7. This formulation is not quite adequate in the case of
ambiguous sentences. I don’t think that the added
complexity required to accommodate such cases (by making the
parameter of interpretation explicit) is necessary for our
purposes. So the present statement should be understood to
be restricted to the case of unambi guous indicatives. The
same point holds for (20) and for my formulation of Thesis
3, both further on in the text.
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CHAPTER 9
AN ALTERNATIVE: THOUGHTS AS TYPES OF EVENT
9 • 1 A Fable About R*SS*LL’s Step
Once it is definitely recognized that the
proposition is... not a belief..., but an object of
belief, it seems plain that a truth differs in no
respect from the reality to which it was supposed
merely to correspond.
G.E. Moore 1
In Chapter 1, I alluded to an old argument dating back
to Frege, Moore and Russell, designed to show that we cannot
take ' thought ’ --used as a common noun in the sense that has
been of concern to us throughout this study--to stand for
concrete events of thinking, to stand, that is, for events
of particular persons’ doing some thinking.
It needn’t be denied that there is a usage of 'thought’
on which the term does stand for particular events of
thinking. But on that usage, it couldn’t be said that your
thought and my thought were the same. For what 'your
thought’ denotes, on that usage, is an event involving you
and not me as subject, whereas the thing denoted by 'my
thought’, on that usage, is an event involving me and not
you. Since you and I are distinct, so are our thoughts, on
that usage of 'thought’.
Let us reserve the phrase, 'shareable sense’, for the
sense of 'thought’ that has been our principal concern in
this study, the sense in which the term stands for items
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that you and I may be said to have or be thinking in common,
in virtue of having or thinking the same thought. (Strictly
speaking it hasn’t been ruled out that there are many such
‘'shareable” senses of the term 'thought’, but for ease of
exposition, let me set this point aside and suppose that
there is only one such sense; the policy will not jeopardize
any of the main points I wish to make.) Concrete events of
thinking themselves do not seem to be items of the sort to
which the common noun ,' thought
’ ,
applies in this shareable
sense. That is the thrust of the old argument. Then what
sort of items are the things that we refer to when we speak
of 'thoughts’ in the shareable sense? The Propositional
Tradition proposes a particular answer to this question, and
I wish to turn now to consider how certain followers of that
tradition may have arrived at their answer.
I have used the term, 'circumstance’, at various points
in the study so far, on what I think is a fairly familiar
and tolerably clear usage: for example, I have spoken of
circumstances in which someone did something or other, or in
which such and such an event took place, or circumstances
relative to which this or that claim is true, etc. I’ve
also used 'situation’ to stand for things of the same sort;
some might use instead the phrase "state of affairs" for
the kind of items I have in mind. Although this ordinary
usage of "circumstance" has been clear enough for purposes
so far, let me briefly say something further at this point
concerning the sort of thing intended.
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I take circumstances to be abstract items, ways for
things to be at least some of which may be taken to be
represented by sets of possible worlds. For example,
circumstances of my now having a good time may be represented
by sets of worlds whose members all include me having a good
time presently. Circumstances may be said to obtain or be
actual— I use the predicates 'obtains’ and 'is actual’
interchangeably— but a circumstance’s obtaining or being
actual should not be confused with its existence. I assume
that there are (that there exist) circumstances that do not
obtain (aren’t actual): circumstances that are "merely
possible". If a circumstance is taken to be represented by
a set of possible worlds, we may say that it obtains or is
actual iff the actual world is one of its members. I have
reservations about whether circumstances are properly
represented along these lines, in terms of possible worlds.
There are other conceptions that have been proposed that
expand the notion of circumstance to include ways for things
to be that are not possible (and that, accordingly, are not
well represented by any sets of possible worlds). However,
I do not think that the main points I wish to make in what
follows hinge on this question.
There is a sense in which a circumstance may be said to
be the content of thoughts of various sorts: an occurrent
belief, wish and question may be said to have one and the
same circumstance as their common content. Loosely, the
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content of a thought is the circumstance that the thought
may be said to concern or be about. For example, if I am
thinking that Jones will arrive on time, my thought (at
least one thought I am having) is about the circumstance of
Jones’ being such that he will arrive on time; if you are
wishing that Jones would arrive on time, your thought (the
wish, or at least one wish, you are having) concerns that
same circumstance. There are problems with this
character i zati on of content, ^ but for purposes at hand,
perhaps I may assume that the reader has an acceptable idea
of what it is for a circumstance to be the content of a
thought, whether an occurrent belief, a wish, a question, or
an "object" of any other attitude. At any rate, I shall
proceed with this assumption, and with the assumption, as
well, that in examples to be discussed, it will be clear
with respect to given thoughts, which circumstances are the
contents of those thoughts in the relevant sense.
The fact is that many philosophers of the Propositional
Tradition have supposed that what we mean by "thoughts",
when we use the phrase in the shareable sense, just are
circumstances (or some might rather use one of the terms,
'proposition’ or 'state of affairs’, intending by it,
however, the same sort of thing as I here intend when I
speak of circumstances). In fact their view would be that a
given thought iust is that thought’s content. It may seem
odd to identify a thought with anything that that thought
itself could be said to concern or be about; I find it
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counterintuitive. Nevertheless, it is pretty easy to see
the plausibility in such a proposal. Here is a fable about
how a philosopher might have arrived at this view.
9.1.1 The Fable
There once was a famous philosopher named M R*SS*LL"
.
Having seen quite clearly that thoughts could not plausibly
be identified with concrete events of thinking, R*SS*LL made
the following observation: "Take any two acts of judging"
('judging’ was his technical term for occurrent believing,
and he commonly counted events of occurrent believing as
acts) "and suppose that, in virtue of engaging in those
particular acts, the subjects may properly be said to be
thinking the same thing. Then plainly," R*SS*LL observed
"on any such occasion, we should want to say that the
thought these two have in common concerns the same fact",
('fact’ was R*SS*LL’s term for what I have been speaking of
as "circumstances", for what his friend W*ttg*nst*n spoke of
as "states of affairs".) "Suppose, for example," R*SS*LL
proceeded "that our two subjects are both judging that Mt.
Blanc has many snowfields. This would be a case where we
should say they are thinking the same thing. But then
surely, we should also say that their common thought
concerns the same fact, namely the fact of Mt. Blanc’s
having many snow fields."
"But," R*ss*ll continued, "let us now go in the other
direction. Suppose that our two thinkers are having
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thoughts that could be said to concern the same fact. Isn’t
it clear that in any such case it will be correct to say
that they are thinking the same thing, having the same
thought? Suppose for example, that both are wishing to know
whether Scott authored Waverly. Here is a case where we
should be inclined to hold that their thoughts concern the
same fact, namely that of Scott’s authoring Waverly. But
then plainly this is also a case where we should say that
they are thinking the same thing, having the same thought."
It is apparent, then" R*SS*LL concluded, "that for any
two acts of thinking, the subjects may be said to be
thinking the same thing just in case what they are thinking
concerns the same fact. Then we might as well equate the
thought that a person has (though not to say the particular
act of thinking in which the person is engaged) with the
fact that the person’s thought concerns or is about."
With this lead set by R*SS*LL, all philosophers
following in his footsteps (keep in mind that this is a
fable), arrived very naturally at the central tenets of the
Propositional Tradition. If one assumes that the things
occurrently believed are in general truth-valued, and
moreover, one follows R*SS*LL in identifying thoughts with
contents, one will be led to the conclusion that
circumstances, at least those that are the contents of
occurrent beliefs, are true or false thoughts--hence
propositions. And since it is plausible to suppose that if
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a circumstance is the content of an occurrent belief it may
also be the content of what one is thinking when one is
wishing or wondering, hoping or doubting, etc., it will be
natural to conclude as well that circumstances
—
propositions— are the "objects" of all the attitudes.
Philosophers were led, this way, to the two component
principles of the Received View. Since it is plausible to
think that any circumstance that is the content of an
occurrent belief, is as well the content of a wish, and a
question, if one is identifying contents with what is
occurrently believed, wished or wondered, one will be led
strai ght-away to (RV1). More specifically, the content of
what one is occurrently believing, wishing, or wondering,
when one is occurrently believing that 0 , wishing that it
would be that 0 , or wondering whether 0 , will be the very
same circumstance, what R*SS*LL would have spoken of as "the
fact that 0 " (let me set aside R*SS*LL’s troubles that arose
concerning cases where it is not a fact that 0 ) . Thus, if
one is inclined to identify this circumstance with the
proposition that 0 , one arrives strai ght-away at (RV2).
Plainly, all this still leaves open the question of
what sort of things propositions are; circumstances, of
course (or states of affairs, R*SS*LLian facts, situations;
choose your phrase), but what sort of thing are these?
Proposals varied in response to this latter question, with
concomitant variation in proposals as to the nature of
propositions. There was the old R*SS*LLian view according
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to which propositions facts"--are complex entities, each
an arrangement of an object and property (or of several
objects under a relation), the object and property (or
objects and relation) being counted as constituents of the
fact. More recently, the concept of possible worlds has
been employed in explicating the nature of propositions.
Thus, philosophers have suggested that we view propositions
as sets of possible worlds, or as functions from worlds to
truth- val ues . Others have proposed to take propositions as
" intensional relations" of a certain sort: O-ary ones.
Still, the conception of propositions as things akin to what
I mean by "circumstances" has been the leading idea. All of
these accounts, in their own ways, have proved to be
fruitful and promising proposals concerning propositions,
and consequently— so it was supposed--of thoughts in
general. Here the parable ends.
9.1.2 R*SS*LL ’ s Step
What I wish to highlight in this fable is a certain
step that R*SS*LL and all his followers made— I shall refer
to it as " R*SS*LL ’ s step". I believe that this step, or one
closely analogous to it (concerning specifically belief), is
implicit in G.E. Moore’s remarks that I quoted at the head
of this section. It is the step of supposing, upon noting
that the term 'thought’, in its shareable sense, cannot
plausibly be held to apply to particular concrete events of
occurrent believing (or wishing, or wondering, etc.), that
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the term must apply rather to contents— to items that we
would, intuitively speaking, say the thoughts are about, or
concern (that the term applies to things in significant
respects akin to what I mean by 'circumstance’: R*SS*LL’s
complexes, or sets of possible worlds, or functions from
sets of worlds to truth values, etc.)
If one has one’s attention focussed exclusively on the
case of belief (or occurrent belief), R*SS*LL’s step has
some plausibility. For as R*SS*LL noted (in effect), the
following expresses a truth:
(1) nec Vx Vx ’ Vy Vy ’ nec( if x is occurrently believing y, and
x’ is occurrently believing y’, and y and y’ have the
same content, then Jz( x is thinking z and x’ is
thinking z ))
Restricting attention to the case of occurrent belief, it
seems indeed to be the case that two persons are bearing
this attitude to things that have the same content— that
concern the same circumstance— iff these persons may be said
to be thinking something in common, sharing a thought.
There is, then, an equivalence, at least in the case of
occurrent belief, between sharing a belief and having
beliefs with the same content.
In fact, it is plausible to think that the same point
can be made, mutatis mutandis , concerning many occurrent
attitudes: whenever one person is, for example,
imperatively wishing a thing, x, and another person is
imperatively wishing an item, x’, if x and x’ may be said to
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have the same content to concern the same ci rcumstance--
then it is plausible to say that the two persons are
thinking something in common--shar i ng a thought. An
analogous claim can be made concerning the occurrent
attitude of wondering. For any one of a host of occurrent
attitudes, it will be plausible to claim that the attitude
satisfies (for 'A’):
(2) nec VxYx' Vy Vy ’ nec( if A(x,y) and A(x’,y’), and y and y’
have the same content, then ^z( x is thinking z and x’
is thinking z ) ) 4
If sharing thoughts and sharing contents are equivalent in
these single attitude cases, it may seem quite natural to
suppose that the thought shared .just is the shared content.
And in fact, philosophers working within the Propositional
Tradition commonly have restricted their attention to cases
in which a single attitude is in question, especially in
discussions where the nature of "objects" of the attitudes
was at issue. As I have noted before, it has been a
commonplace in that tradition to attend solely to the case
of belief, and to suppose that the results arrived at in the
case of that attitude apply as well to the case of all other
attitudes
.
What should we make of R*SS*LL’s step? Since it leads
directly to some of the central tenets of the Propositional
Tradition, and since I believe that we should take seriously
the doubts that were raised concerning those tenets in the
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preceding chapter
,
I am inclined to think that we ought to
Question R*SS*LL’s step. The arguments of the preceding
chapter suggest that in cases involving two persons bearing
any pair of our three attitudes of occurrent believing,
wishing and occurrent wondering, the apparent equivalence of
shared thought and shared content breaks down. In cases
where one person is bearing one of those attitudes, and only
bearing it, and the other is bearing another of those
attitudes, and only bearing that attitude, then whether or
not any of the things these two are thinking have the same
content, it will be counterintuitive to claim that they are
thinking anything in common. Yet if we were to follow
R*SS*LL’s step concerning cases where there i_s a content had
in common, we would be led to claim that the two persons are
thinking something in common. It seems to me, then, that we
should think twice about taking R*SS*LL’s step.
Fortunately, R*SS*LL’s step is not forced on us; there
are other items that 'thought’ may plausibly be taken to
refer to, in its shareable sense.
9 . 2 The New Category
The question is: what are the things we correctly
speak of having, when we correctly speak of having thoughts?
What are the things persons may properly be said to be
genthinking? One could say, simply, "thoughts", and
suppose, moreover, that there isn’t any other natural,
ontological category to which thoughts may be subsumed.
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This was not R*SS*LL’s view. When R*SS*LL proposed that we
take thoughts to be facts, he was proposing, concerning a
certain category of items that he had independent reasons to
acknowledge, that thoughts should be understood to be things
of that category. However, as we’ve just seen, any view
that identifies thoughts with their contents will be subject
to the same sort of doubts that were raised in the preceding
Chapter against ( RV2 ) . In the remaining sections of this
chapter, I wish to develop an alternative to R*SS*LL’s
proposal. But I shall follow R*SS*LL at least in this
respect: there is a certain category of items that I think
we have independent reason to acknowledge, and I shall claim
that thoughts should be understood to be things of that
category. These things, I believe, prove to be a better
choice than contents for the sort of items we speak of when
we speak of thoughts in the shareable sense. In the present
section, I shall lead up to a claim concerning which
category of items is in question here, by introducing a
battery of concepts and assumptions that will be important
in subsequent development.
9.2.1 Characteri zation
I propose to use the phrase "noetic event for any
event, e, such that for some person (or thinking thing of
some other sort), x, and some thought, y, e is an event of
x’s
genthinking y. 5 (Hereafter, I shall take "e" variables
to range solely over events.) Before discussing this
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concept, I would like to address a few important background
matters. I have been using the gerund, ' 9en thi nki ng
’ ,
as a
common noun applying to any event of a person thinking
something, but it is not clear to me that all events fitting
this description are noetic events. Perhaps there are, so
to speak, existentially quantified events— such a thing, for
example, as an event of Sarah’s thinking something, though
not an event that could be said, for any thought, to be an
event of Sarah’s thinking it. If there are such events,
they fit the description of 9en thi nki ngs
,
but not of noetic
events
.
This way of character i zi ng noetic events places a lot
of weight on the idea that an event may be said to be an
event of x’s 9enthinking y, for given x and y. In preceding
discussions, I have frequently appealed the notion of an
event’s being one of 0-ing, where "0-ing" is some gerund or
gerundive clause ( "an event of kicking a football", "an
event of my dispatching my chore for the day", etc.). I
believe that the notion in question here may be understood
to involve a relationship between events and properties, and
I would now like to attend to that relation more directly.
When we employ an ascription of one of the forms
(FI) e is an event of 0-ing, or
(F2) e is an event of t’s 0-ing
(where substituends of '0-ing’ are gerunds, and substituends
of 't’s’ are noun phrases in their possessive forms), I take
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it that we ascribe a certain sort of property to the event
denoted by the substituend of 'e’. And I suppose that when
we refer to an event using a gerundive clause of the form:
t ’ s 0- i ng
we presuppose that the event referred to has a property of
the sort in question; in using such a term, we presuppose
that the event is an event of t’s 0-ing. One way to
understand what is being presupposed here, and what is
asserted of events when we employ instances of (FI) and (F2)
is as foil ows
.
I suggest that in characteri zi ng an event as one of 0-
ing (or of t’s 0-ing), we assert a particular relation
between the event in question and the property of 0-ing (or
of being such that t is (or are) 0-ir\g)
.
Actually, I take
it that in certain cases the relation in question holds,
rather, between an event and a relation (for example, in
saying that an event is one of hitting we assert a relation
between this event and the relation of hitting, in saying
that an event is one of giving we assert a relation between
the event and the relation of giving). In stating
assumptions and principles in what follows, though, just for
ease of formulation, I shall disregard these cases. Another
matter of convenience: instances of (F2) may contain plural
possessive noun phrases and quantifier expressions as
substituends for 't’s’, but in discussions to follow, I
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shall usually set aside consideration of such cases and
attend to instances of (F2) in which the possessives of
singular referring terms are substituends for 't’s’. I
think the discussions will be clearer for it, with no
central points for our purposes jeopardized by the practice.
So, I am assuming in what follows that if there is a
property expressed by the verb phrase [is 0-ing], there is a
property denoted by the corresponding singular terms:
[the property of 0-ing]
[the property of being such that t is 0-ing]
for singular term, t, and gerund 0-ing. (I am adopting one
further practice out of convenience here: the "ing" forms
figuring in the present progressives of verbs— as in "is 0-
ing"--are normally referred to as present participles ,
whereas the "ing" forms figuring in instances of (FI) and
(F2), and in instances of the two schemas for property terms
just cited, are normally referred to as gerunds : but I shall
ignore the distinction of participle and gerund in what
follows, and speak of "gerunds" in both sorts of case.)
As I see it, there are actually any number of relations
that satisfy instances of:
R holds between an event, e, and the property of
0-ing (of being such that t is 0-ing) just in case
the event is an event of 0-ing (of t’s 0-ing)
for the variable ' R ’ , where substituends for ' 0-ing' are
suitable gerunds (each one, G, such that [is G] expresses a
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property). But I propose to assume that there is just one
of these many relations that is expressed when we use
ascriptions that are instances of (FI) and (F2) in
characterizing events.
I shall refer to the relation in question here as that
of characterization", and shall appropriate the various
forms of the verb, ' characteri zes’
,
taking them to express
the relation. So I take the following to express truths
(for suitable gerund, 0-ing):
[ nec Ve( the property of 0-ing characterizes e iff
e is an event of 0-ing ) ]
[ nec VteVx( the property of being such that x is
0-ing characteri zes e iff e is an event of
x’s 0-ing ) ]
I do not claim that adopting this view of matters is of
direct help in finding informative, necessary and sufficient
conditions under which the things expressed by instances of
(FI) and (F2) are true. But I do think that positing this
relationship of character i z i ng will make it easier to
formulate such proposals, and will allow us to consider
questions concerning such proposal s--and other proposals
concerning the concepts expressed by instances of (FI) and
(F2)--in a more regimented and perhaps more tractable
fash i on
.
It should be borne in mind when considering assumptions
that I claim govern the relation of characterization that
ultimately they should be tested against intuitions we have
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concerning a relation expressed when we speak of an event
being an "event of 0-ing", or an "event of t’s 0-ing"
; I
don’t mean to supplant this concept, only to regiment it.®
9.2.2 Some Features of Character i zati on
One feature of the relation of character i zati on is that
events cannot bear it to just any property. I have not been
able to find a precise way, though, to mark off those
properties that can from those that cannot characterize
events. Intuitively, there is a distinction to be made
between event properties and properties of other sorts that
might be thought to be of help in the present connection.
Let us say that a thing engages in an event according to
(D12) x engages (is engaging) in e =df x is a subject
of e and e occurs (is occurring)
Then, roughly, an event property, P, may be said to be one
such that for any x, if x has P, then in virtue of x’s
having P, x is engaging in an event. Doing a sprint,
exhaling, occurrently believing that politicians lie and
cheat are all examples of event properties; being wise,
being malleable, believing (not occurrently) that
politicians lie and cheat are not. And the first three
properties just cited can indeed characterize events,
whereas the latter three cannot. We might say, rather, that
the latter three characterize states— there are states of
being wise, states of being malleable, states of belief, but
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no events can be character! zed these ways. In general, it
seems that if a property does fit the intuitive
specification of event properties just given, then it can
characterize events.
These observations might lead one to think that a
property can characterize an event iff it is an event
property. But on the conception of characterization
proposed here, there are plenty of non-event properties that
can characterize events. Vacuous properties such as being
such that Sarah is running, being such that O’Brien is
occurrently believing something, being such that Jones is
dancing the Boogaloo— all such properties by which, I claim,
we characterize events when we employ instances of (F2)— are
not intuitively event properties. After all, the number two
may be such that Sarah is running, but it wouldn’t, in
virtue of that, be the subject of any event. So such a
distinction between event and non-event properties does not
seem to be immediately helpful in drawing a line between
those properties that can and those that cannot be said to
characterize events.
Could we say that for any property that can
characterize an event, either it is an event property or
else it is a property, P, such that for some x and some
event property, P* , P = the property of being such that x
has P’? But an event may be properly character i zed , for
example, as one of somebody’s doing the wash in the sink.
When this is the case, I would claim, we correctly assert
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that the property, of being such that somebody is doing the
wash in the sink, characterizes that event. But the
property in question here is not a P such that, for some x
and some event property, P’
,
P = the property of being such
that x has P’. I shall have to leave the matter of which
properties can characterize events on a rather loose and
intuitive footing, but there do seem to me to be some clear
cases on both sides of the line. The examples cited in the
preceding paragraph are cases in point.
I suppose that if a property characterizes an event,
then the occurrence of the event is conditioned by the
subject’s exemplifying the property in question (I am
confining attention here to events that have single
subjects). If e is an event of sprinting, then presumably e
occurs only if the subject of e is sprinting. It is not
clear to me, however, what manner of conditioning is the
strongest that may be taken to hold here. Material
conditioning surely holds; that is:
(A10) nec VteVP( P characterizes e -) ( e is occurring
the subject of e has P ))
(Note: the conditioning at issue is expressed by the main
consequent of this and of each of the following two
formulations.) The conditioning doesn’t hold in the other
direction. Suppose that e is some event of my running five
miles. Then the property, call it R, of being such that I
am running five miles characterizes e. But surely it
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doesn’t follow from this alone that if I have R, e itself is
occurring. e may be some event that occurred in Amherst in
1987, but I may have R in virtue of engaging in some event
of running five miles in Seattle in the Summer of 1990.
Surely we shouldn’t say that e itself is then occurring.
I am inclined to think that an event’s occurrence is
"subjunctively" conditioned by the subject’s having a
property that characterizes the event:
(3) nec VeVP( P character i zes e -> ( if e were
occurring, the subject of e would have P ))
However, it is not clear to me that strict conditioning
holds
:
( 4 ) nec VbVP( P character i zes e -» nec( e is
occurring the subject of e has P ))
We shall consider a case in the next subsection that has led
me to question the thesis formulated in (4).
Upon reflection, I think it is pretty clear that the
three grades of conditioning expressed in the consequents of
(A10), (3) and (4) are not themselves sufficient conditions
for characterization. That is, if we replace the main
conditionals in these formulations by their converses, the
resulting formulations do not express truths. For
simplicity, let me refer to the claims expressed by these as
the "converses" of (A10), (3) and (4). Consider the
converse of (A10): suppose that there is an event
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characterized by my running that is occurring at this
moment, and suppose too that I am presently thinking
something. Then the claim that this event of my running is
occurring materially implies that I have the property of
thinking something. But surely we should not want to say
that this event of my running is an event of thinking
something. Then we should not accept that the property of
thinking something character i zes e. So the converse of
(A10) should be rejected.
Examples concerning events that are inessential but
regular accompaniments of one another defeat the converse of
(3). It might so happen that any likely event of my working
on the dissertation is such that were I to engage in it, I’d
also be drinking coffee. But no event of working on this
dissertation is any event of drinking coffee, no matter how
likely it is that my working will be accompanied by coffee-
drinking— the event of working is not character i zed by the
property of drinking coffee. So the converse of (3) fails.
Examples concerning properties that cannot characterize
events clearly defeat the converse of (4). Anyone who is
occurrently believing that Jones will arrive, believes that
Jones will arrive. But there are no events of (non-
occurrent 1 y ) believing that Jones will arrive, so no event
of occurrently believing that Jones will arrive is an event
of believing that she will. I am not sure whether an
amended version of the converse of (4), with 'P’ restricted
to properties that can characterize events, is to be
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accepted or not. That seems to me a difficult Question.
Roughly, the question is: suppose an event e, and the
property of 0-ing, are such that necessarily e occurs only
when its subject is 0-ing, and suppose too that there are
events that may be said to be events of 0-ing (i.e., that
the property of 0-ing is one that can characterize an
event); does it follow, concerning any such case, that the
event in question is an event of 0-ing? I don’t know.
We may formulate a certain thesis of event identity by
appeal to the concept of characteri zation . For we can ask
whether it is the case, roughly put, that if e is an event
of 0-ing, and e’ is an event of 0’-ing, and 0-ing and 0’-ing
are different properties, then e and e’ are different
events. We may ask, in other words, whether the following
expresses a truth:
(5) nec VeVe’(( P characterizes e & P’ characterizes
e’ &P^P’ ) -» e * e’ )
I am very much inclined to think that the thesis formulated
here is false. For it seems to me that some events of
hitting someone, for example, are events of punching
someone. In fact, I’d be inclined to say that any event of
punching someone is an event of hitting someone. I do not
have any arguments to offer for this particular contention,
and it does conflict with certain extant accounts of event
identity. ^ However, it is surely the case that the property
of punching someone and the property of hitting someone are
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distinct. Then if it is at least possible that there is an
event of punching someone that is also an event of hitting
someone, it will be the case concerning a pair <e,e’>, e =
e’, that this pair satisfies the antecedent of (5) but fails
to satisfy its consequent. Some cases that seem to me to
provide further counterexamples along similar lines concern
events of persons bearing intentional attitudes. We shall
come to this matter below, in section 9.5.
Although I consider it plausible to hold that events of
punching someone are events of hitting someone, I do not
think that a proper generalization is to be derived here
from the observation that punching someone entails hitting
someone. I do not suppose that anytime a property, P,
entails a property, P’, then any event characterized by P
will be characterized by P’
:
(6) nec VP VP ’ ( nec Vx( x has P -V x has P’ ) -»
nec Ve( P characterizes e -V P’ character i zes e ))
As in the case of the converse of (4), counterexamples here
derive from the fact that not all properties are ones that
can characterize events. As in that case, if the claim is
amended so as to concern solely properties that can,
characterize events, the resulting claim is still not one
that I am confident is correct.
Another question that can be asked by appeal to this
concept of characterization: is an event essentially
characterized by any property that in fact character i zes it?
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In other words, does the following formulate a truth?
nec VeVP( P characterizes e -» nec( e exists -»
P character i zes e ))
The claim expressed here is quite close to that expressed by
(4). In fact, in the presence of (A10)—which I accept— and
a few other natural assumptions, (4) can be derived from
(7). As I noted, we shall shortly discuss a case
consideration of which leads me to question whether the
thesis formulated in (4), and consequently that expressed by
(7), should be accepted.
Finally one last matter before turning to consider some
assumptions specifically concerning noetic events. Perhaps
there are conjunctive events, events that may be said, in
some sense, to "conjoin" other events. So, for example,
perhaps there is an event of Moe and Larry’s hitting Curly
that conjoins an event of Moe ’ s hitting Curly and an event
of Larry’s hitting Curly. Should we say that the properties
character i zi ng the "conjuncts" in such cases characterize
the conjoining event as well? I doubt that reflection on
our ordinary usage of instances of (FI) or (F2) can be
expected to yield firm intuitions on this matter.
Nevertheless, I propose to assume that if a property
character i zes a conjunct of an event, e, then that property
may be said to characterize e itself iff it character i zes
each of e’s conjuncts:
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( A 1 1 ) nec VeVP( Je'
(
e’ is a conjunct of e &
P characterizes e’ ) -» ( P character i zes e iff
Vte ’ ( e’ is a conjunct of e -»
P characterizes e’ )))
As an illustration, imagine that Larry is hitting Curly and
Moe is hitting Larry. I take it that in at least some such
situations, there is an event, call it "L", of Larry’s
hitting Curly that is occurring and is not an event of Moe’s
hitting Larry. I also suppose that in some such situations
in which L is occurring, there is also an event, call it
"M", of Moe’s hitting Larry that is not an event of Larry’s
hitting Curly. It seems to me that some such situations are
possible. Now let us suppose further that in some (any?)
situations in which L and M are occurring, there is an
event, LM, that conjoins these and only these two events, L
and M. I take (All) to guarantee that the property of
hitting someone characterizes LM. For it seems to me that
we should allow that any event that is either an event of
hitting Larry or an event of hitting Curly is an event of
hitting someone. Then the property of hitting someone
characterizes both L and M. But then by (All), LM is so
characterized as well. So we may say that LM is an event of
hitting someone. This seems acceptable. But according to
(All), we cannot say that the property of being such that
Moe is hitting Larry characterizes LM , for by hypothesis,
one of the conjoined events, L, is not characterized by this
property
.
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There may be some regimentation imposed by (All) that
is not supported by any features to be discerned by
reflection on our ordinary usage of instances of (FI) or
(F2). But I am presuming this regimentation when I say that
a noetic event is an event of x’s genthinking y, for given x
and y, and this presumption will have to bear some weight in
what follows; so we shall proceed with (All).
9.2.3 Noetic Events
I shall use lambda expressions of the form
>v,...v
n t0]
(where variables go in for ' vl 1 vn’
,
and sentences for
' 0 ' ) as terms denoting properties and relations. If the
variable, v, isn’t free in 0 , read [ )<v[0] ] as "the
property of being such that 0 " . Then 'noetic event’ may be
defined as follows:
(D13) e is a noetic event =df
)iz[x is genthinking y] character i zes e )
I assume that there are noetic events--that there are events
each of which may be characterized as an event of x’s
thinking y, for particular thinking thing, x, and thought,
y. It seems to me that in any familiar circumstance in
which it would be correct to say that someone is thinking
something we are supplied with an example of such an event.
I wish to discuss some assumptions that I take to
govern the concept obtained from (D13). All of these
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assumptions may be seen, in effect, as placing constraints
on the relation of character i zati on when its domain is
restricted to properties of particular persons 9enthinking
things
.
In light of (D13), every noetic event, e, may be
associated with an x and a y such that ),z[x is 9enthinking
y] characterizes e. Let us consider some features of this
association. I assume that for any noetic event, a thing,
x, is such that the event is characterized by x’s thinking
something iff x is a subject of that event:
(A12) nec *te( e is a noetic event -»
^x( Jy( )z[x is 9enthinking y] characterizes e )
iff x is a subject of e )
)
I also assume that every noetic event has at most one
subject
:
(A13) nec Vte( e is a noetic event —» VxVy(( x is a
subject of e & y is a subject of e ) -» x = y )
)
Against this it might be suggested that there are
conjunctive events satisfying the definiens of (D13), and
that some of these should be said to have more than one
subject. So, for example, for two noetic events, one an
event, say, of Moe’s thinking that Curly is an ignoramus,
the other of Larry’s thinking that Curly is an ignoramus,
perhaps there is a single event that conjoins these two.
Let "T " denote the thought that Curly is an ignoramus, "L*"
denote the event of Larry’s thinking Tc , and “M* " denote the
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event of Moe ’ s thinking T
c . And let us suppose that there
is an event that conjoins L* and M*
,
call it " LM* " . Perhaps
it should be claimed of LM* that it has both Moe and Larry
as its subjects. Then don’t we have in this case a noetic
event with more than one subject?
I am inclined to think not, for I am inclined to think
that LM is not a noetic event— that there isn’t any x (in
particular, neither Moe nor Larry) nor any y (in particular,
not T
c ) such that LM is an event characterized by x’s
genthinking y. Here is why: L* itself is surely not
character i zed by any property that, for some thought, y, is
the property of being such that Moe is genthinking y.
Provided that Moe is not Larry (they were the three stooges
after all), L is not an event of Moe ’
s
thinking y, for any
y. Then it is a consequence of (All) that the conjunctive
event, LM*, is not character i zed by any such property. And
parallel reasoning suggests that there is also no y such
that the property of being such that Larry is gen thinking y
characterizes LM*. And I take it that if this event
conjoining solely L* and M* isn’t characterized by
properties of either of these two sorts, then there is no x
and y at all such that yz[x is genthinking y] characterizes
LM*. If no thinking on Moe’s part alone character i zes that
conjunctive event, and no thinking on Larry’s part alone
does so either, then there is no person such that thinking
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on his or her part characterizes LM*
. if this is right,
then by (D13), LM* is not a noetic event.
From here on, I shall suppose it safe to speak of the
subject of any noetic event
— (A12) guarantees it at least
one subject; (A13) guarantees it a unique one.^
(D13) also guarantees that every noetic event, e, may
be associated with at least one thought, y, such that for
some x the property of x’s ^enthinking y character i zes e.
What can we say of th i
s
association? For one thing, it is
doubtful that for every noetic event, there is a unique
thought with which it is associated in this way. This is
doubtful in view of considerations of the sort raised in
Chapter 4 that lead to the Plurality of Thoughts Argument
(PTA) and its analogues. Suppose that I am thinking that
politicians lie and cheat. Argument 1 purports to show that
supposing just this, it follows that there are at least two
things that I am thinking. Indeed the line of argument
suggests three thoughts in particular that I may be said to
be having: i) the thought that politicians lie and cheat,
ii) the thought that they lie, and iii) the thought that
they cheat. But must we hold that in such circumstances
there are three corresponding events of thinking? I don’t
have an argument against this contention, but in the absence
of any argument in its favor , it seems plausible to allow,
rather, that it is at least possible that I may be thinking
that politicians lie and cheat and only be engaged in one
event of thinking.
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But (DIST) (the distribution rule employed in Argument
1; see Chapter 4, p.36) will still yield the result that I
may be said not only to be thinking that politicians lie and
cheat but also to be thinking that politicians lie, and to
be thinking that politicians cheat. If all three of these
ascriptions are indeed true relative to the imagined
circumstance in which I am engaging in only one noetic
event, then I take it that this one event of thinking may be
character i zed as an event of my thinking that politicians
lie and cheat, as an event of my thinking that politicians
lie, and as an event of my thinking that politicians cheat.
Then there would be three thoughts associated with a single
noetic event in the manner in question. Since I am somewhat
inclined to think that such cases are possible, I do not
propose to accept:
(8) nec Vte( e is a noetic event -» VyVy’( ix( ^z[x is
genthinking y’] characterizes e) y’ = y )
There are certain essential characteristics of noetic
events that are worth noting here. In general, no matter
what sort of event is at issue, I assume the subjects of
events to be essential to them. Consequently, in the case
of noetic events, I suppose that if a person is the subject
of such an event, the event is essentially such that that
person is its subject:
( A 1 4 ) nec Vfe( e is a noetic event -» x is the
subject of e & nec( e exists —> x is the subject
of e )
)
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I assume, further, that noetic events are essentially events
of thinking, each an event of a person doing some thinking.
We may indicate that an intransitive reading is called for
by affixing an * i " subscript to a verb. Then what I propose
to accept is:
(A15) nec V<e( e is a noetic event nec( e exists -»
^z[the subject of e is thinking^] characterizes e ))
However, it is another matter whether a noetic event is
essentially an event of someone thinking somethi ng 1 More
specifically, it is not clear to me that every noetic event,
e, is essentially such that for some x and y, e is an event
of x’s genthinking y:
(9) nec Ve( e is a noetic event —> nec( e exists -»
yz[x is genthinking y] character i zes e )))
The sorts of considerations that lead me to question (9)
have to do with cases of another sort alluded to in Chapter
4. At one point in section 4.2, I was concerned to give
some idea of the grounds I had for doubting whether the
following rule is valid:
x is thinking^
: : Jy ( x is thi nki ngt y )
(where the ’t* subscript indicates a transitive reading). I
described a case (pp.9-10, 4.2) that had to do with an
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antique furniture connoisseur, Max, who was having a very
vivid hallucination of an 1870’s vintage Chippendale chair.
Now imagine a somewhat different situation: suppose that
the circumstances in which Max finds himself really are as
he mistakenly took them to be in the original case of
hallucination. In other words, imagine that Max really is
looking at an 18th century Chippendale and is thinking,
concerning that chair, that it is a mint-condition
Chippendale. The "text" of his thinking, so to speak, may
be precisely the same as that in the original case of
hallucination. With respect to at least some cases fitting
the present description, however, it is clearly correct to
say that Max is thinking something. Indeed he is thinking a
thing expressed by the sentence
That is a mint-condition, late 70’s Chippendale
(with respect to suitable contexts). Let us call this
thought that Max is having, "T_". I think it is intuitively
plausible to suppose that there is a particular mental event
in which Max is engaging in this situation, an event that we
are referring to if, speaking of this situation, we were to
speak of "the event of Max’s thinking Tm
"
. And concerning
this event, it is simply not clear to me whether or not we
should say that i_t— that very event— can possibly occur in
circumstances of the sort originally described, where Max is
only having an hallucination of a chair, where there isn’t
anything that Max is thinking at all. Couldn’t this very
353
event be the one we would be reporting in such circumstances
were we to say:
Max is thinking: that is a mint-condition late
70' s Chippendale
If this is a possibility, then it would be a case in which
an event of a person’s thinking something—Max’s thinking
T
m— is possibly such that it occurs without there being
anything that the subject is thinking.
One might be tempted here to respond that if the event
we’re speaking of in the non-hal 1 uci natory case is really
one properly described as an event of Max’s thinking T m ,
then surely for that very event to occur is for Max to be
thinking Tm . Surely, one might say, the event, Max’s
thinking Tm , is necessarily such that if it occurs, Max is
thinking Tm . However, I can see no non-question-begging
grounds for supporting this contention. The event, by
hypothesis, is one in fact characterized by the property of
being such that Max is thinking Tm . Can we infer from this
much that the event is necessarily such that if it occurs,
Max is thinking Tm? I do not know.
10
Considerations along these lines are what lead me to
suspend judgement on two claims formulated in the preceding
subsection. There is the matter of whether, if a property
character i zes an event, that event is essentially
characterized by the property—of whether we should accept
the thesis formulated in (7). Also there is the matter of
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whether a property, P, that character i zes an event is
necessarily such that if the event occurs, the subject of
the event has P (in cases where the event has unique
subjects) of whether we should accept the thesis formulated
in (4). Since (4) can be derived from (7) (in the presence
of some assumptions that I have made or am willing to make),
to show that this case concerning Max’s thinking T m
undermines both claims, it will suffice to see that it calls
into question the claim expressed by (4). So note that the
following is a consequence of (4):
(4’) nec Ve( ^z [ gen thi nki ng ( Max ,
T
m ) ] character i zes e ->
nec( e occurs -» Max has y.z [ gen thi nki ng ( Max ,
T
m ) ] )
)
But if the case described above is indeed possible, then it
is possible that there be an event of Max’s 9en thinking Tm
(i.e., characterized by the property of being such that Max
is 9enthinking Tm ) that is possibly such that it occurs,
though its subject, Max, is not thinking T m or any other
thought. If such a case is indeed a possibility, then (4’),
and consequently (4) and (7), do not express truths.
I have noted that, in light of (D13), every noetic
event may be associated with at least one thought: any
thought, y, such that the event is one of x’s thinking y,
for some person x. My hunch is that if one is not committed
to the view that each thought associated this way with a
noetic event, e, is one of the ob.i ects of e if one does not
presume that the thought is as much a constituent of the
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activity of which e consists as is the subject of e— then
one will be less inclined to suppose that e is essentially
associated in the way in question with each such thought.
On the view I am proposing, thoughts are not objects, nor
constituents of any other sort, of events of thinking. In
section 9.5, I shall address the question of what sort of
things do occupy the role of object in noetic events.
In passing it is worth noting that the putative
possibility that leads me to question (4), (7) and (9), does
not undermine (A15). For I assume that whether Max is
hallucinating or not, if it is correct to say "Max is
thinking: That is a mint-condition, late 70’ s Chippendale "
,
then Max is doing some thinking--he is thinking^.
I shall make one further assumption concerning noetic
events before proceeding. Nothing in what has been
explicitly assumed so far guarantees a certain connection
that exists between a person’s genthinking a thing, and the
occurrence of a noetic event character i zed by that person’s
genthi nk ing that thing:
(A16) nec VxVy( x is genthinking y -»
}e( \z[x is genthinking y] character i zes e &
r
x i s engaging i n e )
)
The assumption implies that if a person may be said to be
genthinking something, then there is a noetic event that is
occurring and has that person as subject. A related thesis
may be put
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( 10 ) nec ( e is a noetic event —> ^xfy( x is engaging
in e -> x is 9 nthinking y ).
(10) follows from (A10), (A12) and (A13).
9.2.4 Types and Instances
There is a distinction commonly drawn in philosophy
between concrete, particular events, and items that are
sometimes spoken of as "event types". Perhaps the same
distinction is intended when philosophers have spoken of
distinguishing concrete events from generic events. I’m not
sure. At any rate, for the moment I shall assume that the
reader is familiar enough with the concept of a type. On my
usage, ’type’, ’sort’ and 'kind’ are all more-or-less
interchangeable expressions that apply to the same bunch of
things. I am not sure of the precise features of our
ordinary concept of a type. In the present study I propose
to adopt a somewhat regimented notion, and I shall be
restricting my attention to types of event, and a rather
select group of such types, at that. A little later on, I
shall have more to say about what sort of thing I understand
'types’ (and specifically, 'event types’), to refer to, in
this regimented sense.
Types of event may be said to have particular events as
their instances just as types of tiger may be said to have
particular tigers as their instances. I take this relation
of instantiation as a primitive. On the usage I propose,
only types are possibly instantiated. So I am assuming:
357
( A 1 7 ) nec Vx ( pos }y( y instantiates x ) -> x is a type)
I do not suppose that al 1 types of events have
instances. Also, I do not suppose that among event types
that do have instances, their instances all occur; I am
prepared to allow that there are some types none of whose
instances in fact have occurred or ever will occur.
Furthermore, I do not assume that events instantiate their
types essentially— if an event happens in fact to be an
instance of a given type, I do not take it to follow from
this that wherever it exists (nor even wherever it occurs)
it instantiates that type. Thus I do not accept any of the
following (here and in what follows, I use T-variables to
range exclusively over event types):
(11) nec VT ( pos ^e( e instantiates T ))
(12) nec VteVT( e instantiates T -» e has occurred or
will occur )
(13) nec VfeVT( e instantiates T -» nec( e exists -» e
i nstanti ates T ) )
,
9.2.5 Noetic Event Types
I assume that among all the various types of event,
some are types of noetic event. I’m afraid that again I
cannot offer any useful set of necessary and sufficient
conditions for what I shall mean when I speak here of
"noetic event types". I assume that noetic event types can
only be instantiated by noetic events:
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( A 1 8 ) nec VT ( T is a noetic event type —» nec Ve( einstantiates T e i s a noetic event ))
I also suppose that among the things that I would count as
event types at all, any that are instantiable and can only
be instantiated by noetic events are noetic event types:
( A 1 9 ) nec VT ( ( pos }y( y instantiates T ) & nec Vy ’ ( y’instantiates T
-V y* is a noetic event )) —> T is
a noetic event type )
But informative, necessary and jointly sufficient conditions
elude me. The problem is that on the conception of types to
be proposed below, there are many event types that are not
possibly instantiated that I would not wish to count as
types of noetic event. So the condition expressed in the
consequent of (A18) is not sufficient. On the other hand I
do not wish to rule out that there are noetic event types
that are themselves uni nstanti abl e . Consequently, the
condition expressed in the antecedent of (A19) is not
necessary. I can offer some examples of instantiable noetic
event types, and I shall have to hope that this serves to
convey the idea.
I assume that among noetic events, some are events of
persons occurrently believing that politicians lie and
cheat, some are events of persons imperatively wishing that
Sarah would say "yes" (for some given Sarah), and others are
events of persons wondering whether Jones will arrive on
time (for some given Jones). And I assume that in each of
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these cases, the noetic events of which we speak instantiate
a noetic event type: there is, for example, a type
necessarily such that it is instantiated by all and only
occurrent believings that politicians lie and cheat, a type
of imperative wishings, necessarily such that it is
instantiated by all and only imperative wishings that Sarah
would say "yes", and so on. In each of these cases, an
instantiable noetic event type is in question: a type of
event that is possibly instantiated and is necessarily such
that, for some thought, x, any events instantiating that
type are events of persons 9enthinking x.
Let us say that an event type is a "^correlate" of a
thought, according to the following:
( D1 4 ) T is a correlate of x =df T is a noetic event
type & nec Ve( e instantiates T iff
}y( )z[y is 9 nthinking x] character i zes e ))
Roughly, a ^correlate of a thought, x, is a noetic event
type necessarily such that all and only events instantiating
it are events of persons 9enthinking x.
I assume that there are noetic event types and thoughts
related in this way. Take for example, a type suggested
above--one necessarily such that it is instantiated by
exactly those events of persons occurrently believing that
politicians lie and cheat. I take it that any such noeticMM
event type is a correlate of the thought, call it T p -| c ,
that politicians lie and cheat. Relative to any possible
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situation, any instancs of such a typs will b© an event
satisfying the following (for 'e’):
4y( )z[y is genthinking T
p i c 3 characterizes e )
I do not assume that for every noetic event type there
is a thought of which it is a ^correlate. On the conception
of types to be proposed below, I will not wish to rule out
that there are disjunctive event types, instantiated as well
by events of gen thinking x and by events of genthinking y,
for distinct thoughts, x and y. If we must admit such
types, then I would be inclined to hold that some of them
are noetic event types. But we couldn’t say, of any such
noetic event type, T, that there is any thought such that an
event instantiates T i f
f
the event is one of a person’s
thinking that thought. Then such a type is not a correlate
of any thought. So I shall not assume
(14) nec VT ( T is a noetic event type fx( T is a
correl ate of x )
)
However, I do propose to assume that for every thought,
%
there is a correlate:
(A20) nec Vix( x is a thought -» JT ( T is a ^correlate
of x )
)
This is a very substantial assumption, and the conception of
thoughts that I shall be laying out in the next sections
hinges on it.
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is expressed by the conclusion will vary, and do so with
attendant variation in truth-value relative to selected
situations. I believe that similar cases ( mutatis mutandis l
hinging in this way on context-sensitivity of the
conclusions yield counterexamples to certain instances of
both i) and ii) as well. But if the inference of (1) from(1’) fails, it will not be due to such examples since, I
take it, (1) is context-i_nsensi ti ve
,
and the same goes for
the inference of (2) from (2’).
However
,
perhaps it is worth noting that there are some
instances of iii), with context-j_nsensi ti ve conclusions,
that are invalid as well. Consider:
iiip) Benjamin Franklin said: “President Bush will
never order an invasion of Iraq"
:: Benjamin Franklin said that President Bush will
never order an invasion of Iraq.
I assume that the conclusion here is not context-sensitive.
Now suppose that back in the early 1800’s, Benjamin Franklin
had uttered these words: "President Bush will never order
an invasion of Iraq". Then I take it that the premise of
iiip) expresses a truth, just by virtue of Franklin’s
utterance. But I am inclined to say that the conclusion of
iiip) does not, by that fact alone, express a truth. There
wasn’t and had never been, as of Franklin’s time, any such
person as President Bush, nor any such country as Iraq. It
perhaps doesn’t follow
,
given this, that it is incorrect to
assert of Franklin that he said Bush will never order an
invasion of Iraq. Perhaps, under the following
circumstances, even though there had never been a president
Bush, nor any such country as Iraq, the conclusion of iiip)
would express a truth: imagine that Franklin said, "Listen,
I’m telling you that there will be a 41st president of our
country, and in 1990 there will be a foreign country that
occupies the region ... [lengthy specification of longitudes
and latitudes follows that picks out the region in fact to
be occupied by Iraq (pre-annexation of Kuwait)]..., and I’m
telling you that he, that presi dent- to-be , will never order
an invasion of i_t, that country-to-be. Maybe relative to
such circumstances, the conclusion of iiip) expresses a
truth.
However, it seems clear to me that it does not follow,
merely upon the truth of what is expressed by the premi se of
iiip), that what is expressed by the conclusion of iiip) is
true. Then if I’m right about iiip), and moreover
,
corresponding instances of i) and iii) stand or fall
together, then I think we should have to grant that the
inference of (1) from (1’), in particular, is not valid.
It is not clear to me that instances of i) and iii) do
stand or fall together, but the validity of the inferences,
(
1
’ )/ : : ( 1 ) » (
2
’ ) / : : ( 2 )
,
remains unclear to me as well.
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3. I think it is plausible to claim that Witold can’t be
wishing that Jones will arrive on time unless he believes
some things; in particular, wishing that Jones will arrive
may entail believing that someone exists. If one accepts
this claim, one might be tempted to infer that situations
meeting Constraint 1 are not possible. For I say that
Witold is on! y wishing, yet from the description of the case
it follows that he is also believing something. But this
reasoning is based on a confusion. Constraint 2 does not
require that Witold lacks any beliefs at the moment; it
requires only that he isn’t bearing any occurrent attitudes
apart from those required by that of imperative wishing.
Imperative wishing does not require occurrent belief. Then
if Witold is onl
y
wishing, he can’t be having any occurrent
beliefs. But that is not incompatible with the description
of the case.
Belief and occurrent belief seem plainly to be
different in this respect: it is plausible to claim that
bearing the attitude of wishing or wondering (or as well any
of a host of other attitudes) to a thing entails having a
belief (though perhaps only a quite minimal belief, such as
that something exists); bearing that same attitude to that
same thing, however, does not entail occurrentl
v
believing
anything
.
4. It is not clear to me that there are such other
occurrent beliefs that we should acknowledge that O’Brien is
having in *-si tuat i ons
.
(Similar points apply, I believe,
to the question of whether Witold is having other wishes
besides the two expressed by (4) and (4’); see note on
following page in the text.) The matter depends on what
other analogues of (DIST^) must be accepted. One might
find the following plausible, for example:
(DIST?) t is occurrently believing that Jones will arrive
on time
: : t is occurrently believing that someone will
arrive on time
If (DIST?) is correct, we should allow that the following
ascription also expresses a report true relative to *-
situations, in addition to (3) and (3’):
(a) O’Brien is occurrently believing that someone will
arrive on time
However, conclusions of inferences sanctioned by (DIST?) are
ambiguous and may be interpreted either de—re or de
—
die to
.
Assessment of the validity of a given instance of (DIST?),
then, must await disambiguation.
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On one hand, if the conclusions are to be understood as
de d i cto ascriptions, with the quantifier 'someone’ not
taking wide scope over 'O’Brien is occurrently believing’,
then it is not clear to me that inferences sanctioned by
(DIST?) are in general valid. The case is different with
inferences involving non-occurrent belief. I grant that if
a person believes that Jones will arrive on time, then this
person may be ascribed de dicto the belief that someone will
arrive on time. But with occurrent belief, I do not see
that matters go the same way. I grant as well that if a
person is occurrently believing that Jones will arrive, then
that person may be said to believe, non-occurrent! v . de
di cto , that someone will arrive. But that is not an
entailment relevant to the inferences with which we are
concerned
.
On the other hand, if the ascriptions that figure as
conclusions to instances of (DIST?) are to be interpreted de
re
.
then I am inclined to think that such inferences are
questionable for other reasons. Consider the parallel:
(DIST?’) t is occurrently believing that Santa Claus will
arrive
:: t is occurrently believing that x will arrive)
Surely, instances of (DIST?’) are not in general valid.
Then we should say the same for (DIST?), if the conclusions
of its instances are to be interpreted de re .
5. In Note 2. it was observed that some instances of the
pai r
( f 1
’
)
t i
s
thi nki ng : 0
( f 2
’
t is thinking: 0*
do not imply the corresponding instances of
(fl) t is occurrently believing that 0
(f2) t is wishing that it would be that you 0
*
And although in some cases this is due to the relevant
instances of (fl) and (f2) being context-sensitive, this is
not always so. One case was considered above deriving from
the choice of the standard indicative, 'President Bush will
never order an invasion of Iraq’, for 0 . So there are cases
where the truth of the di spl ayed-sentence ascription does
not guarantee the truth of the corresponding standard
ascription. Any such case will be one where it does not
suffice, for the constraint presently at issue, to require
that the ^-situation analogues be ones relative to which the
displayed-sentence ascription alone is true.
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_nrl
*° 1 am
.
puttin 9 a lot of weight on the present clause
expresse^bv
1 ex P ressed loosel y in it, that the claims
ascriptions \ eS£° n ? ln9 standard and displayed-sentenceare to be true relative to these situations invirtue of the same bit of occurrent believing or wishing asthe case may be. in formulating Constraint 1, I avoided’is (or meant to avoid it) by adding the adverbial clauseconcerning Jones’, to (1’) and (2’). The resultingdisplayed-sentence ascriptions (clauses a. and b. ) seem tome to do the trick. In general, however, I do not see any
clear, principled way to produce, for any given indicative,
a pair of displayed-sentence ascriptions that will
suffice in this connection: ones that express claims suchthat it is enough to require that those claims be true
relative to a situation, in order to impose a constraint, inthe case of 0 , with an effect analogous to that of
Constraint 1, in the case of 'Jones will arrive on time’.
Suppose, for example, that the indicative, 0, selectedfor instantiating ( RV2 ) , contains occurrences of two proper
names. Suppose 0 is 'Henry won’t bother Laurie’. In such a
case, I do not see how the addition of adverbial clauses toinstances of ( f 1
’ ) or ( f 2
’ ) will do the trick. It will not
do to say that the ^-situation analogues in this case are
situations relative to which the claim expressed by the
following is true
:
(a) Witold is thinking, concerning Laurie and Henry:
Let it be that Henry won’t bother Laurie.
Briefly, the problem that I see with this particular
proposal is that it might be that Witold uses the name
'Laurie’ for Henry, and 'Henry’ for Laurie. Some such
situations will be ones relative to which the claim
expressed by (a) is true, though they are not ones in which
Witold is wishing that Henry wouldn’t bother Laurie, but
rather
,
ones in which he’s wishing that Laurie doesn’t
bother Henry. Plainly, similar problems would confront
other appeals to instances of ( f 1 ’ ) or (f2’) with these
"concerning x" modifiers.
It may be that a proposal can be fashioned that gets
around this sort of difficulty by employing the concept of
event-characterization introduced in the next chapter
(section 9.2). For any standard indicative, 0 , an event of
occurrent believing may be said to have the conjunctive
property ("Pq"
)
of being an event of O’Brien’s occurrently
believing that 0, and as well an event of O’Brien’s
thinking: 0. Likewise, an event of wishing may be said to
have the conjunctive property ("P*)") of being an event of
Witold’s imperatively wishing that it would be that 0 , and
as well an event of Witold’s thinking: Let it be that 0. I
believe that for each of these properties it is possible
that an occurring event has it; moreover, I think that it is
possible for two events, each one having one of these
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properties (and not the other) to co-occur. I claim, inparticular, that there are two such co-occurring events in
any ^-situation; I believe this is guaranteed by the
condition imposed by Constraint 1.
The idea, then, would be to require that, for the
selected 0 , the relevant ^-analogues are situations in which
(b) there are two occurring events, e and e’, such that e
has P£ and e’ has PjJ.
(the analogue of Constraint 2 will guarantee that only one
of the events has each property). I be! ieve that a precise
and adequate analogue of Constraint 1 can be stated in
generality along these lines. I am not sure.
6. There is a difficulty confronting my appeal to instances
of
(fl) t is thinking: Let it be that 0,
in stating analogues of Constraint 1. The difficulty is of
the sort of problems raised in the preceding note, and has
rather to do with the choice of displayed imperative.
To illustrate the problem, take 0 to be
(a) No bird is noisy
In this case, I do not believe that the problems discussed
in the preceding note arise in stating an analogue of
Constraint 1. I am inclined to think that it suffices to
say, in O’Brien’s case, that the relevant ^-situation
analogues are ones relative to which the following expresses
a truth:
(b) O’Brien is thinking: no bird is noisy
For I take it that (b) implies
(c) O’Brien is occurrently believing that no bird is
noisy.
and also that (b) is compatible with what would be the
counterpart of Constraint 3 in this case: that O’Brien does
not have an occurrent belief stronger than any required by
(c). (For this notion of an occurrent belief (or wish)
being stronger than another, see discussion of Constraint 3
in the text.) And I suppose that, in general, if i) an
instance of
( f 2
’
)
t i
s
thi nki ng : 0
or
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(f3* ) t is thinking: 0*
( subst i tuends of ' 0* ’ being imperatives) implies the
corresponding instance of
(f2) t occurrently believes that 0
or
( f 3
)
t is wishing that it would be that 0 ,
and in addition, ii) the instance of (f2’) or (f3’) is
compatible with the counterpart of Constraint 3— if it does
not require an occurrent belief or wish stronger than any
required by the corresponding instance of (f2) or (f3), as
the case may be
—
then to express a constraint (for the
relevant substituend of ' 0' ) whose effect is parallel to
that of the a. or b. clause of Constraint 1 (for the
indicative, 'Jones will arrive on time’), it will suffice to
require that the instance of ( f 1 * ) or ( f 2
’
) at hand
expresses a truth relative to the ^-situation analogues at
i ssue
.
But it is perhaps not clear, for any indicative, 0 ,
whether the constraint in Witold’s case can be expressed by
an instance of (fl). In particular, it may be questioned
whether
(d) Witold is thinking: Let it be that no bird is
noisy.
implies
(e) Witold is wishing that it would be that no bird is
noisy.
I am inclined to think that there is at least one available
interpretation of (d) on which it does imply (e), but this
inclination, and the inclination to hold, more generally,
that instances of ( f 3
)
are implied by corresponding
instances of (fl), may be questioned.
It may be claimed that, strictly speaking ( modulo the
difficulty of the preceding note), instances of (fl) imply,
not the corresponding instances of (f3), but rather the
corresponding instances of
(f 4 ) t is wishing that you will let it be that 0
The contention would be that, taken strictly and literally,
imperatives of the form
Let it be that 0
should be understood to involve the reading of 'let’ that is
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involved in literal i nterpretati ons of indicatives of the
form
t will let it be that 0.
The problem then is that, strictly speaking, the claim
expressed by (d) with respect to a context, c, would imply
the claim expressed, with respect to c, by
(f) Witold is wishing that it would be that you let it
be the case that no bird is noisy.
but not that expressed by (e). If this contention ia right,
therv the conclusions of the relevant instances of LA^ and
AST^ will not conflict with (RV2 a ). For there would be some
situations satisfying the analogues of Constraints 1 - 3
relative to which the claim expressed by (e) is f al se .
Consequently, (RV2 ) will not yield, concerning all such
situations, that there is a proposition (that no bird is
noisy) such that O’Brien is occurrently believing it, and
Witold is wishing it.
It seems to me, too, that if the present objection to
employing instances ( f 1
)
is correct, then we cannot employ
those instances in formulating analogues of Constraint 1
along the lines suggested at the end of the preceding note.
Employing the instance of (fl), got with (a) in for ' 0'
,
that proposal would require that the relevant ^-situation
analogues be situations where
(g) there is an occurring event that is both an event of
Witold’s wishing that it would be that no bird is
noisy, and as well, an event of Witold’s thinking: Let
it be that no bird is noisy.
I am inclined to think that at least on one i nterpretati on
this expresses a claim that is possibly true and compatible
with the relevant analogues of Constraints 2 and 3. But if
the present line of objection is right, and (d) does not
imply (e), then I think we should have to say that there
couldn’t be any single occurring event that has this
conjunctive property, at least not in situations that also
meet the analogues of Constraints 2 and 3. For the analogue
of Constraint 3 will require that the strongest thing Witold
is imperatively wishing in such situations is (intuitively
put) the wish that no bird is noisy. But if there is an
occurring event of Witold’s wishing that someone (referent
of 'you’) would let it be that no bird is noisy, then there
is this other wish— (intuitively put) the wish that you
would let it be that no bird is noisy— that is i ndependent
of the previous one; neither one is a stronger wish than the
other.
.
Two responses to this line of questioning do not seem
to me satisfactory. One might dismiss the problem, claiming
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that it is clear enough which imperative wishes are supposed
to be captured by requirements formulated using instances of
( f 1 ) : the ones reported by instances of ( f 3 )
.
But it seems
to me that this just begs the line of questioning at issue.
The contention at hand is that instances of (fl) do not
imply corresponding instances of (f3). If that claim is
right, then whether or not one "gets the idea" of which
constraints I want by employing instances of (fl), those
constraints are not, strictly speaking, expressed by those
appeals. I am interested in how, strictly speaking, those
constraints may be expressed.
Another response might be to claim that (f) itself
implies (e) (and more generally, that instances of (f4)
themselves imply corresponding instances of (f3)). I don’t
think that from the fact that I am occurrently believing
that you will let it be the case that one bird escapes, that
I am occurrently believing that one bird will escape (though
I think it would follow that I bel i eve this). And I doubt
too that it follows from the fact that I am wishing that you
would let it be that no bird is noisy, that I am wishing
that it would be that no bird is noisy (though, it perhaps
does follow that I desi re this). On the discrepancies noted
here between belief and occurrent belief, and between desire
and (occurrent) wishing, see notes 3. and 4. above. Also,
this response would leave us with the obstacle discussed
just above for the proposal I offered at the end of the
previous note: even if (f) implies (e), it presumably
requires a wish stronger than any required by (e). Then
there won’t be any situations (not possible ones anyway)
that conform to the analogues of Constraints 2 and 3, yet at
which any event is occurring that is one of Witold’s wishing
that it would be that no bird is noisy and also one of
Witold’s thinking: Let it be that no bird is noisy.
Perhaps it is not possible to find, for any standard
indicative, some displayed-imperative ascription that serves
to express the desired condition on situations (along the
lines of clause b. of Constraint 1). Similar problems would
arise in connection with other imperative forms that one
might employ in this connection: for example, 'See to it
that 0\ 'Make it the case that 0\ 'Bring it about that 0 '
,
etc. Perhaps the Yiddish form, [ that 0 ], for subjunctive
0 ( as in 'That a radish grow on your navel, God forbid’)
would work. I believe that French allows such constructions
in ordinary usage, and that the sentence [ Que 0 ] for
(French) subjunctive 0 , serves just the called for function,
of expressing an imperative wish. If such forms are to be
found in French and happen not to have proper translations
in English, perhaps it would not be unwarranted to
appropriate instances of (fl) (or one of the other forms
just cited) for the purpose.
.
At any rate, there are very many cases where displayed
sentence ascriptions (instances of (f2’) and (f3’)) are
available which imply the corresponding instances of (f2)
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and (f3) (surely, clauses a. and b. of Constraint 1
constitute one case among very many relevantly similar
cases). In all of these many cases, analogues of
Constraints 1-3 can be formulated, and ^-situation
analogues can be specified consideration of which motivates
analogues of LA and AST that are just as compelling as the
originals. Reflection on this fact by itself, it seems to
me, should provide some grounds for allowing that if LA and
AST are to be accepted, then we may doubt whether there is
any standard indicative, 0, such that the instantiation of
(RV2) for 0 expresses a truth.
7. This formulation is not quite adequate in the case of
ambiguous sentences. I don’t think that the added
complexity required to accommodate such cases (by making the
parameter of interpretation explicit) is necessary for our
purposes. So the present statement should be understood to
be restricted to the case of unambi guous indicatives. The
same point holds for (20) and for my formulation of Thesis
3, both further on in the text.
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CHAPTER 9
AN ALTERNATIVE: THOUGHTS AS TYPES OF EVENT
9 • 1 A Fable About R*SS*LL’s Step
Once it is definitely recognized that the
proposition is... not a belief..., but an object of
belief, it seems plain that a truth differs in no
respect from the reality to which it was supposed
merely to correspond.
G.E. Moore 1
In Chapter 1, I alluded to an old argument dating back
to Frege, Moore and Russell, designed to show that we cannot
take 'thought’— used as a common noun in the sense that has
been of concern to us throughout this study— to stand for
concrete events of thinking, to stand, that is, for events
of particular persons’ doing some thinking.
It needn’t be denied that there is a usage of 'thought’
on which the term does stand for particular events of
thinking. But on that usage, it couldn’t be said that your
thought and my thought were the same. For what 'your
thought’ denotes, on that usage, is an event involving you
and not me as subject, whereas the thing denoted by 'my
thought’, on that usage, is an event involving me and not
you. Since you and I are distinct, so are our thoughts, on
that usage of 'thought’.
Let us reserve the phrase, 'shareable sense’, for the
sense of 'thought’ that has been our principal concern in
this study, the sense in which the term stands for items
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that you and I may be said to have or be thinking in common,
in virtue of having or thinking the same thought. (Strictly
speaking it hasn’t been ruled out that there are many such
"shareable" senses of the term 'thought’, but for ease of
exposition, let me set this point aside and suppose that
there is only one such sense; the policy will not jeopardize
any of the main points I wish to make. ) Concrete events of
thinking themselves do not seem to be items of the sort to
which the common noun thought
’ ,
applies in this shareable
sense. That is the thrust of the old argument. Then what
sort of items are the things that we refer to when we speak
of 'thoughts’ in the shareable sense? The Propositional
Tradition proposes a particular answer to this question, and
I wish to turn now to consider how certain followers of that
tradition may have arrived at their answer.
I have used the term, 'circumstance’, at various points
in the study so far, on what I think is a fairly familiar
and tolerably clear usage: for example, I have spoken of
circumstances in which someone did something or other, or in
which such and such an event took place, or circumstances
relative to which this or that claim is true, etc. I’ve
also used 'situation’ to stand for things of the same sort;
some might use instead the phrase "state of affairs" for
the kind of items I have in mind. Although this ordinary
usage of "circumstance" has been clear enough for purposes
so far, let me briefly say something further at this point
concerning the sort of thing intended.
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I take circumstances to be abstract items, ways for
things to be— at least some of which may be taken to be
represented by sets of possible worlds. For example,
circumstances of my now having a good time may be represented
by sets of worlds whose members all include me having a good
time presently. Circumstances may be said to obtain or be
actual— I use the predicates 'obtains’ and 'is actual’
interchangeably— but a circumstance’s obtaining or being
actual should not be confused with its existence. I assume
that there are (that there exist) circumstances that do not
obtain (aren’t actual): circumstances that are "merely
possible". If a circumstance is taken to be represented by
a set of possible worlds, we may say that it obtains or is
actual iff the actual world is one of its members. I have
reservations about whether circumstances are properly
represented along these lines, in terms of possible worlds.
There are other conceptions that have been proposed that
expand the notion of circumstance to include ways for things
to be that are not possible (and that, accordingly, are not
well represented by any sets of possible worlds). However,
I do not think that the main points I wish to make in what
follows hinge on this question.
There is a sense in which a circumstance may be said to
be the content of thoughts of various sorts: an occurrent
belief, wish and question may be said to have one and the
same circumstance as their common content. Loosely, the
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content of a thought is the circumstance that the thought
may be said to concern or be about. For example, if I am
thinking that Jones will arrive on time, my thought (at
least one thought I am having) is about the circumstance of
Jones being such that he will arrive on time; if you are
wishing that Jones would arrive on time, your thought (the
wish, or at least one wish, you are having) concerns that
same circumstance. There are problems with this
characteri zation of content
,
3 but for purposes at hand,
perhaps I may assume that the reader has an acceptable idea
of what it is for a circumstance to be the content of a
thought, whether an occurrent belief, a wish, a question, or
an “object” of any other attitude. At any rate, I shall
proceed with this assumption, and with the assumption, as
well, that in examples to be discussed, it will be clear
with respect to given thoughts, which circumstances are the
contents of those thoughts in the relevant sense.
The fact is that many philosophers of the Propositional
Tradition have supposed that what we mean by "thoughts",
when we use the phrase in the shareable sense, just are
circumstances (or some might rather use one of the terms,
'proposition’ or 'state of affairs’, intending by it,
however, the same sort of thing as I here intend when I
speak of circumstances). In fact their view would be that a
given thought just is that thought’s content. It may seem
odd to identify a thought with anything that that thought
itself could be said to concern or be about; I find it
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counterintuitive. Nevertheless, it is pretty easy to see
the plausibility in such a proposal. Here is a fable about
how a philosopher might have arrived at this view.
9.1.1 The Fable
There once was a famous philosopher named "R*SS*LL".
Having seen quite clearly that thoughts could not plausibly
be identified with concrete events of thinking, R*SS*LL made
the following observation: "Take any two acts of judging"
('judging’ was his technical term for occurrent believing,
and he commonly counted events of occurrent believing as
acts) "and suppose that, in virtue of engaging in those
particular acts, the subjects may properly be said to be
thinking the same thing. Then plainly," R*SS*LL observed
"on any such occasion, we should want to say that the
thought these two have in common concerns the same fact",
('fact’ was R*SS*LL’s term for what I have been speaking of
as "circumstances", for what his friend W*ttg*nst*n spoke of
as "states of affairs".) "Suppose, for example," R*SS*LL
proceeded "that our two subjects are both judging that Mt.
Blanc has many snowfields. This would be a case where we
should say they are thinking the same thing. But then
surely, we should also say that their common thought
concerns the same fact, namely the fact of Mt. Blanc’s
having many snow fields."
"But," R*ss*ll continued, "let us now go in the other
direction. Suppose that our two thinkers are having
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thoughts that could be said to concern the same fact. Isn’t
it clear that in any such case it will be correct to say
that they are thinking the same thing, having the same
thought? Suppose for example, that both are wishing to know
whether Scott authored Waverly. Here is a case where we
should be inclined to hold that their thoughts concern the
same fact, namely that of Scott’s authoring Waverly. But
then plainly this is also a case where we should say that
they are thinking the same thing, having the same thought."
"It is apparent, then" R*SS*LL concluded, "that for any
two acts of thinking, the subjects may be said to be
thinking the same thing just in case what they are thinking
concerns the same fact. Then we might as well equate the
thought that a person has (though not to say the particular
act of thinking in which the person is engaged) with the
fact that the person’s thought concerns or is about."
With this lead set by R*SS*LL, all philosophers
following in his footsteps (keep in mind that this is a
fable), arrived very naturally at the central tenets of the
Propositional Tradition. If one assumes that the things
occurrently believed are in general truth-valued, and
moreover, one follows R*SS*LL in identifying thoughts with
contents, one will be led to the conclusion that
circumstances, at least those that are the contents of
occurrent beliefs, are true or false thoughts hence
propositions. And since it is plausible to suppose that if
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a circumstance is the content of an occurrent belief it may
also be the content of what one is thinking when one is
wishing or wondering, hoping or doubting, etc., it will be
natural to conclude as well that circumstances
—
propositions are the "objects" of all the attitudes.
Philosophers were led, this way, to the two component
principles of the Received View. Since it is plausible to
think that any circumstance that is the content of an
occurrent belief, is as well the content of a wish, and a
question, if one is identifying contents with what is
occurrently believed, wished or wondered, one will be led
strai ght-away to (RV1). More specifically, the content of
what one is occurrently believing, wishing, or wondering,
when one is occurrently believing that 0 , wishing that it
would be that 0 , or wondering whether 0 , will be the very
same circumstance, what R*SS*LL would have spoken of as "the
fact that 0 " (let me set aside R*SS*LL’s troubles that arose
concerning cases where it is not a fact that 0 ) . Thus, if
one is inclined to identify this circumstance with the
proposition that 0 , one arrives strai ght-away at (RV2).
Plainly, all this still leaves open the question of
what sort of things propositions are; circumstances, of
course (or states of affairs, R*SS*LLian facts, situations;
choose your phrase), but what sort of thing are these?
Proposals varied in response to this latter question, with
concomitant variation in proposals as to the nature of
propositions. There was the old R*SS*LLian view according
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to which propositions— "facts"— are complex entities, each
an arrangement of an object and property (or of several
objects under a relation), the object and property (or
objects and relation) being counted as constituents of the
fact. More recently, the concept of possible worlds has
been employed in explicating the nature of propositions.
Thus, philosophers have suggested that we view propositions
as sets of possible worlds, or as functions from worlds to
truth-val ues . Others have proposed to take propositions as
"intensional relations" of a certain sort: O-ary ones.
Still, the conception of propositions as things akin to what
I mean by "circumstances" has been the leading idea. All of
these accounts, in their own ways, have proved to be
fruitful and promising proposals concerning propositions,
and consequently— so it was supposed— of thoughts in
general. Here the parable ends.
9.1.2 R*SS*LL * s Step
What I wish to highlight in this fable is a certain
step that R*SS*LL and all his followers made— I shall refer
to it as "R*SS*LL ’ s step". I believe that this step, or one
closely analogous to it (concerning specifically belief), is
implicit in G.E. Moore’s remarks that I quoted at the head
of this section. It is the step of supposing, upon noting
that the term 'thought’, in its shareable sense, cannot
plausibly be held to apply to particular concrete events of
occurrent believing (or wishing, or wondering, etc.), that
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the term must apply rather to contents— to items that we
would, intuitively speaking, say the thoughts are about, or
concern (that the term applies to things in significant
respects akin to what I mean by 'circumstance’: R*SS*LL’s
complexes, or sets of possible worlds, or functions from
sets of worlds to truth values, etc.)
If one has one’s attention focussed exclusively on the
case of belief (or occurrent belief), R*SS*LL’s step has
some plausibility. For as R*SS*LL noted (in effect), the
following expresses a truth:
(1) nec Vx Vx ’ vy Vy ’ nec( if x is occurrently believing y, and
x’ is occurrently believing y’, and y and y’ have the
same content, then x is thinking z and x’ is
thinking z ))
Restricting attention to the case of occurrent belief, it
seems indeed to be the case that two persons are bearing
this attitude to things that have the same content— that
concern the same circumstance— iff these persons may be said
to be thinking something in common, sharing a thought.
There is, then, an equivalence, at least in the case of
occurrent belief, between sharing a belief and having
beliefs with the same content.
In fact, it is plausible to think that the same point
can be made, mutatis mutandis , concerning many occurrent
attitudes: whenever one person is, for example,
imperatively wishing a thing, x, and another person is
imperatively wishing an item, x’, if x and x’ may be said to
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have the same content— to concern the same circumstance
—
then it is plausible to say that the two persons are
thinking something in common— sharing a thought. An
analogous claim can be made concerning the occurrent
attitude of wondering. For any one of a host of occurrent
attitudes, it will be plausible to claim that the attitude
satisfies (for 'A’):
(2) nec Vx Vx ’ Vy Vy ’ nec( if A(x,y) and A(x’,y’), and y and y’
have the same content, then x is thinking z and x’
is thinking z ) ) 4
If sharing thoughts and sharing contents are equivalent in
these single attitude cases, it may seem quite natural to
suppose that the thought shared .just is the shared content.
And in fact, philosophers working within the Propositional
Tradition commonly have restricted their attention to cases
in which a single attitude is in question, especially in
discussions where the nature of "objects" of the attitudes
was at issue. As I have noted before, it has been a
commonplace in that tradition to attend solely to the case
of belief, and to suppose that the results arrived at in the
case of that attitude apply as well to the case of all other
attitudes
.
What should we make of R*SS*LL’s step? Since it leads
directly to some of the central tenets of the Propositional
Tradition, and since I believe that we should take seriously
the doubts that were raised concerning those tenets in the
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preceding chapter, I am inclined to think that we ought to
question R*SS*LL’s step. The arguments of the preceding
chapter suggest that in cases involving two persons bearing
any pair of our three attitudes of occurrent believing,
wishing and occurrent wondering, the apparent equivalence of
shared thought and shared content breaks down. In cases
where one person is bearing one of those attitudes, and onl y
bearing it, and the other is bearing another of those
attitudes, and onl
y
bearing that attitude, then whether or
not any of the things these two are thinking have the same
content, it will be counterintuitive to claim that they are
thinking anything in common. Yet if we were to follow
R*SS*LL’s step concerning cases where there i_s a content had
in common, we would be led to claim that the two persons are
thinking something in common. It seems to me, then, that we
should think twice about taking R*SS*LL’s step.
Fortunately, R*SS*LL’s step is not forced on us; there
are other items that 'thought’ may plausibly be taken to
refer to, in its shareable sense.
9 . 2 The New Category
The question is: what are the things we correctly
speak of having, when we correctly speak of having thoughts?
What are the things persons may properly be said to be
genthinking? One could say, simply, "thoughts", and
suppose, moreover, that there isn’t any other natural,
ontological category to which thoughts may be subsumed.
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This was not R*SS*LL’s view. When R*SS*LL proposed that we
take thoughts to be facts, he was proposing, concerning a
certain category of items that he had independent reasons to
acknowledge, that thoughts should be understood to be things
of that category. However, as we’ve just seen, any view
that identifies thoughts with their contents will be subject
to the same sort of doubts that were raised in the preceding
Chapter against (RV2). In the remaining sections of this
chapter, I wish to develop an alternative to R*SS*LL’s
proposal. But I shall follow R*SS*LL at least in this
respect: there is a certain category of items that I think
we have independent reason to acknowledge, and I shall claim
that thoughts should be understood to be things of that
category. These things, I believe, prove to be a better
choice than contents for the sort of items we speak of when
we speak of thoughts in the shareable sense. In the present
section, I shall lead up to a claim concerning which
category of items is in question here, by introducing a
battery of concepts and assumptions that will be important
in subsequent development.
9.2.1 Character i zati on
I propose to use the phrase "noetic event" for any
event, e, such that for some person (or thinking thing of
some other sort), x, and some thought, y, e is an event of
x’s
genthinking y. 5 (Hereafter, I shall take "e" variables
to range solely over events.) Before discussing this
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concept, I would like to address a few important background
matters. I have been using the gerund, ' 9en thi nki ng
’ ,
as a
common noun applying to any event of a person thinking
something, but it is not clear to me that all events fitting
this description are noetic events. Perhaps there are, so
to speak, existentially quantified events— such a thing, for
example, as an event of Sarah’s thinking something, though
not an event that could be said, for any thought, to be an
event of Sarah’s thinking it . If there are such events,
they fit the description of genthi nki ngs
,
but not of noetic
events
.
This way of characterizing noetic events places a lot
of weight on the idea that an event may be said to be an
event of x’s 9enthinking y, for given x and y. In preceding
discussions, I have frequently appealed the notion of an
event’s being one of 0-ing, where "0-ing" is some gerund or
gerundive clause ("an event of kicking a football", "an
event of my dispatching my chore for the day", etc.). I
believe that the notion in question here may be understood
to involve a relationship between events and properties, and
I would now like to attend to that relation more directly.
When we employ an ascription of one of the forms
(FI) e is an event of 0-ing, or
(F2) e is an event of t’s 0-ing
(where substituends of ' 0-ing’ are gerunds, and substituends
of ’t’s’ are noun phrases in their possessive forms), I take
334
it that we ascribe a certain sort of property to the event
denoted by the substituend of 'e’. And I suppose that when
we refer to an event using a gerundive clause of the form:
t’s 0- i ng
we presuppose that the event referred to has a property of
the sort in question; in using such a term, we presuppose
that the event is an event of t’s 0-ing. One way to
understand what is being presupposed here, and what is
asserted of events when we employ instances of (FI) and (F2)
is as foil ows
.
I suggest that in character i z i ng an event as one of 0-
ing (or of t’s 0-ing), we assert a particular relation
between the event in question and the property of 0-ir\g (or
of being such that t is (or are) 0-ing). Actually, I take
it that in certain cases the relation in question holds,
rather, between an event and a relation (for example, in
saying that an event is one of hitting we assert a relation
between this event and the relation of hitting, in saying
that an event is one of giving we assert a relation between
the event and the relation of giving). In stating
assumptions and principles in what follows, though, just for
ease of formulation, I shall disregard these cases. Another
matter of convenience: instances of (F2) may contain plural
possessive noun phrases and quantifier expressions as
substituends for 't’s’, but in discussions to follow, I
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shall usually set aside consideration of such cases and
attend to instances of (F2) in which the possessives of
singular referring terms are substituends for 't’s’. I
think the discussions will be clearer for it, with no
central points for our purposes jeopardized by the practice.
So, I am assuming in what follows that if there is a
property expressed by the verb phrase [is 0-ing], there is a
property denoted by the correspondi ng singular terms:
[the property of 0-ing]
[the property of being such that t is 0-ing]
for singular term, t, and gerund 0-ing. (I am adopting one
further practice out of convenience here: the "ing" forms
figuring in the present progressives of verbs— as in “is 0-
ing"--are normally referred to as present participles ,
whereas the "ing" forms figuring in instances of (FI) and
(F2), and in instances of the two schemas for property terms
just cited, are normally referred to as gerunds : but I shall
ignore the distinction of participle and gerund in what
follows, and speak of "gerunds" in both sorts of case.)
As I see it, there are actually any number of relations
that satisfy instances of:
R holds between an event, e, and the property of
0-ing (of being such that t is 0-ing) just in case
the event is an event of 0-ing (of t’s 0-ing)
for the variable 'R’, where substituends for ’ 0-ing’ are
suitable gerunds (each one, G, such that [is G] expresses a
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property). But I propose to assume that there is just one
of these many relations that is expressed when we use
ascriptions that are instances of (FI) and (F2) in
character i zi ng events.
I shall refer to the relation in question here as that
of characterization", and shall appropriate the various
forms of the verb, 'characterizes’, taking them to express
the relation. So I take the following to express truths
(for suitable gerund, 0-ing):
[ nec Ve( the property of 0-ing character i zes e iff
e is an event of 0-ing ) ]
[ nec V<eVx( the property of being such that x is
0-ing character i zes e iff e is an event of
x’s 0-ing ) ]
I do not claim that adopting this view of matters is of
direct help in finding informative, necessary and sufficient
conditions under which the things expressed by instances of
(FI) and (F2) are true. But I do think that positing this
relationship of characterizing will make it easier to
formulate such proposals, and will allow us to consider
questions concerning such proposal s--and other proposals
concerning the concepts expressed by instances of (FI) and
(F2)— in a more regimented and perhaps more tractable
fashion
.
It should be borne in mind when considering assumptions
that I claim govern the relation of characterization that
ultimately they should be tested against intuitions we have
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concerning a relation expressed when we speak of an event
being an event of 0-ing", or an "event of t’s 0-ing"
; I
don’t mean to supplant this concept, only to regiment it. 6
9.2.2 Some Features of Characteri zation
One feature of the relation of characterization is that
events cannot bear it to just any property. I have not been
able to find a precise way, though, to mark off those
properties that can from those that cannot characterize
events. Intuitively, there is a distinction to be made
between event properties and properties of other sorts that
might be thought to be of help in the present connection.
Let us say that a thing engages in an event according to
(D12) x engages (is engaging) in e =df x is a subject
of e and e occurs (is occurring)
Then, roughly, an event property, P, may be said to be one
such that for any x, if x has P, then in virtue of x’s
having P, x is engaging in an event. Doing a sprint,
exhaling, occurrently believing that politicians lie and
cheat are all examples of event properties; being wise,
being malleable, believing (not occurrently) that
politicians lie and cheat are not. And the first three
properties just cited can indeed characterize events,
whereas the latter three cannot. We might say, rather, that
the latter three characterize states— there are states of
being wise, states of being malleable, states of belief, but
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no events can be characters zed these ways. In general, it
seems that if a property does fit the intuitive
specification of event properties just given, then it can
characterize events.
These observations might lead one to think that a
property can characterize an event iff it is an event
property. But on the conception of character i zati on
proposed here, there are plenty of non-event properties that
can characterize events. Vacuous properties such as being
such that Sarah is running, being such that O’Brien is
occurrently believing something, being such that Jones is
dancing the Boogaloo— all such properties by which, I claim,
we characterize events when we employ instances of (F2)— are
not intuitively event properties. After all, the number two
may be such that Sarah is running, but it wouldn’t, in
virtue of that, be the subject of any event. So such a
distinction between event and non-event properties does not
seem to be immediately helpful in drawing a line between
those properties that can and those that cannot be said to
characterize events.
Could we say that for any property that can
characterize an event, either it is an event property or
else it is a property, P, such that for some x and some
event property, P’
,
P = the property of being such that x
has P’? But an event may be properly character i zed , for
example, as one of somebody’s doing the wash in the sink.
When this is the case, I would claim, we correctly assert
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that the property, of being such that somebody is doing the
wash in the sink, character i zes that event. But the
property in question here is not a P such that, for some x
and some event property, P’
,
P = the property of being such
that x has P’. I shall have to leave the matter of which
properties can characterize events on a rather loose and
intuitive footing, but there do seem to me to be some clear
cases on both sides of the line. The examples cited in the
preceding paragraph are cases in point.
I suppose that if a property characterizes an event,
then the occurrence of the event is conditioned by the
subject’s exemplifying the property in question (I am
confining attention here to events that have single
subjects). If e is an event of sprinting, then presumably e
occurs only if the subject of e is sprinting. It is not
clear to me, however, what manner of conditioning is the
strongest that may be taken to hold here. Material
conditioning surely holds; that is:
(A10) nec VeVP( P characterizes e -> ( e is occurring
the subject of e has P ))
(Note: the conditioning at issue is expressed by the main
consequent of this and of each of the following two
formulations.) The conditioning doesn’t hold in the other
direction. Suppose that e is some event of my running five
miles. Then the property, call it R, of being such that I
am running five miles character i zes e. But surely it
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doesn’t follow from this alone that if I have R, e itself is
occurring. e may be some event that occurred in Amherst in
1987, but I may have R in virtue of engaging in some event
of running five miles in Seattle in the Summer of 1990.
Surely we shouldn’t say that e itself is then occurring.
I am inclined to think that an event’s occurrence is
"subjunct i vel y " conditioned by the subject’s having a
property that character i zes the event:
(3) nec VeVP( P characterizes e -» ( if e were
occurring, the subject of e would have P ))
However, it is not clear to me that strict conditioning
holds
:
(4) nec VbVP( P characterizes e -» nec( e is
occurring —
>
the subject of e has P ))
We shall consider a case in the next subsection that has led
me to question the thesis formulated in (4).
Upon reflection, I think it is pretty clear that the
three grades of conditioning expressed in the consequents of
(A10), (3) and (4) are not themselves sufficient conditions
for characterization. That is, if we replace the main
conditionals in these formulations by their converses, the
resulting formulations do not express truths. For
simplicity, let me refer to the claims expressed by these as
the •’converses" of (A10), (3) and (4). Consider the
converse of ( A 1 0 )
:
suppose that there is an event
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characteri zed by my running that is occurring at this
moment, and suppose too that I am presently thinking
something. Then the claim that this event of my running is
occurring materially implies that I have the property of
thinking something. But surely we should not want to say
that this event of my running is an event of thinking
something. Then we should not accept that the property of
thinking something character i zes e. So the converse of
(A10) should be rejected.
Examples concerning events that are inessential but
regular accompaniments of one another defeat the converse of
(3). It might so happen that any likely event of my working
on the dissertation is such that were I to engage in it, I’d
also be drinking coffee. But no event of working on this
dissertation is any event of drinking coffee, no matter how
likely it is that my working will be accompanied by coffee-
drinking— the event of working is not characterized by the
property of drinking coffee. So the converse of (3) fails.
Examples concerning properties that cannot characterize
events clearly defeat the converse of (4). Anyone who is
occurrently believing that Jones will arrive, believes that
Jones will arrive. But there are no events of (non-
occurrently) believing that Jones will arrive, so no event
of occurrently believing that Jones will arrive is an event
of believing that she will. I am not sure whether an
amended version of the converse of (4), with 'P’ restricted
to properties that can characterize events, is to be
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accepted or not. Ihat seems to me a difficult question.
Roughly, the question is: suppose an event e, and the
property of 0-ing, are such that necessarily e occurs only
when its subject is 0-ing, and suppose too that there are
events that may be said to be events of 0-ing (i.e., that
the property of 0-ing is one that can characterize an
event), does it follow, concerning any such case, that the
event in question is an event of 0— ing? I don’t know.
We may formulate a certain thesis of event identity by
appeal to the concept of character i zati on . For we can ask
whether it is the case, roughly put, that if e is an event
of 0-ing, and e’ is an event of 0’-ing, and 0-ing and 0’-ing
are different properties, then e and e’ are different
events. We may ask, in other words, whether the following
expresses a truth:
(5) nec VfeVe’(( P character i zes e & P’ character i zes
e’&P^P’ ) -» e i e’ )
I am very much inclined to think that the thesis formulated
here is false. For it seems to me that some events of
hitting someone, for example, are events of punching
someone. In fact, I’d be inclined to say that any event of
punching someone is an event of hitting someone. I do not
have any arguments to offer for this particular contention,
and it does conflict with certain extant accounts of event
identity.^ However, it is surely the case that the property
of punching someone and the property of hitting someone are
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distinct. Then if it is at least possible that there is an
event of punching someone that is also an event of hitting
someone, it will be the case concerning a pair <e,e’>, e =
e’, that this pair satisfies the antecedent of (5) but fails
to satisfy its consequent. Some cases that seem to me to
provide further counterexamples along similar lines concern
events of persons bearing intentional attitudes. We shall
come to this matter below, in section 9.5.
Although I consider it plausible to hold that events of
punching someone are events of hitting someone, I do not
think that a proper generalization is to be derived here
from the observation that punching someone entails hitting
someone. I do not suppose that anytime a property, P,
entails a property, P’, then any event characterized by P
will be characterized by P’
:
(6) nec VPVP’( nec Vx( x has P -» x has P’ ) ->
nec Ve( P characterizes e -* P’ character i zes e ))
As in the case of the converse of (4), counterexamples here
derive from the fact that not all properties are ones that
can characterize events. As in that case, if the claim is
amended so as to concern solely properties that can
characterize events, the resulting claim is still not one
that I am confident is correct.
Another question that can be asked by appeal to this
concept of characteri zation : is an event essentially
characterized by any property that in fact characterizes it?
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In other words, does the following formulate a truth?
(7) nec V<e VP( P character i zes e nec( e exists ->
P character i zes e ))
The claim expressed here is quite close to that expressed by
(4). In fact, in the presence of (A10)—which I accept— and
a few other natural assumptions, (4) can be derived from
g(7). As I noted, we shall shortly discuss a case
consideration of which leads me to question whether the
thesis formulated in (4), and consequently that expressed by
(7), should be accepted.
Finally one last matter before turning to consider some
assumptions specifically concerning noetic events. Perhaps
there are conjunctive events, events that may be said, in
some sense, to "conjoin" other events. So, for example,
perhaps there is an event of Moe and Larry’s hitting Curly
that conjoins an event of Moe’s hitting Curly and an event
of Larry’s hitting Curly. Should we say that the properties
character i z i ng the "conjuncts" in such cases characterize
the conjoining event as well? I doubt that reflection on
our ordinary usage of instances of (FI) or (F2) can be
expected to yield firm intuitions on this matter.
Nevertheless, I propose to assume that if a property
character i zes a conjunct of an event, e, then that property
may be said to characterize e itself iff it characterizes
each of e’s conjuncts:
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( A 1 1 ) nec VeVP( ^e’( e’ is a conjunct of e &
P characterizes e’ ) ( P characterizes e iff
Ve ’ ( e’ is a conjunct of e ->
P characterizes e’ )))
As an illustration, imagine that Larry is hitting Curly and
Moe is hitting Larry. I take it that in at least some such
situations, there is an event, call it "L", of Larry’s
hitting Curly that is occurring and is not an event of Moe ’
s
hitting Larry. I also suppose that in some such situations
in which L is occurring, there is also an event, call it
"M"
,
of Moe’s hitting Larry that is not an event of Larry’s
hitting Curly. It seems to me that some such situations are
possible. Now let us suppose further that in some (any?)
situations in which L and M are occurring, there is an
event, LM, that conjoins these and only these two events, L
and M. I take (All) to guarantee that the property of
hitting someone characterizes LM. For it seems to me that
we should allow that any event that is either an event of
hitting Larry or an event of hitting Curly is an event of
hitting someone. Then the property of hitting someone
characterizes both L and M. But then by (All), LM is so
characterized as well. So we may say that LM is an event of
hitting someone. This seems acceptable. But according to
(All), we cannot say that the property of being such that
Moe is hitting Larry characterizes LM , for by hypothesis,
one of the conjoined events, L, is not characterized by this
property
.
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There may be some regimentation imposed by (All) that
is not supported by any features to be discerned by
reflection on our ordinary usage of instances of (FI) or
( F2 )
.
But I am presuming this regimentation when I say that
a noetic event is an event of x’s gen thinking y, for given x
and y, and this presumption will have to bear some weight in
what follows; so we shall proceed with (All).
9.2.3 Noetic Events
I shall use lambda expressions of the form
)v,...v
n [0]
(where variables go in for * vl vn’
,
and sentences for
' 0 ' ) as terms denoting properties and relations. If the
variable, v, isn’t free in 0 , read [ ^v[0] ] as “the
property of being such that 0" . Then 'noetic event’ may be
defined as follows:
(D13) e is a noetic event =df
JxJyi )<z[x is genthinking y] character i zes e )
I assume that there are noetic events— that there are events
each of which may be characterized as an event of x’s
thinking y, for particular thinking thing, x, and thought,
y. It seems to me that in any familiar circumstance in
which it would be correct to say that someone is thinking
something we are supplied with an example of such an event.
I wish to discuss some assumptions that I take to
govern the concept obtained from (D13). All of these
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assumptions may be seen, in effect, as placing constraints
on the relation of character i zati on when its domain is
restricted to properties of particular persons 9enthinking
thi ngs
.
In light of (D13), every noetic event, e, may be
associated with an x and a y such that ),z[x is 9enthinking
y] character i zes e. Let us consider some features of this
association. I assume that for any noetic event, a thing,
x, is such that the event is characterized by x’s thinking
something iff x is a subject of that event:
(A12) nec V<e( e is a noetic event
V!x( iy( )z[x is 9enthinking y] characterizes e )
iff x is a subject of e ))
I also assume that every noetic event has at most one
subject
:
(A13) nec Ve( e is a noetic event VxVy(( x is a
subject of e & y is a subject of e ) -» x = y )
)
Against this it might be suggested that there are
conjunctive events satisfying the definiens of (D13), and
that some of these should be said to have more than one
subject. So, for example, for two noetic events, one an
event, say, of Moe’s thinking that Curly is an ignoramus,
the other of Larry’s thinking that Curly is an ignoramus,
perhaps there is a single event that conjoins these two.
Let "T " denote the thought that Curly is an ignoramus, "L*"
denote the event of Larry’s thinking T c , and M denote the
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event of Moe s thinking T
c . And let us suppose that there
is an event that conjoins L* and M*
,
call it " LM* " . Perhaps
it should be claimed of LM* that it has both Moe and Larry
as its subjects. Then don’t we have in this case a noetic
event with more than one subject?
I am inclined to think not, for I am inclined to think
that LM is not a noetic event—that there isn’t any x (in
particular, neither Moe nor Larry) nor any y (in particular,
not T
c ) such that LM* is an event character i zed by x’s
genthinking y. Here is why: L* itself is surely not
characterized by any property that, for some thought, y, is
the property of being such that Moe is genthinking y.
Provided that Moe is not Larry (they were the three stooges
after all), L is not an event of Moe ’
s
thinking y, for any
y. Then it is a consequence of (All) that the conjunctive
event, LM
,
is not characterized by any such property. And
parallel reasoning suggests that there is also no y such
that the property of being such that Larry is genthinking y
characterizes LM*. And I take it that if this event
conjoining solely L* and M* isn’t character i zed by
properties of either of these two sorts, then there is no x
and y at all such that )<z[x is
genthinking y] characterizes
LM*. If no thinking on Moe ’ s part alone characterizes that
conjunctive event, and no thinking on Larry’s part alone
does so either, then there is no person such that thinking
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on his or her part characterizes LM*
. If this is right,
then by (D13), LM* is not a noetic event.
From here on, I shall suppose it safe to speak of the
subject of any noetic event--(A12) guarantees it at least
one subject; (A13) guarantees it a unique one. 9
( D 1 3 ) also guarantees that every noetic event, e, may
be associated with at least one thought, y, such that for
some x the property of x’s genthinking y characterizes e.
What can we say of this association? For one thing, it is
doubtful that for every noetic event, there is a unique
thought with which it is associated in this way. This is
doubtful in view of considerations of the sort raised in
Chapter 4 that lead to the Plurality of Thoughts Argument
(PTA) and its analogues. Suppose that I am thinking that
politicians lie and cheat. Argument 1 purports to show that
supposing just this, it follows that there are at least two
things that I am thinking. Indeed the line of argument
suggests three thoughts in particular that I may be said to
be having: i) the thought that politicians lie and cheat,
ii) the thought that they lie, and iii) the thought that
they cheat. But must we hold that in such circumstances
there are three corresponding events of thinking? I don’t
have an argument against this contention, but in the absence
of any argument in its favor , it seems plausible to allow,
rather, that it is at least possible that I may be thinking
that politicians lie and cheat and only be engaged in one
event of thinking.
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But (DIST) (the distribution rule employed in Argument
1; see Chapter 4, p.36) will still yield the result that I
may be said not only to be thinking that politicians lie and
cheat but also to be thinking that politicians lie, and to
be thinking that politicians cheat. If all three of these
ascriptions are indeed true relative to the imagined
circumstance in which I am engaging in only one noetic
event, then I take it that this one event of thinking may be
character i zed as an event of my thinking that politicians
lie and cheat, as an event of my thinking that politicians
lie, and as an event of my thinking that politicians cheat.
Then there would be three thoughts associated with a single
noetic event in the manner in question. Since I am somewhat
inclined to think that such cases are possible, I do not
propose to accept:
(8) nec Vte( e is a noetic event -» VyVy’( )tz[x isgenthinking y’] characterizes e) y’ = y )
There are certain essential character i sti cs of noetic
events that are worth noting here. In general, no matter
what sort of event is at issue, I assume the subjects of
events to be essential to them. Consequently, in the case
of noetic events, I suppose that if a person is the subject
of such an event, the event is essentially such that that
person is its subject:
( A 1 4
)
nec Ve( e is a noetic event -» x is the
subject of e & nec( e exists —> x is the subject
of e )
)
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I assume, further, that noetic events are essentially events
of thinking, each an event of a person doing some thinking.
We may indicate that an intransitive reading is called for
by affixing an * i* subscript to a verb. Then what I propose
to accept is:
( A 1 5 ) nec Ve( e is a noetic event nec( e exists -»
)<z[the subject of e is thinking^] character i zes e ))
However, it is another matter whether a noetic event is
essentially an event of someone thinking something ! More
specifically, it is not clear to me that every noetic event,
e, is essentially such that for some x and y, e is an event
of x’s genthinking y:
(9) nec Vfe( e is a noetic event -> nec( e exists
)cz[x is genthinking y] character i zes e )))
The sorts of considerations that lead me to question (9)
have to do with cases of another sort alluded to in Chapter
4. At one point in section 4.2, I was concerned to give
some idea of the grounds I had for doubting whether the
following rule is valid:
x is thinking^
: : }y{ x is thinking t y )
(where the ' t ’ subscript indicates a transitive reading). I
described a case (pp.9-10, 4.2) that had to do with an
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antique furniture connoisseur, Max, who was having a very
vivid hallucination of an 1870’s vintage Chippendale chair.
Now imagine a somewhat different situation: suppose that
the circumstances in which Max finds himself really are as
he mistakenly took them to be in the original case of
hallucination. In other words, imagine that Max really is
looking at an 18th century Chippendale and is thinking,
concerning that chair, that it is a mint-condition
Chippendale. The "text" of his thinking, so to speak, may
be precisely the same as that in the original case of
hallucination. With respect to at least some cases fitting
the present description, however, it is clearly correct to
say that Max is thinking something. Indeed he is thinking a
thing expressed by the sentence
That is a mint-condition, late 70’s Chippendale
(with respect to suitable contexts). Let us call this
thought that Max is having, "Tm
"
. I think it is intuitively
plausible to suppose that there is a particular mental event
in which Max is engaging in this situation, an event that we
are referring to if, speaking of this situation, we were to
speak of "the event of Max’s thinking Tm " . And concerning
this event, it is simply not clear to me whether or not we
should say that i_t— that very event--can possibly occur in
circumstances of the sort originally described, where Max is
only having an hallucination of a chair, where there isn’t
anything that Max is thinking at all. Couldn’t this very
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event be the one we would be reporting in such circumstances
were we to say:
Max is thinking: that is a mint-condition late
70 ’s Chippendale
If this is a possibility, then it would be a case in which
an event of a person’s thinking something—Max’s thinking
T
m Possibly such that it occurs without there being
anything that the subject is thinking.
One might be tempted here to respond that if the event
we’re speaking of in the non-hal 1 uci natory case is really
one properly described as an event of Max’s thinking T
then surely for that very event to occur is for Max to be
thinking Tm . Surely, one might say, the event, Max’s
thinking Tm , is necessarily such that if it occurs, Max is
thinking Tm . However, I can see no non-question-begging
grounds for supporting this contention. The event, by
hypothesis, is one in fact character i zed by the property of
being such that Max is thinking Tm . Can we infer from this
much that the event is necessarily such that if it occurs,
Max is thinking Tm? I do not know.
10
Considerations along these lines are what lead me to
suspend judgement on two claims formulated in the preceding
subsection. There is the matter of whether, if a property
characterizes an event, that event is essentially
character i zed by the property—of whether we should accept
the thesis formulated in (7). Also there is the matter of
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whether a property, P, that characterizes an event is
necessarily such that if the event occurs, the subject of
the event has P (in cases where the event has unique
subjects) of whether we should accept the thesis formulated
in (4). Since (4) can be derived from (7) (in the presence
of some assumptions that I have made or am willing to make),
to show that this case concerning Max’s thinking T
m
undermines both claims, it will suffice to see that it calls
into question the claim expressed by (4). So note that the
following is a consequence of (4):
( 4 ’ ) nec >z[9enthinking(Max,T
m )] character i zes e
nec( e occurs -> Max has )z
[
genthi nki ng ( Max ,
T
m ) ] )
)
But if the case described above is indeed possible, then it
is possible that there be an event of Max’s genthinking T
m
(i.e., characteri zed by the property of being such that Max
is genthinking Tm ) that is possibly such that it occurs,
though its subject, Max, is not thinking Tm or any other
thought. If such a case is indeed a possibility, then (4’),
and consequently (4) and (7), do not express truths.
I have noted that, in light of (D13), every noetic
event may be associated with at least one thought: any
thought, y, such that the event is one of x’s thinking y,
for some person x. My hunch is that if one is not committed
to the view that each thought associated this way with a
noetic event, e, is one of the objects of e— if one does not
presume that the thought is as much a constituent of the
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activity of which e consists as is the subject of e— then
one will be less inclined to suppose that e is essentially
associated in the way in question with each such thought.
On the view I am proposing, thoughts are not objects, nor
constituents of any other sort, of events of thinking. In
section 9.5, I shall address the question of what sort of
things do occupy the role of object in noetic events.
In passing it is worth noting that the putative
possibility that leads me to question (4), (7) and (9), does
not undermine (A15). For I assume that whether Max is
hallucinating or not, if it is correct to say "Max is
thinking: That is a mint-condition, late 70’s Chippendale ",
then Max is doing some thinking— he is thinking^.
I shall make one further assumption concerning noetic
events before proceeding. Nothing in what has been
explicitly assumed so far guarantees a certain connection
that exists between a person’s 9enthinking a thing, and the
occurrence of a noetic event character i zed by that person’s
9enthinking that thing:
( A 1 6 ) nec VxVy( x is genthinking y -»
}e{ \z[x is 9en thi nki ng y] character i zes e &
'
x is engaging in e )
)
The assumption implies that if a person may be said to be
9en thi nki ng something, then there is a noetic event that is
occurring and has that person as subject. A related thesis
may be put
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( 10 ) nec Vfe( e is a noetic event -> x is engaging
in e -> x is 9 nthinking y ).
(10) follows from (A10), (A12) and (A13).
9.2.4 Types and Instances
There is a distinction commonly drawn in philosophy
between concrete, particular events, and items that are
sometimes spoken of as "event types". Perhaps the same
distinction is intended when philosophers have spoken of
distinguishing concrete events from generic events. I’m not
sure. At any rate, for the moment I shall assume that the
reader is familiar enough with the concept of a type. On my
usage, ’type’, ’sort’ and 'kind’ are all more-or-less
interchangeable expressions that apply to the same bunch of
things. I am not sure of the precise features of our
ordinary concept of a type. In the present study I propose
to adopt a somewhat regimented notion, and I shall be
restricting my attention to types of event, and a rather
select group of such types, at that. A little later on, I
shall have more to say about what sort of thing I understand
'types’ (and specifically, 'event types’), to refer to, in
this regimented sense.
Types of event may be said to have particular events as
their instances just as types of tiger may be said to have
particular tigers as their instances. I take this relation
of instantiation as a primitive. On the usage I propose,
only types are possibly instantiated. So I am assuming:
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( A 1 7 ) nec Vx ( pos Jy{ y instantiates x ) -» x is a type)
I do not suppose that all types of events have
instances. Also, I do not suppose that among event types
that do have instances, their instances all occur; I am
prepared to allow that there are some types none of whose
instances in fact have occurred or ever will occur.
Furthermore, I do not assume that events instantiate their
types essentially— if an event happens in fact to be an
instance of a given type, I do not take it to follow from
this that wherever it exists (nor even wherever it occurs)
it instantiates that type. Thus I do not accept any of the
following (here and in what follows, I use T-variables to
range exclusively over event types):
(11) nec VT( pos fe( e instantiates T ))
(12) nec VbVT( e instantiates T —» e has occurred or
will occur )
(13) nec VeVT( e instantiates T -» nec( e exists -» e
i nstant i ates T ) ) ,
9.2.5 Noetic Event Types
I assume that among all the various types of event,
some are types of noetic event. I’m afraid that again I
cannot offer any useful set of necessary and sufficient
conditions for what I shall mean when I speak here of
"noetic event types". I assume that noetic event types can
only be instantiated by noetic events:
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( A 1 8 ) nec VT( T is a noetic event type —» nec Ve( einstantiates T -> e is a noetic event ))
I also suppose that among the things that I would count as
event types at all, any that are instantiable and can only
be instantiated by noetic events are noetic event types:
( A 1 9
)
nec VT (
(
pos Jy( y instantiates T ) & nec Vy ’ ( y’instantiates T -» y’ is a noetic event )) T is
a noetic event type )
But informative, necessary and jointly sufficient conditions
elude me. The problem is that on the conception of types to
be proposed below, there are many event types that are not
possibly instantiated that I would not wish to count as
types of noetic event. So the condition expressed in the
consequent of (A18) is not sufficient. On the other hand I
do not wish to rule out that there are noetic event types
that are themselves uni nstanti able
. Consequently, the
condition expressed in the antecedent of (A19) is not
necessary. I can offer some examples of instantiable noetic
event types, and I shall have to hope that this serves to
convey the idea.
I assume that among noetic events, some are events of
persons occurrently believing that politicians lie and
cheat, some are events of persons imperatively wishing that
Sarah would say "yes" (for some given Sarah), and others are
events of persons wondering whether Jones will arrive on
time (for some given Jones). And I assume that in each of
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these cases, the noetic events of which we speak instantiate
a noetic event type: there is, for example, a type
necessarily such that it is instantiated by all and only
occurrent believings that politicians lie and cheat, a type
of imperative wishings, necessarily such that it is
instantiated by all and only imperative wishings that Sarah
would say "yes", and so on. In each of these cases, an
i nstant i able noetic event type is in question: a type of
event that is possibly instantiated and is necessarily such
that, for some thought, x, any events instantiating that
type are events of persons 9enthinking x.
Let us say that an event type is a "^correlate" of a
thought, according to the following:
( D 1 4 ) T is a correlate of x =df T is a noetic event
type & nec Ve( e instantiates T iff
iy( )z[y is 9 nthinking x] characterizes e ))
Roughly, a correlate of a thought, x, is a noetic event
type necessarily such that all and only events instantiating
it are events of persons 9enthinking x.
I assume that there are noetic event types and thoughts
related in this way. Take for example, a type suggested
above--one necessarily such that it is instantiated by
exactly those events of persons occurrently believing that
politicians lie and cheat. I take it that any such noetic
event type is a correlate of the thought, call it T p -| c >
that politicians lie and cheat. Relative to any possible
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situation, any instance of such a type will be an event
satisfying the following (for 'e’):
iy( )z[y is 9en th inking T plc ] characterizes e )
I do not assume that for every noetic event type there
is a thought of which it is a *cor rel ate . On the conception
of types to be proposed below, I will not wish to rule out
that there are disjunctive event types, instantiated as well
by events of 9enthinking x and by events of 9enthinking y,
for distinct thoughts, x and y. If we must admit such
types, then I would be inclined to hold that some of them
are noetic event types. But we couldn’t say, of any such
noetic event type, T, that there is any thought such that an
event instantiates T i f
f
the event is one of a person’s
thinking that thought. Then such a type is not a correlate
of any thought. So I shall not assume
(14) nec VT ( T is a noetic event type fx( T is a
correl ate of x ) )
However, I do propose to assume that for every thought,
$
there is a correlate:
( A20
)
nec Vx( x is a thought -» ( T is a ^correlate
of x )
)
This is a very substantial assumption, and the conception of
thoughts that I shall be laying out in the next sections
hinges on it.
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Actually, on the conception of types to be proposed
below, it is not plausible to suppose that every thought has
some unique type ^correlated with it. However, I have not
been able to envision any case concerning which it would be
intuitively plausible to say that there are several thoughts
sharing a correlate, apart, perhaps, from vacuous cases
where the type is uni nstanti abl e
.
1
1
If there were any non-
vacuous cases, they would be ones in which some single
noetic event type (that can be instantiated) is necessarily
such that it is instantiated by all and on!
y
events of
thinking x, and at the same time necessarily such that it is
instantiated by all and onl
y
events of thinking y, where x
and y are distinct thoughts. Then there would have to be
two thoughts such that all events of thinking the one were
events of thinking the other and vice-versa . I do not say
that this is impossible. But I have not been able to
imagine such a case.
With the foregoing concepts and assumptions addressed,
let us turn to the matter of which category of entities it
is that thoughts are supposed to comprise, according to the
alternative to the Propositional Tradition that I wish to
consider
.
9.2.6 A General Category for Thoughts
According to the alternative I wish to consider, the
things we refer to when we speak of thoughts in the
shareable sense of that term just are noetic event types.
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In particular, every thought is identical to one of its
$
correl ates
.
Let us say that a person is an "instancer" of a type of
event, according to:
( D15 ) x is an instancer of T =df x is engaging in an
instance of T
An instancer of an event type, then, is a subject of an
occurring event that instantiates that type. It may be
noted that if a noetic event type is *correl ated with a
thought, a person will be an instancer of that type iff he
or she is 9enthinking that thought: 12
(15) VxVT( T is correlated with x -> nec Vy( y is an
instancer of T iff y is 9enthinking x )
Let us adopt:
(D16) x is an instancer of T =df x is an instancer of
*
T & Jy( T is correlated with y )
The relation defined here is just the "instancer" relation
with its range restricted to types that are *cor rel ates . In
light of (15), it can be seen that this relation and the
attitude of 9enthinking require one another (the notion of
requirement is defined in (D6), Chapter 4, p.30):
(16) i) nec VxVy nec( x is an instancer of y -» Jy ’ ( x is9enthinking y* )), and
ii) nec VxVy nec( x is 9enthinking y -> }y ’ ( x is an
i nstancer of y ’ )
)
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Indeed the two relations are more closely linked than this.
Necessarily, any two persons are 9enthinking something in
common iff they are both instancer*s of a common "correlate
(17) nec Vx Vy ( iz{ x and y are genthinking z ) iff
x and y are instancer s of z )
)
There is then a close connection between these two
rel ations
.
A parallel closeness exists between the attitude of
occurrent belief and the relation, let us call it "R",
def i ned
R(x,y) =df x is occurrently believing something
with content y
Then the following expresses a truth:
(18) nec VxVy ( lz{ x and y are occurrently believing
z ) iff lz{ R ( x , z ) and R(y,z) ))
It was upon having noted this equivalence in the case of
belief, that the R*SS*LL in my fable from the preceding
section was led to make what I called "R*SS*LL’s step", that
led him and his followers to equate the things "judged" with
the items in the modal range of R. The step may be seen as
that of moving from what is formulated in (18) to the
stronger thesis expressed by:
(19) nec V)<Vy( x is occurrently believing y iff R(x,y) )
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A similar move is made on the alternative view of
thoughts we are about to consider. But on this view,
thoughts generally (and things occurrently believe, in
particular) are not equated with contents. Rather, the view
holds that there is a distinguished subset of -correl ates
such that, with their modal ranges restricted to that
subset, the instancer relation is equivalent to genthinking.
The step made on this view, then, is that from the thesis
formulated in (17), to the stronger claim, that there is a
distinguished subset of ^correlates, each member of which
satisfies (for 'x’):
(20) nec Vy( y is an instancer of x iff y isgenthinking x )
Then what you’re genthinking .just is one of these
distinguished ^correlates of which you are an instancer.
That, at any rate, is a consequence of the view we are about
to consider.
There are, however, many noetic event types that are
not counted as thoughts, according to the view I propose.
And I suggested above that on the development of the view I
am about to undertake, it will be plausible to think that
for each thought, there are many *correl ates . Plainly only
one can be identified with the thought. In the following
section, I propose to provide a somewhat fuller account of
what I mean by "type of event". Then, within this fuller
account, I wish to give a more precise specification of
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certain classes of noetic event types that I take to be
thoughts. In section 9.4, I shall turn to the task of
explaining what motivation there is for at least considering
the unorthodox proposal that such things are thoughts.
9 • 3 Some Details of the New Proposal
9-3.1 A Review of Where Things Stand
For convenience, let me use the labels, "OB", "IW" and
"WN" for the modal ranges of occurrent belief, imperative
wishing and occurrent wondering, respectively. So OB
contains all and only occurrent beliefs, IW contains all and
only imperative wishes (wishes in the modal range of
imperative wishing) and WN includes all and only questions.
We have seen that if the considerations raised in Chapter 8
are accepted, then things other than propositions must be
identified as the items making up IW and WN . Let me briefly
discuss a couple of ways that this can be accomplished, but
that I do not consider attractive.
i) We could retain one of the standard conceptions of
propositions as an account of the nature of occurrent
beliefs—taking them to be, say, sets of worlds, or
Russellian complexes, and suppose that imperative wishes and
questions fall under some other genus of thing (or perhaps
under separate genera).
But this is not intuitively appealing. Better to have
new accounts for proposi ti ons/occurrent beliefs as well;
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accounts according to which there is some category that can
be seen to subsume all of OB, IW and WN (some genus a little
narrower though, than say, that of entities or exi stents
. a
genus including all but only thoughts).
ii) Since the items in each of OB, IW and WN are
distinguished from the members of either of the other two
sets according to the attitudes one may bear to them, we
could artificially concoct a species of thing that would at
least serve to represent each of these species of thoughts.
For example, we could use the three attitudes themselves as
tags or indices, taking thoughts to be ordered pairs of
attitude and content, where the content is understood to be
a thing of the sort that the standard view equates with
propositions. So, for example, if we took contents to be
sets of worlds, we would have it that thoughts could be
represented by pairs of attitude and set of worlds, the
attitude in a given pair serving as an index marking what
species of thought the represented thought belongs to. In
particular, we could have the following sorts of pairs, all
with sets of worlds as their second members:
a. proposi t i ons/occur rent beliefs represented by pairs,
each with the attitude of occurrent belief as first
member
,
b. imperative wishes represented by pairs, each having
as its first member the attitude of imperative wishing,
c. questions represented by pairs, each with the
attitude of occurrent wondering as its first member.
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But this representation is not very natural. Having
such a concocted variety of object serving to represent
thoughts, we will not be in much of a position to predict
any further features that thoughts have by appeal to any
features that the representati ves are known to have.
Noetic event types, I believe, are items that display
the very features that we would be seeking to represent by
employing the artificial representat i on afforded by taking
thoughts to be ordered pairs of attitude and content. I
assume that types of occurrent believings, wishings, and
wonderings make up pairwise disjoint groups. So we have, in
effect, a distinction according to attitude. And within any
of these groups, say among types of wishings, types will be
further distinguished from one another according to content:
wishing that Jones would arrive on time is one type of
wishing, wishing that Sarah would say "yes" is another type.
The two types are distinguished by what circumstance it is
that is being wished to be the case when events of either
one or the other type occur. In effect, then, we have a
distinction according to content.
The account to follow is restricted to the case of
occurrent beliefs (members of OB), imperative wishes
(members of IW), and questions (members of WN ) , and it will
not be a complete account even for the thoughts in these
select groups. No informative set of necessary and jointly
sufficient conditions will be provided for a thing s be i
n
g—
a
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thought
,
nor even for a thing’s being an occurrent belief,
imperative wish or question. But I think the account to be
offered covers enough cases that it will serve to illustrate
the leading ideas of the approach.
I shall begin by explaining what I take types to be.
9.3.2 T ypes
The concept of type that I intend when I propose that
there are types of noetic event, and that thoughts are such
things, is a familiar one. We commonly speak of types of
dances, types of tigers, types of people, and I assume that
there is a single concept of type involved in such talk. I
do not claim that it is a thoroughly clear notion. And what
I wish to do presently is suggest a somewhat regimented
conception that one gets by adopting a certain account of
the nature of types. It may be that some other way of
accounting for our ordinary notion of type would be
philosophically preferable. But I would hope that any
acceptable account would serve our purposes here well
enough, though I can’t be sure of this. The conception
afforded by the following account does serve our purposes
wel 1 enough
.
I take types to be properties. More specifically, when
we speak of types of cns
,
for common noun, cn (types of
dances, types of tigers, types of people), I am supposing
that we are speaking of properties of a sort to be had by
cns (of a sort to be had by dances, tigers, people), and
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that the relation of instantiation that I have taken as a
primitive is just the relation of exemplification
(restricted to those properties that are types).
The contention from the previous section was that
thoughts are certain types of noetic event. On the view of
types I am now suggesting, this contention amounts to the
claim that thoughts are certain properties of noetic events.
Before proceeding to give an idea of which properties I
count as thoughts, let me say a little more, in a general
way, about what I am not going to be assuming, given this
conception of types as properties.
I don’t suppose that just any property had, say, by
tigers, is a type of tiger. For example, presumably no
property, T, should count as a type of tiger if it is
possibly exemplified but also such that for any x that
exemplifies it, necessarily x and x alone exemplifies it.
In general, then, I think it would be plausible to suppose
(21) nec VP( P is a type nec Vx( x has P -»
pos Jy ( y has P & y i x )))
We may wish to grant that there are types that are possibly
or perhaps are in fact uniquely instantiated, but if a
property is to count as a type it should be possible that
more than one thing instantiate it. Some properties are
distinguished from others by the fact that they are possibly
exemplified. But I have not assumed that types are possibly
instantiated, so I shall not assume
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( 22 ) nec VP( P is a type -» pos fx( x has P ))
Some properties are such that anything that has them has
them essentially, but I have proposed not to assume that
types of events are essentially instantiated by the events
that in fact instantiate them. Finally, then, I am not
going to assume:
(23) nec VPV6< ( P is a type & x has P -» nec( x exists
x has P )
)
9.3.3 Attributing, Prescribing and Querying
I will focus attention on a certain group of occurrent
believings, imperative wishings, and wonderings, and some of
their properties. But to get at which occurrent believings,
imperative wishings, and wonderings will be at issue, and
which of their properties I wish to attend to, I am going to
begin by confining attention to the case of occurrent
belief.
I assume that there are noetic events each of which may
be said to be one of a person’s attributing a property to an
object. In ordinary language we count events of a very wide
variety as attr i buti ngs ; acts of asserting, in particular,
may properly be said to be attr i but i ngs . But among noetic
events, I claim, any event of attributing i_s an occurrent
believing. These, in turn, are the occurrent believings to
which I mean to attend. A paradigm case of the occurrent
believings I have in mind are ones that might be termed,
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"directly referential" occurrent believings or attr i buti ngs
:
noetic events correctly reported by ascriptions of the form
(FI) t is thinking: t* is 0
where substituends of ' t* ’ are directly referential terms,
and the displayed sentences express things that are true or
false ( wrt the appropriate context). Or to get at the same
sort of events another way: the events in question are ones
such that in virtue of their occurrence, the subjects of the
events may be said to be having occurrent beliefs accurately
expressed by sentences of the form:
( F2 ) t* is 0
where again, substituends of * t* ’ are directly referential
terms, and the instances express things that are true or
false (wrt an appropriate context). Concerning such cases,
the assumption is that the occurrent believing j_s an
attributing of a property to an object: the property
attributed is the one expressed by the relevant substituend
of 'is 0 ' , and the item to which this property is being
attributed is the thing denoted by the relevant substituend
of *t*’. I think the sort of events at issue could be
broadened by including as well any occurrent believing that
could be viewed as an attributing of a property to severa l
things, or as an attributing of a relation to objects in a
sequence . However, I shall confine attention here to cases
of attributing properties to single objects.
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As an example, consider an event that we might report
by saying "O’Brien is thinking: Jones will arrive on time."
This event of occurrent believing, on the present
assumption, is an event of O’Brien’s attributing the
property of arriving on time to Jones. If William is
thinking: You will not say "yes”, meaning Sarah by 'you’,
then the present view has William engaged in an event of his
attributing a property— being an x such that x will not say
"yes"— to Sarah.
I take the property attributed to be the ob.iect of the
event of attributing, and I shall speak of the thing to
which the property is attributed as the " indirect object " of
the event. Since, on the present proposal, occurrent
believings just are (a certain subset of attr i buti ngs ) and
occurrent believings are events of genthinking, we have the
result that events of genthinking may have objects and
indirect objects. But the object of such a thinking is a
property; it will not be an item of the sort ordinarily
intended by the philosophical usage of 'object of thought’.
That’s why I proposed not to use "object of thought” as a
technical term for thoughts here. The usage encourages the
idea that thoughts are being taken to be objects of
th i nk i ngs , which I believe is in general false.
Now I propose to do in the case of imperative wishings
and wonderings, what I have done above in the case of
occurrent believings. I shall assume that certain
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imperative wishings are events of a person’s bearing a
particular relation to a property, P, and some item, x, in
virtue of bearing which relation, the person may be said to
be imperatively wishing that x have P. Similarly for
wonderings: I assume that certain wonderings may be said to
be events of a persons bearing a particular relation to a
property, P, and some item, x, in virtue of bearing which
relation, the person may be said to be wondering whether x
has P. So far as I know, there are no verbs in English
expressing the relations that I am proposing that we
acknowledge— no verbs that (so to speak) are to either
’wishes’ or 'wonders’ as 'attributes’ is to 'occurrently
believes’. But I assume that there are such relations; I
propose to use the following locutions to express them:
x prescribes P for y
x queries P of y
I am assuming then that there are imperative wishings
that are prescribings of properties for things, and that
there are wonderings that are queryings of properties of
things. I shall suppose that prescribings and queryings may
be said to have objects and indirect objects in exactly the
same sense that attributings may be said to. The object of
an event of prescribing (querying) is the property
prescribed (queried) and the indirect object of a
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prescribing (querying) is the thing to which the object is
prescribed (queried).
9.3.4 Some Formalities
I shall suppose that being an attributing , being a
prescr i bi ng , and being a querying are properties of noetic
events. And I shall suppose that for any property, P, and
any sort of item, x, the following are also properties of
noetic events: being an event having P as its object and
being an event having x as its indirect object . To express
such properties in formulations to come, I propose to use
the following predicates:
a. 'ATTRIBe’ for 'e is an attributing’
b. ’PRESCRBe’ for 'e is a prescribing’
c. 'QUERYe’ for 'e is a querying’
d. 'OBJ(e,P)’ for 'P is the object of e’
e. ' i ndOBJ ( e , x ) ’ for 'x is the indirect object of e’
Then we may employ ^-expressions of the following forms; I
shall take them to be terms designating the properties of
noetic events cited above:
a. )e[ ATTRIBe ], b. )e[ PRESCRBe ], c. )e[ QUERYe ],
d. )e[ OBJ (e , 0 ) ], e. )e[ indOBJ(e,t) ].
where substituends of ' 0' are singular terms for properties,
and substituends for 't’ are any singular terms.
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I assume that there are conjunctive properties uniquely
related to other properties— thei r conjuncts— by a relation
of conjunction, and I assume that any bunch of properties
has a unique conjunction. Also, if the )-expressi ons
,
^v [#1 ] , . . . ,^v[0n ] , denote the properties, P
p
respectively, then I shall suppose that
[ )v[ 0y & ... & 0n ] ]
denotes the conjunction of P P.
Then, for any property, P and object, x, there is a
unique conjunction of the following three properties:
)te [ ATTRIBe ], ^e[ OBJ(e,P) ], ^e[ indOBJ(e,x) ]
Likewise, for any property, P, and object, x, there is a
unique conjunction of each of the following two trios of
properti es
:
i) )te[ PRESCRBe ], ^e[ OBJ(e,P) ], ^e[ indOBJ(e,x) ]
ii) ^e[ QUERYe ], ^e[ OBJ(e,P) ], ^e[ indOBJ(e,x) ]
I assume that the three conjunctive properties of events at
issue here are noetic event types. Then we may put the
following as existence axioms:
a
.
VPVxJ\T( T =
i ndOBJ ( e , x
)
)e[
] )
ATTRIBe & OBJ ( e , P ) &
b. VPVx^!T( T = )e[ PRESCRBe & OBJ ( e , P ) &
i ndOBJ ( e , x ] )
c VPVxi'.K T = \e[ QUERYe & OBJ ( e , P ) &
i ndOBJ ( e , x ] )
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9.3.5 The Proposal
According to the account I am proposing, any type
obtained directly from (A21) a. - c. is a thought. In
particular, the thoughts obtained from a. - c., for any
given P and x, are (respectively) an occurrent belief
(member of OB), an imperative wish (member of WS) and a
question (member of WN ) . Thus, the account proposes the
following as sufficient conditions for being an occurrent
belief, an imperative wish, or a question:
Thesis 4 nec VPVxVT
a. if T
= ^e [ ATTRIBe & OBJ(e,P) & indOBJ(e.x) ] ),
then T is an occurrent belief;
b. if T
= )<e[ PRESCRBe & OBJ(e,P) & indOBJ(e,x) ] ),
then T is an imperative wish, and
c. if T
= )te[ QUERYe & OB J ( e , P ) & indOBJ(e,x) ] ),
then T is a question.
Intuitively, the thoughts identified in each clause, for
given P and x, are the occurrent belief that x has P, the
imperative wish that x have P, and the question whether x
has P, respectively. If I am occurrently believing that
Sarah is saying "yes", and William is occurrently believing
this too, then William and I have a thought in common.
According to the present account, this is equivalent to
saying that there is a noetic event type of which both you
and I are instancers. And indeed we are both instancers of
a common type in these circumstances: we are both
attributing the property of saying "yes", and we are both
attributing that property to Sarah. Hence we are both
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instancers of the type:
\e[ ATTRIBe & OBJ(e,\x[ x is saying "yes" ]) &
i ndOBJ ( e , Sarah ) ]
According to the present account, this noetic event type
ju st i_s a thought that we have in common.
The starting question of the present study may be put
in various ways: What sort of things are we referring to
when we speak of what a person is thinking? What sort of
item is it that comprises the modal range of the relation
expressed on their relational reading, by progressive forms
of 'think’? What are the "objects" of thinking? The answer
that is proposed above--that the things in question are
types of events of thinking--is certainly unorthodox. But
the proposal finds some support in the case of other verbs.
The fact is that there are other event verbs that admit
complements that are plausibly understood as designating
types of events of the very sorts to which those verbs
apply.
9 . 4 Precedent for Types as "Objects" of Event Verbs
9.4.1 Cases Where Complements do not Apply to Constituents
I believe that there are many examples of event verbs
in English each of which, V, has a relational reading, r,
with the following property: there are sentences each one
of which, 0 , is such that i) 0 has V as its main verb and a
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referring term (or a quantifier phrase), t, as a complement
of V, and ii) on any of the i nterpretations of 0 involving
r, if 0 expresses a truth, it reports an event, but iii) a
reading of t involved in at least some of these
i nterpretat i ons of 0 , is one on which the term is not
plausibly seen as designating (or ranging over) constituents
of events reported by 0 on those interpretations. This is a
complicated relationship; so let me try to convey the idea
by way of some examples.
The verb 'dance’ is a case in point that I have alluded
to before. The verb has a transitive reading displayed in
the following sentence:
(24) Jones is dancing a tango.
Let us suppose that there is presently an event occurring
that is reported by this sentence, that the Jones denoted
by the subject term is actually dancing a tango. The
complement of (24) does not range over any objects of the
event reported by the sentence. The event reported by (24)
is a particular instance of dancing on Jones’ part. The
event has no constituent in the role of object; at least
that is what I am inclined to say about such an event. If
what I’m inclined to say here is right, then whatever items
are in the range of the quantifier phrase 'a tango’ are not
objects of that event.
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Similar remarks apply to the reading of the verb 'run’
called for by its occurrence in
(25) William ran the 60th Boston Marathon.
Again, a reading is called for on which available
complements— the complement appearing here in (25) is one
example of many— do not refer to constituents of the events
reported. As in the case of dancings of tangos, I’m
inclined to say that instances of running the 60th Boston
Marathon are not events that have constituents in the role
of object. But in any case, surely 'the 60th Boston
Marathon’ denotes no such constituent of these events.
The two cases just considered are instances of a
phenomenon that is very common— it is not restricted to
verbs that apply just to events lacking object constituents.
The verbs, 'hit’ and 'serve’, for instance, both have
readings that afford further examples, though the events we
refer to when we speak of "hittings" and "servings", in the
relevant sense, are events that do, intuitively, involve
constituents in the role of object.
Here is a such a case; consider:
(26a) Sarah served an ace.
Assume that this sentence reports an event, and suppose that
the reported event has taken place in a tennis match. I
assume that the event in question is a fairly complex bit of
activity involving Sarah’s hitting a tennis ball in such a
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way that it clears the net, hits the appropriate portion of
the court on the side opposite Sarah, and is not returned by
Sarah’s opponent.
The intuitive notion of a thing’s being a constituent
of an event does not apply clearly in all cases, and the
present example is one case where the application of this
concept is certainly not clear. What things should be said
to be constituents of services in a tennis match? I think
it is clear enough that such events have subjects— the
persons responsible for the activity, the servers. So Sarah
is one constituent of the event in question. On the loose
character i zati on of the role of object I offered in Chapter
1
--consti tuents that bear "the brunt" of the activity of
which the event consists--it would seem plausible enough to
say that the tennis ball that Sarah served was an object of
her service reported by (26a). But perhaps there are other
items that should be counted as constituents of services,
other constituents in the role of object.
At any rate, it does seem clear that events of serving
themse 1 ves should not be said to be constituents of events
of serving. But the complement in (26a), 'an ace’, ranges
over just such events. The ace Sarah served is precisely
the event reported by (26a). So there is a reading of the
verb 'serve’ on which it takes a complement not designating
(or ranging over) constituents of the events reported by
sentences calling for that reading.
381
It is worth contrasting the reading of 'serve’ called
for by (26a) with that called for by
(26b) Sarah served that tennis ball I spray-painted
purple.
Here, the reading called for is one on which it would be
plausible to say that the verb takes a complement
designating a constituent of the event reported.
And I suppose that remarks parallel to those just made
concerning the readings of 'serve’ as it figures in (26a)
and b) apply concerning the readings of 'hit’ that are most
plausible for the following pair:
(27a) Sarah hit a line-drive
(27b) Sarah hit a baseball.
In (27b), the verb calls for a reading on which it expresses
a relation between persons and constituents of hittings; in
(27a), the reading called for is one on which 'hit’
expresses a relation between persons and things that are not
constituents of hittings.
In sum, there seems to me to be a general pattern
displayed by certain event verbs on certain of their
readings: on those readings, the verbs take complements
that do not designate (or range over) constituents of the
events reported by sentences formed from those verbs.
Within the wide variety of cases conforming to this
general pattern, there are many cases where, it seems to me,
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the complements of the event verbs are plausibly seen as
designating types of the reported events. To see just how
common this particular phenomenon is, let me begin by noting
a certain ambiguity attaching to complements of a sort
commonly associated with the general pattern noted above.
9
- 4
- 2 An Ambiguity Attaching to Verbal Nouns
I wish to draw attention to a class of common nouns
having the following features: each noun, cn, is i) derived
from some event or action verb, V, and is such that ii) for
some singular term, t, and action or event verb V’ (perhaps
not V itself), the sentence,
[tv’ cns ]
is grammatical and, moreover, expresses a claim that is
possibly true (where cns is the plural of cn)
. I shall
refer to such terms as "verbal nouns"; the following are
examples: 'a hit’, 'a serve’, 'a run’, 'a dance’, 'a punch’,
'a hike’, 'a shot’, 'an experience’, 'a sensation’, 'a
feeling’, 'a sight’, 'a drink’. Often such nouns may be
used to refer to events; but there are exceptions. It is
not clear to me, for example, that 'a drink’ has a reading
on which it applies to events. The common noun 'a sight’
has no reading (that I know of) on which it applies, in
general, to events.
With most any verbal noun, vn
,
there is associated a
host of related nouns that apply to species of the sort of
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things to which vn itself applies; I have in mind,
generally, any noun, n, such that the following expresses a
truth
:
[ nec( any n is a(n) vn ) ]
Each of the following nouns is related in this way to a
verbal noun: 'lob’, 'top-spin’ (to 'shot’), 'line drive’,
'home run’ (to 'hit’), 'ace’, 'double-fault’ (to 'serve’),
'swing’, 'waltz’ (to 'dance’), 'left-hook’ 'right jab’ (to
punch ). So, for example, we have (on appropriate
read i ngs
)
nec( any lob is a shot ),
nec( any line-drive is a hit ),
nec( any ace is a serve ),
nec( any waltz is a dance ),
nec( any left hook is a punch ), etc.
Let us say that if a noun has a reading on which it is thus
related to a verbal noun, it is a subordinate of that noun,
on that reading. A verbal noun, it may be noted, is a
subordinate of itself. It may also be noted that some of
the examples of subordinates just given are themselves
verbal nouns; one can lob a lob, and waltz a waltz.
(Although in these cases one hesitates to say that the noun
is in any sense derived from the verb.)
There is a certain ambiguity attaching to verbal nouns
and their subordinates. To discuss the ambiguity, I propose
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to confine attention to such nouns, and their subordinates,
that have readings on which they stand for events. Let us
say that a common noun is an event noun just in case it is a
subordinate of some verbal noun, cn, on a reading such that,
on that reading, cn applies to events. Most of the examples
of verbal nouns and their subordinates that have been
considered as examples above are event nouns (though, as
noted, 'sight’ and perhaps 'drink’ are exceptions).
The ambiguity I wish to point out hinges on two sorts
of readings: the "concrete readings" and "type readings",
as I shall call them. Briefly, concrete readings of event
nouns are those on which the nouns apply to events--to
particular instances of activity. On their type readings,
such nouns apply to types of event. I am inclined to
believe that readings of both sorts attach to any event
1 3
noun
.
Take the case of the noun 'lob’. Singular terms formed
with this noun may be used to refer to particular events of
a sort that occur in tennis matches, typically when a player
is returning a shot the opponent has made from the net.
Consider,
"That lob was impossible to return."
With such a remark, we may well be speaking of a particular
event of lobbing a ball. Then we are using the common noun,
'lob’ on its concrete reading. Note that on this concrete
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reading, we cannot say that two persons have the same lob.
In fact, on its concrete reading we wouldn’t speak of a
person having a lob at all.
But there is a reading of the noun 'lob’ on which it i_s
correct to speak of a person having a lob, and to speak of
several persons having the same lob--a "shareable" reading,
so to speak, of the noun. "Old Hale" we might say, "had a
terrific lob, it had an incredible amount of spin and always
went to the far left-hand corner of his opponent’s court.
He could hit it from just about anywhere. It would touch
ground and take off like a bullet." Here we are not
speaking of any particular instance of lobbing; we are
referring to a type of lob that Old Hale had down pat. When
we say "That lob was impossible to return", if we are
speaking of the lob old Hale used to pull off, we are using
the noun 'lob’ on what I am calling its "type reading".
In a large number of cases, event nouns apply, on their
concrete readings, to events that are instances of the very
types to which those nouns apply, on their type readings.
Let me use subscripted prefixes to mark the concrete and
type readings ("c" and "t", respectively). Then
That lob was a perfect example of that lob
and
That punch was a perfect example of that punch
may be disambiguated as follows (and only as follows, if the
sentences are to be understood to express claims that are
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possi bl y true )
:
Th at
c
lob was a perfect example of that t lob.
That
c
punch was a perfect example of that tpunch.
If the claims expressed by these sentences are indeed true,
then in each case, the denotation of the first occurrence of
the noun phrase, with the c-prefix, is an instance of the
denotation of the second occurrence of that noun phrase,
with the t-prefix.
Though this relationship between the concrete and type
readings of event nouns holds in many cases, there are
exceptions: 'dance’ has a concrete reading, but on that
reading it does not stand for items that are instances of
the types for which it stands on its type reading (at least
not on its most familiar type reading). The cdance we went
to last night is not an example of the twist, the boogaloo,
the quickstep or any other ^dance.
Some event nouns have more than one concrete reading
each. The noun, 'run’ is an example. On one reading, 'a
run’ stands for a particular instance of a person (or
persons) running, as in
(28) Laurie and I went on a run last night, and didn’t
get back till after dark.
But 'run’ also has a reading, distinct, I believe, from the
one called for in (28), which is akin to the concrete
reading of 'dance’ discussed above. On this other reading,
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'a run’ applies to foot-races, to gatherings for the purpose
of foot-racing. In one sense, then, 'run’ applies to events
of one or more persons running; in another sense, it applies
to events that we might say include a bunch of runnings, but
may well include a lot of other instances of activity, such
as an official s signaling the runners to their mark,
another official ’s recording the time of each run (in the
first concrete sense), etc.
I think it is very clear that event nouns, generally,
have readings distinct from their concrete readings, those
that I have here been speaking of as the type readings of
the nouns. And I think it plausible at least that, as I
have proposed, the items to which event nouns apply on these
type readings are types of event (in this connection see
Carlson [1977]). A more thorough-going account of the
nature of events, and of types, before this proposal can be
carefully assessed. Nevertheless, we do have a rough,
familiar conception of types of event, just as we have a
rough, familiar conception of types of tiger, and it seems
to me plausible to hold that Old Hale’s lob j_s a type of lob
(of
c
1ob, I assume), on this rough, familiar conception.
And it seems to me that similar things could plausibly be
said about the items to which other event nouns apply on
their type readings. It seems not unreasonable to accept
this as a place to start, and then seek a precise account of
the nature of types that accommodates this beginning
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assumption. Ordinary parlance might also allow that Old
Hale’s lob is a way of lobbing, a manner of lobbing, a style
or sort or kind of lob (of
c
lob, I assume). But as I see
it, these are all ways of speaking of the same sort of
thing: of types of event.
9-4.3 Type-Matching Readings
Next I wish to draw attention to a class of readings of
event verbs; I shall refer to them as "type-matching
readings", according to:
(D17) r is a type-matching reading =df
i) r is a relational reading of an event
(or action) verb, V;
ii) V expresses a relation on r whose modal
range includes event types, and
iii) if a sentence formed from V with a
referential complement denoting one of
those event types, T, is true on an
interpretation involving r, then that
sentence, on that i nterpretati on
,
reports an instance of T.
Again, the idea is somewhat involved so I shall try to
convey the sort of readings in question by way of examples.
I believe there are a large number of event verbs in English
that admit type-matching readings.
Most of the verbs used in examples above--that take
their own verbal nouns and subordinates as complements— are
cases in point. We commonly speak, for example, of hitting
hits, dancing dances, serving serves, shooting shots, and
such like. Though the sentences, "he hit a hit", "she
danced a dance", "he served a serve"--sentences in which a
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verb is complemented by its own verbal noun— are certainly
not commonly uttered, I take them to be grammatically
acceptable and to express things that are at least possibly
true. Sentences formed from these verbs together with
subordinates of their verbal nouns certainly are
commonplace, plainly are grammatical, and these sentences,
in many cases, definitely express things that are at least
possibly true. The following are examples:
(29) Jones served an ace.
(30) Sarah hit an incredible
backspin serve.
1 oop
,
returning that
(31 ) William and Sarah danced a waltz
(32) Jones shot a jumper from
buzzer
.
the line, right at the
But if (29) - (32) express things that are possibly true,
and 'ace’, 'loop’, 'waltz’ and 'jumper’ are, on suitable
readings, subordinates of 'serve’, 'hit’, 'dance’ and
'shot’, respectively, then it follows that
(33) Jones served a serve
(34) Sarah hit a hit.
(35) William and Sarah danced a dance.
(36) Jones shot a shot.
express things that are possibly true as well. And even if
we wouldn’t be inclined to utter (33) - (36), nevertheless,
if we utter (29) - (32) I think it is correct to say that we
are speaking of a person serving a serve, of a person
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hitting a hit, of two people dancing a dance, and of a
person shooting shots.
Each of (29) - (36) may be so interpreted that their
complements are understood to range over types of the very
events that the sentences serve to report. I claim that the
readings of the verbs involved in such i nterpretati ons are
type-matching. Indeed, in all cases I have been able to
think of in which an event verb figures as main verb of a
sentence, and has a complement formed from an event noun
derived from it, or from a subordinate of such a noun, at
least one i nterpretati on of the sentence will be one
involving a type-matching reading of the main verb.
In many cases, interpretations of such sentences are
available involving either the concrete or the type reading
of the complement. So, for example, suppose that the
following sentence expresses a truth and reports an event:
(37) He hit that lob.
On its concrete reading, 'that lob’ denotes the event of
hitting reported. But it may be interpreted according to
its type reading, for it may be used to denote Old Hale’s
lob; Old Hale’s lob being a t lob exemplified whenever
someone hits a
c
lob that has just the right touches to it.
Sometimes, either the concrete or the type reading is
favored. Ordinarily, talk of hitting line drives does not
involve a type reading of 'line drive’. On the most natural
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interpretation of the following, for example,
(38) Ruth hit a line drive to center field.
’a line drive’ would presumably be understood to apply to
events of hitting. But a type reading can be discerned. if
Ruth had so refined his hitting of line drives that there
was a particular type that seemed worthy of note, one might
well find such claims being made as that expressed by
(39) There’s that line drive again, he hit it to left
field this time.
Here, I take it, 'that line drive’ calls for a type reading,
denoting a type of line drive. It is not clear to me that
we must say in such cases that different readings of the
verb itself are involved. It may be that the type-matching
reading of the verb may be accompanied by either the
concrete or the type reading of the complement.
Unlike the case of 'hit’, 'serve’ and 'shoot’, there
are some verbs with type-matching readings from which there
are no verbal nouns derived that apply to the sort of events
reported by sentences formed from those verbs:
(40) She landed a right upper cut square on his jaw.
(41) She planted a left in his midsection.
(42) She pulled her right hook, luckily for him; it
would have done him in.
Upper cuts, lefts and right hooks are not examples of the
things we refer to when we speak of landings, plants or
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pulls. Nevertheless, in each of ( 40 ) - ( 42 ), the event
reported is one denoted by the complement (or over which the
complement ranges). So here as well, type-matching readings
of the main verbs are involved.
Not all event verbs from which event nouns are derived
have type-matching readings. Some serve to report events to
which the derived event noun applies, but do not admit
complements formed from those nouns or any of their
subordinates. As we’ve just seen, it is acceptable to speak
of planting punches, landing punches, pulling punches; but
the following is anomalous:
* She punched a left hook
If this sentence manages to express anything at all, what it
expresses is at any rate not possibly true--left hooks
cannot be punched. I take it, then, that the verb, 'punch’,
does not have a type-matching reading. Perhaps a rule of
thumb is that if a verb does not take complements formed
from its associated verbal noun or subordinates, the verb
does not have a type-matching reading. I do not claim that
it follows from the fact that a verb does not take such
complements, that it lacks a type-matching reading. But I
have not found any exceptions. I have also not been able to
think of any principled explanation of why it should be that
some event verbs accept complements formed from their verbal
nouns or subordinates, whereas other such verbs do not.
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If type-matching readings are in fact displayed in the
cases discussed above, then by (D17), those readings must be
relational ones. This point may be questioned; but it seems
prima-facie plausible to suppose that the readings in
question are relational. For example in each of the
following pairs, I take it that the complement position in
each i nter rogat i ve is bound by an existential quantifier
—
ranging over types— and that the complements of the
indicatives are genuine referring terms--referr i ng to types:
(43) a. Did he hit anything in the second set at all?
b. He hit Old Hale’s lob.
(44) a. Were they dancing anything familiar?
b. They were dancing the quickstep.
(45) a. Did she land anything in the first round?
b. She landed that bollo punch she’s been working on.
I do not see any grounds for denying that relational
readings of the main verbs are indeed involved here. If
such readings are involved in these cases, then I assume
that there are readings available for all of (29) - (42)
above that are relational as well.
9.4.4 ’Thinking’ and ’Dancing’. ’Thoughts’ and
’ Exper i ences
’
One source of motivation for the proposal I am about to
develop lies in the idea that the relation between the
verbal noun 'thought’, and the verb 'think’ from which it is
derived, is analogous to that between the verbal nouns
'dance’, 'hit’, 'shot’, 'experience’ (etc.), and the event
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verbs from which these are derived. According to this idea,
in each case, the nouns display a concrete/type ambiguity,
and in each case, the idea would be, the type reading
available for the noun may accompany the type-matching
reading available for the verb.
There are two parts to the idea. First, the contention
is that the generic relational reading of forms of the verb
'think’ just is a type-matching reading. Thus,
x is thinking y
is assimilated to the case of
x is dancing y
Both formulas are taken to be satisfied by pairs whose
second members are types of the very events reported by
true sentences obtained by substituting singular terms for
*x’ and ' y ’
.
Both formulas are seen as expressing relations
between subjects of events of the sort in question (reported
by sentences that result from substitutions of the sort just
mentioned), and types of those very events. The contention,
then, is that the verb, 'think’, on its generic, relational
reading expresses a relation between thinkers and types of
thinking— types of noetic event--that the modal range of
generic thinking is comprised of noetic event types.
Second, the idea has it that the common noun 'thought’
functions in important respects like the common nouns,
'hit’, 'shot’, 'dance’ 'experience’ (etc.). Like the latter
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four, 'thought’ is ambiguous: it has a concrete reading on
which it applies to particular events of the relevant sort,
but like the latter four, it has a type reading on which it
applies to types of those events. The contention is that
what we refer to when we use the term 'thought’ in its
shareab 1
e
sense--the sense in which two persons may be said
to be having the same thought— are the things to which the
term applies on its type reading: to types of thinking, to
types of noetic event.
I wish to stress that I do not have arguments for these
contentions concerning the relational, generic reading of
the verb, 'think’ and concerning the "shareable" reading of
the verbal noun, 'thought’. There are certainly some
notable similarities between our use of 'thought’, on its
shareable reading, and our use of certain other verbal
nouns, on what I have referred to as their type readings:
we speak of having the same thoughts; likewise we may speak
of having the same experiences, the same sensations, the
same feelings, the same reactions, the same responses.
Moreover, in all these cases it seems to me that the verb
'has’ is functioning in very similar ways. In each case,
the present progressive, 'is having’, can be used together
with a complement formed from the event noun to form a
sentence that reports an event of the relevant sort.
These similarities are only suggestive, but it seems to
me that they provide some motivation for supposing that
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these cases should all be treated on a par. One can grant
that 'experiences', 'sensations', 'feelings’, etc. stand for
event types but resolutely look elsewhere for items to
identify as the sort of things to which 'thought’ applies,
in its shareable sense. But it seems reasonable at least to
pursue the idea that in all of these cases, we are using the
event nouns, 'thought’, 'experience’ 'sensation’, 'feeling’
etc., on readings of a common sort, readings on which all
these nouns apply to types of the very events to which the
verbs from which they are derived apply.
I believe it is clear that the following phenomenon
does indeed occur in the case of a large number of event
verbs and event nouns: the verbs have type-matching
readings on which they take complements denoting types of
the events to which those verbs, on those readings, apply;
the derived nouns have type- read i ngs on which they apply to
just such types of event. The fact that this phenomenon
arises commonly with other event verbs and event nouns is
not evidence that the verb 'think’ and the noun 'thought’
are cases in point. But the prevalence of the phenomenon
seems to me to provide some motivation for pursuing the idea
that they are cases in point.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 9
1* This passage is taken from Moore’s article "Truth", in
J. Mark Baldwin’s Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology .
London: MacMillan, 1902, Vol.2; I got it from Cartwright
[1987a] where it is quoted, p. 74.
2- See for example Salmon’s discussion of "ways for things
to be" in his "The Logic of What Might Have Been" (Salmon
[1989]
.
3. I assume that there is a circumstance of five’s being
the sum of two and three and a circumstance of three’s being
the sum of two and one, and I am inclined to say that I havejust now mentioned two circumstances, not one— an occurrent
belief that two plus three is five concerns, and has as its
content, the former circumstance; the question whether one
plus two is three concerns the latter circumstance and has
that one as its content.
4. I take gen think ing to be an occurrent attitude, but I
deny that it satisfies (2): though I am 9enthinking an
occurrent belief, y, and you are 9en thinking a question, y’,
whether y and y’ have the same content or not, it doesn’t
follow that you and I are 9enthinking anything in common.
And there may well be other attitudes besides generic
thinking that fail to satisfy (2).
Perhaps, for example, we should countenance an attitude
whose modal range includes all and only wishes of the sort
expressed by optatives, and deny that any such wishes are in
the modal range of imperative wishing (see the discussion in
Chapter 8, section 8.2.3, where the concept of imperative
wishing is first distinguished). Yet an imperative wish,
and an "optative" wish may nevertheless be said to have the
same content. Compare, for example, the wish expressed by
(a) Arrive on time
with that expressed by
(b) If only you would arrive on time
(with respect to contexts sharing an addressee). I take it
that the wish expressed (a) has the same content as that
expressed by (b). As I have stressed before (Chapter 6), I
am not convinced that such pairs as these should be seen as
expressing different things (though I am inclined to think
so). But if in general there is an attitude of “optative
wishing" with a modal range disjoint from that of imperative
wishing, it will be plausible to suppose that an optative
wish and an imperative wish may nevertheless have the same
398
content. Yet since both of these attitudes would be species
of the more generic attitude of wishing ( tout court 1. thatlatter attitude will include wishes of either sort in its
modal range. And if this is the case, that latter attTtude
will not satisfy (2).
5. According to one standard dictionary entry, to say that
something is noetic is to say that it is of or pertaining
to... the intellect; characterized by, or consisting in
intellectual activity" (Webster’s Collegiate, 1989). This
seems reasonably appropriate for the usage I am proposing.
Husserl made use of a Greek phrase, 'noema'
,
in his work
on intentional ity. I first came across the English
adjective, ’noetic’, in some of Alvin Plantinga’s work in
epistemology. Plantinga speaks of a person’s "noetic
structure", by which he means, roughly, the structure of
propositions that comprises the person’s beliefs, ordered
according to their epistemic status for the person. I do
not know whether Plantinga’s terminology is derived from
Husserl ’ s
.
6. It may prove tempting to suppose (even though I am
hereby warning you not to) that when I speak of an event
being characterized by a property, I mean that the event
exemplifies that property. But this is not what I mean.
Rather, when I say that an event is characterized by the
property of 0-ing, I mean what is more ordinarily expressed
by saying that the event in question is an event of 0-ing.
An event of running is, as I would put it, characterized by
the property of running, but the event doesn’t have the
property of running. My choice of terms may be misleading,
but I have not found any preferable choice. Kim speaks (see
[1980]) of the same relationship as that of "constitution"
(the property of running constitutes any event of running).
I find that Kim’s phrase to be misleading as well, though in
a different respect. To say that a property constitutes an
event suggests that the property is essential to that event;
as if every event of 0-ing is essentially an event of 0-ir\g.
But this is a view upon which I wish to suspend judgment.
7. See Kim [1973] and [1980], and Goldman [1971].
8. In addition to (A10) and (7), a proof of (4) in S5 will
also rely on
nec Ve( e is occurring -» e exists )
which I assume to be true.
9. Could there be a non-conjunctive event of two or more
persons thinking a thing? I have in mind what would be
called a "joint" event of thinking on the part of several
persons, an event whose occurrence requires a joint effort
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in the
playing
on the
events
However
thi nki
n
persons
speak i
having
impossi
same way that an event of moving a large couch, or of
a sonata for four hands, may require a joint effortpart of more than one person. This idea that certaininvolve a concerted effort is familiar enough.
,
the idea that there could be joint events of
3 is not so fam iliar. Could it be that several
are having a thought in concert and strictly
g not true that any one of these persons is the
the thought? I do not see that this
bi 1 i ty
.
one
l s an
I assume that joint events, generally, each have morethan one constituent in the role of subject. So if there
are joint events of thinking then I take it that such eventshave more than one subject too. I shall also assume, though
my intuitions are not quite firm on the matter, that a joint
event of 0-ing is not correctly character i zed as an event of
y s 0- ing, for any individual y, even when y is one of the
event s subjects. Consider an analogous case: suppose for
example that Moe
,
Larry and Curly are jointly carrying a big
sofa. Then there is an occurring joint event of sofa-
carrying. Is this event one that may properly be
character i zed as one of Moe ’
s
carrying that big sofa? I am
inclined to say not.
A general rule here would seem to be (roughly):
(*) For any event, e, if e satisfies (for 'x’)
[ )tz[t 0] characterizes x ]
where t is a referring term (singular or plural),
and 0 is a suitably inflected event verb phrase,
then e is an event whose subject is (or whose
subjects are ) denoted by t.
It seems to me that (*) captures a feature of one familiar
usage of instances of (F2) in characterizing events.
Consider two results concerning the application of this rule
to the case of Moe, Larry and Curly’s sof a-carry i ng . 1) The
rule would tell us that this event is not one of Moe’s (or
Larry’s or Curly’s) carrying the sofa; for Moe is not the
subject of that event, so according to (*), the event can’t
be said to satisfy the sentence, f ^z[ Moe is carrying the
sofa] characterizes x’. 2) (*) does not rule out, however,
that the event may properly be said to be one of Moe. Larry
and Curly’s carrying the piano. For Moe, Larry and Curly
are the subjects of the event. These two results seem to
conform with ordinary usage.
If ( * ) is accepted, though, then if there are any such
joint events of gen thinking, they are not noetic events.
For it won’t be the case for any such event, e, that there
is any individual , x, nor any thought, y, such that ^z[x is
9enthinking y] characterizes e. Then by (D13), e is not
noetic
.
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10. There is an issue suggested here that parallels aquestion ran sed by David Lewis and others having to do with
whether thoughts are properly conceived of as things "in the
r o i .
S
?
S Lew
]
s s " what Puzzling Pierre Does Not Believe"
L 1 9 8 1 j ; also relevant is a personal correspondence fromLewis to David Austin, quoted in Austin [1990], p. 110-12.Does the matter of which thoughts we may be said to behaving depend on factors not "in the head"? That is aquestion that Lewis has said should be answered in the
negative. Analogously, I am asking: does the matter of
which noet i c
—
events we may be said to be engaging in depend
on factors not in the head ? Couldn’t this very event of
thinking occur in circumstances in which Max is
hallucinating? Why should it be that whether this mental
event is the one that is occurring in a situation or not
depends on external, "outside the head" considerations, such
as whether or not seeing some chair, in addition to Max’s
having a certain sensory state (which we may assume to be
alike in the two cases), happens to be a causal antecedent
to the thinking Max is doing? I do not know the answers to
these questions; this is one reason why I shall proceed
without assuming the claim expressed by (9).
11. Perhaps there are noetic event types that cannot be
instantiated, and thoughts each of which cannot be
entertained (i.e., each not possibly such that anyone is
thinking it). If there are such types and thoughts, it may
£e— I am not sure about this— that any such type will be a
correlate of any such thought. The issue is whether such a
type, T, and such a thought, x, satisfy
Def i ni ens of C D 1 4
)
:
T is a noetic event type & nec Ve( e instantiates
T iff iy{ ^z[y is 9enthinking x] characterizes e))
The first conjunct is satisfied by hypothesis. The idea I
am considering is, roughly, that it might turn out that no
matter the choice of possible situation, and no matter the
choice of event, e, the triple <e,T,x> will fail to satisfy
either side of the biconditional in the second conjunct.
Then the second conjunct is satisfied vacuously. I haven’t
been able to settle on an opinion as to whether this would
be the case for a T and x as described above.
Let T and x be fixed as some uni nstanti abl e type and
unentertai nabl e thought, respectively. Then go to any
possible situation you want. For any event that exists in
that situation, e, this much will be true relative to the
situation: e does not instantiate T. Then if it is also
the case that the following is satisfied by e and x relative
to this situation,
(a) there is no thing, y, such that ^z[y isgenthinking x] character i zes e,
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we will have it that the biconditional in the second
conjunct of the definiens of ( D 1 4 ) is satisfied vacuously.
But must (a) be satisfied by any event relative to any
situation, provided that x is uni nstanti able?
Suppose that necessarily, all events are at least
possibly occurrent. It might be thought that this
assumption gives us some leverage. For if the thesis
expressed by
nec VteVP( P characterizes e nec( e occurs
the subject of e has P ))
were true, (a) wou 1
d
be satisfied by any event, e, relative
to any possible situation in which e exists. By
§|^® c i f i cat i on of x, it is impossible that there be anyoney thinking x; then it_is impossible that the subject of e
should have ^y[y is genthinking x] . But now
reducti
o
.
that there is a y such that \z[y is
characterizes e. Then I take it that \y[y is
su
9
forpose
h thi nki nggen thi nki ng
>ossibly occurs, we
x]
x]
character i zes e as well. But since e
have it from (4) that there are situations in which e occurs
and in all of them the subject of e has \y[y is gen thinking
z]. This contradicts the previous result,
must
such
then
event
. Consequently we
reject the reducti
o
assumption, that there is any y
that z [ y is yer,thinking x] character i zes e. We would
have established that (a) is indeed satisfied by any
relative to any situation in which that event exists.
But I have suggested grounds for questioning (4) in the
text; I do not assume it to express a truth. Presently I
cannot see any principled reason for claiming that (a) will
be satisfied relative to any situation by any event existing
in that situation (with x as fixed). So I do not see any
way of showing that uni nstanti abl e types might vacuously be
correlates of any unentertai nabl e thoughts.
12. Here is a sketch of the proof of (15).
We may seek to show the main conditional of (15) by way
of Conditional Proof (this will be a sub-proof of a
Necessi ty- i ntro
.
proof of (15) it|elf). So we assume the
antecedent of (15): that T is a correlate of x.
We then arrive at a step where we need a subproof of
the left-right direction of (15)’s consequent. We may
proceed by Conditional Proof: assume that y is an instancer
of T; seek to show that y is gen thinking x. Since y is an
instancer of T, there is an instance of T, e, in which y is
engaging. But we already have assumed that T is a
correlate of x. It follows that any instance of T,
including e, is such that for some y, )<z[y is 9 thinking x]
character i zes e. So we have that there is an occurring
event (we have e in mind), of which y is a subject, such
that, for some y, this event is character i zed by )z[y isgenthinking x] . But then we can show that if this is the
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case, then y is genthinking x. The proof here will rely on
(A10) (that if an event is characterized by a property, and
the event is occurring, then the subject of e has that
property), on (A12) and (A13) (for uniqueness of a subject
of e), and on (D13) (the definition of 'noetic event’).
Then modus ponens will give us that y is genthinking x
Q.E.D.
Then it remains to show the right-left direction of
(15)’s consequent. Again we proceed by Conditional Proof;
this time we assume that y is gen thinking x, and aim to show
that y is an instancer of T. From our assumption and (A16),
we get that there is an event, e, characterized by \z[y isgenthinking x] in which y is engaging. But from the
antecedent assumption that T is a correlate of x, we get
that for any event, if there is a y such that \z[y isgenthinking x] characterizes that event, then that event is
an instance of T. Then we will be able to show that there
is an occurring instance of T (we have e in mind) whose
subject is y. From this and (D15) it follows that y is an
instancer T, Q.E.D.
13. Carlson has suggested (in Carlson [1977], cf. section
2.3) that just about any common noun, cn, has an additional
reading that could be paraphrased by saying: "kind of cn"
.
This, he claims, is true not only for count nouns but as
well for mass nouns, concrete as well as abstract, standing
for events or not. I take it that this reading could be
paraphrased as well by saying: "type of cn". If so, then
Carlson’s suggestion is that the phenomenon of what I am
calling "type readings" is ubiquitous among common nouns.
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